Well, I know I’m against to populist flow of things with my belief that Kant misinterpreted Hume - in spite of my respect for Kant. And, though I don’t much want to bicker on the subject - unless there’s reason to - I’m so far not convinced to the contrary. Basically, just wanted to express this for what its worth. — javra

Screw the populist flow. As my ol’ buddy R. Dubbya said, “to be a man one must be a non-conformist”.

As for Kant misinterpreting Hume, if you think it so, more power to ya. Me....all I’m qualified to do is philosophize regarding either one or the other, but only a Master is qualified to critique another. “Master” being just somebody talked about scholastically centuries after they’re no longer around to appreciate it.

Bickering is pathologically stupid, and, it’s worth whatever you think it is.

that Kant passage supports my earlier response to @Mww. (...) We don't necessarily have to think that mathematics is nothing but synthetic or nothing but analytic. — Janus

Correct. We don’t have to think that math is nothing but this or that. All we need from math is the validity of it as a certain science. But we’re not looking to prove that. What is being asked is, are synthetic a priori propositions and whatnot, valid explanatory devices, and if math is a possible way to show that they are, and subsequently can be used as validations for something else, then we need to know, not that math is this or that, but how math can be a proof of the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions. Because math is already a certain science, if math can ground the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions, then those propositions will necessarily be as certain as the science of mathematics, the validity of them thus obtained.

So no, all those as usual folk don’t have to think of math as anything but a tool. Only the unusual folk, on the other hand.....ehhhh, they’re off in Never-Never-Land anyway, operating in the realm of pure logic, so.....

Two distinct impressions the mind gets, yes. The immediate from perception, the mediate from the mind itself. The impression the mind presents to itself is not immediately sensed, so in that respect, they are not the same type of impression. Technically, then, we can say the impression from sense is an appearance, the impression from the mind on itself, is a recollection of an appearance. — Mww

The point though is that to be in the memory is not the same as to be in the mind (the reasoning process), because things which are being thought about are in the mind, while things in the memory are not necessarily being thought about. So I do not think we can accurately say that this impression which is derived from the memory is derived from the mind itself. We might divide the mind, like Augustine did. He proposed three parts, memory, understanding (or reason), and will. Each is understood as a sort of distinct faculty, but operating together as one trinity.

What is relevant to our discussion is that these impressions derived from memory are more fallible than impressions derived directly from sense. And, we have to account for where they are derived from. They are similar to sense impressions, yet they are produced by an internal system without the necessity of sense input. So we have to assume a different sort of intuition involved int the creation of these impressions which do not utilize immediate sense input, they are created from an internal source. We have a whole category of such things, dreams, creative fantasies, and even mathematical axioms might be placed into this category.

Since I described these things through reference to memory you called them "recollection of an appearance". But this is clearly not accurate because of the fictional aspect. And as evident in dreams, the fiction need not be a product of the conscious mind. So this category of internal intuitions includes a creative element which is other than the creativity of the conscious mind. This nonintentional (or perhaps more properly called undirected intention) is very evident in dreams, and also in certain instances of memory we might call creative memory, which produces a defective recollection with manufactured parts. We must be very wary of this 'behind the scenes' creativity, especially in its epistemological presence, in fields like pure mathematics, because it is often faulty.

But distinction in impressions on the mind is not the same as distinctions in intuitions given to the mind. Not yet worked on by the mind implies no knowledge; worked on by the mind implies knowledge. Otherwise, why have a working mind? An impression we know must be very different than an impression we don’t know, but that doesn’t qualify intuitions themselves as being of different types, or, there being one type of intuition for this impression and another for that impression. — Mww

The problem now, is that if you use "knowledge" in this way, you allow these varying degrees of fallibility into what we are calling "knowledge". Things derived from memory are manufactured by the internal process and presented to the conscious mind in a way similar to the way that things derived from sensation are manufactured and presented to the conscious mind, but the difference is in the raw 'material', content. You are saying that the content of the internal (non-sense) process uses 'knowledge' as the content, but I am saying that this supposed 'knowledge' has a high degree of fallibility and ought not be called 'knowledge'.

If I remember something, I will call this "knowing", in common parlance. But in the stricter, epistemological sense, knowledge requires justification. "I remember it that way" does not qualify as justification, so this content, derived from the internal source is not "knowledge" in the epistemological sense. This is the problem Wittgenstein approaches in the Philosophical Investigations, internal justification is not proper justification. The issue is that "worked on by the mind" as an internal process, does not imply "knowledge", in the stricter sense of the word.

Which is a perfect rendition of the intrinsic circularity of the human cognitive system. We use reason to examine ourselves, ourselves being that which reasons. We can never examine the inside of the self. We merely call it self-consciousness, represent it to ourselves as “I”, and reason from it, to everything else, by using a system reason itself invents. Like it or not, we’re stuck with it because we’re human. Or, we need to come up with a better explanatory, albeit speculative, methodology. Which hasn’t happened since 1787. — Mww

I wouldn't characterize the process as circular, because it does make progress, as you say progress occurred in 1787. And small amounts of progress do occur consistently. An inward spiral is not a circle, because it proceeds further and further inward, though it might appear to many who do not observe many revolutions, as circular.

Since "reason" is essentially method, then each advancement involves changes to methodology. Coming up with a better methodology, is exactly what I am proposing that we have a need for. The 'better methodology' is the different type of logic required to understand the internal.

Place future possible things in this category, yes. I can place existent things in this category just as well, insofar as experience only qualifies my condition, not that of the object. There’s millions of existent things I can think about and never hope to experience. — Mww

To place present existent things into the category of future possible things would be a category error. The exact "present" is fleeting, and indeterminate, because by the time anything is pointed to as present, it is gone into the past. So the judgement of present and existent, is produced from past experience. A continuity of presence is observed over a temporal duration in the past, and extended to the current present, as "now", and the existent at present is determined, judged by us, in this way. So present "existent things" really refers to things of the past, with the assumption of continuity at some indeterminable "now".

So present is a junction between the determinate past, and the indeterminable now. What is existent at the present "now" is indeterminable because the future consists only of "possible things" while the past consist of determinate things, and we do not understand how this changes at "the present. Our conception of "existent things" is a product of past experience, and you can place "possible things" in this category if you want, but I think that would be a category mistake.

Agreed, in an off-handed way you may not appreciate, insofar as the object I perceived is “real” in a way the object I haven’t perceived is “real”, because, for me, they are both equally represented by my cognitive system, the past thing “real” as a phenomenon, the future thing just as “real” as a mere conception. Again....differences in source faculties within the system, not differences in logic used by the system.

Now, the actual reality of the thing may be quite different, insofar as the past thing certainly existed, whereas the future thing may not, so it is correct to say I have no reason to affirm one is more REAL....that is to say, more existent....than the other, and I am in fact logically prohibited from claiming such is the case. Logically permitted is exactly the same kind of logic as logically prohibited, the difference being merely the conditions manifest in the premises and not its operation by means of them. — Mww

Consider the difference I described above, concerning the internal manufacturing of the impression derived from memory, relative to the more direct production of the impression derived straight from sensation. If we proceed now to a representation of a future thing, from memory, we need a further level of manufacturing, and a further level implies another opportunity for mistake, therefore more fallibility, in anything produced as a future impression.

