You left out the most important part - justification. Knowledge is information adequately justified for it's intended use. Different uses required different levels of justification. No knowledge can be absolutely certain. — T Clark

Truth is also important. If John claims to know that the answer to the equation is 5 and Jane claims to know that the answer to the equation is 6 then at least one of them is wrong in their claim of knowledge. They can't both know the answer and yet have different answers.

By "correct" do you mean "true"? Because then this very sentence accepts that there is such a thing as truth which is independent of whatever we believe, so you appear to be contradicting yourself. — Michael

I specifically didn't use the word "true." Say I have data chemical laboratory analysis data measurements for 100 water samples for 10 chemical constituents. So I have a 10 x 100 table of data. Is it true? What does that even mean? What can possibly go wrong?

• It's the wrong data.
• The data was tabulated incorrectly.
• Samples were collected incorrectly in the field.
• Samples were not packaged correctly - refrigeration.
• The wrong analytical methods or detection limits were specified.
• Samples were not analyzed within holding times.
• The analysis was not performed in accordance with standard operating procedures.
• The appropriate quality assurance procedures were not followed.
• The analyses did not meet the laboratories quality assurance standards.
• And lots more.

In order to use the data effectively, it has to be validated before usage. That means it's quality has to be evaluated against standards - data quality objectives. If some samples don't meet standards, they may be rejected as unusable or, more likely, they will be qualified. That means they will be judged to be less than fully validated, but still usable.

So, where is truth in all this?

Truth is also important. If John claims to know that the answer to the equation is 5 and Jane claims to know that the answer to the equation is 6 then at least one of them is wrong in their claim of knowledge. They can't both know the answer and have different answers. — Michael

Of course truth is important, but if it turns out later something I know is wrong, it doesn't stop being knowledge somehow retroactively. That's silly. It's the kind of thing only philosophers would care about.

Say I have data chemical laboratory analysis data measurements for 100 water samples for 10 chemical constituents. So I have a 10 x 100 table of data. Is it true? What does that even mean? — T Clark

If the first cell says that there is iron in the first sample of water but there isn't iron in the first sample of water then the data in the first cell is false, and if there is iron in the first sample of water then the data in the first cell is true.

But if you didn't mean "true" then what did you mean when you said that "We can never be absolutely certain the information we have is correct"?

Of course truth is important, but if it turns out later something I know is wrong, it doesn't stop being knowledge somehow retroactively. — T Clark

It doesn't stop being knowledge; it was never knowledge in the first place. Just because you claim to know the answer doesn't mean you do, regardless of how convinced and justified you are.

If the first cell says that there is iron in the first sample of water but there isn't iron in the first sample of water then the data in the first cell is false, and if there is iron in the first sample of water then the data in the first cell is true. — Michael

Data validation doesn't determine whether or not a data point is true, it determines whether or not it meets data quality objectives, which is another way of saying that it is adequately justified. The only thing I can ever be certain of about with that data is that it is adequately justified or not.

It doesn't stop being knowledge; it was never knowledge in the first place. Just because you claim to know the answer doesn't mean you do, regardless of how convinced and justified you are. — Michael

This is why people dismiss philosophy as useless. Silly arguments about abstract ideas that have nothing useful to say about how to get along.

This is why people dismiss philosophy as useless. Silly arguments about abstract ideas that have nothing useful to say about how to get along. — T Clark

I don't understand this at all. You claim that there is an apple in the bag. We open the bag to find an orange. It didn't stop being an apple when we opened the bag; it just never was an apple.

So what's the difference between saying "there's an apple in the bag" and saying "I know where you were born"? If you can understand me when I say "there never was an apple in the bag" then why can't you understand me when I say "you never knew where I was born"?

If I'm going to dig a hole in my yard, it's important that I know if there are buried gas pipes in that location — T Clark

When you wanna bury your wife they could serve as a good cover. So check out the scheme first. Sure the city hall can provide...

Joking aside, there is lots of a priori knowledge waiting for the baby child to be explored. It once was no a priori knowledge, but it has become a priori for anyone interested. Laying there, in the world, to be discovered.

