Alright, so can Mary's Room be recast to ask why there is something more to the physical world than knowing all the facts?

That's what all the criticisms of physicalism qua consciousness come down to. Why is there (in the case of human brains at the very least) an experiential aspect?

I don't think the Mary's room argument ascertains that there are non physical facts because I think it is based on an incoherent view of language and how language might represent the world. Science uses symbols that refer to concepts so it is unlikely to represent experience identically.

I think what the Thought Experiment inadvertently shows and what Jackson didn't seem to intend is our primary reliance on consciousness. The thought experiment seems to want to ask how you can represent experience without having experience. I don't see how a description of anything could usurp experience. The Experiment has a similar problem to the Twin earth one in pushing the idea that language must some how refer directly to essences.

Goodness - I'd forgotten that Mary's Room is mostly about the Physicalism issue. It often sounds like it isn't because it often ends with a question about 'knowledge', but I think you're right - it was originally intended to put some sort of challenge to Physicalism.

Perhaps it can be recast to ask that. But I don't think it will help us to do so. Very few 'Why' questions have answers.

It occurs to me that another perspective on Mary's Room is that it highlights the limits of language. What Mary can learn while in the room is limited to what can be conveyed by language. It demonstrates rather neatly that one cannot convey the experience of colour by language alone. A critic might say that it can be highlighted more economically by simply observing that the experience of colour, or vision more generally, cannot be conveyed to somebody that was blind from birth.

Edit: I see the other Andrew also posted while I was writing this, and has also homed in on the limits of language issue.

First, are you saying that the Swampman scenario is nomologically impossible, or just less probable than something else? — SophistiCat

I am saying that the scenario is both implausible and impossible. The implausibility comes from the violation of laws of entropy by this incredibly implausible arrangement of matter that would require massive coincidences. The impossibility comes from the idea of two things being identical.

It seems that things can only be identical with themselves.

I don't see how I could draw any conclusions from a thought experiment when I couldn't imagine the proposed scenario. I think the Chinese room argument suffers from this also to a lesser extent because complex task required of the interlocutor.

But I think the China brain argument is plausible because it is simply showing how we wouldn't expect a country to be conscious whatever physical state it got into.

So yes, I suppose I am advocating total simplicity in thought experiments. (But even then there are endless quibbles)

Other quasi thought experiments like The Trolley problem I think suffer from lack of ecological validity. I think you should assess real life reactions (Like Nordby's) over intuitions.

The thought experiment seems to want to ask how you can represent experience without having experience. I don't see how a description of anything could usurp experience. — Andrew4Handel

Sure, but the issue is that it seems like language can describe most of the world in scientific terms, so the question is what makes minds unique? Particularly given how the bodies those minds are part of are understood in scientific terms. Far as anyone can tell, there's nothing unique about the brain or body that would make it an experiencer.

But I don't think it will help us to do so. Very few 'Why' questions have answers. — andrewk

If we ask why water is a liquid within a certain temperature range and pressure, we know that's because of it's chemical properties. If we ask why some pattern of brain activity is conscious, we have no clear answer without biting some philosophical bullet or other the many people will find objectionable.

Indeed. I suspect that question is one of those that has no answer. Perhaps it is the 'wrong question'.

Being able to remember and recognize red sounds like knowledge. We do use "know" to mean experiential in addition to propositional knowledge. — Marchesk

By this definition, we cannot then say that Mary knew everything there was to know about red before she left the room, so the problem is resolved either way without giving us any insights other than clarifying the language.

I was thinking of the identity of those mental states. I feel like I have a persistent identity (being the same person I was a minute ago, despite a different physical state back then, and being the same person I was when I was 4, despite a nearly complete lack of the original matter of which I was then composed). So how am I not already swampman? What has happened in that thought-experiment that has not happened to me? All that's missing is an unverifiable causal connection between the one version of 'me' and the present state. — noAxioms

The causal connection is what is missing, according to Davidson and other externalists like him. Obviously, this won't matter to those who don't construe consciousness in terms of representations and their causal connections to the represented objects.

I don't get the point about the causal connection being unverifiable. If even your causal connections to your earlier selves are unverifiable, then I suppose nothing is, in which case this is just a truism.

Sure, but the issue is that it seems like language can describe most of the world in scientific terms — Marchesk

I think science is explaining and theorising about the world not describing it. We don't need a description for what is already a vivid experience.

I think the problem for science is explaining consciousness. When you have reasonable scientific and causal explanations/theories then you can manipulate experiences or entities.

I think that if we had an explanation or causal theory for consciousness then a lot of other things would be enlightened such as in psychology, the nature of colour and qualia in general and some issues in physics. A lack of conciousness is why Knut Nordby and Mary can't see Red. So what does consciousness reveal or add to phenomena? If we had a dogs sense of smell would we develop new theories?

In some sense theory is a tool for expanding consciousness.