This is where I see the biggest failure in our logical systems. We have immediate impressions at the present. And we have two distinct types of less immediate, 1) memories of the past, and 2) anticipations of the future. But when we proceed toward making an impression of a future thing, we employ the empirical method, turn to memories of the thing in the past, and flip this around toward the future, to make the future impression, instead of turning directly toward our anticipations of the future, to produce our impressions of a future thing. So this is where the empirical method totally misleads us. We think that we can turn to the thing in the past, and from this produce a representation of the thing in the future, but all we do here is produce a larger probability of mistake. In reality, to produce a proper representation of a thing in the future, we need to look directly at how the thing in the future appears to us, in anticipation, and use this to produce our representation of the thing in the future. We need to look directly at intention, to understand our intuitions of future things.

There is a fundamental difference in the type of internal object, sure, but why not simply because of the fundamental differences in their respective sources? If the different types of internal objects came from the same source, in what way could we say they are different? All conceptions represent different objects, but all conceptions, as internal objects of the faculty of understanding, are all the same type, just as phenomena represent different objects but are all the same type of object of the faculty of intuition, or maybe we could say the same species, respectively. — Mww

The different sources for the internal object produce the need for a different type of analysis. Having a different source means that they are different species. So, we have memories which originate from the past, and anticipations which originate from the future. Right away, we can see a logical problem, saying that something originates from the future. This is indicative of our faulty way of looking at the future, through the past, then reflecting the past, onto the future. and using the same descriptive terminology. The terminology does not apply properly. It's evident that we have not adequately developed the proper way to discuss things which have the future as their source.

Even the goals and objectives are different respecting different types of objects. If the goal is empirical knowledge of the world because it is always objectively conditioned, we require both kinds of internal objects; if the goal is proper moral activity, which is always subjectively conditioned, we have no need of the type of internal object found in intuition. Although, post hoc, we will need intuition to determine whether or not our moral activity is in fact properly moral. — Mww

What I'm talking about is a categorical difference, so that the different species are not reducible to being of the same genus. When the different species of objects do not have the same source, i.e. part of the same genus, we need to assume different genera.

Yep, I surely do. The logic is the same; what the logic concerns, doesn’t have to be. It is the difference between the form of logic as such, and the conceptions contained in its propositional architecture. — Mww

Perhaps, this is the way that the two types of internal objects are commonly treated, by logicians, as being different content, yet subject to the same form of logic, but what I am saying is that this is a mistake. I'm arguing that the different types of content, are subject to real distinctions, therefore requiring different forms of logic, to be properly understood. The further problem though, is that to distinguish one type of content from another, is to apply formal principles, so we already fall back on a type of logic here. This implies the need for a third type of logic, the type needed to distinguish which things are of one category of content, and which things are of the other. The "form of logic" needs to be structured so as to adequately deal with the type of content. We have one type of content which is an indeterminate future, another type which is a determined past, and a third type which is both.

Logic improperly employed is still logic. — Mww

No, it really isn't still logic, unless we can demonstrate the logic which justifies the judgement of "improperly", and show that this is somehow proper, therefore still logic. And this is the mistake made by Janus. If the process is invalid, then it is not logical and cannot be called logic. To be logical is to properly follow the principles. If you say that it is "improperly employed" then you are saying it is illogical, therefore it cannot be logic.

This is the whole point. If you ground "proper" and "improper" in some sort of "ought", which is other than that which is described by the rules of the logic, then we need another type of logic to determine "proper and "improper" in this sense. This would allow that the person is using logic, but the way that the person is using the logic is "improper" by some other rules, therefore some other logic. Then we could make sense of "Logic improperly employed is still logic", because the "improper" is determined by some other type of logic, rather than the logic which is said to be employed. If it is not determined by some type of logic, then the judgements of "improper" or "proper" have no validity, and we would have to turn to the logic itself, which is said to be "improperly employed", and there'd be no justification for the claim that it is "logic".

While the content of logic can be of real-world things, the content can also be of things thought and felt, with equal justice, from which follows that logic itself cannot belong to any faculty of mere perception, which justifies the idea that logic is a purely formal condition of human understanding and reason. — Mww

Because of the difference in content, we need a difference in form as well. Different types of content submit to different formal structures. This is fundamental to art. The freedom to create a form is limited by the medium, or content used. We can see that "real-world things", is a medium, or content of past experience, empirical truth, what is and what is not, based in our judgements of past experience. Also, we can understand that future goals, objectives, as "what ought to be", is a medium, or content of future expectations. These two distinct type of content clearly require distinct formal structures of logic to understand them.

As Aristotle showed, the three fundamental laws of logic, identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle, break down, or are inapplicable to future occurrences. This is because the judgement of truth and falsity is inapplicable to future events. He insisted that we maintain the law of non-contradiction, and allow exception to the law of excluded middle. This means that there is neither truth nor falsity to the future event, and that is what he proposed, we cannot speak about future things in those terms because they do not apply. The modern trend following Hegel, dialectical materialism, and dialetheism is to deny the applicability of the law of non-contradiction. This means that contradiction could be acceptable in statements about future things. This perspective is incorporated into modern physics, the energy moves as a particle and as a wave, contradiction. And the particle both is, and is not, at a specific place, because being a wave at the same time allows for this.

What we ought to be able to see, is that the real problem is not with non-contradiction, or excluded middle, it is with with identity. The future thing, not having a material existence as a particular, really cannot have a proper identity. This renders both non-contradiction, and excluded middle as inapplicable. But now we have the problem of producing a form of logic which can deal with this type of content, things without identity.

So, back to the is/ought. What "is", is identifiable things, and this can be dealt with by classical logical principles, truth and falsity. What "ought to be" is not something which can be properly identified, therefore there is no truth and falsity. But we have another choice term, "good". The logic which deals with "good" is not the same as the logic which deals with truth, because the object cannot be properly identified.

Already addressed; read more carefully and you might avoid further misunderstandings. — Janus

Sorry Janus, I'm not interested in your manipulation of ill-defined words for the purpose of deceptive sophistry. Your conclusion, "if the rabbit didn't go down either of those paths it went down this one" is not "inferential", because without the premise "the rabbit must have gone down one of the three", it is not valid logic. And if it is not valid we cannot say it is "inferential". If you remove the criteria, that valid logic must be employed to call the conclusion "inferential", then any decision whatsoever, can be said to be inferential. But "inference" under this use does not require logic. So even if the dog made an inference, under this definition, we cannot conclude that the dog used logic.

The dog sniffed a couple places, got tired of the trial and error process, and ran down the nearest path, and you claim that this is "inference". You show absolutely no discipline in your usage of the term.

And if it is not valid we cannot say it is "inferential". — Metaphysician Undercover

This is absolute nonsense. You don't seem to understand the distinction between inductive and deductive logic. Validity is a deductive matter concerning the principle that the conclusion must follow from the premises. Validity is irrelevant to inductive logic. Inductive logic concerns plausibility, inductive inferences are plausible explanations, it is not a matter of conclusions following strictly from premises.To say on that account that therefore there are no such things as inductive inferences is ridiculous.

It seems implausible that the dog tired of sniffing; my familiarity with dogs informs me that they don't generally tire of sniffing, and in the story as told the dog had been tracking the rabbit by scent the whole time. So, there I have myself just made an inductive inference which could, I acknowledge, be incorrect (as can any inductive inference) but it seems to me. given my knowledge of dogs, the most plausible explanation.

I look at synthetic a priori knowledge as coming from reflection on the general nature of our experience. So I see it in a phenomenological sense as not being (always at least) apodeictally certain.

You don't seem to understand what inductive reasoning is.

Inductive reasoning is a method of reasoning in which a body of observations is synthesized to come up with a general principle.[1] — Wikipedia

Your example of the sniffing dog is not an example of a dog deriving a general principle from a body of observations.

Inductive reasoning is not, in the first instance, or essentially, a matter of deriving general principles. It is, primordially, just expectation based on prior experience. Animals do it, and your own body will do it before you are even aware of it. Survival would be impossible without it.

