If it is the agreement of others that shows what the rules are then my having watched many games and finding an infallible consensus about the way the game is meant to be played is sufficient to show me that I have understood the rules.

Cancer comes from cells that don’t follow rules. There’s some physical causation for ya, of a most unpleasant kind.

If it is the agreement of others that shows what the rules are then my having watched many games and finding a consensus about the way the game is meant to be played is sufficient to show me that I have understood the rules. — Janus

Having admitted that it is the agreement of others which determines the rules, how can you then say that your own personal judgement of whether you have understood what the consensus is, is now sufficient?

Let's say, for example, that you watch one hundred games and in each one, every time the ball lands on the line it is declared 'out'. You might think you understand the rule "every time the ball lands on the line, it is declared 'out'". But in the one hundred and first game you watch, you see a ball land on the line and not be declared 'out' because light conditions are low that day and the rules say that a ball on the line is declared 'in' when light levels are low to give the benefit of the doubt*

* I know nothing about tennis, these are example rules I made up.

The rule following paradox if a true paradox would imply that every possible pattern (rule) exists in any given sequence of word usages.

For causality, what this means is every cause-effect relationship we discover is compatible with all possible such relationships. So, if the sun doesn't rise tomorrow or Russell's chicken is beheaded the coming day, these, in no way, contradict the preceding sunrises or early-morning bird feed.

I'd say it boils down to statistics, specifically the quality of the sample.

Moreover, mathematicians, it's said, don't just stop with finding patterns, they're also in the business of explaining why there is a pattern in the first place.

Signing off...

Having admitted that it is the agreement of others which determines the rules, how can you then say that your own personal judgement of whether you have understood what the consensus is, is now sufficient? — Isaac

Convention establishes rules. It also establishes language, which enables me to understand the rules, without having to implement them. If I couldn't be sure that I understood rules, how could I be sure that I understood that there is consensus? I think you like arguing just for the sake of it, and that is against the rules.

...a rule is necessarily public and so a merely private understanding of it remains a mere opinion until demonstrated. — Isaac

Yep.

.

...you would first have to understand a rule in order to be able to demonstrate that understanding. — Janus

Too analytic. Understanding the rule and implementing it are coextensive. As if a lecture on bike riding were enough to teach you how to ride a bike.

There's a lot of ambiguity going on in the use of the word "rule". So understanding the rules of tennis does imply being able to participate in a public demonstration of that understanding, involving actual balls and nets and other stuff, and other people. You are sitting in the stand, contemplating the meaning of "Duce", but that is not a private understanding. that understanding is about balls and nets and other stuff; Further, enacting those rules includes talking about them as part of a community.

language, which enables me to understand the rules, without having to implement them. — Janus

How does it do that?

If I couldn't be sure that I understood rules, how could I be sure that I understood that there is consensus? — Janus

Consensus is a fact of world. Certainty about consensus is an entirely different process.

One might be wrong about F=ma, but unlike a rule, F=ma is a constraint the external world places on our models of it. We could all be wrong about F=ma, because that's what to be 'wrong' means in the context of a scientific model. But with a rule, we cannot possibly all be wrong. There's no rule-maker we might all consult with and find out we'd all got it wrong, it's just not what 'wrong' means in the context of a rule. 'Wrong' here means something like 'to treat the matter one way and not be understood to have played by the rules'.

So all the while you declare balls in tennis to be 'out' and there's an understanding that you're playing (or otherwise partaking in) tennis, you are following the rule, it's enacted. But the moment you claim - the rule is "all balls hitting the line are declared out", you're no longer demonstrating an understanding of the rule, you're declaring a belief of your about the rule. You're no longer playing tennis, but talking about tennis. You maybe even talking about what the rule ought to be. But it's not what the the rule is.

Having admitted that it is the agreement of others which determines the rules, how can you then say that your own personal judgement of whether you have understood what the consensus is, is now sufficient? — Isaac

Irrelevant. I acknowledged that the rules are established by consensus. If can describe the rules then I understand them; I don't have to play tennis, which I would need to do to enact, to implement, them. My question about consensus was not about established convention, but about whether, if I described the rules of tennis, I could be sure that there was universal consensus, or not, that I had understood them. If I can't understand a rule without demonstrating it, then how could I be sure that I had understood consensus without demonstrating it, in other words? You and Isaac are clutching at straws, and you haven't grasped enough to even construct a decent strawman.

An embarrassing load of crap, Isaac; you should be ashamed.

If can describe the rules then I understand them — Janus

Agreed. So can you?

