If language doesn't refer to things that are real, or accurate, then how is it that any one can talk about language itself? What does it mean to talk about, or communicate things about, language, like it's rules and symbols? What was W. doing when he talked on and on about language? What was he referring to? What was he getting at? — Harry Hindu
"But now it may come to look as if there were something like a final analysis of our forms of language, and so a single completely resolved form of every expression. It is as if our usual forms of expression were, essentially, unanalysed; as if there were something hidden in them that had to be brought to light. When this is done the expression is completely clarified and our problem solved.
"It can also be put like this: we eliminate misunderstandings by making our expressions more exact; but now it may look as if we were moving towards a particular state, a state of complete exactness; and as if this were the real goal the of our investigations (PI, para. 91)." — Sam26
When we talk about knowledge we are talking about language, and how we go about making a claim that we know something. If I say that "I know X," then presumably I have the evidence, or I have good reasons for making the claim to knowledge. However, knowledge by definition is true, as opposed to someone making a claim to knowledge. One's claim can always turn out false, i.e., saying one knows is different from how we define knowledge. We have all experienced making a claim to knowledge, but later we find out that the claim was false."Knowledge" is simply some set of instructions for interpreting sensory information. We have all had the experience of believing that we know something and then realize that we didn't know it at all, or were mistaken. "Knowledge" can be wrong. — Harry Hindu
What you seem to be saying is that we never possess knowledge. We only possess claims of knowledge. Does that make any sense? If we don't possess knowledge, then how is it that we are claiming it? If we don't possess knowledge, and never can, then we are misusing the word knowledge when we claim we have it, as knowledge is something unattainable, or imaginary. So, if we don't have knowledge, then what do we have? What is it that makes us claim that we have "knowledge"?When we talk about knowledge we are talking about language, and how we go about making a claim that we know something. If I say that "I know X," then presumably I have the evidence, or I have good reasons for making the claim to knowledge. However, knowledge by definition is true, as opposed to someone making a claim to knowledge. One's claim can always turn out false, i.e., saying one knows is different from how we define knowledge. We have all experienced making a claim to knowledge, but later we find out that the claim was false. — Sam26
But I can know the orange juice is sweet by looking at the sugar content on the label of the orange juice carton, or know that orange juice is sweet simply by referring to my memory of tasting it, not by experiencing the sweetness by tasting it now.There are rules for saying that one "knows," and Wittgenstein shows us in On Certainty how we can unlock the rules by examining the many uses of the word know. Knowing though goes beyond simply sensory information, however, it also includes sensory information. For example, I can know the orange juice is sweet by tasting it, but knowing that triangles have three sides, is something that can be known apart from sensory experience. By definition triangles have three sides. This is not to say that I can't have a sensory experience of a triangle, but that my knowledge of what a triangle is not limited to sensory experience. — Sam26
What you seem to be saying is that we never possess knowledge. — Harry Hindu
Reading philosophy by dead philosophers that didn't have access to the findings of modern science is like reading a science book written by some dead scientist who didn't have access to the findings of modern science. It's nice if you are interested in a history lesson, but not if you are interested in modern ideas involving modern knowledge. — Harry Hindu
There is no "my" world. There is the world and the limits of my language mean the limits of me being able to communicate my knowledge and understanding of the world. I can still experience the world without language. The world is still there even if I never learned a language. — Harry Hindu
What about older insights, scientific or philosophical, that have *not* been rendered obsolete by modern knowledge? Do ideas all come labeled with a expiration date? I would be hard pressed, myself, to think of a single Wittgensteinian insight that has been rendered obsolete by a recent scientific discovery. On the other hand, reading some philosophical musings produced by philosophically illiterate modern scientists, it often seems to me that what they are saying had already been rendered obsolete by Aristotle more than twenty-three centuries ago! — Pierre-Normand
No, I'm not saying that we never possess knowledge. I'm simply pointing out that there is a difference between the definition of knowledge (justified true belief), and one's claim to knowledge. Just because one claims to have knowledge it doesn't follow that they do. By definition knowledge is a true belief, but knowledge claims are not by definition true. You seem to be conflating the two.What you seem to be saying is that we never possess knowledge. We only possess claims of knowledge. Does that make any sense? — Harry Hindu
I never said ideas come with an expiration date. That would be committing a genetic fallacy. My point was that old ideas without the new is only telling half the story. We can find what Steven Pinker thinks about W., but we will never know what W. thinks about Pinker. Studying W. without studying Pinker is limiting yourself and prevents you from seeing the bigger picture.What about older insights, scientific or philosophical, that have *not* been rendered obsolete by modern knowledge? Do ideas all come labeled with a expiration date? I would be hard pressed, myself, to think of a single Wittgensteinian insight that has been rendered obsolete by a recent scientific discovery. On the other hand, reading some philosophical musings produced by philosophically illiterate modern scientists, it often seems to me that what they are saying had already been rendered obsolete by Aristotle more than twenty-three centuries ago! — Pierre-Normand
Yeah, so that's the tinge of solipsism in the Tractatus. It's no big deal if one acknowledges that the world represents logical space, with every person being some point on the origin, perceiving reality relativistically. Wittgenstein doesn't go into detail; but, I assume he would say that some external world exists apart from the one perceived by an observer. — Question
Sure, one can claim that they have a set of instructions for interpreting some sensory impression, and then there is the true interpretation of that sensory impression. But how do you, or anyone else, know when your claim represents true knowledge, or the accurate interpretation?No, I'm not saying that we never possess knowledge. I'm simply pointing out that there is a difference between the definition of knowledge (justified true belief), and one's claim to knowledge. Just because one claims to have knowledge it doesn't follow that they do. By definition knowledge is a true belief, but knowledge claims are not by definition true. You seem to be conflating the two. — Sam26
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