"Inductive reasoning" produces general principles. It is not defined as "expectation based on prior experience", whatever that means. When I awake in the morning, and I am not surprised, because I see things in my bedroom to be as they were, I am not applying inductive reasoning at this moment when I open my eyes.

In your deceptive definition of terms, Janus, you do not separate out the specific thing being defined, from the general category of which it is a part. So if there is there is a general attitude in a mind, which we could call "expectation based on prior experience", and also there is a much more refined, very specific form of this general attitude, directed and applied in a very specific way, which we call "inductive reasoning". The proposition that inductive reasoning is a form, or specific type, of expectation based on prior experience, if we accept that as a true premise, does not produce the conclusion that all instances of expectation based on prior experience are instances of inductive reasoning.

This seems to be your MO, you define the more specific word as something more general. Then you try to put forward the argument that we ought to accept as reality that the more specifically named thing is occurring everywhere that we see the more general occurring. What's the point to such an argument. Is it your intent to reduce the capacity of deductive reasoning through the use of vague definitions?

Two distinct impressions the mind gets, yes. The immediate from perception, the mediate from the mind itself...
— Mww

The point though is that to be in the memory is not the same as to be in the mind (the reasoning process), because things which are being thought about are in the mind, while things in the memory are not necessarily being thought about. — Metaphysician Undercover

After working on this seemingly forever, I find I can’t offer a conclusive response, because I don’t have a clear idea of your meanings of mind. The mind may be conceived to contain a reasoning process, but if it contains it, it cannot be it, so why not remove the reasoning process from “mind” and just let the reasoning process be itself? Then it can have all the constituent parts it needs to be a proper method, and even if things in memory are not being thought about, they wouldn’t be in memory if they weren’t thought about at some time. From which follows to be in memory is the same as being in the mind, in the reasoning process, just at a different time than the other distinct impression the memory merely represents. Besides that, things that are currently thought about may be impressions from memory, which is the very same thing as my recollection of appearance.

Much easier for me to grasp, if we just say every impression ever, are all merely the contents of our consciousness, and were each and every one worked on by the reasoning process, either first, by being put there, which we might call an impression of an object of experience, or subsequently, by being recalled from there, which we might call an object as an impression from memory of the object of experience, or some object as an impression from that which is not an object of experience.
————

So we have to assume a different sort of intuition involved int the creation of these impressions which do not utilize immediate sense input, they are created from an internal source. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which type of impressions are not created from an internal source? And don’t say real objects of sense, because they are not impressions. That which makes an impression cannot be the impression it makes.

Using my terms, we have to assume a different sort of faculty involved in the creation for our impressions which do not utilize immediate sense input (because the faculty that creates impressions that do utilize sense input can’t operate unless there is one).
————

An impression we know must be very different than an impression we don’t know....
— Mww

The problem now, is that if you use "knowledge" in this way, you allow these varying degrees of fallibility into what we are calling "knowledge". — Metaphysician Undercover

In your words, my conscious mind gets an impression but the reasoning process can cognize nothing from it, then it is impossible for me to know what that impression represents. I may still be left with an opinion about the impression, but an opinion does not imply correspondence with the actual object the impression represents. To express this I would say, “I think the impression might represent a (____).” No fallibility in knowledge, insofar as I would never rightfully say, “I know the impression represents a (_____)”.

On the other hand, if my conscious mind gets an impression created by me in an internal faculty without any input from sense whatsoever, the certainty of the knowledge derived from that impression is automatic, because I myself am the author of it. This type of impression on the conscious mind given from the reasoning process, is a thought cognized as a singular conception, or a series of united conceptions cognized in the form of a completed proposition. I know with absolute certainty anything I think. It is impossible for me to think something, then turn right around and tell myself I can’t know the thought I just had.

It doesn’t matter if the object my conscious mind gets from the reasoning process is an object in memory, insofar as my knowledge is just as certain that it is an object impressed on me from memory, and I will swear up and down the memory and the original object are perfectly related. What could possibly tell me they were not? Again, no hint of a fallibility in my knowledge.

The fallibility resides in judgement, the only part of the reasoning process susceptible to fallibility. This makes perfect sense in a cognitive system that is itself purely a logical system. Not based on logic, but IS logic. The reason we know things logically is simply because reason is logic.

This reduces to...how can logic make mistakes, which answers how can judgement be fallible. Dunno. We make mistakes but don’t know the irreducible cause of them. Hence.....wait for iiiittttttttt....transcendental metaphysics, which cannot prevent mistakes, but can show how to guard against them.
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We need to look directly at intention, to understand our intuitions of future things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whole lot less complicated, whole lot less susceptible to mistakes, if we just don’t bother with understanding the intuitions of future things. We grant possibility, which is always contingent, which makes explicit knowledge from contingency it itself contingent. I can look directly at any intention I wish all day long, and tomorrow may very well thwart every one of them. Nature helps me out here, because I don’t need to directly look at my intention to breathe, for my blood to circulate, and stuff like that. Nature removes control of absolute necessities from my intentions. All the others.....ehhhhh, intend away, and merely hope for the best. Which gets us to reasonable expectations: I expect my legs to work, I expect the sun to still be there in order to intuit it tomorrow exactly as I did today.

Psychology. What a waste of brain cells.
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Logic improperly employed is still logic.
— Mww

No, it really isn't still logic, unless we can demonstrate the logic which justifies the judgement of "improperly", and show that this is somehow proper, therefore still logic. And this is the mistake made by Janus. If the process is invalid, then it is not logical and cannot be called logic. If you say that it is "improperly employed" then you are saying it is illogical, therefore it cannot be logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, your principle of identity writ large: break down the syllogism into its subject/copula/predicate composition, you get....logic/is/logic. The conception contained in the predicate is exactly the same conception contained in the subject, which makes it an analytical a priori judgement, the same thing as a tautology, which is always a necessarily true statement. And, is exactly what Aristotle indicated with the Law of Identity.

Logic improperly employed merely indicates the conceptions in the premises, or the conceptions in the syllogism itself, don’t belong to each other but are conjoined as if they do, which makes the conclusion drawn from them illogical. The conclusion is illogical, the statements/syllogisms are nonetheless logical constructions.

Second, regarding the validity of the process, “There may be some dogs that have wings” is a perfectly constructed logical syllogism, exactly following the valid logical process. The logical form is correct; the logical content conflicts, so the statement is illogical. I prefer irrational, but....whatever. But the statement illustrates your requirement so can be called logic. Bad logic, but still......

Anyway, sorry for the delay.

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An impression we know must be very different than an impression we don’t know.....
— Mww

Things derived from memory are manufactured by the internal process and presented to the conscious mind in a way similar to the way that things derived from sensation are manufactured and presented to the conscious mind, but the difference is in the raw 'material', content. You are saying that the content of the internal (non-sense) process uses 'knowledge' as the content, but I am saying that this supposed 'knowledge' has a high degree of fallibility and ought not be called 'knowledge'. — Metaphysician Undercover

Things from memory are not manufactured by the internal process; they are recalled as pre-manufactured impressions of things from the spare parts bin, called consciousness, by the internal process to bridge a gap in some subsequent raw material processing, or just to give the process something to do in the absence of raw material to process.

So, yes, there is a difference in raw material content, in that there isn’t any raw material at all in things from memory. Having already been worked on by the internal process, we may treat things from memory as impressions of resident experiences, which by that token the conscious mind receives those things known to it. But not being received directly from sense impressions, being called up as post hoc impressions to bridge a gap in a current internal ad hoc manufacturing process, the recalled impressions are known a priori to the conscious mind.

