An event can be both a cause and an effect. Indeed. An event is a point in spacetime, somewhat self-contradictory. An event has no temporal extension. Like a happening. Time stands still at an event. The happening finds place and starts at an event, the time and location. So the event is no cause or event, or both at the same time. Coming from what was and starting what to come. Or the other way round if time ran backwards. But please correct me if I'm wrong. Time can start only if the happenings have a start. There needs to be motion before time takes off in one direction. Irreversible motion can be set in motion by a reversible motion of which you can't say it goes forwards or backwards, like an ideal pendulum. It were idea pendulums that set the universe in uniderectional, irreversible motion.

As far as I can tell from my philosophical readings, events are temporal phenomena that can be extended or instantaneous: parties, watching movies, playing chess, calculating an equation are considered examples of temporally extended events. Explosions, particle decays, date expiration, snapping fingers are considered examples of temporally instantaneous events. Not sure to understand the link you see between the notions of “event”, “causality”, and the question of the reversibility or the direction of motion (or time).

Substance causation is causation by an object - a thing - rather than an event. So, not causation by a thing changing, but a change caused by a thing. It's not that the thing causes the event by undergoing some change - for a change is an event. The thing causes the event directly.

The first event or events are going to have been caused this way (some argue that all events are caused this way - that events are just manifestations of substance causation). — Bartricks

Your phrase "substance causation" is still incoherent to me. (I'll be clear to add "to me" if that satisfies you). You are saying that a "substance" can cause an event without that substance undergoing any change itself. This is not consistent with any sense of "substance" which I know of. Substance never creates an event without itself changing. That's the nature of how we use "substance". Maybe you are using a definition of "substance" which I am unfamiliar with. Can you provide your definition for me?

The first event or events are going to have been caused this way (some argue that all events are caused this way - that events are just manifestations of substance causation). — Bartricks

No, the first acts are the ones which cause the existence of substance. When you claim that the first events are cause by substance, without the substance itself changing, you place "substance" outside of time, because the passing of time coincides with events. So by saying that substance causes the first event, you place substance outside of time. Then substance is necessarily inert, passive, and cannot cause anything because it cannot be active as an agent. And since substances are what are active in events, you have a distinction between an active substance and a passive substance, and no way to show how a passive substance magically creates an active substance, as the first "event".

Many in the free will debate think that free will requires substance causation, where the substance in qusetion is ourselves (that's called 'agent causation'). And an apparent example of substance causation would be our own decisions, which we seem to make directly. — Bartricks

This is incoherent to me because you have said that the substance causes an event without itself changing. If it does not change, then we cannot say that it is "active". And if it is not active we cannot say it is an "agent". A substance which does not change cannot be an agent. In your example, "ourselves", human beings, it is very clear that the substance, which is the human being actively changes when causing a freely willed event. So it is very clear that your definition of "substance causation", in which the substance causes an event without itself changing, is not applicable to the "agent causation" of freely willed acts, in which the agent, as a human being, changes.

As far as I can tell from my philosophical readings, events are temporal phenomena that can be extended or instantaneous: parties, watching movies, playing chess, calculating an equation are considered examples of temporally extended events. Explosions, particle decays, date expiration, snapping fingers are considered examples of temporally instantaneous events. Not sure to understand the link you see between the notions of “event”, “causality”, and the question of the reversibility or the direction of motion (or time — neomac

"In physics, and in particular relativity, an event is the instantaneous physical situation or occurrence associated with a point in spacetime (that is, a specific place and time). For example, a glass breaking on the floor is an event; it occurs at a unique place and a unique time."

A bit paradoxically... A breaking glas an event?

The ball precedes the cushion ontologically.

A bit paradoxically... A breaking glas an event? — Haglund

A glass breaking is an instantaneous event. Why do you see it as paradoxical?

A glass breaking is an instantaneous event. Why do you see it as paradoxical? — neomac

Because breaking implies motion. An event is a point.

If we see a photo of the glass shattering in space, we can't say which way time goes. No cause and effect.

This is the mystery of the direction of time.

Because breaking implies motion. An event is a point. — Haglund

are you talking about Zeno's paradox? The impossibility of having motion on a single point of the time series?

are you talking about Zeno's paradox? The impossibility of having motion on a single point of the time series? — neomac

If Im not mistaken, I referred to him somewhere here before!

are you talking about Zeno's paradox? The impossibility of having motion on a single point of the time series? — neomac

Seems so indeed... How can we see which way motion goes by looking at a point?

How can we see which way motion goes by looking at a point? — Haglund

Again, I would distinguish between what is the case (metaphysical question) and what we can "see" (epistemological question).

Anyway the notion of "point" is a useful abstraction, but what the spatial notion of "point" doesn't seem able to render is precisely the dynamic nature of events. Events are transitional states of things, properties and relations in their becoming. As such they are intrinsically dynamic and can't be understood without reference to the time. So the notion of "motion" itself is a dynamic concept not because it relates to space, but because it relates to time.

