Basically, there are two causes. Mental causes and physical causes. Mental causes obey different laws than physical causes. Action resulting from mental states are teleological causes. Why lays the book on the table? Because we had the idea to put it there. The idea was the cause. The table pushing up is the cause it stays on it. Where do the mental and physical meet?

An inference can be derived from observation alone, but all observation is always already interpretive. Anything that could count as an event is primordially seen, or understood, as being this or that kind of state of affairs; so conceptual judgement (not inference) is obviously directly involved in perception. There is no "raw data". "Intuitions without concepts are blind" is indeed true.

It certainly seems to be the case that the action, the purported actual energy exchange, which is involved in causation is not directly observed, really not observed at all, but is inferred on the basis of the notion of causation. The fact that all observations are already conceptually mediated does not entail that all concepts are observations,and is derived only from understanding what is directly observed and what is involved in something being directly observed. Again, I think it is indisputable that there is no "raw data" which could becomes conscious, simply because any purported "data" would have to be understood as something (in other words conceptualized) in order to become conscious and thus have any influence on judgement.

I said that scientific laws (or principles) are where 'logical necessity meets physical causation'. — Wayfarer

I believe it is important to understand that logical necessity is a form of need. It is derived from the need to understand. From the need to understand comes the "discovery" of all the principles, or rules of logic, and form this, the judgements of valid and invalid.

The judgement that one described situation is the cause of another, which is the effect of the prior, is based in principles of logic. What is required for that judgement is a definition of what constitutes a "cause".

Again, physical causation is not a necessary relation; and logical necessity sets out the way things might be spoken about, not the way things are. — Banno

I don't understand how you might propose to remove necessity from physical causation, and still retain prediction as a valuable tool in science. If, in the discipline of physics, we can say that one described situation causes another (in general), or that one described situation caused another ( in particular), and we remove "necessity" from this relation, then how do we validate the usefulness of prediction?

Here's an example of what I'm asking. Suppose that described situation A is proposed as the cause of described situation B. If there is necessity between A and B, I can say "if A occurs then B will occur", and when I create the situation of A, I can make a valid prediction of B. The "necessity" between A and B is what validates my prediction that A will result in B, which I can express with the relation of necessity, "if A then B"..

Now, let's remove "necessity" from this relationship. I create A, and predict that B will be the result. The prediction is true, but B did not necessarily come from A, because we've removed the necessity. We now allow that B could have been the result of something other than A. Nor will B necessarily be the consequence of A, because that necessity has been removed as well. What validates my rule of prediction, "if A then B" now? And, if I'm a scientist, and I want to support a hypothesis with a prediction, through experimentation, how could that hypothesis be supported, if the relation is understood to be one of coincidence rather than necessity?

It might appear, that a reasonable thing to do would be to allow probabilities instead. We could say that if the prediction is good ninety percent of the time, we'll accept the hypothesis. Or, we might say that if the description of the consequent is ninety per cent accurate, ninety per cent of the time, in ninety per cent of the situations, we'll accept the hypothesis. But what happens if in some cases, we allow eighty five per cent as the rule of thumb? If we adhere to one hundred percent, all the time, we support "necessity", and probability is excluded. But if we slip into probabilities, what standards will produce rigidity in the rules, when we allow the probabilities of practise to have supremacy over the necessity of logic?

exactly what Kant proved, in several tens of thousands of words. — Wayfarer

.....and summed up in five: “...intuitions without concepts are blind...”.

(As I turn the page I see already said it. Gives new meaning to.....you guys need to get on the same page!!!!)
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An inference can be derived from observation alone — Janus

Not if “.....intuitions without concepts are blind....” is true.

You know the drill: “....understanding cannot intuit, intuition cannot think....”.

I think the rest of your comment supports the drill, but if it does, the first statement contradicts the support, in that an inference cannot be derived from observation alone. An inference is a logical relation......yaddayaddayadda......

An inference can be derived from observation alone — Janus


Not if “.....intuitions without concepts are blind....” is true. — Mww

The thing is that observations are always already conceptually mediated as the quoted phrase states. We always already observe anything or any event as something. Events are observed to succeed one another, with certain events being constantly correlated with certain other events. None of this involves inference yet. The inferences come when we imagine hidden connections between the correlated events.

An inference is a kind of logical associative relation, but it doesn't follow that it is a necessary logical relation. We can, and humans have, imagined many different kinds of causal forces at work in the world. We might say that some kind of inferred causation is logically necessary....to our ability to be able to associate events intelligibly with one another. But that does not mean we have to think in terms of efficient causation. We could instead think the animal spirits, or God. or whatever, did it.

