If X is true for everything within the universe, then X is also true for the universe itself. — Magnus

I think the idea is that there is an inductive conclusion which is the first premise: "X is true for every thing". Then , "the universe is a thing". Therefore X is true of the universe.

Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards. — Kierkegaard

When driving, one must look in front to avoid accidents. Where we're headed seems more critical to our well-being than where we came from, oui?

P. S. All vehicles have rearview mirrors. I hope God penned down the history of the world in mirror writing; you know, to make it easier for us, mere mortals.

Nice trick to mirror write: take a pen in both hands. A left hand pen and a right hand pen. Write the same word with left as with tight, but in opposite directions. You will see the miracle happening.

Nice trick to mirror write: take a pen in both hands. A left hand pen and a right hand pen. Write the same word with left as with tight, but in opposite directions. You will see the miracle happening. — Hillary

:ok:

"The universe began to exist" — Magnus

False.

"The universe has a cause" — Magnus

False or unprovable.

"Whatever begins to exist has a cause" — Magnus

"Exist" is not well defined.

if the speed limit for the universe was the speed of light, the size of the universe would be at most 27.6 light-years across. the observable universe is however 93 billion light-years across. — Magnus

One issue here is that universe expands faster than speed of light.
How is FTL possible?
It's not possible but universe expands in two directions which means maximum 2 x speed of light from reference point.

Thus, the argument "If X is true for everything within the universe, then X is also true for the universe itself" is proven false and subsequently, the Kalam cosmological argument is proven to be a false argument. — Magnus

Yes. Aka compositional fallacy. :up:

The universe is about 13.8 billion years old, if the speed limit for the universe was the speed of light, the size of the universe would be at most 27.6 light-years across. the observable universe is however 93 billion light-years across. — Magnus

There's a rationale in physics for this apparent paradox. The physics is pretty advanced, but physics writer Ethan Siegel has an article on it:

If we were to ask, from our perspective, what this means for the speed of this distant galaxy that we're only now observing, we'd conclude that this galaxy is receding from us well in excess of the speed of light. But in reality, not only is that galaxy not moving through the Universe at a relativistically impossible speed, but it's hardly moving at all! Instead of speeds exceeding 299,792 km/s (the speed of light in a vacuum), these galaxies are only moving through space at ~2% the speed of light or less.

But space itself is expanding, and that accounts for the overwhelming majority of the redshift we see. And space doesn't expand at a speed; it expands at a speed-per-unit-distance: a very different kind of rate. When you see numbers like 67 km/s/Mpc or 73 km/s/Mpc (the two most common values that cosmologists measure), these are speeds (km/s) per unit distance (Mpc, or about 3.3 million light-years).

The restriction that "nothing can move faster than light" only applies to the motion of objects through space. The rate at which space itself expands — this speed-per-unit-distance — has no physical bounds on its upper limit.

The Kalam cosmological argument may indeed be false, but not on those grounds.

One potential challenge to your objection is that you differentiate

If X is true for everything within the universe, then X is also true for the universe itself"

However, the "universe" is defined as

all existing matter and space considered as a whole; the cosmos

Meaning if you accept that matter and energy cannot come from "nothing," then I think you are implicitly assuming that "universes" (defined as collections of matter and energy) cannot come from nothing either.

Furthermore, you state

So let's start at the end, with three statements that theists make.
1. God did not begin to exist.
2. There is only one god and that is God.
3. There is only one universe.

1. I think most theists would agree with this statement.
2. This is a bit tricky. Outside of our physical world, does the idea of "one" vs "many" actually exist? And thus does this idea exist outside of God?
3. I don't know how many theists are attached to this claim. How could we possibly know if another universe (or universes) exist? I guess if you define the universe as the collection all matter and energy, then by definition there can only be "one." But you could also invoke an idea such as the multiverse (which, I should admit, some physicists say is not a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry) where different combinations of physical laws could give rise to different collections of matter entirely.

If X is true for everything within the universe, then X is also true for the universe itself. — Magnus

You're attacking a straw man. You have outlined his argument and then you have proceeded to attack a premise not present in it.

His argument requires that the universe actually has a beginning. He does not make the stronger claim that it 'has' to have a beginning.

But anyway, if every material object has come into being and by 'the universe' we just mean the sum total of all currently existing material objects, then the universe has come into being. How does that not follow?

"Whatever begins to exist has a cause" — Magnus

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is, as of yet, unproven. It's simply a rule-of-thumb; useful, yes, but true/false, a different story.