Yes indeed. That's the reason of the inadequacy of points and point particles. How the hell can they touch? It are point particles giving rise to renormalization. Consider them as an extended geometric shape and your problems are gone. Space can't be broken up into points, and time can't be stopped.

Again, you're not engaging with my arguments.

I don't know what you mean by a 'mechanism'. I'm assuming you mean that there needs to be some kind of intermediary between cause and effect. How does that change anything?

So, I'll just keep repeating myself until you answer: if A, a substance, causes B, when does it do so?

But it'll make you rich. And you'll be able to put up shelves and fix a car.

Yes - specifically because of the softness (ie. 3D variability) of the cushion in relation to the ball. You can’t extend this same quality of softness to an eternal entity - if there is no 4D variation (it never changes), then there is no 3D variability (no softness). Case closed. — Possibility

What on earth are you on about? If a cushion exists eternally it is not soft? What?

I accept that there comes a point in our relation to events where ‘cause’ is a meaningless term - I’d say it’s about where we posit an infinite, either as quantity or quality. — Possibility

That's not what I said. Again: there aren't actual infinities in reality. So, there is not an actual infinity of past events. That's got nothing to do with causation. It's got everything to do with the fact there are no actual infinities. Thus, we can conclude on this basis that not all events have other events as their causes. Again, there's no pressure on the notion of causation here, there's just the rational observation that it follows that not all events have events as their causes. Thus, some events have 'substances' as their causes. That is 'things' initiate causal chains, not changes.

I’m going to be pedantic for a sec: aren’t events still things? — Possibility

No. I am not being imprecise in my language. The problem is that others use language in a sloppy way.

A thing - or substance or object - is a bearer of properties. An event is an occurrence. A happening.

Note, you can have a thing without there being any events. My mug is not an event. It is a thing. And things do not depend on events. You can't, however, have an event without any things, for events always involve things. Happenings happen to things. They undergo a change or initiate a change or whatever. But the dependency is clear: events depend on things, things do not depend on events.

Substance causation is philosophically respectable. Indeed some would argue that all causation is substance causation. That's actually my view. Events are manifestations of causation, but all causing is done by substances. That's a controversial view, but I think it is correct. But anyway, even if one rejects that view and allows that events can cause events, the simple fact is that one is going to run into serious difficulties if one insists that all causation is event causation - you'll have to posit an actual infinity of events.

So, substance causation - causation by a thing rather than by a change - is, must be, coherent.

And substance causation is simultaneous causation. Indeed, I think event causation is too, for any event has been caused at the time at which it occurs, not before. But I think it is clearer in the case of substance causation that we have simultaneous causation.

A ball on a cushion causes the cushion to debt instantaneously but there is one thing causing another. You are not generous in your explanations of how this proves self causation. They are *similar* but not identical

Again, you're not engaging with my arguments.

I don't know what you mean by a 'mechanism'. I'm assuming you mean that there needs to be some kind of intermediary between cause and effect. How does that change anything?

So, I'll just keep repeating myself until you answer: if A, a substance, causes B, when does it do so? — Bartricks

Well, let's look at your ball & cushion example. The ball causes the cushion to develop a depression. The mechanism of this deformation is the ball's weight acting on the soft cushion, oui? Does this mechanism occur instantaneously or is there a time lag, no matter how infinitesimally small, between placing the ball on the cushion and the corresponding hollow in the cushion?

Before you answer that question, remember the ball's weight is temporally anterior to the cushion's depression.

Another point worth noting is that the cause (the ball) exists before the effect (the dent in the cushion).

@Bartricks

Here's what to me is a strong argument for simultaneous causation: If a cause exists prior (time t₁) to the effect (time t₂)then the effect should've already occured (at time t₁).

My response would be that certain aspects of a cause preexist the effect it produces. For example, in your ball-cushion case, the ball, a necessary component of the cause, temporally precedes the effect, the depression.

The ball does not come to be on the cushion. It is on the cushion from the beginning. It's causing the dent in the cushion.

You are just changing the example so that it no longer illustrates the point it was designed to illustrate.

Again: the ball does not come to be on the cushion. Both ball and cushion exist - and have always existed - in that arrangement.

The point Kant is making is that the ball is causing the dent regardless of whether it came to be on the cushion or was always on it.

There is no temporal preceding. Again, you're just adjusting the example so that it no longer illustrates the point it was designed to illustrate.

Once more: when does a substance cause its effect?

You just don't understand the argument.

The only reason to think self-creation is impossible is the idea that to create one's self one would have to exist 'prior' to one's own existence. And the only reason to think that is the idea that causes must precede their effects.

So, once again for the umpteenth time, if causes do not have to precede their effects, then there is no reason to think self-creation is impossible.

Try and argue that self-creation is impossible 'without' appealing to the idea that a cause must precede its effect.

No. I am not being imprecise in my language. The problem is that others use language in a sloppy way.

