I hope someone in this thread will explain the importance of truth. As a latecomer to philosophy, I still haven't grasped why it matters so centrally. But I feel like the village idiot sometimes in looking for ways of saying this, ('In what way is language about truth-conditions?') because it seems so obvious to so many people that it's central. Still, I'm going along with the idea to the extent that I have to go and study Logic for a day or two now :)

I don't know if I quite agree with your definition of truth. I would say that what is true is what state of affairs obtains. A state of affairs makes truth by obtaining, a proposition bears truth by referencing this state of affair. Might just be some technical jargon but then again, just saying that "truth is what is there" isn't necessarily enough; I could postulate that unobtained states of affairs exist (even though I don't think I would). Or if we are to take on modality and wonder what universe you are referencing, this universe or one of the other possible universes (if we agree that possible universes do in fact exist). So for a general definition of what is true, perhaps yours works. But in a technical sense, I don't think it does.

It's all about atheism, I'm afraid. God died. We're trying to figure out what portion of our interests were affected by that.

We love science. We prefer naturalistic answers to: "It's that way because God loves Americans." That's can't be right. Why would God have a preference for morons?

I'm saying that understanding the cultural mileau of the issue of truth requires understanding stuff like the legacy of Descartes, how indirect realism is assumed by scientists, and catching sight of the high-wire act of Fools trying to avoid Nihilism that characterizes contemporary life.

In other words, the stakes are a lot higher than they might seem to be on casual observation. It's all Philosophy of Mind. Is the universe alive? Or is it dead and our intuitions about ourselves.. just illusions?

What's wrong with "Truth is actuality?" Why doesn't this work?

Presumably it would contradict certain modalities.

Could you give an example?

Now that I'm thinking about it more, it's really not that big of a deal, especially if you don't accept multiple universes. But if you did, you would just have to specify that what you claim is true is true in this particular universe because it may be false in another.

Mongrel

Imagine that truth as actuality is closer to the heart of the matter. The truth of statements is the oddity of language use and the conundrums that arise there are the result of missing the use of metaphor.

What's wrong with "Truth is actuality?" Why doesn't this work?

Hi Mongrel:

You're putting a value claim on existence.
If what is, is actuality and actuality is truth then existence is truth, but I think existence is neutral, neither true nor false, it simply is.

Also we talk about truth in a lot of ways: logical, metaphysical, mathematical, historic, narrative, moral, aesthetic.

Some thoughts:

Aristotle (I think) said that Truth compels.

I think historicity is an essential component of Truth.

Truth as in the Truth of a proposition, is different to my mind than the truth that Christopher Columbus discovered America in 1492. The truth of a proposition requires a conclusion, Chris's mistake only requires recognition.

Perhaps there are only a multiplicity of particulars truths. The sum of these 'truths' are our inductive conclusions, which may be transcended/transformed by reason into necessary relationships, necessary truths, when they are realized.

Yea... analytic truths. With those, all we can do is think of truth as a property of statements. We can't think of them as situations that may or may not be actual. Good point.

If you're thinking of the quantum theory sort of "multiple worlds," something strange is going to happen to truth if you have a transcendent vantage point.

What's wrong with "Truth is actuality?" Why doesn't this work? — Mongrel

That's a restatement of the correspondence theory of truth. It's discussed here in detail, with all the various arguments for and against: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#5

In your formulation, you will need to define "actuality," which you've equated to truth. Is it something as it is, unmediated by the perceiver, and what would that look like?

I'm curious; what difference does it make? Is there something special about the word "truth"? If you want to talk about what happens then talk about what happens. If you want to talk about a statement that describes what happens then talk about a statement that describes what happens. You don't even need to bring up "truth" at all.

Until I claim that the sky is purple.

If some blah are mah
and all mah are grah.
Is it true that some blah are grah?
Is it actuality?

I don't get the objection. In that case you're not describing something that 'happens'.

I'm saying that understanding the cultural mileau of the issue of truth requires understanding stuff like the legacy of Descartes, how indirect realism is assumed by scientists, and catching sight of the high-wire act of Fools trying to avoid Nihilism that characterizes contemporary life.

In other words, the stakes are a lot higher than they might seem to be on casual observation. It's all Philosophy of Mind. Is the universe alive? Or is it dead and our intuitions about ourselves.. just illusions? — Mongrel

I do agree. The next bit of my journey is to see whether there's anything in the suggestion that this is rather like what Heidegger was worrying about. With 'being' for 'actuality'. Wouldn't you say?

That's a restatement of the correspondence theory of truth. It's discussed here in detail, with all the various arguments for and against: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#5

In your formulation, you will need to define "actuality," which you've equated to truth. Is it something as it is, unmediated by the perceiver, and what would that look like? — Hanover

No, it's not correspondence. I'm saying truth is the object of knowledge (or potentially the object of it) as opposed to a property of statements.

