Though I'm for some reason weary of unnecessarily stirring up more waters ... My current thoughts concerning semiotics are in some ways at a crossroad. I can somewhat expound on the primary problem I see, but can’t yet be of much help as concerns any resolution.

On one hand, both physically and metaphysically, I find reason to uphold that meaning (hence signs) can only occur within lifeforms. On the other hand—again, both physically and metaphysically—I find reason to speculate that there is a hidden cline that bridges the behaviors of inanimate matter and animate matter: thereby resolving how life evolved out of nonlife.

I note that both positions, however, require a distinction between life and nonlife.

As concerns semiotics applicable to replicating nucleic acids, when the latter occur as parts of a metabolizing system it is, imo, the anima of the metabolizing system that is endowed with meaning and meaning recognition—not the individual physical components of the metabolizing system when taken in isolation form the holistic process of metabolism (again, else conceived, from the respective anima).

So, in agreement with commonsense, an isolated strand of RNA is not itself alive, though it consists of organic matter, and so is not itself endowed with any awareness—thereby making it devoid of inherent meaning and meaning recognition. In the fields of semiosis this is often termed an umwelt, loosely definable as “a self-centric body of meaning regarding i) a self distinguished from non-self and ii) this same self’s context”. A metabolizing system, which empirically minimally consists of a living cell, does however have an umwelt—and thereby does engage in semiotic processes.

But again, this is at a crossroads with the hidden cline of behavior between nonlife and life which, for example, is required to explain how life could have developed from nonlife. The pansemiosis which Apo likes to address is one approach toward eventually discovering what this hidden cline is. And in this pansemiosis view isolated nucleic acids do engage in semiosis—as do individual rocks.

Still, I again note that—in keeping with the themes of this thread—there is a ‘crisp’ distinction between life and nonlife. (Physically addressed, it can be pinpointed to the presence of metabolism—which is a holistic process that some specify as autopoietic).

The same generalized crossroads regarding semiosis can be addressed from the vantage of species. A given species is not of itself an awareness-endowed being … but concepts such as those of pansemiosis would take into account the manners in which species interact, etc.

So, though likely not of much help, these are my basic current views regarding semiosis and life.

Jakob von Uexkull's Umwelt refers to an individual's model of reality, which is constructed by species-specific sentience and awareness.

For human beings, that model consists of physical objects (phenomena) and mental objects (noumena). For other organisms, it may consist of other things. There may even be more than just physical and mental things (unless you think that homo sapiens is the apex of evolutionary development and that its mind will never comprehend things which are currently unknown).

I think it's presumptuous to say: life evolved from non-life, or noumena arise from phenomena, either vice versa, or that both arise from something else entirely. Peirce held that phenomena and noumena are two aspects of one substance. I don't know enough to say even that, preferring to maintain my species-specific common sense, and only say that physical things and mental things exist.

Von Uexkull and Peirce never knew of each other's work, but Umwelt explains why Peirce could say, "...the entire universe...is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs", and why Niels Bohr could say, "We are suspended in language in such a way that we cannot say what is up and what is down." Because for human beings, that is how we interpret the world: through signs, language being a sign system. For human beings, there is no other reality but that which human sentience and awareness impose upon us.

Pansemiotics, being the study of everything semiosis, should not be relevant only to physics, but also to all other sciences (including psychology and sociology), as well as to culture (the mindset and products of a social group).

Also, semiotics should not be interpreted, or elaborated upon, within, or communicated from, the context of any single scientific discipline, but rather serves to interpret and elaborate upon all scientific disciplines.

Since semiosis is sign processing (i.e., sign interpretation and modelling), I find it difficult to conceive of semiosis as anything other than an awareness process. Endosemiotics employs the signal aspect of signs to explain physiology. I think this may be a metaphorical application (i.e., a category error, as previously noted). And biosemiotics seems to rely on the premise that living matter is different from non-living matter to explain biology and zoology. This also may be a category error.

So why would I use the term "semiosis" in my definitions of life? Because "semiosis" is a term that's understood (if not universally accepted) and used within the field of biology (which is best suited among the sciences to define "life"), and is general enough to include endosemiosis, psychosemiosis and cultural semiosis.

I can only confidently place the functions of interpretation and modelling within an awareness context (i.e., one where perception, cognition and intuition occur), and so hold that semiotics applies exclusively to mental (not physical) things.That said, I would be interested in any functional explanations which connect thinking with non-thinking, and living with non-living, domains (much as chemistry provides a functional connection between other natural sciences).

Your comments are very much appreciated.

