Kant acknowledged that a priori judgements come after experience. (You couldn't conceive of causality, for example if you had never experienced constant conjunctions of events or number if you had never experienced different objects). Once these concepts are synthesized from experience, and understood to be common to all experiences, they do not need to be checked against subsequent experiences; that's all the "a priori" means in this context.

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Don't think this is the case, in my humble opinion — Hillary

No offense, but your opinion has no bearing, and the examples you cite are not relevant. If you go back and read the first post in the thread you might see why.

No offense, but your opinion has no bearing as well. All logical necessities are based on physical causes and effects. Maybe some logical necessities apply to the laws governing the objects in the causal processes, but your logical necessities will always follow the laws of nature. Your logical necessities have no impact.

All logical necessities are based on physical causes and effects. — Hillary

Says who? Provide one citation for that.

Says who? — Wayfarer

Says I. Give me one example of a logical necessity. I can point to a natural process corresponding to it.

Kant acknowledged that a priori judgements come after experience. — Janus

Kant’s ‘discovery’ of the a priori grounds of empirical cognition was praised because it showed how a spiritualist metaphysics could be confined to the limits of empirical experience. It was acclaimed much more, though, for showing that beyond these limits in which Locke and Newton threatened to immure reason, the mind encountered ‘objects that cannot be conceived but can only be thought through reason’. These transcendental objects or ideas made it possible to defend the presence of a self-acting moral being within the empirical world and a supreme intelligence as
the ground of its intelligibility.

...

These are concepts – the transcendental ideas – that necessarily arise from rational reflection. According to Kant, these ideas of reason, like the categories of the understanding, form an a priori system. Kant does not attempt to derive the transcendental ideas in questionable ways from the forms of rational inferences or the possible relations between subject, object, and representation (even though the text suggests this), but rather considers them, much more plausibly, as concepts we arrive at through rational inferences about specific (psychological, cosmological, and theological) subject matters. The central philosophical point here is that concepts can be the result of what Kant calls ‘necessary inferences of reason.’ A first instance of this is Kant’s derivation of the concept of the unconditioned; the chapter then turns to the three classes of transcendental ideas (psychological, cosmological, theological).

(Cribbed from various sources.)

Says I — Hillary

Have you ever studied philosophy in any formal sense? Read anything about it? I only ask, because your comments appear on almost every thread on this forum, but they seem almost totally devoid of any real philosophical acumen.

you ever studied philosophy — Wayfarer

Yes.

Well, what to some of the texts say about the relation of logical necessity and physical causation? I'm sure you will find it's not nearly the slam-dunk you're saying it is.

I'm sure you will find it's not nearly the slam-dunk you're saying it is. — Wayfarer

Haha! No indeed not. Is that bad?

I mean, there is a plethora of material patterns to be seen in our world. Forms that show coherence without the parts having causal connections. Held coherent by common causes, holonomic coherent constraints, absorbing energy, transforming, evolving away from thermodynamic equilibrium. There is resonance between two worlds, on both sides of the epistemic cut, covered by a Markov or Friston blanket. The outside of the physical world is projected continuously into ia mental counterpart on the other side. It's on the cut itself where physical causation meets logical necessity.

It's on the cut itself where physical causation meets logical necessity. — Hillary

:up: Now that's better. And very close to something I said somewhere earlier in this thread - that scientific principles are a place where logical necessity and physical causation meet.

The outside of the physical world is projected continuously into a mental counterpart on the other side. It's on the cut itself where physical causation meets logical necessity. — Hillary

But the distinction between inner and outer is itself a constructive activity of the mind. That is why I am always working on trying to understand Kant's 'copernican revolution in philosophy' - that things conform to thoughts, not thoughts to things.

Kant's 'copernican revolution in philosophy' - that things conform to thoughts, not thoughts to things. — Wayfarer

Both, for Kant.

It's one-way. If it were 'both', then Kant would not have said anything. If you want to show otherwise, you'll need to back it with some references.

It's one-way. If it were 'both', then Kant would not have said anything. If you want to show otherwise, you'll need to back it with some references. — Wayfarer

Same to you.

It's one-way. — Wayfarer

Of course it is; couldn’t be otherwise.

Forgive them, for they know not what they say. If they did, no citation would be necessary, it (the “experiment” you mentioned) being the foundation of the entire systemic transcendental enterprise.

(Sigh)

Kant acknowledged that a priori judgements come after experience. — Janus

I think Kant means the validity of a priori judgements are demonstrated by experience.

“....The possibility of experience is, then, that which gives objective reality to all our à priori cognitions....”

An a priori judgement is an a priori cognition, insofar as a judgement is the synthesis of representations from which a cognition follows. As such, then, an a priori judgement is valid iff a possible experience may follow from it. All this is intended to show, is that we can synthesize all the representations we want, but if they don’t lead to an experience, or a possible experience, they are generally useless. Or what he calls “without sense or meaning”. Which is the conventional way of describing the ever-dreadful transcendental illusion.

We’ve been here before, and honestly, I can’t find anything to substantiate Kant’s acknowledgement as you’ve posited it. I’d understand if you’ve no wish to pursue this line of disagreement; to each his own, etc, etc.....

I think Kant means the validity of a priori judgements are demonstrated by experience.

“....The possibility of experience is, then, that which gives objective reality to all our à priori cognitions....”

An a priori judgement is an a priori cognition, insofar as a judgement is the synthesis of representations from which a cognition follows. As such, then, an a priori judgement is valid iff a possible experience may follow from it. All this is intended to show, is that we can synthesize all the representations we want, but if they don’t lead to an experience, or a possible experience, they are generally useless. Or what he calls “without sense or meaning”. Which is the conventional way of describing the ever-dreadful transcendental illusion.