If I'm going to dig a hole in my yard, it's important that I know if there are buried gas pipes in that location — T Clark

And using this example; assume you start digging and break a gas pipe. You wouldn't say "I knew where all the gas pipes were, but I was wrong"; you would say "I didn't know where all the gas pipes were."

You might have thought you knew, but you didn't, because they weren't (only) where you believed them to be.

I don't understand this at all. You claim that there is an apple in the bag. We open the bag to find an orange. It didn't stop being an apple when we opened the bag; it just never was an apple. — Michael

You might have thought you knew, but you didn't, because they weren't (only) where you believed them to be. — Michael

I understand your argument, but I don't agree with your conclusions. I know you don't agree with mine. It's clear neither of us is going to change our minds.

So check out the scheme first. Sure the city hall can provide... — Haglund

In many locations in the US, you can call Dig Safe at 811. They'll come out and mark out where the underground utilities are. If you call, don't tell them you're burying someone.

In many locations in the US, you can call Dig Safe at 811. They'll come out and mark out where the underground utilities are. If you call, don't tell them you're burying someone. — T Clark

:lol:

"Dig safe"...

811... are you serious?

Yes, you are! A priori knowledge?

because we use the phrase "the grass is green" when we believe that the grass is green — Michael

But this, and ...

You claim that there is an apple in the bag. We open the bag to find an orange. It didn't stop being an apple when we opened the bag; it just never was an apple. — Michael

...this, only show to serve that "I know X" (probably) has a truthmaker, not what that truthmaker is. The presence of the apple in the bag is the truthmaker of "there's an apple in that bag". If it turns out there wasn't, then "there's an apple in that bag" was false.

But I'm not arguing there's no truthmaker for "I know X", I'm just arguing that the truth of X isn't it.

So, like our apple, proper justification (relative to the context) is the truthmaker of "I know X". If it turns out that (like our apple not being there) that I don't have proper justification for believing X, then the proposition "I know X" is false.

You're trying to claim the the truth of X is the thing that renders "I know X" true or false, but your argument consists only of a demonstration that something renders "I know X" true or false. You haven't yet presented a case for what that something is.

My argument is to look to the use of the term. It's used (present tense) in situations where the justifications are of a sufficient level. It's not reserved for use only when X is true. It's used in the past tense comparing to what we currently believe. Again, truth is not referenced at all.

If you want to add 'truth' to the criteria for the meaning of 'knowledge', you'd have to show some way the word, in use, references truth, but I can't see it referencing anything other than the quality of justification.

I've provided examples of how truth is a condition for knowledge:

If John claims to know that the answer to the equation is 5 and Jane claims to know that the answer to the equation is 6 then at least one of them is wrong in their claim of knowledge. They can't both know the answer and yet have different answers. — Michael

And using this example; assume you start digging and break a gas pipe. You wouldn't say "I knew where all the gas pipes were, but I was wrong"; you would say "I didn't know where all the gas pipes were." — Michael

Almost every competent English speaker will agree with this. Our understanding of the word "knowledge" is that it includes the condition of truth.

My argument is to look to the use of the term. It's used (present tense) in situations where the justifications are of a sufficient level. It's not reserved for use only when X is true. It's used in the past tense comparing to what we currently believe. Again, truth is not referenced at all. — Isaac

That's true of everything we say. I say "the grass is green" when I believe (with justification) that the grass is green. I say "the defendant is guilty" when I believe (with justification) that the defendant is guilty. It doesn't then follow that X being true isn't the truthmaker.

As I said before, you just appear to have a fallacious interpretation of meaning-as-use.

And using this example; assume you start digging and break a gas pipe. You wouldn't say "I knew where all the gas pipes were, but I was wrong"; you would say "I didn't know where all the gas pipes were." — Michael

Almost every competent English speaker will agree with this. Our understanding of the word "knowledge" is that it includes the condition of truth. — Michael

Again, all this use of the past tense shows is that "I know X" could be made true by the truth of X. Given that some very smart people have proposed the idea, I should jolly well hope it could be, otherwise something's gone very seriously wrong in the philosophy departments' various hiring policies.

What it fails to show is that it must be. It's perfectly plausible that we use the past tense of 'to know' to reference the relationship between our previous state of mind and out current beliefs about the state of the world, and the present tense to reference the relationship between our current state of mind and our current beliefs about that state of the world. To make something past tense, we only have to put one aspect into the past, not all aspects. "There was an apple in that bag" is past tense even though I'm referring to a current bag - that one.