I think it's presumptuous to say: life evolved from non-life, or noumena arise from phenomena, either vice versa, or that both arise from something else entirely. Peirce held that phenomena and noumena are two aspects of one substance. I don't know enough to say even that, preferring to maintain my species-specific common sense, and only say that physical things and mental things exist. — Galuchat

As to my presumption that life evolved from nonlife, if I’m allowed to indulge in my own metaphysical views for a moment: I should first say that this supposition is, for me, of secondary importance to the system of metaphysics I’ve been working on. I’m for now strengthening its foundations, as time allows. Yet, inevitably, two systems of objective reality result from it (given that objectivity can, in part, be loosely translated into impartiality): one that is equivalent to what we term the physical (and phenomenal) world, and a second that is metaphysical (and purely noumenal), which, among other parallels, can be likened with Aristotle’s teleological cause. While it is the latter type of objectivity that is pivotal to this philosophy as a whole, the latter’s presence entails a) the presence of the former and b) that the former physical objectivity is the closest mutually shared reality we hold in our proximity to noumenal objectivity. Thus, as always, the very conclusions of the philosophy I’m working on entail that what our physical world informs us of at a macro-scale (thing such as laws of nature; as compared to the way that particular leaf over there just moved due to wind) can unveil truths that—given our current subjective biases—bring us closer to the stated noumenal objectivity. It may be of help to mention that our physical world, in this philosophical approach, is metaphysically understood as an intersubjective reality equally applicable (or equally real) to all co-existing awareness (including, for example, that of individual, metabolizing/living cells)—and, thereby, necessarily consists of givens such as space, time, and representations relative to, and equally applicable for, multiple awareness-endowed beings/selves. Overlooking the details of all this: Then, while some inferences of science (such as the way the universe will end) can be understood as our best, collective, bias-endowed guesswork, other inferences of science (such as that physical objectivity clearly informs us that physical life on this planet is predated by a time when no life occurred) can, I believe, only be interpreted as what is most objective in relation to life’s presence relative to our current understanding. Again, given the very tenets of the metaphysics I’ve working on, this objective appraisal that life evolved from nonlife—were it to be properly understood philosophically—would better enlighten us toward obtaining states of awareness in closer proximity to an eventual awareness of what noumenal objectivity is [In case this may be of interest, this noumenal objectivity would not be nothingness but something more along the line of infinite awareness devoid of boundaries (such as those that phenomena impose)]. Now, no expression can be considered perfect (e.g., to accurately and fully convey to all possible audiences that which is intended); but, if the gist of all this is roughly understood: this stated metaphysics then entails that there should objectively be a bridge between the behaviors (and properties) of inanimate matter and animate matter. But I as of yet have no cogent understanding of what it might be.

That stated, a philosophical skeptic as I am, I’m of course aware that mistakes of reasoning might have been made somewhere along the way.

So why would I use the term "semiosis" in my definitions of life? Because "semiosis" is a term that's understood (if not universally accepted) and used within the field of biology (which is best suited among the sciences to define "life"), and is general enough to include endosemiosis, psychosemiosis and cultural semiosis. — Galuchat

Agreed.

I can only confidently place the functions of interpretation and modelling within an awareness context (i.e., one where perception, cognition and intuition occur), and so hold that semiotics applies exclusively to mental (not physical) things.That said, I would be interested in any functional explanations which connect thinking with non-thinking, and living with non-living, domains (much as chemistry provides a functional connection between other natural sciences). — Galuchat

Again agreed. As to my own reasons for the supposition that there is a connection between the two, they consist of my metaphysical justifications for presuming that life evolved from nonlife, as previously mentioned. Though, again, I currently lack knowledge of any functional explanation for such a connection.

But again, this is at a crossroads with the hidden cline of behavior between nonlife and life which, for example, is required to explain how life could have developed from nonlife. — javra

Why would you assume that life developed from non-life? Don't you agree that there doesn't seem to be any evidence to support this assumption? If we do away with this assumption then we don't have to bother seeking degrees of existence between non-living and iving. This whole line of investigation, which seeks to determine these missing links, degrees of existence between non-living and living, is fueled by this belief that life developed from non-life. But this belief is unsupported, because there is no evidence of these missing links. Why not dismiss this as misdirected speculation?

