All you can say is that only you can have your experiences; but that says nothing. — Banno

You can also say that you can check your current experiences against previous experiences, and that in fact perception is based on this meeting between expectation derived from one’s past and the present event. This is knowing as interpretive recognition. By the same token, we can check our expectations concerning the way another person will react to and interpret an event against their actual behavior from our vantage. This is how we determine that there are ‘others’ in the first place , by their violation of our expectations that we can come to anticipate. We learn this way that other people are like me but also different. We can engage with them and form imperfect mutual
understandings using the ‘same’ language , that don’t overcome so much as they are built upon these interpersonal differences.

In sum , my ‘self’ is an ongoing checking of events against expectations. Through this process there is revealed an ongoing ‘self’ that is never self -identical but that for the most part continues to recognize itself though it’s familiarity with its perceptions of its world, its body and its thoughts and feelings. Of course, this achievement of a unified self is tenuous. Psychosis can split this ongoing unity into alien selves. But because in most cases a self-consistency is maintained over time, this provides a basis for distinguishing self from other in a fashion similar to how one experiences one’s own self as changing over time.

:brow: It was your interjection that now appears to have been without purpose.

it's not clear to me what you had to add to the discussion.

One learns the grammar of "I" and "me".

↪Joshs One learns the grammar of "I" and "me". — Banno

But not just unidirectionally through language, as if we were stimulus-response creatures. There is a bi-directional reciprocal shaping between organism
and languaged community. If there were only one way shaping from the social unit to its bodies , there would be no need for the concept of ‘I’ in the first place, only a vast cultural we-self.

If there were only one way shaping from the social unit to its bodies , there would be no need for the concept of ‘I’ in the first place, only a vast cultural we-self. — Joshs

I think the idea of the self is something of a fetish. Hume's critique of identity is accurate. There are multiple selves without there being an identity of all the selves.

Not until six pages in does Nagel even define what "like" means. Footnote 6, "Therefore the analogical form of the English expression "what it is like" is misleading. It does not mean "what (in our experience) it resembles," but rather "how it is for the subject himself."

This always troubled me. It seems his whole idea of "like" is vague or inchoherent. — Jackson

If I ask you what it's like to visit Las Vegas, would you understand what I'm asking?

If I ask you what it's like to visit Las Vegas, would you understand what I'm asking? — Tate

Yes, I understand English.

Yes, I understand English. — Jackson

Excellent.

It was your interjection that now appears to have been without purpose.

it's not clear to me what you had to add to the discussion. — Banno

My interjection? My original comment was a response to @Tom Storm; I wasn't addressing you at all, so if anyone interjected it was you. The point I made was that "what is it like to be...or do...?" just means "how does it feel to be.. or do...? and has nothing to do with resemblance.

You attempted, unsuccessfully, to argue against this, albeit without actually presenting a cogent argument. The best thing you've said lately in this thread was your point about the so-called "view from nowhere" actually being the view, not from nowhere, but from anywhere; a point which I also have made in a few of these kinds of discussions (and which I recently discovered was also made by Merleau-Ponty back in the middle of last century).

I think the idea of the self is something of a fetish. Hume's critique of identity is accurate. There are multiple selves without there being an identity of all the selves. — Jackson

There is a general sense of self which underlies and ties all the different aspects of the self together in that they are all aspects of my self, even if some of them are in conflict.

Yep. Not private.

There is a general sense of self which underlies and ties all the different aspects of the self together in that they are all aspects of my self, even if some of them are in conflict. — Janus

I do not think the self which underlies is anything but all those aspects.

I do not think the self which underlies is anything but all those aspects. — Jackson

You can lose aspects, but not the underlying sense, of self. From my own experience I can say that the underlying sense of being myself does not change; it just consists in being me.

The point I made was that "what is it like to be...or do...?" just means "how does it feel to be.. or do...? and has nothing to do with resemblance. — Janus

I have pointed out that "How does it feel to be...?" depends on resemblance as much as "what is it like to be...or do...?". "Exhilarating" has its use in the resemblance of different exhilarations.

