Then this is foolish. — schopenhauer1

Seems rude.

Seems rude. — Jackson

It seems foolish to say there is no "inner and outer" but maybe prove me wrong. It's as if someone said, "I do not see colors" when they clearly show evidence they do.. Thus misconstruing perhaps what I am asking.. and if evaluated further would realize, "Oh yea, I see this red color when I look at X thing (apple, fire truck, etc.).

But of course, this doesn't explain much either. It just posits that the "inner aspect" is spread around to everything. It is a position.. — schopenhauer1

It just seems like an incoherent position to me that there could be relations without non-relations (stuffs, or "inner aspects", as you call them).

It just seems like an incoherent position to me that there could be relations without non-relations (stuffs, or "inner aspects", as you call them). — litewave

Yeah but why are non-relations necessarily experiential, other than we know that experience exists in animals?

It just seems that both non-relations and the qualia of experience are unstructured stuffs. And who is to say which unstructured stuffs are qualia of experience? You could say that certain stuffs are qualia and others are not, or you could say that all stuffs are qualia but of different kinds, levels or intensities. So the stuffs of a stone would be a low-intensity, negligible kind of qualia while the stuffs of a human brain would be a high-intensity kind of qualia we all care about. Or you could reserve the term "qualia" only for the human or animal kinds of stuffs. The stone stuffs might be so radically different and negligible, indistinguishable from what we would call unconsciousness or coma, that they're just not worth being called qualia of consciousness. Either way, it is morally important to differentiate between stone stuffs and human brain stuffs.

By "stuff" I mean something that is not a relation. Are you saying that only relations exist? Or what exists? — litewave

Yes, only relations exist, and every relation is the creation of a new differentiation.

It just seems like an incoherent position to me that there could be relations without non-relations (stuffs, or "inner aspects", as you call them). — litewave

This thinking is the basis of not only a host of postmodern philosophies but of newer thinking in the cognitive sciences , and perhaps physics.

“...the identity of the thing with itself, that sort of established position of its own, of rest in itself, that plenitude and that positivity that we have recognized in it already exceed the experience, are already a second interpretation of the experience...we arrive at the thing-object, at the In Itself, at the thing identical with itself, only by imposing upon experience an abstract dilemma which experience ignores(p.162).”
(Merleau-Ponty)

I see red. I don't feel myself seeing red — Jackson

You do both simultaneously:

“Although these two sides can be distinguished conceptually, they cannot be separated. It is not as if the two sides or aspects of phenomenal experience can be detached and encountered in isolation from one other. When I touch the cold surface of a refrigerator, is the sensation of coldness that I then feel a property of the experienced object or a property of the experience of the object? The correct answer is that the sensory experience contains two dimensions, namely one of the sensing and one of the sensed, and that we can focus on either.”( Dan Zahavi)

We also can distinguish the mode of givenness of a perception. We can tell whether it is actual , a recollection or something we imagine.

Yes, only relations exist — Joshs

What about the Einzelgänger, who has moved away from any sort of relation? Will he get lost in space, diluted into oblivion, like a single particle in the empty void, only the virtual in the vacuum to play with?

Yes, only relations exist, and every relation is the creation of a new differentiation. — Joshs

Relations between what?

Philosophically, we cannot answer why humans have sensations, consciousness, and feelings. We can only answer the how humans became this way -- through mutation, evolution, etc. — L'éléphant

Yep, I agree. — schopenhauer1

Maybe I'm misinterpreting or else missing something. So I'll ask: How can the mechanics of biological evolution explain how consciousness comes about when it cannot provide an explanation of what does and does not have consciousness?

Relations between what? — litewave

Relations between relations. To exist is to make a difference. Deleuze is one of the philosophers articulating this idea:

“ Normally we think of difference as an empirical relation between two things that have a prior identity (‘x is different from y’), but Deleuze takes the concept of difference to a properly transcendental level: the differential relation is not only external to its terms (Bertrand Russell’s empiricist dictum), but it also conditions or determines its terms. In other words, the differential relation becomes constitutive of identity: difference becomes productive and genetic.”