The use of some perspective other than our own as the 'reality' we are talking about the confidence we have in our beliefs matching doesn't mean we always must use that perspective in all cases, only that we can.

That's true of everything we say. I say "the grass is green" when I believe (with justification) that the grass is green. I say "the defendant is guilty" when I believe (with justification) that the defendant is guilty. It doesn't then follow that X being true isn't the truthmaker. — Michael

Again, you're just showing that "I know X" could be of a form similar to "the grass is green" where we could look to some empirical fact to show it's truth. You're not showing anywhere that is must be of that sort.

. I understand that people do sometimes ruminate over basic life decisions. But I don't consider that kind of quotidian decision making (or lack thereof) philosophy. It may be how philosophy begins and then from it an ontology and epistemology is gradually built. — Tom Storm

What about your own personal philosophy? Not sure if you have one? And even if you do, certainly not everyone has one and , more importantly, very few dip into it in order to resolve the everyday trivia of life, right?
But I would argue the contrary. Each of us walks around with an evolving personal philosophy that is referenced implicitly even with regard to the most minute aspects of life.
More importantly, each trivial rumination modifies and re-writes that personal philosophy. So if all of us are already naive philosophers, what separates w the pros from the amateurs? Not much , really, other than an overt conceptual articulation of what is implicitly going on with all of us. Why put in the effort to perform this articulation? No reason other than that for certain people this conceptualizing is the best means of getting in touch with themselves and their world. For others the best way to articulate and grow their personal philosophy may be through the language of music , poetry, dance, painting , running a business , doing science or digging ditches.

What about your own personal philosophy? Not sure if you have one? — Joshs

I have a half-baked worldview, not sure that counts.

For others the best way to articulate and grow their personal philosophy may be through the language of music , poetry, dance, painting , running a business , doing science or digging ditches. — Joshs

Ok. This is a different perspective to mine but I like it.

Isn't the point of including "true" in justified, true belief simply to rule out cases of knowing things that are not true?

Does anyone here know something that is not true?

Does anyone here know something that is not true? — Banno

That's a good question. What about things like alchemy and astrology and the people who believe in that stuff. Wouldn't they say they know it's true - even if we would say evidence point to the contrary?

The difference between believing that X and knowing that X is that if you know X then X is true.

SO no, I'd say they believe it is true, but that they are wrong, because it is not true.

One last question, this is just curiosity, not attempting to start an argument or disagreement, I really want to see how you think about this:

So right now, we postulate quantum fields. We assume they literally exist. But what happens if in, say, 5 years time we discover something new, say a cube structure is found to be even more fundamental.

What we know to be true now, may turn out to be literally false, just an approximation.

How would you deal with this?

Does anyone here know something that is not true? — Banno

Ooh, ooh, Mr. Banno. I do. I do. Mr. Banno. I do.

So we thought we knew, but we were mistaken.

Perfectly good English, just wrong. — T Clark

Oh? And why is it wrong?

So, like our apple, proper justification (relative to the context) is the truthmaker of "I know X". If it turns out that (like our apple not being there) that I don't have proper justification for believing X, then the proposition "I know X" is false. — Isaac

Suppose you bought a paper bag of apples, and left them in the car for a few minutes when you went to the post office. While you were away, a thief broke into your car, and replaced it with a bag of oranges. Later, you claim, "I know I have a bag of apples in the car". By every standard you are perfectly justified in believing so. And yet, you do not know it, because the truth is, you have a bag of oranges.

So we thought we knew, but we were mistaken. — Banno

Here, the present tense references actual 'truth' (our past belief was false relative to the truth now), yet the past tense references only beliefs ('we thought we knew'). You've changed references between tenses. "we thought we knew but now think we don't" would preserve our beliefs about our knowledge as the subject of both tenses. or "we knew, now we don't" would preserve our actual knowledge as the reference.

We've talked at great length about belief and truth before, I know, so there may be little value in retreading all that old ground, but here, in this change of subject between tenses, is where I think all the problems of JTB lie.