But you are right that this it trivial.

"Exhilarating" has its use in the resemblance of different exhilarations.

But you are right that this it trivial. — Banno

:up: Trivial indeed, since the name of any kind of thing has its use on account of resemblances of different instances of the kind of thing named.

All you can say is that only you can have your experiences; but that says nothing. — Banno

Knowing isn't an experience?

What? — Banno

Huh?

There is an ambiguity. Consider the conversation:

"What is it like to visit Vegas?"
"It's not like anything at all."

The reply is ambiguous, and that ambiguity brings out the disagreements in this thread I think. One thing the reply could mean is that there is nothing to compare it with, it's so unique there is nothing that is like it. Another thing it could mean is that if you go to Vegas you cease to feel anything at all. It is impossible to have an experience there. If that seems like an odd interpretation, consider:

"What is it like to be dead?"
"It's not like anything at all."

Again, this is ambiguous in the same way. It could mean that the experience of death is so unique there is no apt comparison. Or it could mean that when you are dead you can't experience anything.

In both examples the second interpretation is not about comparison. That's the sense that Nagel means.

n both examples the second interpretation is not about comparison. That's the sense that Nagel means. — bert1

Every experience is unique therefore there is nothing to be said about it.

Not until six pages in does Nagel even define what "like" means. Footnote 6, "Therefore the analogical form of the English expression "what it is like" is misleading. It does not mean "what (in our experience) it resembles," but rather "how it is for the subject himself."
This always troubled me. It seems his whole idea of "like" is vague or inchoherent. — Jackson

Standing alone, the phrase "what is it like" is indeed vague, in that it can apply to many different contexts. I just Googled "what is it like" and got pages of examples in return. Example : "what is it like to be in a coma?". The implication in most cases is a desire to understand how it "feels" to exist in a different place or body or condition. Or to read another person's mind.

Although the common phrase is not precisely defined, that omission never bothered me. Because the following discussion provided a specific context. So, I intuitively understood what he was implying. However, to make it a bit clearer, I might supply the implicit subjective reference : "what does it feel like to inhabit (exist in) the body of a bat". Or "if I could exchange bodies & brains with a sonar sensing creature, how would my personal existence be different?" The ontological question is focused on our way of knowing & interpreting the world through the lens of our species-defined physiological senses.

The 2003 movie Daredevil, featured a blind hero, who could "see" with his ears. The film attempted to help us see what he saw, to feel what he felt, by converting the sound of raindrops splashing on Elektra's face into a conceptual image --- by analogy with photons reflecting off the face. It was a plausible, yet fictional, way to know "what is it like" to be a blind super-hero. However, Nagel's question was more general & philosophical, epistemological & ontological. It probed the limits of our ability to know anything beyond the boundaries of our personal body & brain. :cool:

What Is It Like to Be a Bat? :
The paper presents several difficulties posed by consciousness, including the possible insolubility of the mind-body problem owing to "facts beyond the reach of human concepts", the limits of objectivity and reductionism, the "phenomenological features" of subjective experience, the limits of human imagination, and what it means to be a particular, conscious thing.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_It_Like_to_Be_a_Bat%3F


RAINDROPS FALLING ON HER FACE

There is an ambiguity. Consider the conversation:

"What is it like to visit Vegas?"
"It's not like anything at all." — bert1

The question is really asking what would one (typically) experience if one visited Las Vegas, so the answer is not so much ambiguous, as it is pedantic in taking the question literally when it is obviously (in ordinary parlance, and unless specified otherwise, at least) not meant that way.

Similarly, Nagel's overworn question "what is it like to be a bat?" is really asking "what (kinds of things) would you experience if you were a bat?".

So, in a subtle way the "what is it like?", the idea of resemblance, comes in in the form of "kinds of things" experienced, as @Banno said earlier; so now it seems to me that I misinterpreted what he was suggesting, and we were not disagreeing after all.