We might say that some kind of inferred causation is logically necessary — Janus

I’d go so far as to say....objects must relate to one or more categories, cause is a category, therefore inferred causation is logically necessary for human empirical cognitions.

And of course, physical causation in the world is meaningless without an intelligence to apprehend it, which makes logical necessity under such conditions of absence, moot.

I’d go so far as to say....objects must relate to one or more categories, cause is a category, therefore inferred causation is logically necessary for human empirical cognitions. — Mww

That raises an interesting point. Cause and effect are categories of events, but I would say they are not "primary" categories. So, form is a category of objects; insofar as all objects have form and I would say it does count as a "primary" category.

I would say cause is more a category of judgment. I get that all these categories are categories of judgement, but I mean here that cause is more strictly just a category of judgement insofar as it is not an obvious attribute of objects. Think of a stone, for example; a stone is not in itself a cause, but it does in itself have form.

Cause and effect are categories of events, but I would say they are not "primary" categories. — Janus

In that Closer to Truth video I linked Richard Swinburne says that causality is a primitive concept, meaning irreducible. I agree with him. If you ask ‘why’, any answer will begin with ‘because….’ - which proves his point!

I agree that causality is, like freedom or truth, irreducible, insofar as it cannot be explained in terms of anything else. But It is not logically necessary. There is no logical contradiction involved in thinking that events might simply happen without cause or reason.

I agree that causality is, like freedom or truth, irreducible, insofar as it cannot be explained in terms of anything else. But It is not logically necessary. There is no logical contradiction involved in thinking that events might simply happen without cause or reason — Janus

This all depends on the way you would define your terms. You have three principal terms here, "event", "happen", and "cause". When we define "event" we might allow a distinction between an actual event, and a possible event, such that "happen" is not a necessary, or essential aspect of "event". This means that any described event may have either happened, or not happened. An event might be fact or fiction. Further, we could allow that "event" is not an attribute or property of anything, so that it does not function as a predication of a subject, and assume that "an event" is a type of general, ill-defined, and vague object. Then, "an event" would be an object without a proper identity and we could find that the law of excluded middle, or the law of non-contradiction, would not apply to anything we said about "an event".

As you can see, there are numerous possibilities to how "event" might be defined. And when we position "happen" in relation with our definition of "event", it is possible to define the two such that "happen" is a necessary, or essential aspect of "event". This would mean that we can't call something an "event" unless it has already "happened", i.e., we assume factuality with "event". If we take this step, then we need justification that whatever we want to call "an event", has actually occurred. So we would refer to the present situation, and explain how the present situation is the effect of, or was "caused" by the thing which we want to call "an event" (where it is necessary that the "event" has actually happened to be able to call it "an event").

Therefore, if "event" is defined such that it is necessary that the activity called "an event" has actually already occurred, so that occurrence is an essential aspect of being "an event", then we need to allow that "causation" is also an essential, or necessary, aspect of events. This is because we have no direct access through sensation, to events which have already occurred in the past, therefore no way to identify "an event" (being necessarily in the past by this definition) through sensation, as "an event". The only sensual evidence we have, is what is occurring now, at the present time, but to necessitate, validate, or justify, the claim that a specific event has actually occurred, (therefore fulfills the criteria of "event" under this definition), we have only a relationship of causation to rely on.

Because we need to assume this relationship of causation, to have confidence concerning truth about the past (memory being insufficient), we must approach your proposal, that an event might just happen without a cause, very cautiously, and with healthy skepticism. If we decide that we want to define "event" such that an event might be occurring right now, as we speak, at the present time, and we allow "that events might simply happen without cause or reason", then we deny the necessity of the causal relationship between the present and the past. Then our method for determining the truth about the past, is designated as invalid (by your proposition), and such claims about truth are unjustifiable.

it (cause) is not an obvious attribute of objects. — Janus

It is good to divide out cause in this way, insofar as attribute implies identity of an existence while cause implies the relation of an existence. In this regard, I would agree cause is not a primary category for what an object is to be known as, but would add...neither is existence.
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Trivial sidebar: existence has to do with representation of each object in general in a time, cause has to do with representation of objects in general in successive times.
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Not-so-trivial sidebar: given the above, cause is not the form, re: .....

form is a category of objects — Janus

.....but rather, time is. And we already know this, because time is already stated in the transcendental method as the form of all phenomena, to which every single category subsequently applies.
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Second....and final, promise..... trivial sidebar:
The schemata of the categories of understanding are conceptions or compound conceptions, whereas the schema of the categories of judgement are cognitions.
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a stone is not in itself a cause, — Janus

But can it be said with equal certainty, that a stone is not an effect? If it cannot be said, or it is said but contradicts empirical conditions, therein lay the validity for those categories with complementary, what Kant calls “dynamical”, nature. As opposed to “mathematical”, which do not have complementary conceptions belonging to them.