Doesn't that make premise 2 and the conclusion obsolete?

How do you know that?

The fact that the universe expands faster than the speed of light is reason the Kalam doesn't work for me.
The problem with speed of light is that everyone measures it as the same regardless of their own movement. Which is a bit of a brain twister.

Doesn't that make premise 2 and the conclusion obsolete? — Magnus

No, I think it's the inductive principle which justifies premise 2 as true. Premise 1 says that if a thing has a beginning, it has a cause. Premise 2 says that "the universe" is that type of thing.

Your discussion concerned "the universe" being defined as a collection of all things. But that is misguided (or a 'strawman') discussion, because that is not how "the universe" is defined here. "The universe" is defined as a thing which has a beginning.

Whether or not premise 2 provides an accurate description of "the universe", is a question you might ask. You might also ask whether or not Premise 1 provides an accurate description of things which have a beginning. Showing that the premises are not necessarily true, demonstrates that the argument is unsound. But to give "the universe" a different meaning, other from the one used in the argument, doesn't prove the logic invalid, it just makes a strawman refutation.

A thing coming into existence doesn't necessarily have a cause as defined by thermodynamic time. Thermodynamic time is an emergent time, and can't yet have an existence as thermodynamic time since it's emerging. During emergence the time used in the emergence process is not thermodynamical. So you can not yet speak of a cause. Only in a larger context this can be the case. So the era before the emergence of TD time has to have a connection with a previous TD time, which signals it to start from zero again. If we realize this we can ask the question of the origin of the larger whole. And in answering that question a reference to physics is doomed to fail. Physics fails to point at a physical cause of the physical laws and the matter they guide.

If X is true for everything within the universe, then X is also true for the universe itself.

Is that then a statement that holds true? — Magnus

Um, no.

The universe isn't "everything inside the universe".

is proven false and subsequently, the Kalam cosmological argument is proven to be a false argument. — Magnus

The Kalam argument never lifted off the ground. There is no evidence for any kind of unique existence of a "personal powerful being"; so the first premise is already false because there would evidence via 'cause' to point to the existence of a powerful being being 'caused to exist'.

The Kalam argument never lifted off the ground. There is no evidence for any kind of unique existence of a "personal powerful being"; so the first premise is already false because there would evidence via 'cause' to point to the existence of a powerful being being 'caused to exist'. — Cobra

That is it,yes.

That is awsome, I didn't know it had a name. :)

I disagree, even if the expansion of one Mpc of space is 73 km/s compared to its neighbouring Mpc of space, the relative expansion rate at the extremes is still faster than the speed of light. The article (very interresting, thanks for the link) says that 18 million light years is the distance from us where space expands faster than the speed of light.

That definition can be used on anything that is composed of smaller parts. A house, for example, is all the things that make the house, taken together. Without the parts, there would be no house. But even if all the different parts share a characteric, let's say "have the same value regardless of location", that characteristic is not true for the house.

From what I have seen and read at least, theist see the multiverse theory as something non-theist come up with to not have to deal with a god. Like here for example.
The Kalam argument says nothing about multiverses and I agree with you, how could you possibly know? If there is a God, maybe this is just one of many universes he made. Or maybe there are many gods and they all made their own universes. :)

Why is it a straw man? How is "If X is true for everything within the universe, then X is also true for the universe itself." not a correct representation of the argument? It's not correct of course if any of the three statements I made are false of course but which one do you think is false and why?

It does not follow that if the sum total of all the parts of something have one characteristic, then the something also have that one characteric because it is a fallacy of composition as i learn from 180 proof that it's called. In fact, I would say that it is false for the big majority of characteristics.

How is "If X is true for everything within the universe, then X is also true for the universe itself." not a correct representation of the argument? — Magnus

Let's say X is "is a thing within the universe."

P1. If everything within the universe is a thing within the universe then the universe itself is a thing within the universe.

Neither of the Kalam cosmological argument's premises entail P1. Therefore P1 is an incorrect representation of the Kalam cosmological argument's premises.

I think this argument is a false argument and I will try to explain why here. — Magnus

Arguments can't be false. Premises (and conclusions) can be false, arguments can be invalid. So do you believe that one or both of the argument's premises are false, or that the conclusion doesn't follow?

I certainly think that the conclusion follows, so if the conclusion is false then either things can begin to exist without a cause or the universe has an infinite past.