We’ve been here before, and honestly, I can’t find anything to substantiate Kant’s acknowledgement as you’ve posited it. I’d understand if you’ve no wish to pursue this line of disagreement; to each his own, etc, etc..... — Mww

A priori means before experience, or a condition of experience.

A priori means before experience, or a condition of experience. — Jackson

The foregoing conversation is in reference to Kant, so.....

“....By the term “knowledge à priori,” therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. (....) If, on the other hand, a judgement carries with it strict and absolute universality, that is, admits of no possible exception, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely à priori....” (...) Not only in judgements, however, but even in conceptions, is an à priori origin manifest....”
(B3-6, A2 says something a little different, but always go with the latest)

....which is not to say there is no other reasonable criteria for the conception, but any such is useless in this transcendental context.

Correct — Mww

:snicker:

Give me one example of a logical necessity. I can point to a natural process corresponding to it. — Hillary

A proposition containing logical necessities whose subject matter does not correspond to any natural processes or entities:

A Chimera (from Greek mythology) can magically teleport itself or it cannot.

The principle of identity stipulates the following logical necessity: “A Chimera that can magically teleport itself” is equivalent to “a Chimera that can magically teleport itself”.

The principle of noncontradiction stipulates the following logical necessity: A Chimera cannot both be capable of magically teleporting itself and incapable of magically teleporting itself at the same time and in the same respect.

The principle of the excluded middle stipulates the following logical necessity: there cannot be a medial state of being in-between those of “can magically teleport itself” and “cannot magically teleport itself”.

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I don't see the epistemic cut between physical causation and logical necessity in the aforementioned.

Then again, some such as myself will claim that these same three laws of thought are natural laws. Such that they govern not only all of thought (some of which has little to nothing to do with natural process and entities) but all of nature.

All the rest is good philosophy, so it doesn’t really matter that I can counter-argue many of its points. Because you’ve done a worthy job of self-expression, it becomes now a matter of minutia.

You place the "cause" of the sense impression in the external object, rather than within the human being, and you conclude that the "impression I get from an object is determined by that object". The human body is very finely tuned, and a slight alteration in the chemical balance will change the sense impressions greatly. — Metaphysician Undercover

I hold with materialism with respect to external objects of perception, yes. All external objects are substance, or, material, and the material of the object is that which affects my perceptive apparatus. In conjunction with that, I hold that these sense organs have no cognitive power, they merely relay the presence of material, upon which that part of the reasoning system having to do with sense impressions, functions. Do my eyes qualify as chemically imbalanced upon hallucination, or is it in the brain, where the impressions are received, that the chemical changes occur? If in the brain, and the philosophical equivalent of brain is a theory of cognition, in which comparable manifestations appear, then it is in the reasoning process where judgement is affected, that stands in for chemical changes in the brain.

So no, the sense impression does not change; what the reasoning process makes of it, does. It is the cognition of the object given from the reasoning process, not the impression the object gives me, that tells me I’m stoned.

The human body receives information from the object, but it is this human body which creates, and determines the impression, not the external object. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed, in that the body (actually, the sub-conscious process you favor, which I call intuition) creates a phenomenon that determines how the impression should be represented. In this respect, then, causes are always and only internal, but only regarding the reasoning process itself, having nothing whatsoever to do with causes of objects, or that which objects cause.

We might agree, on the other hand, that objects cause, are the raw unprocessed material for, perceptions, but then, perceptions (raw material) alone are not impressions, which are the purview of sensation (representation of raw material). Again....minutia.

A Chimera (from Greek mythology) can magically teleport itself or it cannot. — javra

A quantum particle hops non-locally between different position, within the bounds of the wavefunction.

A Chimera (from Greek mythology) can magically teleport itself or it cannot. — javra

A quantum particle hops non-locally between different position, within the bounds of the wavefunction. — Hillary

Seems like a bit of a non sequitur ... Can you either cite references of this being "the magical teleportation of quantum particles which they willfully enact" or else independently provide rational evidence for the same?

For instance, why would self-imposed/willed magical teleportation logically need to be bounded by anything physical, wave-functions included? Its magic, after all.

Secondly, your reply doesn't seem to address the logical necessities of identity, of noncontradiction, and of the excluded middle. Last I recall, QM is riddled with what appear to us to be logical inconsistencies. The delayed-choice quantum erasure as just one example which I'm personally astounded by.

Seems like a bit of a non sequitur ... Can you either cite references of this being "the magical teleportation of quantum particles which they willfully enact" or else independently provide rational evidence for the same? — javra

The wavefunction can be seen as made uo from hidden variablds. Bohm was called names because of this in his time (foolish Trotskyan, mindless child, etc.). One can even say its the make up of space itself. The wavefunction aids the particle to explore space around it instantaneously. To find other particles. To interact, to love, to hate. Quite a purpose...

Secondly, your reply doesn't seem to address the logical necessities of identity, of noncontradiction, and of the excluded middle — javra

The law of the excluded middle stems from physics.

The delayed-choice quantum erasure as just one example which I'm personally astounded by. — javra

That's not that difficult to understand. It involves backward collapse. The present collapsing the wave in the past. Example: a double slit. If the wave has passed through two slits and arrives at a large distance screen, you can alter the state by closing a slit.

logical necessities of identity, — javra

What are those?

What are those? — Hillary

Never mind.