Then our method for determining the truth about the past, is designated as invalid (by your proposition), and such claims about truth are unjustifiable. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you're misunderstanding. I'm not saying that understanding events in terms of (some kind of) causation is somehow "invalid"; in fact it is the only way we can understand events. Any explanation of the connections between events must posit some hidden forces or powers; whether those are gods, animating spirits or mechanical causes.

It is good to divide out cause in this way, insofar as attribute implies identity of an existence while cause implies the relation of an existence. In this regard, I would agree cause is not a primary category for what an object is to be known as, but would add...neither is existence. — Mww

I would say though, that an object is only known (as such) insofar as it does exist. If this is so, then we must allow for different categories of existence: possible, fictional, actual and so on. So, I agree that objects do not have an "extra" attribute: existence; on the contrary to be an object is to exist.

Trivial sidebar: existence has to do with representation of each object in general in a time, cause has to do with representation of objects in general in successive times. — Mww

Right, but objects do not exist "in a time" in isolation, either temporally or spatially. We could represents a succession of objects appearing or successive events that have no causal connection, but such a representation would not be an explanation of anything, but would be a mere description.

.....but rather, time is. And we already know this, because time is already stated in the transcendental method as the form of all phenomena, to which every single category subsequently applies. — Mww

Agreed.

But can it be said with equal certainty, that a stone is not an effect? If it cannot be said, or it is said but contradicts empirical conditions, therein lay the validity for those categories with complementary, what Kant calls “dynamical”, nature. As opposed to “mathematical”, which do not have complementary conceptions belonging to them. — Mww

We cannot say with "certainty" that a stone is or is not an effect, it seems to me; although of course we feel certain that stones originated somehow. But there is no strictly logical contradiction involved in thinking that a stone could have randomly popped into existence for no reason and caused by nothing at all (as incomprehensible as that might seem). That has been my only point in arguing against the idea that causation is logically necessary.

I think you're misunderstanding. I'm not saying that understanding events in terms of (some kind of) causation is somehow "invalid"; in fact it is the only way we can understand events. Any explanation of the connections between events must posit some hidden forces or powers; whether those are gods, animating spirits or mechanical causes — Janus

Then how do you justify your other statement, that causation is not logically necessary?

I agree that causality is, like freedom or truth, irreducible, insofar as it cannot be explained in terms of anything else. But It is not logically necessary. There is no logical contradiction involved in thinking that events might simply happen without cause or reason. — Janus

If causation is "the only way we can understand events", how can causation be "not logically necessary"? Is there a way that we understand things (events in this case), in which we do not employ logical necessity? And how does "causation" fit into this mode of understanding?

At first glance, it would appear like if there was any sort of "understanding" which could not be demonstrated and justified through logical necessity, it ought to be dismissed as misunderstanding. What type of "understanding" is valid "understanding", yet it is not given by the means of logical necessity? We'd have to say it's not a "valid" type of understanding, yet it is still a type of understanding. How can we classify this as "understanding" when it's just as easily classified as "misunderstanding"? Or do you base "understanding" in something completely different from logical necessity? What constitutes "understanding" to you?

But there is no strictly logical contradiction involved in thinking that a stone could have randomly popped into existence for no reason and caused by nothing — Janus

This is of course, correct given certain premises. As the saying goes, “...I can think whatever I please, provided only I do not contradict myself...”. To think that which exits without a cause is unconditioned by antecedent causes, so.....there ya go. I have not contradicted myself. That is the correct form of transcendentally thinking an unconditioned effect. But you’re stuck right there, you can’t do anything constructive with a mere form.

Another way to look at it is....it is impossible to prove all that exists has a reason for its existence. There may be that which exists that we cannot know anything about, that cannot be called out as “things”, which makes explicit we cannot know anything whatsoever regarding their causality. Thus, logically, we are not authorized to say that which has no cause is impossible.

Neither of these will work for stones, though, or any possible experience of ours. We know stones, so we are restrained by the logic of physical causality because of that knowledge. If we deny logical necessity for that which we claim to know, we jeopardize the very conception of entailment for empirical knowledge itself.

The inescapable dualism of human reason. Can’t live with it, can’t kill it.

Then how do you justify your other statement, that causation is not logically necessary? — Metaphysician Undercover

For something to be psychologically necessary is not always for something to be logically necessary.Thinking in terms of causation may be necessary for our rational understanding of things; our rationalizations so to speak, but this is not the same as to say that thinking in terms of causation is logically necessary.