Why would you assume that life developed from non-life? Don't you agree that there doesn't seem to be any evidence to support this assumption? If we do away with this assumption then we don't have to bother seeking degrees of existence between non-living and iving. This whole line of investigation, which seeks to determine these missing links, degrees of existence between non-living and living, is fueled by this belief that life developed from non-life. But this belief is unsupported, because there is no evidence of these missing links. Why not dismiss this as misdirected speculation? — Metaphysician Undercover

In principle, I’ll answer my own metaphysical justifications by referring back to my last post—a loose outline of my justifications though it is. But to elaborate a bit, that life evolved out of nonlife is again only a secondary philosophical concern for me. This much like what type of solar systems exist beyond our own is for me of secondary concern to the nature of meta-ethics (which very much encapsulates value-judgements; which in turn informs politics and economics, this among other things devoid of which the existence of NASA would not be possible). The same overall importance is given to the issue of life evolving from nonlife being secondary in comparison to the nature of life and awareness itself. And my beliefs are clearly not those of physicalism.

As to the issue of evidence: In one line of argument, it consists of the same evidence that dinosaurs existed, or that saber-toothed cats existed (still can’t figure out how they could capture any prey with those teeth … but our reality evidences that they existed all the same), or—to be more fastidious—the same evidence that three generations ago existed. The metaphysical and epistemological justifications can become both debatable and difficult in their details, but, via one allegory, even if the world started last Thursday all evidence would yet indicated the existence of a last Wednesday as well. Last Wednesdayism would in turn indicate the existence of a last Tuesday, so on and so forth. What is today has a history in what was yesterday. Though an indirect answer, I hope this made some sense.

On the more empirical side, in review of what is likely already known, we have evidence that life once existed in the Precambrian period via fossils of very tiny creatures (one with five eyes on an otherwise bilateral body—which is about as alien a biological symmetry relative to what’s been on the planet since as one can get). Then we have no physical evidence of life on Earth prior to this. How did this Precambrian life on Earth appear? One could extrapolate a meteor or comet of some type which brought it over to Earth from somewhere else. But, even then, given the history of the universe which physics attests to, there was a time in the history of the universe when life was not possible … such as before the atoms required for organic molecules existed.

Due to this evidence, I uphold that physical life evolved from nonlife. But again, not due to or via a system of physicalism.

...physical life on this planet is predated by a time when no life occurred... — Javra

This may be true as far as the inferences of human science (an intersubjective enterprise) are concerned, but it says nothing regarding the cause of life (which is a different question altogether), and does not rise to the level of objectivity. In fact, it cannot even rise to the level of pan-species intersubjectivity, because the way each species interprets the world is limited by their own biologically-specific responsiveness/sentience/awareness. In other words, intersubjectivity only happens within species, not between species.

However, I am interested in concepts somewhat related to your noumenal objectivity, such as collective consciousness/unconsciousness (albeit types of human intersubjectivity).

In other words, intersubjectivity only happens within species, not between species. — Galuchat

Even if one’s definition of “intersubjectivity” would have it so, there yet occurs overlap in umwelts between species. As one example, no relation between a predator and prey, where the first chases the second and the second eludes the first, could make sense without this overlap in umwelts. This overlap, for example, will minimally regard the presence of the same solid ground underfoot, given that both predator and prey are mammals (OK, excluding bats, dolphins, etc.). Those organisms that can sense gravity will all have their own subjective awareness of gravity; they will thereby have a shared awareness of the same force external to them such that they act and react in accordance to it; yet, a plant’s roots don’t follow gravity due to the sensory apparatus of an inner ear, and so the quality of the awareness of the same external force will significantly differ between a plant and a mouse, for example.

Whatever this common awareness of external realities between differing species may be termed, it does occur. The result is that all life acts and reacts to the same external (or non-self) reality which we term the physical world … they do this in different ways with different qualia but the external reality is nevertheless singular relative to all life.

Yet, obviously, no two species have the same capacities for awareness of external realities. And if it needs to be stated, the total sum of information and meaning that a fish’s reality consists of is vastly different from that of a bee’s (etc.). But, then again, no two individual humans share a perfectly identical body of perceptual understandings and meanings. Yet we all address (else, act and react relative to) the same physical world … even if it is metaphysically conceived by us through the lens of some objective idealism, Maya, or something else of the like.

As to the issue of evidence: In one line of argument, it consists of the same evidence that dinosaurs existed, or that saber-toothed cats existed (still can’t figure out how they could capture any prey with those teeth … but our reality evidences that they existed all the same), or—to be more fastidious—the same evidence that three generations ago existed. The metaphysical and epistemological justifications can become both debatable and difficult in their details, but, via one allegory, even if the world started last Thursday all evidence would yet indicated the existence of a last Wednesday as well. Last Wednesdayism would in turn indicate the existence of a last Tuesday, so on and so forth. What is today has a history in what was yesterday. Though an indirect answer, I hope this made some sense. — javra

That there was a time on earth when there was no life, prior to the time that there was life, is not evidence that life developed from non-life. That certain life forms existed prior to human beings is not evidence that human beings developed from those life forms. If I was born before you, would you accept this as evidence that you developed from me?