That's why I provided the example of the ball hitting the line. In it one 'describes' a rule, but it is shown that they don't then understand it. The whole rule following paradox is about the underdetermination of any description of the rule.

If I can't understand a rule without demonstrating it, then how could I be sure that I had understood consensus without demonstrating it — Janus

I tried to expand on what I see as the difference. Understanding how to play chess and understanding how gravity works are two very different states of affairs. Likewise, understanding a rule and understanding that there is a consensus are two very different states of affairs.

An embarrassing load of crap, Isaac; you should be ashamed. — Janus

If that's the quality of reply you're reaching for just a few posts in we'll leave it there.

If rules contradict each other are they rules?

I'd gently commend Quine to you, to help you along your path. — Banno

Ehhhhh.....Quine. Been there, done that, back when cars had fins and penny-loafers were exactly that, finding a near-perfect exhibition of apples (representation) and oranges (meaning), which was, I must say, of great help on my path. I nonetheless appreciate your concern for my well-being.

Ohfercrissakes......all this beating around the proverbial “rule” bush.

Without ever once stating what a rule is, its origin, or its import......

the parlour-game which passes for philosophy in today’s culture. — Banno

....yeah, sorta just like that.

Ohfercrissakes......all this beating around the proverbial “rule” bush.

Without ever once stating what a rule is — Mww

Why, do you not know? Have you been using the word 'rule' thus far in your (I'm going to guess, substantial) lifespan thus far by just winging it?

Yeah, my bad. I kinda assumed that since we were talking about Philosophical Investigations, folk might be using the notion of rules from there. Silly me.

Anyway, since Quine didn't do it for you, what about Kripke? Those annoying necessary non-a priori statements?

And how are you measuring that degree of curvature exactly? What is your non-arbitrary yardstick? :rofl: — apokrisis

I'd measure in the same way that curvature is normally measured, classically, relative to a central point. That's why I said, replace your "negative and positive" curves, which are completely arbitrary, dependent on the arbitrary placement of a straight line, with something more real, "internal and external". Toward the central point is inward, away from the central point is outward.

Let me check. So to be flat is to lack curve. And to be curved is to lack flat?

Thus we agree? :up: — apokrisis

Yes, we agree on this. But you proposed degrees of each, when in reality there is no degrees of straightness because it is ideal, and cannot vary from the ideal, and there is only degrees of curvature, because curvature does not meet the standard of "ideal".

All that remains is for you to explain how you measure the difference in some non-arbitrary metric basis. — apokrisis

When you come to accept the fact that straight lines are not at all curved, and are therefore categorically distinct from curved things, (straight lines being purely theoretical, ideal), you might be able to understand that straight lines are used as a tool for measuring curvature. Further, the degree of curvature is measured with straight lines relative to a point determined as the centre. Classically, we'd assume a circle, and assign an arbitrary number of degrees (360) to the circle. Any point on the arc or curve would demonstrate equal distance from a central point, and the degree of curvature would be determined that way.

However, we know that pi is irrational, and perfect circles are unreal, so some small degree of arbitrariness will enter into the act of designating the centre point. But the larger the number of points on the curve which one uses, the more accurate the determination of centre point will be. And since the centre point is an attribute of the curve itself, as a defining feature of a circle, the measurement is non-arbitrary in a fundamental way.

You say that a lot. — Wayfarer

Banno is not even willing to consider as relevant, thoughts which are only two hundred years old, that implies no understanding of, or complete rejection of "the test of time".

Ohfercrissakes......all this beating around the proverbial “rule” bush. — Mww

So we have Kant:

Reason provides categories that inform our expectations of the world. So yes, necessity is in there. (Nobody is paying attention to what "logical" necessity actually is, so we may as well drop the logic part.)

Wittgenstein:
Has nothing to do with the topic as far as I can see. Somebody could explain how if they think otherwise.

Schopenhauer :
Causality is about explanation. We're bound to certain ways of thinking, so yes, we think in terms of necessity when producing our explanations.

Anybody else?

Have you been using the word 'rule' thus far in your (...) lifespan thus far by just winging it? — Isaac

Yep, but irrelevant. Most of the time I’m just as conventional as the next guy. I have to be, in order to get along with them. But in places such as this, no one should be conventional.

.....we were talking about Philosophical Investigations, folk might be using the notion of rules from there. — Banno

Perhaps they are. Beside the point, still, insofar as notions of rules merely presupposes them, and the discussion remains lopsided argument from example, which is....truth be told.....all analytic philosophy in general, and OLP in particular, grants as meaningful.