What constitutes "understanding" to you? — Metaphysician Undercover

Pre-reflective understanding consists in seeing things as having their various significances for us; seeing things under some basic conceptualization/ category or other. Reflective understanding consists in stories we use to explain how things came to be the way we find them.

Neither of these will work for stones, though, or any possible experience of ours. We know stones, so we are restrained by the logic of physical causality because of that knowledge. If we deny logical necessity for that which we claim to know, we jeopardize the very conception of entailment for empirical knowledge itself. — Mww

I agree with what you say except, I would still maintain that it is not logically necessary that a stone could not have just popped into existence. I don't see why we need to think of our empirical notion of causation as logically necessary when we know it works and has worked very well for us. Why must it be apodictic?

Can we agree that what might be thought to be logically necessary for our rational thinking (what is psychologically necessary) can be distinguished from what is logically necessary per se?

For something to be psychologically necessary is not always for something to be logically necessary.Thinking in terms of causation may be necessary for our rational understanding of things; our rationalizations so to speak, but this is not the same as to say that thinking in terms of causation is logically necessary. — Janus

I don't understand what you are saying here. I asked, how can you say both, that causation is not logically necessary, i.e. that events can happen without cause, and also that the only way we can understand events is through causation. If some events can happen without causation, then how can causation be the way to understand these events? Do you see what I mean? If the only way that events are understandable is through causation, then the idea of an event without cause is not understandable, because if it was, that would contradict "causation is the only way we can understand events".

The fact, if it is one, that we can only understand events by thinking causally does not entail that the events must be causal. Also, I haven't said that events can happen without cause. I have said there is no logical contradiction involved in thinking that they could happen without cause. And that is why I say that causation is not logically necessary. This does not preclude the possibility that all events are in fact causal; we just don't know.

The fact, if it is one, that we can only understand events by thinking causally does not entail that the events must be causal. Also, I haven't said that events can happen without cause. I have said there is no logical contradiction involved in thinking that they could happen without cause. — Janus

So let me go through the problem again. I'll try to be concise and to the point, so maybe you'll understand this time. Suppose I believe both, that events can happen without cause, and, that I can only understand events as being caused. Aren't these contradictory beliefs? Doesn't the proposition "events can happen without cause" present itself as a sort of understanding of "events", which contradicts "we can only understand events by thinking causally"?

This is why I asked, what does "understanding" consist of to you. If "understanding" consists of applying logic, and ensuring that the thing "understood", adheres to logical principles, then the proposition "we can only understand events by thinking causally", contradicts the other, "I understand that events could happen without cause". So the two cannot be a part of one understanding of "events".

This is because "event" is a word we use to refer to things, and you have defined "event" by saying that it is a type of thing which which can only be understood causally. So "event" necessarily refers to a causal type of thing. Then you turn around and say that there is "no logical contradiction involved in thinking that events could happen without cause". But clearly there is contradiction here, because you have defined "event" as the type of thing which is understood causally. This other type of thing, which happens without a cause, cannot be classed as an "event", because it does not fit in that definition of "event" as things understood causally.

You need to either change your definition of "event" to allow that we can understand "events" through means other than causation, or adhere to your definition, and place these things which can happen without cause in a category other than "events", to allow for the truth of this understanding of those things.

Can we agree that what might be thought to be logically necessary for our rational thinking (what is psychologically necessary) can be distinguished from what is logically necessary per se? — Janus

Logically necessary per se. In my mind, that translates to....what is logically necessary because it is logically necessary. What is logically necessary just because it is. I honestly don’t know what to do with that.

I can easily enough distinguish what is logically necessary for our rational thinking from logical necessity per se. What is logically necessary for our rational thinking is that which justifies it as such. Logical necessity is merely the rule by which the justification is given. But that’s taking unwarranted liberties with what you said. Unless what you said just makes no sense, which I wouldn’t dare say.

So, we have.....my rational thinking is “stones have physical causation”. The question then becomes, what do I think is logically necessary in order for the thought I had about stones to be a rational cognition. Initially, I might think something like the principle of induction is logically necessary, insofar as I have never thought about any thing that didn’t have physical causation. Next I might think the LNC is logically necessary, insofar as if I think a stone doesn’t have physical causation I contradict my aforethought principle of induction. Then I might think imagination is logically necessary in order to circumvent the LNC because I can imagine what I damn well please. After those, I probably wouldn’t bother with any others.

But these logical necessities I think are sequential, one rather than the other in a series of thoughts, each of which are mutually independent and logically necessary per se, so I haven’t distinguished any particular one from the general, but merely given instances of it.