It is the demonstration of continuity between those ancient life forms and human beings which serves as evidence that one developed from the other. It is a demonstration of temporal continuity from Tuesday to Wednesday which serves as evidence that Wednesday developed from Tuesday. In the case of non-life to life, there has been no demonstration of such a continuity, and therefore no evidence.

Even if one’s definition of “intersubjectivity” would have it so, there yet occurs overlap in umwelts between species. — Javra

Intersubjective: of, or pertaining to, the common interpretation of context which presupposes communication between individuals.

Intersubjectivity is a shared understanding based on a common sign system, not on a common environment. This is how science can be a global enterprise.

That there was a time on earth when there was no life, prior to the time that there was life, is not evidence that life developed from non-life. — Metaphysician Undercover

What alternative(s) are there to explain life’s appearance given a time when life did not physically exist?

Intersubjective: of, or pertaining to, the common interpretation of context which presupposes communication between individuals. — Galuchat

As per wiktionary, it can also mean: (1) Involving or occurring between separate conscious minds. (2) Accessible to or capable of being established for two or more subjects.

In academia, the term has any number of related definitions. And it is in the wiktionary sense that I’ve addressed it. If you disagree with wiktionary's definition, a) why do you find wiktionary mistaken, and b) what term do you then sponsor to address the two meanings wiktionary offers?

As per wiktionary, it can also mean: (1) Involving or occurring between separate conscious minds. (2) Accessible to or capable of being established for two or more subjects. — Javra

In choosing to use a particular definition for a word (and words do have different meanings, depending on context), I prefer to use a definition which is sympathetic to the relevant field(s) of study, Wiktionary notwithstanding (as in deferring to biology for a definition of life). N.B. Wiktionary's first definition of life includes the word "reproduction".

Which relevant scientific discipline, or academic area of study would limit the meaning of intersubjectivity to those listed on Wiktionary? And if a scientific or academic definition is not listed on Wiktionary, is it invalid?

Wikipedia has a relevant article on intersubjectivity.

All very valid. Yet why should it be proscribed to refer to the underlying concepts I’ve so far addressed —which have been addressed in due context—as one possible type of intersubjective reality?

What alternative(s) are there to explain life’s appearance given a time when life did not physically exist? — javra

The evidence is that life did not physically exist on earth. How do you know that life did not come from somewhere other than earth?

The evidence is that life did not physically exist on earth. How do you know that life did not come from somewhere other than earth? — Metaphysician Undercover

MU, I’ve already addressed this possibility. The following is from what I previously posted to you:

[...] Then we have no physical evidence of life on Earth prior to this. How did this Precambrian life on Earth appear? One could extrapolate a meteor or comet of some type which brought it over to Earth from somewhere else. But, even then, given the history of the universe which physics attests to, there was a time in the history of the universe when life was not possible … such as before the atoms required for organic molecules existed.

Due to this evidence, I uphold that physical life evolved from nonlife. But again, not due to or via a system of physicalism. — javra

So the question I last placed stands despite us not knowing whether or not life first - else, independently - appeared on planet Earth.

So the question I last placed stands despite us not knowing whether or not life first - else, independently - appeared on planet Earth. — javra

You should clarify your statement. Physics does not attest to a time in the universe when life was not possible. This is not physics, but speculative cosmology, metaphysics. And if you're going to insist on the claim that physics attests to a time in the universe when life was not possible, it's just as valid to say that physics allows for the possibility that life came from another universe. But I really don't believe that we have a very accurate representation of the history of the universe right now.

Let me try this logic out. Suppose I try to nail down the essence of 'cute'. I pick an arbitrary way to sort things into two heaps: A thing is cute if it masses more than a KG. So I am cute, but this pebble is not. There is at least one thing in each heap, therefore there must be an essence of cute. Somehow the proof seems invalid. — noAxioms

Indeed your proof is invalid because it is not commonsensical to label you as cute and to label the pebble as not. It would only be valid, and thus match my argument, if you found a particular that fits into the category 'cute' that everyone (or close to) agrees with, and found for another particular that fits outside of the category of 'cute' that everyone agrees with.

Better example: A hamster is cute. A math exam is not. Therefore the essence of 'cute' exists.

What alternative(s) are there to explain life’s appearance given a time when life did not physically exist? — Javra

In the absence of evidence, explanations come from imagination, creativity, and propositional attitude.