"what is it like to be a bat?" is really asking "what (kinds of things) would you experience if you were a bat?". — Janus

Or a rock. Or a tree. I am a panpsychist.

Cheers.

Or a rock. Or a tree. I am a panpsychist. — Jackson

I find something of value and interest in Whitehead's panexperientialism, but the idea that rocks have minds does not convince; nevertheless to each their own...

I find something of value and interest in Whitehead's panexperientialism, but the idea that rocks have minds does not convince; nevertheless to each their own... — Janus

Not that rocks have consciousness like humans. But that they act in intelligent systems like our own.

I find something of value and interest in Whitehead's panexperientialism, but the idea that rocks have minds does not convince; nevertheless to each their own.. — Janus

You may be interested in this paper by John Protevi. He discusses Evans Thompson’s book, Mind in Life, where he locates mind in the most general functions of all living systems. Mind and life are co-extensive; life is a sufficient condition for mind. Protevi suggests that it may be possible to push this back to include pre-living processes.

“…we have to worry that a definition of mind as mere information transfer involved in self-organization is so broad as to be meaningless: if convection currents in a pot of boiling water are mind, what good is such a broad definition? But on the other hand, what‘s exciting about dynamic systems modeling is that it shows self-organizing processes in an extremely wide range of registers, from convection currents through neurodynamics. So if self-organization is a univocal concept, that is, if there is a non-trivial shared structure between convection currents and neurodynamics, then we have identified a fundamental principle that links the inorganic and organic registers. So we‘re back to the cybernetic challenge: is information transfer and self-organization capable of being called ―mind‖ in a defensible fashion? It wouldn‘t be autopoietic cognition, because it‘s doesn‘t involve a membrane-metabolism recursive process and hence an autonomous subject position. But wouldn‘t it be ―Mind in Process,‖ even if it‘s not ―Mind in Life?”



http://www.protevi.com/john/Deleuze-Thompson-web-version.pdf

Thanks Josh it looks interesting. I've downloaded it and will certainly read it when I have some time.

What is it about the phenomenal and the tangible that distinguishes them so significantly that they be placed in separate categories? — Hanover

You'll have to ask someone who makes the mistake of placing them "in separate categories". Like "vapor" & "ice", they are different properties of water and not different substances (categories). Like "subjectivity" and "objectivity" with respect to (meta)cognition – no need to repeat the cartesian fallacy of reifying semantic functions of subject and object into "res mensa" and res extensa" substances (inadvertantly generating the interaction pseudo-problem ...)

So you, I and the bat all see the moth. — Banno

What is it like to see a moth?

It's not at all uncommon to find folk claiming that because the bat sees the moth differently, there is no moth. — Banno

You could say that what it is like for a bat to see a moth is different from what it is like for a human to see a moth.

One explanation of "what it is like" might be "how it feels"; not only in an emotional sense, but also in sensory terms of (how it) looks, sounds, tastes, smells, proprioception, temperature, balance, etc.

It does not mean "what (in our experience) it resembles," but rather "how it is for the subject himself." — Jackson

What makes a subject special in this regard? Is there a way it is for any object? I'm not asking if a table or rock has a perspective or a mind. I'm asking if there is a what is the case for any object or subject? How is talking about what is the case for the environment of Earth different than talking about what is the case for your state of mind?

Or it could mean that when you are dead you can't experience anything.

In both examples the second interpretation is not about comparison. That's the sense that Nagel means. — bert1

I doubt Nagel was implying that there is nothing it is like to be a bat. I think Nagel was trying to get at the sensory information the bat posesses and the form this sensory information takes and not only how it is like (similar to) our sensory information we possess and the form it takes, but also how it differs.

I doubt Nagel was implying that there is nothing it is like to be a bat. — Harry Hindu

Oh indeed. I was just trying to bring out different usages of 'like', one as a way to compare, and one to indicate phenomenality.