The internal process is a chain of events determining an output relating to the input raw material. If a memory is being recalled to fill a gap in a current process, the impression dropped into the gap will either allow the process to continue to its conclusion, or cause the process to stop manufacturing, culminating in no output. Therefore, there must be an authority responsible for which memory to recall from the huge manifold of spare parts in a lifetime’s worth of consciousness.

But the internal process could be just in idle, energized and waiting for the next raw material to process, operating under the condition where there isn’t any. The process doesn’t stop operating in the absence of raw material, for the conscious mind is stil conscious even in idle mode. The process can still recall impressions of things from memory to present to the conscious mind, using that, not as raw material.....because it isn’t raw material, that being the input from sense alone....but as mere impressions as such. In this case, there isn’t any gap to be dropped into, so there isn’t any ceasing of the process because the wrong impression was recalled.

The internal process by which the conscious mind gets its pre-manufactured impression of objects of sense from consciousness, is nothing but pure thought. But what of the authority that determines the validity of the memory to be recalled? If the memory is being recalled to fill a gap in order for there to be a determined relation, the authority must be more strict than in the case where the process is in idle and for which, on the one hand, a determined relation has already been given, re: extant experiences, or, on the other, is not even being sought, re: possible experiences.

In all cases of raw material of sense, discursive judgement calls up memory, reason is the authority, from which is obtained a relative truth. In all other cases, aesthetic judgement calls up memory, imagination is the authority, from which is obtained a relative pleasure.

Intuition can now be the one thing it is, and logic hasn’t even made a functional appearance.

Easy-Peasey......

@T Clark

A priori, self-evident, intuitive, obvious, and common sense knowledge

If a proposition (herein that causality is logically necessary) can't be proven true but feels true, it could be a self-evident truth!

If a proposition (herein that causality is logically necessary) can't be proven true but feels true, it could be a self-evident truth! — Agent Smith

I think it's the other way around - if it feels true but we can't prove it, we call it self-evident. That's my problem with the whole concept of self-evidence. It lets people be lazy with the illusion of knowledge.

:ok:

After working on this seemingly forever, I find I can’t offer a conclusive response, because I don’t have a clear idea of your meanings of mind. The mind may be conceived to contain a reasoning process, but if it contains it, it cannot be it, so why not remove the reasoning process from “mind” and just let the reasoning process be itself? Then it can have all the constituent parts it needs to be a proper method, and even if things in memory are not being thought about, they wouldn’t be in memory if they weren’t thought about at some time. From which follows to be in memory is the same as being in the mind, in the reasoning process, just at a different time than the other distinct impression the memory merely represents. Besides that, things that are currently thought about may be impressions from memory, which is the very same thing as my recollection of appearance. — Mww

I think the issue here is not what "mind" means, but what it means to be in memory. We tend to believe that the mind takes an object, an idea, sense impression, or something like that, and places it somewhere, holding on to it, to be referred to for later use. Under this belief, the thing remembered, the memory would be in the mind somewhere.

That, I think is a mistaken belief. I think, that in reality, the mind must recreate the impression or idea every time it supposedly retrieves it from memory. If this is the case, then we cannot say that things in memory are actually in the mind. The mind must recreate the memory each time it remembers it.

Accordingly, the issue is not a question of what "mind" means, it's more a question of what mind does. If mind puts the object, sense impression, in a storage place, to be pulled out later, then the remembered thing is always in the mind. If it recreates the object (the memory) each time it recalls it, then the object is not in the mind, in the mean time. I believe that the fallibility of the remembering faculty, and the changes which occur to the remembered object, from one time to the next, which I've already referred to, indicate that the latter is the truth. The other, is a sort of naive way of talking about remembering, which facilitates communication ("I have it in my memory"), but it doesn't suffice for a philosophical inquiry into this matter. So you say, "much easier for me to grasp", that way, but sometimes taking what appears to be the easy way, is to be misled.

If the sense impression is not deposited in the memory, as an object, but replicated each time that a person remembers something, then we ought to inquire about this capacity to replicate a sense impression, without the use of the senses, and consider how similar it is, or isn't, to an actual sense impression.

The internal process is a chain of events determining an output relating to the input raw material. If a memory is being recalled to fill a gap in a current process, the impression dropped into the gap will either allow the process to continue to its conclusion, or cause the process to stop manufacturing, culminating in no output. Therefore, there must be an authority responsible for which memory to recall from the huge manifold of spare parts in a lifetime’s worth of consciousness. — Mww

If the process is as I propose, that the mind recreates, or replicates a sense impression (consider having a song in your mind) every time that it remembers something, then we have to question what exactly is the content here. You say that memory can provide content to fill gaps in the input raw material, but what is this content which the memory is providing? The mind is not making it up as pure fiction, but it is attempting to replicate something. But how could the mind replicate something which already happened in the past, unless it has that something to look at and copy? But if it has that something to look at, then that something is the real memory. Maybe the mind puts a token, or representation of the thing somewhere, but a token doesn't look like the thing itself, so the token can't produce the memory.

I think it's just a pure process, with no content. The mind learns a process, and it can repeat this process. It's entirely formal, a process free from material content. The process creates the impression, whether or not there is any input from the senses. In its fundamental "pure" form, there is no sense input, no raw material, just a formal process. That process allows itself to be affected by raw material.

But the internal process could be just in idle, energized and waiting for the next raw material to process, operating under the condition where there isn’t any. The process doesn’t stop operating in the absence of raw material, for the conscious mind is stil conscious even in idle mode. The process can still recall impressions of things from memory to present to the conscious mind, using that, not as raw material.....because it isn’t raw material, that being the input from sense alone....but as mere impressions as such. In this case, there isn’t any gap to be dropped into, so there isn’t any ceasing of the process because the wrong impression was recalled. — Mww

I see it similar to this, except I see no necessity for raw material. The mind can continually create impressions without any raw material, like in the case of dreams and memories. But then it can also do the same in thinking, manufacturing conceptions, mathematical axioms etc., without any real need for new raw material. The difference between this type of impression, and the ones which use sense input, is that the mind uses the sense input to learn new processes and techniques, because the sense input is stimulus which excites new feelings, and new challenges for the mind. So it's sort of ironic because the process is fundamentally free to do anything, but it won't do anything until provided with the initiative, because it has to first learn how to do something. So novelty comes not from freedom, but from being subjected to new limitations.

The internal process by which the conscious mind gets its pre-manufactured impression of objects of sense from consciousness, is nothing but pure thought. — Mww

I don't see how you can validate this idea of a "pre-manufactured impression". How could the mind store an impression?

Easy-Peasey...... — Mww

Maybe, but like I said, sometimes taking the easy way is to be misled.

Oh sorry Mww, I got mixed up between your two posts. Here's some more points

Things from memory are not manufactured by the internal process; they are recalled as pre-manufactured impressions of things from the spare parts bin, called consciousness, by the internal process to bridge a gap in some subsequent raw material processing, or just to give the process something to do in the absence of raw material to process. — Mww

Making something from spare parts is still manufacturing. But then you still have to account for where, and how the spare parts are stored.

So, yes, there is a difference in raw material content, in that there isn’t any raw material at all in things from memory. — Mww

Doesn't this contradict the notion of "spare parts"?

The fallibility resides in judgement, the only part of the reasoning process susceptible to fallibility. — Mww

But then what is remembering? Surely it's an essential part of the reasoning process. And surely it is fallible. So there is fallibility which is prior to judgement, in the memory process.

because I don’t have a clear idea of your meanings of mind.....
— Mww

I think the issue here is not what "mind" means, but what it means to be in memory. We tend to believe that the mind takes an object, an idea, sense impression, or something like that, and places it somewhere, holding on to it, to be referred to for later use. Under this belief, the thing remembered, the memory would be in the mind somewhere. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don’t think the mind does anything, except serve as conceptual complement to “body”. Just sayin’.