The article (very interresting, thanks for the link) says that 18 million light years is the distance from us where space expands faster than the speed of light. — Magnus

The article explains that the expansion of space cannot be measured in terms of velocity, but of rate of increase. So it's not true to say that it's 'faster than' the speed of light.

The restriction that "nothing can move faster than light" only applies to the motion of objects through space. The rate at which space itself expands — this speed-per-unit-distance — has no physical bounds on its upper limit. — Ethan Siegel

Very tricky concept, I agree. I can't claim to understand all of it, but I think it falsifies your 'faster than' claim.

It's just a tricky way of saying, that there's a way that the distance between two objects increases at a rate which is faster than the speed of light. It's allowed to be faster than the speed of light, because the change in distance is not called "motion". The concepts of space and time, which are the basis for the concept of "motion" are tied to relativity theory in a way which makes understanding this change in distance as a "motion" impossible. So they are forced to say that this change in distance between two objects is something other than "motion".

The premises of the argument were that 1, everything that begins to exist has a cause; and 2, the universe began to exist.
You have decided that the truth of 2 somehow depends upon the claim that if x is true of everything in the universe, then x is true of the universe itself.
No it doesn't.

But anyway, if by 'the universe' you mean the sum total of all things that have come into being, then of course the universe came into being. How does that not follow? It would only not follow if you think there can be an actual infinity of events. But that's precisely what Craig denies. So, explain to me how something made of things that came into being did not itself come into being. And do that without begging the question by assuming there can be an actual infinity of events - something Craig denies.
If there is no actual infinity of events, then the universe - if by that we mean the sum total of all things that have come into being - came into being. And thus there would need to be a cause of it's coming into being.

Hmmm maybe I'm misunderstanding what you mean when you say

A house, for example, is all the things that make the house, taken together. Without the parts, there would be no house. But even if all the different parts share a characteric, let's say "have the same value regardless of location", that characteristic is not true for the house.

For instance, if we said that all parts of the house were made of wood, or that all parts of the house came into existence at some point, then I believe it would follow that the house was made of wood (i.e. made of parts that were made of wood) or also came into existence at some point. I admit its been a while since I've seen Craig's Kalam argument, but I think he makes the point that if matter or energy don't just "pop" into existence, then universes don't just "pop" into existence either. Especially if these universes are collections of matter. I believe he uses the analogy such as things like horses and other objects not just coming into existence unprovoked. Maybe someone else who is more familiar with the argument can chime in here.

I think the distinction between this and the fallacy of composition is that the fallacy of composition is applied when someone generalizes from a part of something to the whole of something (similar to hasty generalization). For instance, the fallacy of composition would be "This tire is made of rubber, therefore the vehicle of which it is a part is also made of rubber." Inductive reasoning would instead say (a rather crude example) "Tires are made of rubber. Therefore this pile of many tires, is also made of rubber". Note the difference between generalizing from part of something to a whole vs. generalizing from the properties of a collection of constituent items.

Of course, it may not always be that simple, as we have things such as emergence and the Modo hoc fallacy. So a fallacy of composition would also be

No atoms are alive. Therefore, nothing made of atoms is alive

However, once again, the distinction is "alive" can apply to a collection of atoms despite not applying to each one individually. Kalam's argument, on the other hand is more like saying "matter and energy do not just spontaneously come into existence. The universe is a collection of matter and energy. Therefore, the universe could not spontaneously come into existence."

As for the multiverse

The Kalam argument says nothing about multiverses and I agree with you, how could you possibly know? If there is a God, maybe this is just one of many universes he made. Or maybe there are many gods and they all made their own universes. :)

I totally agree. If God exists he could make many universes/multiverses. Each one could either have the same or a different God (who knows), if a god or gods exist. In my experience, some of the theists I've talked to are hesitant about the multiverse not because it does away with the idea of God but simply because it is a non-falsifiable theory (how would it be empirically verified?). As a result, according to some, why would multiverse be considered a scientific theory while theism would not?

Bear in mind that Craig believes the past is finite. He has traditionally argued that the big bang confirms this (he may have abandoned that, by now), but nevertheless argues against an infinite past on philosophical principles (in essence: the apparent impossibility of a completed infinity)

Next, he assumes a finite past implies the universe "popped into existence". This is a problematic characterization because it implies there is an existence into-which a universe pops. A finite past merely implies there was an initial, uncaused state, which didn't "pop in", but rather existed with the potential to evolve.