So I'll ask: How can the mechanics of biological evolution explain how consciousness comes about when it cannot provide an explanation of what does and does not have consciousness? — javra

What does and does not have consciousness is an inter-disciplinary topic covered by biology, psychology, and specialized areas such as neurology. Of course, different levels of consciousness exist among living beings. But human consciousness is the most understood -- so I only referred to human consciousness.

And your question has been answered. It's hard to have a discussion when one starts with "what does and does not have consciousness", because we know humans have consciousness.

What does and does not have consciousness is an inter-disciplinary topic covered by biology, psychology, and specialized areas such as neurology. — L'éléphant

You're not mentioning philosophy, which I think is of greater importance than the disciplines you've mentioned. The cogito comes to mind on one side of the spectrum. Philosophies such as that of autopoiesis in respect to non-human minds on the other.

It's hard to have a discussion when one starts with "what does and does not have consciousness", because we know humans have consciousness. — L'éléphant

Sure, but we don't know this via our inferential knowledge of biological evolution, right?

To be clear, my question was that of “how does biological evolution explain how consciousness comes about, this when biological evolution (as theory we employ for explanations and predictions) does not of itself provide us with an explanation of what is conscious and what is not conscious."

This has to do with the limitations of biological evolution as a system of explanation, and not with our firsthand experiential knowledge of so being conscious.

You do both simultaneously: — Joshs

It seems foolish to say there is no "inner and outer" but maybe prove me wrong. — schopenhauer1

Long story....
Hegel defined ancient greek metaphysics as natural consciousness and modern (Christian) as self consciousness. I think he is correct. Reading Aristotle one does not see discussion of 'my experience', or subjectivity.

Self consciousness is a form of subjectivity. Why did not Aristotle talk about consciousness--is it a new part of the brain? No.

So I think self consciousness is just a form of consciousness. The "self" is just the modern emphasis on the individual. "I see red" and "I know myself as seeing red" are rhetorically different, but logically both mean, "I see red."

Relations between relations. To exist is to make a difference. — Joshs

Except such a difference is undefined and therefore doesn't exist. Its supposed definition refers to other definitions that refer to other definitions etc., thus the initial difference is never defined. A difference between differences between differences etc.

You're not mentioning philosophy, which I think is of greater importance than the disciplines you've mentioned. — javra

Oops, actually, I meant to include Philosophy there. I didn't review my post. But yes, I agree.

Sure, but we don't know this via our inferential knowledge of biological evolution, right? — javra

Uhm, yeah that's what I meant -- we do know through the inter-disciplinary studies. Tests and studies show this.

To be clear, my question was that of “how does biological evolution explain how consciousness comes about, this when biological evolution (as theory we employ for explanations and predictions) does not of itself provide us with an explanation of what is conscious and what is not conscious." — javra

They do. Let's cite some studies from the medical community. For example, the consciousness of babies is defined as that recognizing the mother's voice and face, then later awareness of body parts, etc. As adults we are aware of our own mortality and what is death. So, we are aware of the future and what happened in the past.

Tell me, what is it that's inadequate as explanation in your opinion? Let's start there.

Except such a difference is undefined and therefore doesn't exist. Its supposed definition refers to other definitions that refer to other definitions etc., thus the initial difference is never defined. A difference between differences between differences etc. — litewave

That’s where probabilistic description comes into play.
‘Postmodern’ quantum mechanics is different so f ways to model how ‘stuffs’ are made from differential relations.

That’s where probabilistic description comes into play. — Joshs

Probability is reducible to well-defined pure sets too, so there is nothing undefined ontologically. Something either exists exactly as it is or it doesn't exist. Probability is just a tool to quantify our epistemic uncertainty.

What is lacking in our accepted definition/description of consciousness? Because I'm good with it. But if you're not, what's your definition of consciousness in humans, in animals?

