Fine replace it with debeaking, I don't care, it doesn't effect the argument at all. Is it really relevant whether letting a couple cows out in the afternoon is considered a personal practice or a farming practice?The problem is that the example is bad. — Postmodern Beatnik
Well could you think of another possible way that some gratuitous suffering could be prevented? — shmik
What does cruelty have to do with it? The issue was that it caused gratuitous suffering. So you'd need to show that animals suffered gratuitously by being swiftly killed. Furthermore, I think the comparison with humans fails as it seems unlikely that the friends and families of the to-be-killed animal would suffer. — Michael
This comment is out of place because a built-in condition of the argument is to consider what would be gratuitous suffering in humans. — Soylent
That comparison is the basis for the knowledge claim, and part of the gratuitous suffering of intentional killing is the suffering felt by the animals that have relationships with the slaughtered animal (and they do have relationships).
As it turns out, the argument states that gratuitous suffering can be prevented by a single (in)action: gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet.
And I question your claim that what would cause gratuitous suffering in humans counts as gratuitous suffering in non-human animals. — Michael
it must be the case that the animal is of the understanding that their relative or friend has been killed. So one must show that a) an animal is capable of such an understanding and that b) the animal has such an understanding. The second can be addressed simply by ensuring that the slaughter happens out of sight and hearing of other animals. — Michael
I'm not prepared to defend this claim beyond what I believe is intellectually honest but I would prefer to have grounds to defeat it rather than a mere unsupported assertion that it is dubious. — Soylent
What can you point to that would indicate a divergence between the capacity to experience gratuitous suffering in humans and nonhuman animals?
The nonhuman animal doesn't need the capacity to recognize its own suffering as gratuitous, the judgement of gratuitous comes from moral beings on the basis that the suffering is not morally permissible (as per the conditions of the moral obligation).
That's not the way the burden of proof works. If you use a premise to make an argument then you must defend that premise; it is not the burden of the other person to disprove it. — Michael
The issue isn't over whether or not there is a divergence between the capacity to experience gratuitous suffering in humans and non-human animals; the issue is over whether or not there is a divergence between the cause of gratuitous suffering in humans and non-humans. — Michael
Even if you can show that humans and non-human animals have the same capacity to experience suffering, and even if you can show that food production practices causes non-human animals to suffer, you haven't shown that such suffering in non-humans animals is morally impermissible. — Michael
Suffering is morally impermissible and gratuitous if it is known, preventable, and preventable at a reasonable cost. — Soylent
This is confusing. Are you defining "gratuitous suffering" as "morally impermissible suffering" or as "known and preventable (at a reasonable cost) suffering"? Or is its meaning something else? — Michael
Gratuitous suffering = morally impermissible suffering. Suffering is morally impermissible by the following conditions: known and preventable (at a reasonable cost). — Soylent
If gratuitous suffering is preventable by definition then the premise "gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet" fails. Gratuitous suffering does not depend on something else (e.g. the possibility to adopt a vegan diet) to be preventable. — Michael
It's like saying "bachelors are unmarried men if and only if it is possible to X" (where "bachelors" is defined as "unmarried men"). — Michael
I think it's more akin to the following:
bachelors are called such iff they are men and remain unmarried. (where "bachelors" is defined as "unmarried men"). — Soylent
Then consider: "that suffering which is called gratuitous is called gratuitous if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet". How does one then conclude "one ought adopt a vegan diet" from that? — Michael
I'm questioning how "it is wrong to allow preventable suffering caused by food production practices" and "that suffering caused by food production practices which is called gratuitous is called gratuitous if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet" imply "a vegan diet ought to be adopted". It certainly doesn't seem to be the case that "a vegan diet ought to be adopted" is derived from the other two sentences. — Michael
P9 is a hypothetical so I'm not sure why you're trying to read it as several independent claims absent the hypothetical operator. — Soylent
More succinctly, if it morally impermissible to allow some outcome and the only way to prevent that outcome is performing or abstaining from a specific action, then it is morally impermissible not to perform or abstain from the specific action.
The conclusion that "one ought to adopt a vegan diet" follows from the entire argument before it and not a single premise taken in abstraction.
A vegan diet (i.e., the means of prevention) is only obligated if it has a one-to-one relationship with the prevention of gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices.
I would caution against reducing gratuitous suffering to "preventable suffering". That suffering is preventable is a necessary but not sufficient condition for suffering to be judged as gratuitous.
But the actual phrasing is "X is preventable iff Y is possible". Did you actually mean "X is prevented iff Y"? — Michael
Then what are the necessary and sufficient conditions? — Michael
Then if it can be shown that I can't prevent gratuitous suffering by adopting a vegan diet then I am not obligated to adopt a vegan diet. — Michael
So, if I adopt a vegan diet will gratuitous suffering be prevented? — Michael
No, preventability is the condition of the moral obligation and not actual prevention. It only matters if the action renders the outcome preventable and not actually prevents the outcome (although acting on the obligation should prevent the outcome if it is accurate and a malicious agent is not acting against your efforts, the actual prevention need not be demonstrated for the obligation to hold).
...
More or less, but you should be careful with what you mean. I would state it as, "gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is not preventable if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet". The obligation only holds if the means (i.e., a vegan diet) is suitable or renders the outcome (i.e., gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices) preventable. If multiple actions render the outcome preventable, there is no strict obligation to act on any specific action. Veganism is obligated because it is only means to render the outcome preventable (as per P6). — Soylent
It only matters if the action renders the outcome preventable and not actually prevents the outcome
Veganism is obligated because it is only means to render the outcome preventable (as per P6)
It's in the form "if X and Y then Z". I'm questioning this material implication. If the material implication fails then the premise fails, and if the premise fails then the argument fails. — Michael
it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering — Soylent
I'm glad you left the premise in a formal notation because formally it is valid. I have shown X and Y in the argument and I am trying to arrive at Z so the material implication holds by modus ponens. — Soylent
One ought prevent X
X is preventable iff Y is possible
Therefore one ought do Y. — Michael
No it's not.
P1: X
P2: Y
C1: Z
It's not modus ponens. The premise "If X and Y then Z" can't be defended as a valid syllogism. — Michael
That's not the argument, the argument is:
P1 If X and Y, then Z — Soylent
This is not my argument though, the first premise is too strong since "One ought to prevent X" is beyond the potency of finite beings. Ought implies can, such that one ought act in such a way that X is preventable by their actions. I cannot be held responsible for the outcome if it is beyond my potency so my responsibility is to my action (i.e., acting so as to render X preventable). *my Kant is showing*
And I'm asking you to defend P1. What reasoning or evidence shows that X and Y implies Z? — Michael
Then is the argument:
One ought make X preventable
X is preventable iff Y is possible
Therefore one ought do Y. — Michael
The second premise can be stated as X is preventable iff Y (where Y is "it is possible to adopt a vegan diet") — Soylent
You can't have Y as "it is possible to adopt a vegan diet" in the premise and then have Y as "adopt a vegan diet" in the conclusion. — Michael
"if it is possible to Y then one ought to Y iff Y is the only means to Z and one ought to Z" — Soylent
P1 If any gratuitous suffering is preventable and known, then it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering. — Soylent
P6 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet.* — Soylent
I think part of your objection is covered by my reasonable cost condition not yet mentioned here. — Soylent
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