What we think is true is that which we feel well-justified in believing, that it is is actually true is unknown to us and always will be (we always might be mistaken). It's true that the cat is on the mat if the cat is on the mat, but we can never be sure the cat is on the mat (we might be hallucinating etc) so we can only ever reference our justification for believing the cat is on the mat (i saw it there, I stroked it etc).

So to properly use the word knowledge, the public rule governing it's proper use (the rule which we reference to say what it 'means') cannot use the concept of what is 'actually true' since no-one in the public rule-making community has this information. It can only use what they think is true. But that (as above) already constitutes that which is well-justified - and being well-justified is already one of the criteria for 'knowledge' under JTB.

Essentially the muddle here with 'to know' is that it attempts to treat a mental state as a function of empiricism. What if "I'm in pain" were treated the same way. That external facts could alter whether that were the case, we have to say "I think I'm in pain...but I'm not sure". But what could that possibly mean?. Well likewise with treating "I know X" as similarly bounded? We'd have to admit to the possibility of the disjunction - "I believe I know X" and "I know I know X". But if we admit them we'd have to also admit "I believe I know I know X" and " I know I know I know X"... and so on.

Far simpler, I think, to accept what you've already had to accept anyway in your first expression - that they way we use "I know..." differs from the way we use "He knows..." and the way we use "I/he knew...". The former is about our confidence in the justification we have for our belief. The latter two are an assessment (in the light of our current understanding) of how well placed that confidence was. This better reflects how the words are actually used, and only complicates matters by requiring a change in subject over tenses which you've already had to include anyway to say "we thought we knew, but we were mistaken" or expressions like it.

So to properly use the word knowledge, the public rule governing it's proper use (the rule which we reference to say what it 'means') cannot use the concept of what is 'actually true' since no-one in the public rule-making community has this information. It can only use what they think is true. But that (as above) already constitutes that which is well-justified - and being well-justified is already one of the criteria for 'knowledge' under JTB. — Isaac

There are plenty of examples of well justified falsehoods, like the one I gave above.

By your logic, the use of the everyday word 'true' would be impossible, since no one has access to the truth. The way out is simple: every "I know", every "this is true", is a claim to knowledge and truth. We don't need direct access to the truth to make claims to it.

While you were away, a thief broke into your car, and replaced it with a bag of oranges. Later, you claim, "I know I have a bag of apples in the car". By every standard you are perfectly justified in believing so. And yet, you do not know it, because the truth is, you have a bag of oranges. — hypericin

Again, you're just repeating back to me what your preferred theory of knowledge is ("yet, you do not know it, because the truth is..."). You've not demonstrated that I don't 'know' it because the truth of the matter is what determines whether I know something. You've just declared that I don't know it because the truth of the matter is what determines whether I know something.

Look at the phrasing. There's no argument showing that it must be the case that "you do not know it, because the truth is...". That 'because' is the very matter we're discussing, you're just begging the question by using is as the explanation.

Imagine if we disagreed over the Trolley Problem, I think we should switch because consequences guide morality and you think we should not because virtues do and we shouldn't intentionally kill anyone. It wouldn't constitute an argument if I were to say "But it would be moral to switch because morality is what harms least people", that's the very matter in contention.

I'm arguing that the truth of "I know X..." is not determined by the truth of X. I'm arguing that using the actual way we make what is considered proper use of the expression "I know X...".

There are plenty of examples of well justified falsehoods, like the one I gave above. — hypericin

Not currently there aren't. This is what I mean about tenses changing things. There are currently no well-justified falsehoods. There may be some in the future (when we have better justifications - when we look in the bag) but currently there are none.

By your logic, the use of the everyday word 'true' would be impossible, since no one has access to the truth. — hypericin

Yes. I'm deflationist about 'truth'. I thought I explained that earlier by referencing Ramsey. The entire problem here is the definition of "I know" for someone deflationist about truth.

The way out is simple: every "I know", every "this is true", is a claim to knowledge and truth. We don't need direct access to the truth to make claims to it. — hypericin

I've shown the problem with this above. If "I know" is simply a claim to knowledge, then we have to admit of the disjunction "I believe I know..." and "I know I know...". Then we have to admit of "I believe I know I know..." and "I know I know I know...", and so on.

Your model is not "simple" at all.