They do. Let's cite some studies from the medical community. For example, the consciousness of babies is defined as that recognizing the mother's voice and face, then later awareness of body parts, etc. As adults we are aware of our own mortality and what is death. So, we are aware of the future and what happened in the past.

Tell me, what is it that's inadequate as explanation in your opinion? Let's start there. — L'éléphant

What you provide is not an explanation of how consciousness comes about via the mechanisms of biological evolution - in brief, natural selection acting upon mutations.

It is of course adequate as an explanation. But, again, it is not an explanation via biological evolution. Biological evolution does not address at which stage of an embryo does the species-specific consciousness takes hold. Nor does it address if gametes are themselves conscious But note that a sperm is well recorded as recognizing direction toward the egg and, furthermore, contact with the egg, at which point the sperm attempts to penetrate the egg. Whether or not this evidences some degree of consciousness on the part of sperm is again not something that biological evolution in any way addresses, much less explains.

Whether all life requires some degree of consciousness (firsthand experience) in order to function or else whether consciousness appears at some point in life's evolution is not something that evolution of itself explains.

Again the issue I'm addressing is biological evolution explaining the how of consciousness. Just that.

I think self consciousness is just a form of consciousness. The "self" is just the modern emphasis on the individual. "I see red" and "I know myself as seeing red" are rhetorically different, but logically both mean, "I see red." — Jackson

Let’s see if you agree with this: I dont go along with writers like Nagel who want to establish some sort of self-identical ‘I’ that accompanies every perception and infuses it with some sort of special feeling of me-ness.
Instead, I think the self is contingent, and constantly changes along along with other aspects of our experience. But I think it’s important to recognize that when we perceive a sound or color or touch sensation , we are not just passively receiving data. What we experience in its actuality is a synthesis that includes our expectations derived from prior experience. That is why two people receiving the same ‘data’ from the world will experience it in slightly different ways. So the feeling of what anything is like will always differ from
person to person. But by the same token, the ‘self’ that projects the expectations which enter into what a sensation is for each of us is always changing. Therefore , what it is like for me to experience the ‘same’ color over time is never the same for me, because I am never the same ‘I’.

What you provide is not an explanation of how consciousness comes about via the mechanisms of biological evolution - in brief, natural selection acting upon mutations. — javra

No I have not provided you with the how. I've only been talking about examples of consciousness. So, we can proceed then to discuss how biology is the reason why consciousness exists -- as a start.

What is lacking in our accepted definition/description of consciousness? Because I'm good with it. But if you're not, what's your definition of consciousness in humans, in animals? — L'éléphant

I've missed our agreed upon definition of consciousness. By common standard, it can be deemed equivelent to awareness, hence to a first person point of view, hence to firsthand experience.

Is this something we agree upon?

BTW, my personal take - which I find not possible to definitively prove - is that consciousness is a staple factor of all lifeforms.

So, we can proceed then to discuss how biology is the reason why consciousness exists -- as a start. — L'éléphant

This is a significant change in argument. The OP, to which I responded, addresses evolution as explanation for consciousness - not biology. There's a very distinct difference between the two.

I've posted links in this thread:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12484/the-decline-of-intelligence-in-modern-humans

I need to revisit those articles, as I'm not sure if they're adequate as sources of how intelligence (hence consciousness) developed.

This is a significant change in argument. The OP, to which I responded, addresses evolution as explanation for consciousness - not biology. There's a very distinct difference between the two. — javra

Biology, evolution -- whatever it takes.

I need to revisit those articles, as I'm not sure if they're adequate as sources of how intelligence (hence consciousness) developed. — L'éléphant

OK. Yet one can have intelligence in the absence of consciousness. Current AI as example. They're not the same.

Probability is reducible to well-defined pure sets too, so there is nothing undefined ontologically. Something either exists exactly as it is or it doesn't exist. Probability is just a tool to quantify our epistemic uncertainty. — litewave

Is ontological definition the same as determinism? Can a non-deterministic world be defined in the way you describe?