I think, that in reality, the mind must recreate the impression or idea every time it supposedly retrieves it from memory. If this is the case, then we cannot say that things in memory are actually in the mind. The mind must recreate the memory each time it remembers it. — Metaphysician Undercover

You know how when you need, say, a dozen boards 12” long, you mark off 12”, cut it off the long board, then lay that 12” piece on the long board, mark and cut that piece, then use that second 12” piece to mark the third? If the first cut was off a little, then using that to mark the second, use the second to mark the third.....each time the cut gets longer by the error in the first cut. If the mind recreates the memory each time it remembers it.....what would prevent each memory being a little different than the object being remembered? If you remember an object often enough, it becomes possible you haven’t remembered the original object at all. And if you haven’t remembered the original, what is it you’re remembering? Now the ground is set for, say, by the time you got to 6th grade, you should have failed to remember at least most of which you learned in first grade. But, of course, you have not. What do we do about that?

Besides....is there anything in memory you don’t know? If there is, you’re gonna have a hellava time explaining how it got there.
—————-

If mind puts the object, sense impression, in a storage place, to be pulled out later, then the remembered thing is always in the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

If it recreates the object (the memory) each time it recalls it, then the object is not in the mind, in the mean time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, the remembered thing is always in the mind, the thing remembered remains where it was put. Whether remembered or re-created, there is a representation of a representation, which I agree is susceptible to fallibility of identity, but is not necessarily so.

The mind is not making it up as pure fiction, but it is attempting to replicate something — Metaphysician Undercover

For empirical conditions, by which a real object becomes an impression of experience subsequently a content of consciousness, the faculty of representation grounded in sensibility is necessary. For the re-creation of an impression recalled from consciousness, in which there is no immediate impression grounded in sensibility, makes explicit the faculty responsible for handling sensibility is not necessary. So it appears there is a difference set of faculties for one method as opposed to the other.

In the case where the impression by an object becomes knowledge of it by the synthesis of intuition and concept into a cognition of that object, post hoc memory recall, then, is merely a judgement made on a pre-conceived representation, and the error in recall of an extant representation the object of which is known, is negligible.

While the degree of identity of the recall is determined by the degree of accuracy in the original, the error in the recall is not impossible, but so vanishingly small as to be disregarded. That is to say, if the one is somewhat wrong, the latter will be exactly the same somewhat wrong, but if the original is correct, so too will be the recalled impression. Usually fault is predicated on fault in the entire system as a disfunction of age in the form of electro-chemical brain disability. But we’re concerned with the rule, not exceptions to it.

In the case of re-creation, with the impression of the object of sense already established, what is being used as the source, if not the impression in consciousness? And more importantly, how does that source make itself usable to the system? In the former case, the impression is right there, the faculty being used in recall knows where to find it, and just goes and gets it. In the re-creation scenario, some faculty constructs, but apparently without being told where to get its construction material. Or at least, you’ve haven’t yet posited such a source.

You say that memory can provide content to fill gaps in the input raw material, but what is this content which the memory is providing? — Metaphysician Undercover

A posteriori knowledge for objects in the world; a priori knowledge for objects of reason.
—————

I think it's just a pure process, with no content. The mind learns a process, and it can repeat this process. It's entirely formal, a process free from material content. The process creates the impression, whether or not there is any input from the senses. In its fundamental "pure" form, there is no sense input, no raw material, just a formal process. That process allows itself to be affected by raw material. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the process allows itself to be affected by raw material, then the affect is the content. For there to be a process makes explicit that which is processed. Otherwise is to claim there are thoughts without that which is thought about, a contradiction. Or experience without that which is experienced.

The process is indeed very formal and entirely free from material content, but is necessarily conditioned by it when such material affects sensibility, from which is given the affective representational content.
—————-

The difference between this type of impression, and the ones which use sense input, is that the mind uses the sense input to learn new processes and techniques, because the sense input is stimulus which excites new feelings, and new challenges for the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nature would have ruined us if making it so we needed a different process every time something new came along. Before learning what the something new is, we’d have to learn the process by which learning something new becomes possible. Rather more efficient to use one process exactly the same way for all instances, while compensating for that which Nature herself doesn’t provide.
———

How could the mind store an impression? — Metaphysician Undercover

It doesn’t. All my representations reside in consciousness. Each and every otherwise rational human agent’s personal spare parts bin. All that of which I am conscious in in one place. Obviously, because for each and every single representation ever of mine, “I” is that which brings it forth. Consciousness, a passive faculty, is not part of the active reasoning process, so not subjected to its rules.

But then what is remembering? Surely it's an essential part of the reasoning process. — Metaphysician Undercover

Remembering is, certainly. The distinctions reside in which parts of the process is used under corresponding conditions. Nothing is ever added to the process itself under any conditions whatsoever....it being, as a whole, as our kind of intelligence demands of it....but some parts of it may not be required under some conditions.

The human is a dualistic creature, no matter how such duality is represented. Metaphysics is all about the representation, the explanatory theory, the less complicated and confused the better.

Same as it ever was......

The rules of valid inference cannot be deduced from empirical observation alone, although observation can validate or falsify some inferences. But this is an argument against physicalism: because logical necessity is different to physical causation, then how can it be argued that the mind is causally dependent on physical causes? That was why I originally started this thread. It's related to 'the argument from reason'.

If the mind recreates the memory each time it remembers it.....what would prevent each memory being a little different than the object being remembered? — Mww

I think that's actually very common. We have to work hard to ensure that a memory doesn't change. This requires constant effort. It takes effort to memorize something, that is a method of repetition, and a similar method of periodic recollection is used to ensure that the memory doesn't change. The longer the duration of time between the acts of recollection, the more substantial the change in the memory is likely to be.

If you remember an object often enough, it becomes possible you haven’t remembered the original object at all. And if you haven’t remembered the original, what is it you’re remembering? — Mww

That's exactly the point, you are not remembering an object at all, you are learning a process. And what I said is that there is no content, or material aspect of this process at all, so there is no object. Your sub-conscious mind just repeats a process, and the process creates the material or content, as "the memory". So the content is present to your consciousness, but it is created by the process which is not present to your consciousness. We would say that the process is "the same" each time, but since each time is a different time, there are accidentals which are different, and that accounts for differences in remembering the same thing.

Now the ground is set for, say, by the time you got to 6th grade, you should have failed to remember at least most of which you learned in first grade. But, of course, you have not. What do we do about that? — Mww

You do not forget everything you learn in the first grade by the time you get to the sixth, because you have to keep recalling much of it, at every step of the way between first and sixth. However, much is actually forgotten because we do not make the effort of repetition required to hold onto it. I believe the young mind is much more adept than the older mind though. But unless you sit down at the end of the day and recall everything that happened to you that day, the majority will be forgotten. Something could happen the next day, to bring it back to mind, but as time passes it gets harder and harder to bring it back to mind.

Sure, the remembered thing is always in the mind, the thing remembered remains where it was put. — Mww

This is what I dispute, there is really nothing put anywhere, just a process learned and repeated.

In the case where the impression by an object becomes knowledge of it by the synthesis of intuition and concept into a cognition of that object, post hoc memory recall, then, is merely a judgement made on a pre-conceived representation, and the error in recall of an extant representation the object of which is known, is negligible. — Mww

This makes no sense to me. You must recall first, before you can make a judgement on the thing recalled. How can recollection itself be a judgement? Recollection cannot be "a judgement made on a pre-conceived representation", because judgement is a conscious act, and the pre-conceived representation must be recalled to the conscious mind before a judgement can be made on it. I agree that there is a judgement made to recall a specific representation, but the recollection is not itself a judgement.

