Ah! Found it!

"In modal logic, the necessity of identity is the thesis that for every object x and object y, if x and y are the same object, it is necessary that x and y are the same object."

Well, never mind indeed!

To be the same it's necessary that they are the same. Weieieird....

Kant acknowledged that a priori judgements come after experience. — Janus


I think Kant means the validity of a priori judgements are demonstrated by experience. — Mww

I am sure I remember reading a passage from Kant wherein he says what amounts to saying that a priori judgements are independent of any particular experience, but not independent of experience in general.

Now, isn't that also just what you are saying when you say " I think Kant means the validity of a priori judgements are demonstrated by experience"; that is they are demonstrated by reflecting on experience, but not demonstrated by any particular experience?

Also, it seems unarguably true that no one could make a synthetic a prioiri judgement if they had never experienced anything. Do you find yourself disagreeing with this:

(You couldn't conceive of causality, for example if you had never experienced constant conjunctions of events or number if you had never experienced different objects). — Janus

for example?

Isn't that just because to be the same is a matter of logic, and there is no unnecessary logic; it is entailment all the way down?

that just because to be the same is a matter of logic, and there is no unnecessary logic; it is entailment all the way down. — Janus

To be the same needs the logic of being the same?

To be the same needs the logic of being the same? — Hillary

To be the same is the logic of being the same. What else could it be, since it's not a physical relation?

To be the same is the logic of being the same. What else could it be, since it's not a physical relation? — Janus

But how can two things be the same logically then?

How can A=B if they are different? What's the logic behind it?

If A is the force, and B is the mass multiplied by the acceleration, how come they are the same?

We’ve been here before, and honestly, I can’t find anything to substantiate Kant’s acknowledgement as you’ve posited it. I’d understand if you’ve no wish to pursue this line of disagreement; to each his own, etc, etc..... — Mww

Folks are generally empiricist and realist by upbringing and cultural inclination. As Bryan Magee comments:

We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them. This, of course, is one of the explanations for the almost unfathomably deep counterintuitiveness of transcendental idealism, and also for the general notion of 'depth' with which people associate Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. Something akin to it is the reason for much of the prolonged, self-disciplined meditation involved in a number of Eastern religious practices.

Indeed. No coincidence that my initiation into Kant was via T R V Murti's exposition of Madhyamika in his book The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. I'm still exploring that connection.

We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions

"rajse impossibly deep levels", which means the levels don't exist. And if they could be raised, they should be raised to "the level of self-consciousness", which means they are a part of the self, which is the question, "before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions", which means we must have a frame from which we criticize. From where did we get this frame? It resides in the same impossibly deep level.

I'd say two different things cannot be the same.
As to your 'force/ mass x accelaration example" is that a claim of identity or proportionality?
Other examples might be cases of different descriptions of the one thing.

I'd say two different things cannot be the same. — Janus

Two electrons are exactly the same.

As to your 'force/ mass x accelaration example" is that a claim of identity or proportionality — Janus

Identity. F=ma.

Other examples might be cases of different descriptions of the one thing — Janus

How can different descriptions be the same?

Two electrons are exactly the same. — Hillary

Not if they are at different locations.

How can different descriptions be the same? — Hillary

I didn't say they could be the same (if they were, they would not be different descriptions); I said two different descriptions could be of the same thing.

Not if they are at different locations. — Janus

I mean in a superposition. Their identities merge.

; I said two different descriptions could be of the same thing. — Janus

Yes, obviously.

Not if they are at different locations. — Janus

Is the position important? How else can there be two?

Is the position important? How else can there be two? — Hillary

If they are not at different locations then logically there cannot be two.

I mean in a superposition. Their identities merge. — Hillary

That may have a mathematical meaning in the context of QM, but it has no logical meaning.

If they are not at different locations then logically there cannot be two. — Janus

That's why their position doesn't make them different.

That may have a mathematical meaning in the context of QM, but it has no logical meaning — Janus

It does. There are two electrons. In superposition.

I am sure I remember.....a priori judgements are independent of any particular experience, but not independent of experience in general. — Janus

If you should happen across it again....
————

(You couldn't conceive of causality, for example if you had never experienced constant conjunctions of events or number if you had never experienced different objects). — Janus

This reflects post of Magee’s position. It seems the norm nowadays, to put the cart before the Kantian horse, which is fine, if one is comfortable with it. The theory goes....and of course it is only theory.... that a human rational agent only understands because the conditions for it are already contained within that agency. Long story short...we understand stuff because we’ve come equipped to do it, and one of the ingredients we come equipped with, is the idea of cause/effect.

(Not technically an idea as commonly thought. We call it that because “transcendental conception of pure reason” is just too far out, and misleading, because that conception is developed by pure reason in order to talk about it, but the idea doesn’t belong to reason at all; it belongs to understanding, which is just makes it.....er......further far out)

In fact, we only have the effect of the experience of objects because those objects are the cause of it. From there, it is a short hop to understanding the effects of objects themselves as having a cause. It is clear, then, we don’t have to conceive causality; it is the natural order of our understanding, and antecedent to any use of it.

Take “possibility” for instance, another intrinsic condition. That idea doesn’t represent our ability for understanding might be possible, which is a non-starter because our understanding is given by the type of intelligence that makes us human, but instead, represents that for a thing to be presented to us, that thing must at least be possible. Obviously, things we perceive must be possible, else we wouldn’t perceive them, but that doesn’t hold for things we merely think. As such, Nature....or sheer evolutionary happenstance if you prefer.....has ensured we don’t waste time thinking about things that are impossible, in our pervasive reach, and sometimes over-reach, for knowledge.