A thing - or substance or object - is a bearer of properties. An event is an occurrence. A happening. — Bartricks

Sorry, you are being imprecise. An event still has properties.

Note, you can have a thing without there being any events. My mug is not an event. It is a thing. And things do not depend on events. You can't, however, have an event without any things, for events always involve things. Happenings happen to things. They undergo a change or initiate a change or whatever. But the dependency is clear: events depend on things, things do not depend on events. — Bartricks

Beg to differ. Any object is the result of events, the happenings of which you may just be unable to directly observe, occurring either in the past, at a smaller scale or a slower pace. You cannot have a mug without there being any events. To observe an event requires observing change in objects, but this is not a dependency of all events on things - our ‘observation’ of change is dependent on our observation/measurement of objects. Yet we can define and predict an event such as a photon without any dependence on objects.

Yes - specifically because of the softness (ie. 3D variability) of the cushion in relation to the ball. You can’t extend this same quality of softness to an eternal entity - if there is no 4D variation (it never changes), then there is no 3D variability (no softness). Case closed.
— Possibility

What on earth are you on about? If a cushion exists eternally it is not soft? What? — Bartricks

Show me an object with the property of softness that would persist even a thousand years without change. A variable object guarantees a variable event, and precludes an eternally consistent one.

The ball causes the indentation. There are two things: (1) ball and (2) indentation. In the case of self-creation there would be only one thing - some entity E. The entity E causes the entity E. Let's grant (for sake of argument) that simultaneous causation is coherent and also grant that objects as well as events can be causes. We would still need an argument to show that "E causes E" is a coherent sentence.

We can conceive a ball without an indentation in a cushion and an indentation without a ball. This possibility gives sense to the claim that the ball causes the indentation, even if both are always and have always been co-existent. We cannot conceive E without E. So it is not clear how to give sense to the claim "E causes E". It may be possible. But we need additional argument for it.

Let's try something else. Since a ball has to be placed on a cushion, there's a time t₁ when the ball is not on the cushion, oui? Put simply, the ball & the cushion precede, existentially, the ball on the cushion & the subsequent depression.

The ball on the cushion happens (say) at time t₂.

Both the ball and the cushion as necessary causes (without them there's no effect) do precede the hollow in the cushion, oui? t₁ < t₂

Ergo, since there's something critical to the cause (vide supra) that must precede the effect, simultaneous causation is untenable in that sense, oui?

@Agent Smith

We can adopt two theories. (1) Causes must precede effects. (2) Only events can be causes. But these two theories will not stand by stipulation alone.

Firstly, causes and effects can happen at the same time. You lift a cup. The movement of the cup is caused by your lifting it. But the movement of the cup is simultaneous with your lifting it. Secondly, things other than events can be causes. A ball carries on causing a depression in a cushion for as long as nobody kicks it off. What's the ball doing to cause the depression? Well, nothing. There is no event. Yet it's continuing to cause the depression. Props continue to support walls long after the builders have gone home. A magnetic field causes a compass to point north.

These are ways of conceiving causes. They are incoherent examples if we adopt theories (1) and (2). But since the examples seem coherent, perhaps we should instead reject the theories.

:ok: We need to be very clear as to what constitutes a cause then. In the OP's example, the ball is not the cause, nor is its weight the cause because if they were, we know, for certain, both exist prior to the effect (the depression in the cushion). So, tell me, what is the cause for the cushion's deformation?

The ball does not come to be on the cushion. It is on the cushion from the beginning. — Bartricks

This is Bartricks' insistence on incoherency. Bartricks claims that this proposition, which I claim is incoherent, just appears as incoherent to me. Now I see it's incoherent to you as well. So we can say that it is incoherent to us.

So, tell me, what is the cause for the cushion's deformation? — Agent Smith

The ball is the cause. In the same way, the props are causing the wall not to collapse and the magnetic field is causing the compass to point north. Ropes are holding up swings and holes in water tanks are causing leaks everywhere.

In these examples, objects are causes and effects are happening simultaneously with causes.

But perhaps you are right. Perhaps these things are not causes and cannot be causes - and perhaps it is incoherent to claim that they are. Yet such causal claims are made every day (outside the philosophy laboratory) and sometimes they are made truly and sometime falsely, just as if they are meaningful, coherent and testable. So it's not obvious that we should adopt a theory which does not accommodate them.

The sneer of the peon. — Bartricks

Thank you for the nice compliment.

So, tell me, what is the cause for the cushion's deformation?
— Agent Smith

The ball is the cause — Cuthbert

We can say the cushion is the cause of it's depression. The ball can only be the cause if it's laid on it, which isn't the case here. We can not say what came first, the ball falling on the cushion and depressing it, or the depressed cushion making the ball fly away. Say that instead of the ball laying on the cushing we see a ball eternally above a neat cushion. How do we know what caused them to have this relationship? We don't. The situation can be said it's own cause and it's own effect. Who created the ball and the cushion is a different question. A religious question.