While the degree of identity of the recall is determined by the degree of accuracy in the original, the error in the recall is not impossible, but so vanishingly small as to be disregarded. That is to say, if the one is somewhat wrong, the latter will be exactly the same somewhat wrong, but if the original is correct, so too will be the recalled impression. Usually fault is predicated on fault in the entire system as a disfunction of age in the form of electro-chemical brain disability. But we’re concerned with the rule, not exceptions to it. — Mww

I don't agree with this at all. In my experience there is a heck of a lot of inaccuracy in recollection. We have to work extremely hard if we wish to try to avoid inaccuracy, and this is called memorizing. But even with extraneous efforts, mistakes abound if the thing being memorized is at all complicated. Try reading a long sentence or two, then turn around and try to reprint that, word for word.

In the case of re-creation, with the impression of the object of sense already established, what is being used as the source, if not the impression in consciousness? And more importantly, how does that source make itself usable to the system? In the former case, the impression is right there, the faculty being used in recall knows where to find it, and just goes and gets it. In the re-creation scenario, some faculty constructs, but apparently without being told where to get its construction material. Or at least, you’ve haven’t yet posited such a source. — Mww

The "source" is the process, plain and simple, and it is repeated. You add something extra, the "it" in "the faculty being used in recall knows where to find it". You have the faculty carrying out a process, whereby it goes to find something, gets it, and presents it to the conscious mind. I see no need for the "it". The faculty is not finding anything, it's just doing something, and what it is doing is creating an impression in the conscious mind. And what I've said repeatedly now, is that there is no " construction material". The act which the faculty carries out, is the act which creates the content, the material, which is present in the consciousness.

If it was a sense impression there would be material content involved, from the sense. But material content is responsible for the uniqueness of individual acts of sense impression. In memory and recollection, the goal is to remove all material content, because material content is responsible for uniqueness, and differences, which in memory are accidentals, mistakes. So the pure, perfect memory without mistake must be pure process with no material content.

Otherwise is to claim there are thoughts without that which is thought about, a contradiction. — Mww

Not quite, thinking is the process which produces thoughts, so thinking is prior to thoughts. Notice "thought" is past tense of thinking. Therefore it is necessary to conclude that there is thinking without thought. There is thinking without that which is thought about, because that which is thought about is produced by, created by, thinking.

For there to be a process makes explicit that which is processed. — Mww

Ultimately, there must be a process which creates the things to be processed. Otherwise things are designated as first, prior to process, then we have no way to understand the existence of things. If we say that there is a process which creates things, then we have the means for understanding the existence of things. We have to address that process, and try to understand it.

The process is indeed very formal and entirely free from material content, but is necessarily conditioned by it when such material affects sensibility, from which is given the affective representational content. — Mww

This is why the process which deals with sensations, and creates sense impressions within the conscious mind, must be completely different from the process which recollects. The process which creates sense impressions is confined to dealing with the material received by the specific sense, and is directed toward that sense, whereas the process which recollects must be free to recollect anything. The one is restricted by material content, the other is not.

Nature would have ruined us if making it so we needed a different process every time something new came along. — Mww

But it's true, we need a different process for every new thing that comes along, otherwise we could not remember each one as different. I suppose that's why we have so many neurons.

@Varde

All Claims are Justifiable

Methinks the OP is onto something really important. It happened to Christianity. Church Councils were convened in which Christian doctrines were adopted not by argumentation but by vote (argumentum ad populum). The next generation of theologians then went to work on these tenets, reasoning backwards to axioms that would support them. This is just a hypothesis of course; cum grano salis. Modern psychology has a term for this: rationalization! — Agent Smith

In short, we can justify the logical necessity of causation. All we need to do is come up with a set of axioms that can be used to deductively argue the case.

Anyone have any ideas?

consider having a song in your mind) — Metaphysician Undercover

This is very difficult without actually involving your body to sing along.

What do you mean? I have music in my mind almost all the time. And, I find it fascinating how I can have a song going on in my mind, while I am thinking of something else at the very same time. It's similar to the way that I can be sensing things while I am thinking at the same time, yet the production of the music in my mind is independent from all sensations. It appears like producing the song in my mind is carried out by a different faculty than that which is thinking, just like receiving sensations is done by a different faculty from that of thinking.

The point being that the song in my mind, though it is a memory of music I heard, is definitely created by my mind, rather than being a repetition of something I sensed, because I can't replicate the melody exactly as I heard it, and I need to ad lib on the lyrics, because I can't remember them properly.

The question between Mww and I is whether 'the memory' is created by selecting from a bin of spare parts (and whether or not the spare parts qualify as 'raw material' is another issue), or whether it is simply a process which creates the internal images, a process which attempts to replicate the original sensing process, without any need for material content.

If, in analysis, we remove the "raw material" provided by sensation, we have an inclination to replace it with some sort of stored material, something stored in the memory to replace the raw material of sensing. But I don't see how this material could be stored in the memory. The raw material received through sensation is always active, activities which affect the senses. How could the mind store activity? It would need to be maintain as 'the same' activity over an extended length of time. And if the mind simply recreates the activity, then it is a process without any stored raw material. However, somehow the information of how to recreate the activity must be maintained (stored).

What do you mean? I have music in my mind almost all the time. And — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, if I hear a song in my mind, I unconsciously, so I noticed, sing along in my mouth or vocal court or move my body. Only in dreams I can hear sounds, I think, though I can't actually remember. When you hear sound from headphones, you can do a nice play. You can move them away from your ears and take the sound out of your head. Very strange experience.

If you hear a tune inside your head your body is involved. You can get tears in your eyes or move along. Pure hearing seems impossible.

I have music in my mind almost all the tim — Metaphysician Undercover

Have you seen a doctor? :lol:

No, the sane dont hear the music. And so are mad!

If the mind recreates the memory each time it remembers it.....what would prevent each memory being a little different than the object being remembered?
— Mww

I think that's actually very common. We have to work hard to ensure that a memory doesn't change. This requires constant effort. It takes effort to memorize something, that is a method of repetition, and a similar method of periodic recollection is used to ensure that the memory doesn't change. The longer the duration of time between the acts of recollection, the more substantial the change in the memory is likely to be. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not all that common, but occasionally, sure., especially in the case of individual particular objects. I have no idea exactly what I held in my hand at any given time four years ago, but I remember full well a trip I took to Yellowstone four years ago, and most, but not all, of what I did on that trip.

We don’t work on memories. A memory modified is a new memory.

Memorization is a method of repetition, yes, but we don’t memorize memories; we memorize cognitions that become memories.

We don’t recall memories merely to refresh them; we recall them to compare to a current cognition.

The longer between recall of a memory the less it may relate, yes, but that is not a change in the memory. If a memory no longer is accurate recollection, it’s simply because we’ve more with which it no longer compares. At ten y.o. my memory of going fast was 50mph; at 30 y.o. my memory of going fast was 100mph. My memory of 50mph is still an accurate recollection and hasn’t been replaced; it just doesn’t accurately relate to going fast.
—————

I think, that in reality, the mind must recreate the impression or idea every time it supposedly retrieves it from memory. (...) The mind must recreate the memory each time it remembers it.
— Metaphysician Undercover

If you remember an object often enough, it becomes possible you haven’t remembered the original object at all. — Mww

That's exactly the point, you are not remembering an object at all, you are learning a process. And what I said is that there is no content, or material aspect of this process at all, so there is no object. Your sub-conscious mind just repeats a process, and the process creates the material or content, as "the memory". — Metaphysician Undercover

But I don’t know what my sub-conscious mind is doing, so what grants the authority for it to do what you say it is?