So no, we don’t conceive causality, or the cause/effect dichotomy. We conceive individual representations of it.....because that’s how it’s done, dammit!!!!!

Sorry.....not so short after all.

Folks are generally empiricist and realist by upbringing and cultural inclination. — Wayfarer

Yeah, which generally leads to intellectual laissez-faire....let it be, don’t bother me with the details, kinda thing.

Weieieird.... — Hillary

Trying out my luck at explaining the law of identity in a manner that might be understood.

That which is (A) is not and cannot be that which it is not (not-A). This being a more long-winded way of saying that “each given is identical with itself”, or “A = A”. Which is what the law of identity stipulates to be an innate and determinate aspect of our awareness and, derivatively, of how we think. Hence being deemed "a law of thought" - since it is deemed to govern all thought without exception.

This can be falsified by some given A being cognized as not-A at the same time and in the same respect.

So, if A = “two electrons in superposition” then A is and can only be “two electrons in superposition” - but not “four electrons in superposition” or else “strawberry cake” etc.

So a thing can only be itself if it's itself. A vase can't change into a fork because then the vase is not the vase anymore, unless the fork is a vase in disguise. The two electrons in a superposition are themselves and not themselves (namely, the other electron) at the same time. A is A and not A. Nature doesn't follow established modes of thought. QM is weird. But fully comprehensible, if we accept non-locallity as a feature of nature. The electrons have split identities. Is itself and the other at the same time. Love operates at fundamental level already! :heart:

I'm not going to unpack everything, and I'm not here to debate the nature of QM, but this:

A vase can't change into a fork because then the vase is not the vase anymore, unless the fork is a vase in disguise. — Hillary

... is not what the law of identity states. See my previous post again. A vase can change into a fork ... maybe as can occur in a cartoon. But a vase cannot be a fork at the same time and in the same respect (... unless, of course, one considers the implausibility of a hybrid: something one can use as a vase at one time and as a fork at another. But, then, this hybrid's identity would itself be different from either that of a strict vase or that of a strict fork. The law of identity remains intact.)

One can postulate that QM operates beyond the laws of thought all one pleases, but this does not in any way evidence that we can ourselves think in manners that are not governed by the laws of thought.

How can a vase change into a fork? It truly can't, lemme tellya! In cartoons...yes. But life is no cartoon. Only if a face, eeeh, vase, puts on fork clothes this can be done. I think you over estimate the power of thinking (which is exactly where you excell in, so that's understandable). Which probably is why you think there are laws of thought. Which there are not. QM is prove that we are indeed bound to classical thinking. Which is to say, if you accept the bounds. Which I don't. I think non-local, like an electron! I'm an electron! :wink:

I'm an electron! :wink: — Hillary

Alright you. Enough said.

Out of curiosity, what do you make of the particle-wave duality? Do you take electrons to be both particles and waves at the same time and in the same respect? (Just remembered that many organic molecules - which are big - exhibit the same particle-wave duality. But that aside.)

Well, being an electron, eeehh, sorry couldn't resist!

Seriously. Okay. I think the wave is real. Ala de Broglie or Bohm. Who both were just put aside without reason (just ordinary powerplay). If you consider the wave made from hidden particles (which could be the make up of space itself!), then the electron hops non-locally and instantaneously within the bounds of the wavefunction, spending most times where the "density of space" is highest. So both the particles as the waves are real. No collapse problems, measurement problems, many worlds interpretations, etc. If only at Copenhagen...

Alright. Cool. thanks

How can a vase change into a fork? It truly can't, lemme tellya! — Hillary

You, as Creator of your World, have a chunk of modelling clay in front of you. You think, I must have a vase, so you carefully mold the clay into a vase, without pulling out chunks. You are pleased as you examine your creation. But then you think, I would like a fork now, the vase has served its purpose. And you carefully mush the clay into a lump and start anew, fashioning a large fork. And you are pleased with your creation, saying, Let there be a fork!

This is all done as an exercise in topology, a mathematical topic that studies continuous transformations from one thing to another, roughly. You are pleased with this tidbit of knowledge. :smile:

In fact, I had that coffee mock in mind! But the vase is not changed in a fork then. The vase is just gone. Something can only change if it keeps its identity. I can change from laughing to crying.

Long story short...we understand stuff because we’ve come equipped to do it, and one of the ingredients we come equipped with, is the idea of cause/effect. — Mww

So, is the claim that we have that idea from the moment of birth? When I said "conceive" I was not thinking in terms of linguistic conception; I believe there is evidence that animals also think in terms of causation. My point the whole time , though is that from the moment of birth experience, both extroceptive, introceptive, proprioceptive and agential is happening for both humans and animals. Whether we have a kind of 'hardwired' capacity for thinking in the various categorial terms, analogous to Chomsky's idea about being hardwired to learn language is another question of course. The body has its inherent capacities, no doubt, and we are not born as "blank slates".

Obviously, things we perceive must be possible, else we wouldn’t perceive them, but that doesn’t hold for things we merely think. — Mww

Are we able to think of anything that is not something we have heard of, or at least a composite of things experienced and/ or heard of?

That's why their position doesn't make them different. — Hillary

OK, logically if some one thing could be in two different places at once, then it would be two different manifestations of the one thing, I suppose. But how do we establish that it is in fact the one thing?

That may have a mathematical meaning in the context of QM, but it has no logical meaning — Janus


It does. There are two electrons. In superposition. — Hillary

Logically, if there are two electrons. then they are not the same. Perhaps you mean that there is only one electron that appears as two electrons in superposition. You can't have it both ways.