Dunno if I can agree or not, but I’m leaning towards not. You know.....cuz of what I dare not say. (Grin)

Logically necessary per se. In my mind, that translates to....what is logically necessary because it is logically necessary. What is logically necessary just because it is. I honestly don’t know what to do with that. — Mww

What is logically necessary is simply that which, if its negation were thought, would involve a contradiction. I don't know how to make it any clearer than that.

I'm interested in the fact that Kant acknowledges 'pure physics'.
— Wayfarer

He does? I don’t recall. Doesn’t seem quite right.

So I understand the idea of 'pure maths' but I'm finding the idea of 'pure physics' pretty hard to get my head around.....
— Wayfarer

“Pure” physics as a self-contained science is a misnomer, I think, at least without reference to a specific text. — Mww

@Mww - I don't know if you'll recall this discussion of a few weeks back - of whether, and why, Kant regarded physics as an a priori pure science. I've just been reading Dermot Moran on Husserl's Crisis of the Western Sciences and found this passage:

Galileo counters the Aristotelian approach not by performing experiments, but by showing that it [e.g. the mathematical fabric of space-time] must be so and not otherwise. In this sense, physics is made to be an a priori discipline of necessary truths. Koyré sums it up as follows: ‘The Galilean revolution can be boiled down … to the discovery of the fact that mathematics is the grammar of science. It is this discovery of the rational structure of Nature which gave the a priori foundations to the modern experimental science and made its constitution possible.

That, I think, is the source of Kant's conviction that physics can be an a priori science - that 'physics, like mathematics, is a body of necessary and universal truth.' Noble sentiment but hardly sustainable in respect of physics since Einstein, I would think.

(although, on the other hand, many of the most far-out theories of physics, strings and the like, a very much conducted on the basis of mathematical idealisations of empirical data......)

It appears that minds can exist, albeit only for mere fractions of a second, in chaos (re Boltzmann brains).

Maybe you should try and get one. Might upgrade your input. :wink:

Maybe you should try and get one. Might upgrade your input. :wink: — Wayfarer

Yeah, yeah, I love you too! :grin:

1. We're not Boltzmann brains.
2. If we exist then causality has to exist [we depend on the laws of nature - causal relationships - for our existence]
3. We exist
Ergo,
4. Causality has to exist (causality is necessary)

ah, so the difference between empirical and a priori in physics is echoed by the difference between the theorists and the experimentalists (which is always a pretty major division in physics.)

ah, so the difference between empirical and a priori in physics is echoed by the difference between the theorists and the experimentalists (which is always a pretty major division in physics.) — Wayfarer

Yes. The sounds of experiment and theory are produced close to the focal points of an ellipse. Theoretical sounds spread out to get focused at the practical locus from where it spreads out again, modulated, to reflect back into the theoretical focus, and the experimental sounds reach out for the theoretical campus from where it leaves again to adjust experiment. Once in a while, an almost perfect agreement is reached, when the ellipse has turned circular, and an extatic bright central state of coherence and unity is reached. The magic moments in science.

So I understand the idea of 'pure maths' but I'm finding the idea of 'pure physics' pretty hard to get my head around.....

From the Introduction to the CPR:

"V. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical Judgements “a priori” are contained as Principles.

1. Mathematical judgements are always synthetical [a priori]. Hitherto this fact, though incontestably true and very important in its consequences, seems to have escaped the analysts of the human mind, nay, to be in complete opposition to all their conjectures. ...
...

2. The science of natural philosophy (physics) contains in itself synthetical judgements a priori, as principles. I shall adduce two propositions. For instance, the proposition, “In all changes of the material world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged”; or, that, “In all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be equal.” In both of these, not only is the necessity, and therefore their origin a priori clear, but also that they are synthetical propositions. For in the conception of matter, I do not cogitate its permanency, but merely its presence in space, which it fills. I therefore really go out of and beyond the conception of matter, in order to think on to it something a priori, which I did not think in it. The proposition is therefore not analytical, but synthetical, and nevertheless conceived a priori; and so it is with regard to the other propositions of the pure part of natural philosophy."

B14,B15 Boldings, underlines added

And "synthetic" (a priori) means that there is the self consciousness or apperception involved. That is, active combining of appearances into an unified object within the self identical self consciousness. In contrast to this, "analytic" means that thinking happens "merely" according to the "traditional" or "formal" logical forms. Logical thinking is applied "from without" to empirical material (not conceived as constituting the object itself). Subject and object are separate or empirical and accidental (and thus remaining something "subjective") instead of being necessarily unified (into something objective in apperception).

Thanks! That is tremendously helpful.