And why does it seem like I’m remembering objects?

So the sub-conscious is repeating a learning process, the results of which is a memory. What are the ingredients, the constituency, the composition, of this process? What is learned and what learns it? I can see a comparison being created, maybe, but what is recognizing it as such?

I can see having no material properties, but the content is still an object as “memory”, right? Gotta be a memory of something. I agree my memory of an object is mere convention, insofar as there is no material object being recalled from memory, but there is still a representation of one, which should, for all practical purposes, be a replica of the original material object. So it would seem to have a material aspect.
—————

While the degree of identity of the recall is determined by the degree of accuracy in the original, the error in the recall is not impossible, but so vanishingly small as to be disregarded....
— Mww

I don't agree with this at all. In my experience there is a heck of a lot of inaccuracy in recollection. We have to work extremely hard if we wish to try to avoid inaccuracy, and this is called memorizing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Did you memorize your favorite birthday present, or do you....you know....just remember what it was? If you don’t remember what it was, then you didn’t work hard enough memorizing, in which case you conventionally say you don’t remember, but in fact the truth is, you just don’t know.

I agree, though, that there are times when you tell yourself something is really important and it is a great benefit for you to remember it. Maybe it is in these cases where continuous recall is the method by which the memory becomes embedded and readily available. But I don’t see a repetitive sub-conscious process at work, if you have to tell yourself to repeat the impression in the reasoning process.
———-

.....post hoc memory recall, then, is merely a judgement made on a pre-conceived representation, and the error in recall of an extant representation the object of which is known, is negligible.
— Mww

This makes no sense to me. You must recall first, before you can make a judgement on the thing recalled. How can recollection itself be a judgement? Recollection cannot be "a judgement made on a pre-conceived representation", because judgement is a conscious act, and the pre-conceived representation must be recalled to the conscious mind before a judgement can be made on it. I agree that there is a judgement made to recall a specific representation, but the recollection is not itself a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Recall first, yes, but the recollection is not itself the judgement. The recalled memory is in relation to your experience, which is judged. No, this impression doesn’t represent what I got for my birthday; no this is doesn’t.....yes, this does.

No, this impression doesn’t represent how I remember Stephen King’s antagonist in The Shining. No, this doesn’t, yes this does. The object brought up from consciousness meets general criteria first, becoming more particular as the reasoning process examines that which is given to it. Each object is brought up and discarded or not depending on your experience from which the original object became a memory in the first place.

It is usually the case that the reasoning process helps itself by bringing up several objects, all of which were pre-conceived representations related to the past experience.....who was there, what your brother was doing, what kind of cake, and so on. These aid the reasoning process in giving the conscious mind the impression it’s looking for.....your favorite birthday present.
—————

The process is indeed very formal and entirely free from material content, but is necessarily conditioned by it when such material affects sensibility, from which is given the affective representational content.
— Mww

This is why the process which deals with sensations, and creates sense impressions within the conscious mind, must be completely different from the process which recollects. — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe, dunno how that process works, exactly. In the system I know, sense impressions are given to us, not created by us. The impression I get from an object is determined by that object. I can’t tell an object it is round; it tells me.

I don’t see why the recollections can’t be dealt with by the same system. They’re all representations.

But it's true, we need a different process for every new thing that comes along, otherwise we could not remember each one as different. I suppose that's why we have so many neurons. — Metaphysician Undercover

I reject it’s true. If you ca convince me it’s possible, I’ll work with it.

“The understanding itself is the lawgiver of Nature; save through it, Nature would not exist at all.” Critique of Pure Reason, A126.

"Quantum mechanics is a law of thought."
— Chris Fuchs

I have music in my mind almost all the time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Musicians would like to have a word with you! You're an existential threat to all musicians and music companies.

Just imagine not needing to stream/download music from payfor sites. You're something, man!

:snicker:

We don’t work on memories. A memory modified is a new memory. — Mww

This is where we disagree. I think that memory requires effort, this effort is called memorizing. Memorizing consists of repetition within the conscious mind. After something occurs, to remember it well, in detail, I must go over it again and again in my head, to keep all the details straight, order of occurrence, fine details, etc.. Without this repetition, the details get lost and are not remembered properly. Then, when I try to recount the event at a later time, I will get parts of the ordering wrong, or some of the details wrong, or not be able to recount them at all.

Language serves as a memory aid. When something happens which I want to remember, I put it into words in my mind. This gives me far greater capacity to remember the details and order than if I try to remember all the details of an event through imaging. Order of occurrence of the details is what I find to be the most difficult. If I can't establish some relation (causal) between the images within my mind, I cannot connect them fluidly, and the memory becomes a bunch of disjointed images which become difficult to give temporal order to. This is where using words really helps me for some reason (perhaps because I've been trained in giving order to words when I was very young, as counting). When I order the parts of the event in my mind with words, I find it's far easier to remember the details, and the order. Writing the words takes memory to another level altogether, and sometimes people write journals as a memory aid.

I think that we must always work on memories, to keep them established in the memory. To memorize something requires a conscious system of repetition. Once the thing is memorized it has that status as being memorized. But the status of being remembered is temporally limited, and it is not death which limits it. In other words, to have something memorized does not mean that you'll always be able to recall it until your dying day. Things are forgotten. So there is a temporal limitation to memory, such that if the thing is not recalled and repeated again, by the conscious mind, within that duration, it will be forgotten. We can give many examples of memories which haven't been forgotten. And, memories which prove to be useful are the most recalled, therefore the most remembered. But it would be pointless for me to try and give an example of a memory forgotten. I know for sure though, just by looking at how many things I remember in any given day, and how many days there are in a year, that the things forgotten by me vastly outnumber the things which I remember to this day.

Memorization is a method of repetition, yes, but we don’t memorize memories; we memorize cognitions that become memories. — Mww

This seems like contradiction. Repetition requires 'the same thing' (or same type) more than once. If the same thing comes into your mind a second time, then it comes as a memory. In all my experience of memorizing, it is very clear to me, that what is repeated within the mind in the act of memorizing is the memory. Think about it. Suppose you're learning something fundamental, like how to count. What comes after "two"? If every time you get to "two", the teacher shows you "three", and you mimic it, then you never memorize it. What is required is that you recall "three" as being after "two" from your own memory, and this effort is what establishes the memory that three is after two.

We don’t recall memories merely to refresh them; we recall them to compare to a current cognition. — Mww

Yes, we recall memories to use them, but this is what refreshes them, and keeps them well established. This is why it is the useful memories which are maintained. Unless you start refreshing them simply for the purpose of refreshing them, like when you write a journal, it is only the useful memories which end up maintained.

The longer between recall of a memory the less it may relate, yes, but that is not a change in the memory. If a memory no longer is accurate recollection, it’s simply because we’ve more with which it no longer compares. At ten y.o. my memory of going fast was 50mph; at 30 y.o. my memory of going fast was 100mph. My memory of 50mph is still an accurate recollection and hasn’t been replaced; it just doesn’t accurately relate to going fast. — Mww

When the memory is no longer useful, therefore no longer recalled, it gets forgotten, plain and simple. The vast majority of memories are actually forgotten in this way. Your example is a judgement, as to what constitutes "fast", it's not really a proper example of memory. But how could one give an example of memory which has been forgotten?

But I don’t know what my sub-conscious mind is doing, so what grants the authority for it to do what you say it is? — Mww

We can use introspection and logic to figure out what the sub-conscious mind is doing. That is philosophy.