...why should it be proscribed to refer to the underlying concepts I’ve so far addressed —which have been addressed in due context—as one possible type of intersubjective reality? — Javra

If it's the concept of noumenal objectivity you want to strengthen within the framework of your metaphysics, the only question I have is: on what basis, if not current science?

On a scientific (i.e., biological, psychological, and sociological) basis, I have no problem describing noumenal subjectivity, and intra-species intersubjectivity. But I'm not aware of any evidence to support inter-species intersubjectivity, much less noumenal objectivity.

However, that's not to say that it cannot be formulated on a different (i.e., unscientific) basis. For example, you could formulate noumenal objectivity on a spiritual, mystical, religious, theistic, or some other, basis.

Better example: A hamster is cute. A math exam is not. Therefore the essence of 'cute' exists. — Samuel Lacrampe

So what is the essence of 'essence'? What doesn't have essence?
You just seems to be asserting that every adjective or noun in the language has an essence, and the proof you give is needless given that assertion.

This was probably mentioned by others already, but typically, the demarcation criteria for life consist of things like some overarching organization/structure, metabolism, cell division, reproduction, homeostasis, and responsiveness to environment.

So what is the essence of 'essence'? — noAxioms

Essence or essential properties: properties critical to the meaning of a term, such that if they were to be removed, then the term would lose its original meaning. Example: essential properties of a triangle: 'flat surface' + '3 sides'. If the surface is not flat, it is not a triangle. If the surface does not have 3 sides, it is not a triangle. Conversely, 'red' is not an essential property, because a red triangle remains a triangle if the redness is removed.

What doesn't have essence? — noAxioms

I am not certain, but I think not every term has an essence. It appears to be the case for slang words such as "it sucks" or "he is a jerk". We can test the term by attempting to find a particular that fits into the category of the term that everyone agrees with, and another particular that fits outside the category.

You just seems to be asserting that every adjective or noun in the language has an essence, and the proof you give is needless given that assertion. — noAxioms

Why? The proof would be needless if no one questioned that essences exist, or if it was self-evident; but that is not the case.

We can test the term by attempting to find a particular that fits into the category of the term that everyone agrees with, and another particular that fits outside the category. — Samuel Lacrampe

Wait, everybody has to agree with it? Don't remember that being a requirement. I have personally found some math problems to be cute, and I can find an exception to the hamster thing as well, even if I'm not that exception.

Anyway, you seem to be driving for the language definition of 'life' (or the language 'essence' of anything else), which is pretty easy since there is but one example, and you're related to it or not. The way the word is used in common language is of no use when trying to decide if something new is life or not.

Let X = the body of the cow, and Y = the material thing that gives it life. Then a live cow is X+Y and a dead cow is X without Y. To resurrect the dead cow, we would just need to add the material thing Y back to X to result in X+Y. But this seems absurd. Therefore, Y is not a material thing. — Samuel Lacrampe

You seem to be thinking of material things as something that would be static rather than dynamic, and you seem to be ignoring relations. A living cow and a dead cow are functioning differently. The material in question is in different processes and relations in a living cow. To be living, an organism has to be undergoing certain processes (such as metabolism, homeostasis, etc. as I mentioned above).

Wait, everybody has to agree with it? Don't remember that being a requirement. I have personally found some math problems to be cute, and I can find an exception to the hamster thing as well, even if I'm not that exception. — noAxioms

Not 100% has to agree with it, for I am sure there exists outliers, but they would be just that: outliers. The requirement can be called 'common sense', 'every day language', or 'right opinion'. Exceptions, by definition, would fall into outliers.

The way the word is used in common language is of no use when trying to decide if something new is life or not. — noAxioms

If not that, then what else could be used as the foundation to determine if something new is life or not? A majority rule on arbitrary opinions? I am hoping for something objective.

A good point. There is a misunderstanding in the word 'material'. I use the term in the general sense that includes not only matter but also energy, processes, and in short anything that can be observable or empirical. Thus the processes you speak of fit into the category of material things that give life, labelled as Y. If these processes can be restored, then we could logically (in theory) restore Y to X and thus revive a dead cow.

To bring you up to speed, some people did not disagree with the X+Y reasoning, but only in the claim that it seems absurd. Thus they believe that life Y is a material thing, and that, indeed, we could logically restore life into a dead cow given sufficient technology.

My view as well is that life--and everything else for that matter--is a physical or material thing.

This indeed could be the case for life (at least simple life). Regarding the claim that 'everything is material', what about non-material things like the moral law or law of logic? Surely these exist and are neither matter nor energy.

Plants change sunlight into bird food. This planet changes sunlight into birds.