Which is fine, people can talk about things any way they like, except herein (glancing up at the category title), for the inconsistency with where the discussion is taking place.

Anybody else? — frank

Probably. Usually, some definition is subsequently undermined in order to justify that which didn’t belong to the original in the first place. All in the name of mandatory originality.

Nobody is paying attention to what "logical" necessity actually is, so we may as well drop the logic part. — frank

I think it plain redundant, so we lose nothing but dropping it. Necessity is a logical condition anyway, right?

I think it plain redundant, so we lose nothing but dropping it. Necessity is a logical condition anyway, right? — Mww

Usually. There's logical, metaphysical, epistemic, and physical possibility. Necessity usually has to do with a priori knowledge.

Kripke's aposteriori necessity is interesting, but it's nothing earth shaking. It's kin to epistemic possibility.

There's logical, metaphysical, epistemic, and physical possibility. Necessity usually has to do with a priori knowledge. — frank

And what underpins all of that? And everything else? Without exception?

in places such as this, no one should be conventional. — Mww

Then, dare I ask, what should we be?

And what underpins all of that? And everything else? Without exception? — Mww

I think it's just observations about how we think. Is that what you mean?

Critical.

Even observations of how we think presupposes something, is reducible to something.

Critical — Mww

Rubbish.

(Like that?)

With respect to "the criterion of objectivity": I did some research on the word and found that it only comes into use in the early modern period. — Wayfarer

That's an interesting observation. The late emergence of "objectivity", as a formal verbalizable concept , may be explainable in terms similar to Julian Jaynes' theory of the bicameral mind. He proposed that explicit human consciousness was a consequence of complex social interactions, requiring words to distinguish me from you. I don't know if that thesis is provable, but it's certainly suitable for philosophical conjectures.

Another possible connection, that occurred to me, is the Golden Bough postulation, that the distinction between religious (magical) beliefs and scientific (empirical) thought processes may have evolved along with the emergence of technologies, that gave man more control over his environment. Again, It not only became possible to discriminate between objective Nature and subjective Mind, but it became necessary to articulate the difference between the subjective speaker and objective hearer ; between imagination and perception. My understanding of such things is quite superficial, but it may deserve more research. :smile:

The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind :
The book addresses the problematic nature of consciousness – “the ability to introspect” – which in Jaynes’ view must be distinguished from sensory awareness and other processes of cognition. Jaynes presents his proposed solution: that consciousness is a “learned behavior” based more on language and culture than on biology
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Origin_of_Consciousness_in_the_Breakdown_of_the_Bicameral_Mind

The Golden Bough :
. . . . suggested to him that Hegel had anticipated his view of "the nature and historical relations of magic and religion". Frazer saw the resemblance as being that "we both hold that in the mental evolution of humanity an age of magic preceded an age of religion, and that the characteristic difference between magic and religion is that, whereas magic aims at controlling nature directly, religion aims at controlling it indirectly through the mediation of a powerful supernatural being or beings to whom man appeals for help and protection."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Golden_Bough
Note -- Ironically, science has given us the technological power, "indistinguishable from magic", that the previous generations could only imagine, and pretend to do symbolically & metaphorically.

And I think you're still actually thinking within that mode, while wanting to see beyond it, and sensing something beyond it That's why you revert to the images of 'ghostliness' or 'ethereality' to depict your understanding of anything 'beyond the empirical', because you still are trying to conceive of what is beyond it in quasi-objective terms. — Wayfarer

Actually, the Enformationism thesis requires that I think beyond the conventional modes of Dualism & Matrerialism, into a more Holistic BothAnd way of thinking. Unfortunately, I came to that crossroad late in life. So, I'm still picking my way along an unfamiliar path. And, in my posts on this forum, I must assume that most of us are still thinking in terms of that "customary attitude". Until we learn how to read minds, and to communicate directly from mind to mind, we'll be forced to discuss "what is beyond" in "quasi-objective terms". :nerd:

HA!!!! Just like that, although any critique needs internal support consistent with it.

Even observations of how we think presupposes something, is reducible to something. — Mww

Can't we just start in the middle of it all? And be deflationary or anti realist about the rest?

No?

HA!!!! Just like that, although any critique needs internal support consistent with it. — Mww

Damn, I knew it wouldn't be so easy.

Let's try... any definition of 'rule' would itself be a rule and so one would have to include an understanding of rule-following to understand how to adhere to the definition?