And why does it seem like I’m remembering objects? — Mww

As I said, this is a feature of language, to think of yourself as remembering objects is a practise which has come about for the purpose of facilitating communication concerning internal affairs. That it is useful to speak about internal conditions as if they are objects has made such language the norm.

So the sub-conscious is repeating a learning process, the results of which is a memory. What are the ingredients, the constituency, the composition, of this process? What is learned and what learns it? I can see a comparison being created, maybe, but what is recognizing it as such?

I can see having no material properties, but the content is still an object as “memory”, right? Gotta be a memory of something. I agree my memory of an object is mere convention, insofar as there is no material object being recalled from memory, but there is still a representation of one, which should, for all practical purposes, be a replica of the original material object. So it would seem to have a material aspect. — Mww

These are thoughtful questions, ones which I have no real answer for. Essentially you are asking, how can there be a process without an object, or thing involved in that process (i.e. contnet). What I think we have to do is place the cause of the process as outside the process. "What learns it?", is something outside the process, but is engaged in the process as the cause of it, and this is the person, "the self", as the agent. But what is actually moving, changing, or active in the process, is unknown. The conclusion I make is that the process has no content. Compare this to quantum physics. Remove the particle (as the content), and all we have left is the process, wave pattern. Now ask, what controls the wave pattern if there is no particle, and in our case, it is the self, as the agent. What the "self" is, I cannot answer.

Did you memorize your favorite birthday present, or do you....you know....just remember what it was? If you don’t remember what it was, then you didn’t work hard enough memorizing, in which case you conventionally say you don’t remember, but in fact the truth is, you just don’t know. — Mww

Again, this is an example of judgement, not straight memory. To remember your favorite birthday gift requires that you remember all your gifts, and make a judgement, unless you've already made that judgement and memorized the consequent.

But I don’t see a repetitive sub-conscious process at work, if you have to tell yourself to repeat the impression in the reasoning process. — Mww

What I think, is that the process itself is subconscious, but the judgement to repeat is conscious, and that's why it takes conscious effort to have a good memory. It's a type of habit, where the habitual action itself has been subrogated to the subconscious, but still requires a conscious judgement to initiate. So for instance, like walking, is a subconscious action, not requiring conscious decisions about where to put your feet, but it still requires a conscious decision to initiate the action, and it still requires a sort of conscious effort to be aware of what you are doing. Walking is an activity done subconsciously, but requiring a conscious decision to initiate.

Recall first, yes, but the recollection is not itself the judgement. The recalled memory is in relation to your experience, which is judged. No, this impression doesn’t represent what I got for my birthday; no this is doesn’t.....yes, this does.

No, this impression doesn’t represent how I remember Stephen King’s antagonist in The Shining. No, this doesn’t, yes this does. The object brought up from consciousness meets general criteria first, becoming more particular as the reasoning process examines that which is given to it. Each object is brought up and discarded or not depending on your experience from which the original object became a memory in the first place.

It is usually the case that the reasoning process helps itself by bringing up several objects, all of which were pre-conceived representations related to the past experience.....who was there, what your brother was doing, what kind of cake, and so on. These aid the reasoning process in giving the conscious mind the impression it’s looking for.....your favorite birthday present. — Mww

I think there is a problem with representing the reasoning process in this type of relationship with memory. If you had to bring up an object, and judge it as to whether it is the correct memory, you would have nothing to compare it with to make that judgement, because that would require that you already had the correct object to make the comparison with. So, I think that when the memory (supposed object) is recalled from the memory, it must be taken for granted as the correct memory. The memory (object) comes into relation with the reasoning process if it doesn't fit with other memories, then reasoning is required to sort things out. That we take for granted that the memory (object) which is brought up is correct, is the reason why people with faulty memories, dementia etc., are so hard to deal with. People are always naturally convinced that their memories are correct. So when two different peoples' memories disagree, there is a problem.

Maybe, dunno how that process works, exactly. In the system I know, sense impressions are given to us, not created by us. The impression I get from an object is determined by that object. I can’t tell an object it is round; it tells me.

I don’t see why the recollections can’t be dealt with by the same system. They’re all representations. — Mww

This I believe is the root of the problem, the faulty materialist way of looking at things. You place the "cause" of the sense impression in the external object, rather than within the human being, and you conclude that the "impression I get from an object is determined by that object". A little experimentation with psychedelics and hallucinations would probably show you otherwise. The human body is very finely tuned, and a slight alteration in the chemical balance will change the sense impressions greatly. This demonstrates that the impressions are really determined by the human body, not by the external object. The human body receives information from the object, but it is this human body which creates, and determines the impression, not the external object.

Once we come to apprehend this reality, that the basic cause is internal, rather than external, then many philosophical issues, like free will, become far more intelligible. Then we can place recollections and sense impressions in "the same system", but the system has an internal cause, and it is not "determined" by the external factors.

Musicians would like to have a word with you! You're an existential threat to all musicians and music companies. — Agent Smith

I am a musician, and I speak to myself all the time. Hilary thinks that means I'm mad. I'm also a composer. How do you think an artist could create a piece of music if they didn't have it in their mind? Do you think it's a matter of trial and error? Or do you think composers simply use mathematical formulas to put the music on paper, then try it out on the instrument?

I am a musician, and I speak to myself all the time. Hilary thinks that means I'm mad. I'm also a composer. How do you think an artist could create a piece of music if they didn't have it in their mind? Do you think it's a matter of trial and error? Or do you think composers simply use mathematical formulas to put the music on paper, then try it out on the instrument? — Metaphysician Undercover

So, that's what's going on!

These Romans Musicians are crazy. — Obelix

:snicker: You maniacs!

The rules of valid inference cannot be deduced from empirical observation alone, although observation can validate or falsify some inferences. But this is an argument against physicalism: because logical necessity is different to physical causation, then how can it be argued that the mind is causally dependent on physical causes? That was why I originally started this thread. It's related to 'the argument from reason'. — Wayfarer

I would say the rules of valid inference are abstracted from our experience of making inductive inferences (which are not understood in terms of validity, but of plausibility). Some inductive inferences can be formulated in deductive terms, of course. For example:

P: The sun has risen every day since the earth existed
P; There are laws of nature which determine that, absent some unforeseen catastrophic event, the sun will rise tomorrow, and continue to rise for billions of years into the future.
P: No catastrophic event preventing the rising of the Sun will happen between now and tomorrow
C: The sun will rise tomorrow

Of course there is no guarantee the Sun will rise tomorrow. because some of the premises might be unsound, but nonetheless the argument is a valid deductive argument.Notice that the premises themselves are inductive inferences.

The mind could indeed be dependent on physical causes, but that would not entail that the logical content of thought is dependent physical causes.

I would say the rules of valid inference are abstracted from our experience — Janus

Logical rules (such as the law of the excluded middle) are known a priori. That's what a priori actually means. The mind is capable of understanding such principles without any reference to experience - that's the point. Actually if you look at the OP again, this very point is the subject of the first post so I'm not going to go into it again.

On a related note, I've found an excellent academic paper, which I've pinned to my profile page, 'Philosophy and Spirituality in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason'. It's a difficult and lengthy read but it's a really important paper. It demolishes the depiction of Kant as the sensible, prudent empiricist philosopher. I might do an OP on it to summarise the details.

Logical rules (such as the law of the excluded middle) are known a priori. — Wayfarer

Don't think this is the case, in my humble opinion. Logical rules have their base in the material world. A gas in empty expands or implodes. It can't stay in between, if no gravity is present. The excluded middle. A drop of milk in coffee temporarily has a nice shape. But chaos takes over. Only true life maintains dynamic shape. The logical rule associated? Entropy. Cause and effect.