Actuality is the world I inhabit (as opposed to some other possible world). Apriori, all the parts of this world have to relate to one another in some way, so actuality is, in a sense, all there is from beginning to end.

One assumes that the world can be accurately perceived. This assumption may be wrong. This is a good thing to keep in mind if you're ever in the bar of the Overlook Hotel and you're being offered free booze.

I'm curious; what difference does it make? Is there something special about the word "truth"? If you want to talk about what happens then talk about what happens. If you want to talk about a statement that describes what happens then talk about a statement that describes what happens. You don't even need to bring up "truth" at all. — Michael

Sure I do. Snake oil salesmen, politicians, and my own tendency to believe my own bullshit require me to focus on it.

Philosophically, it shows up when we ponder the workings of the mind.

I do agree. The next bit of my journey is to see whether there's anything in the suggestion that this is rather like what Heidegger was worrying about. With 'being' for 'actuality'. Wouldn't you say? — mcdoodle

Heidegger recognized that being is a combo of subject and object.

I think you might be right. I'm thinking of aesthetic truth.

I'm not quite sure how knowledge fits into that, though.

If some blah are mah
and all mah are grah.
Is it true that some blah are grah?
Is it actuality? — shmik

I don't know what blah and mah are. I think the Actuality Theory could be refined to accommodate the different things we talk about. Philosophers have resorted to examining artificial languages to try to grasp things about language. Some ended up concluding that human speech has no more meaning than the barking of dogs. That sets the bar about as low as it can go, I think.

So I feel free to refine. :)

If you want to talk about what happens then talk about what happens. — Michael

"What happens" is synonymous with "what the truth is." If you tell me what happened and tell you that something else actually happened, then our dispute is over what happened, which is a dispute over the truth.

"What happens" is synonymous with "what the truth is." If you tell me what happened and tell you that something else actually happened, then our dispute is over what happened, which is a dispute over the truth. — Hanover

But clearly Mongrel takes issue with the word "truth". He wants it to also refer to "actuality". So why not just use the word "actuality"? What's gained in using the word "truth"?

Sure I do. Snake oil salesmen, politicians, and my own tendency to believe my own bullshit require me to focus on it.

Philosophically, it shows up when we ponder the workings of the mind. — Mongrel

You missed the point. If the word "truth" is troublesome for you then why not abandon the term? You can get by simply by talking about "actuality" as you say, or by talking about statements that describe actuality.

No, it's not correspondence. I'm saying truth is the object of knowledge (or potentially the object of it) as opposed to a property of statements. — Mongrel

If your argument is epistemological, setting out what knowledge is, it's generally (although certainly not universally) accepted that knowledge is a justified true belief. That being the case, it's generally accepted that truth is an element of knowledge.

Actuality is the world I inhabit (as opposed to some other possible world). Apriori, all the parts of this world have to relate to one another in some way, so actuality is, in a sense, all there is from beginning to end. — Mongrel

I don't know if it's a priori that all parts of the world must interrelate unless you are referring to the world in an external sense. Dreams need not interrelate with one another, and I don't see why it's necessary that actuality not simply be a dream. I'll acknowledge that we intuitively believe the rock we perceive is "out there," but that's not necessarily true nor is it universally accepted as true.

It's not the job of philosophers to dictate the words people use. For an extended period, philosophers have thought of truth as a property of statements. Though this outlook is gravely afflicted, it keeps coming back around.

While pondering knowledge internalism/externalism, it occurred to me that truth is really about knowledge. It's the object of knowledge. In the cases where we speak of it as a property, the use of metaphor is in play. I don't take credit for noticing that. But those who have noticed it have tended to go the route of truth skepticism... which isn't viable.

While pondering knowledge internalism/externalism, it occurred to me that truth is really about knowledge. — Mongrel

What do you mean by this? That we use the word "truth" to talk about knowledge?

If your argument is epistemological, setting out what knowledge is, it's generally (although certainly not universally) accepted that knowledge is a justified true belief. That being the case, it's generally accepted that truth is an element of knowledge. — Hanover

Gettier problem. Theories of knowledge are in flux at present. The problem is central to philosophy of mind.

I don't know if it's a priori that all parts of the world must interrelate unless you are referring to the world in an external sense. Dreams need not interrelate with one another, and I don't see why it's necessary that actuality not simply be a dream. I'll acknowledge that we intuitively believe the rock we perceive is "out there," but that's not necessarily true nor is it universally accepted as true. — Hanover

In an external sense, yea, all the parts of the world have to interrelate.

If actuality is a dream, all the parts still have to interrelate. Try to imagine a portion of a dream that in no way relates to anything else in the dream. Give an example of that.

The world may be a dream. If it is, that is actuality. Of all the things the world could have been, that's what it is. When we seek the truth, we seek to know that actuality.

I think the only viable understanding of truth (in the propositional not in the 'truth as aletheia' sense ) we have is that truth corresponds to, or is about actuality. (In the 'truth as aletheia' sense actuality is not a state of affairs but the living truth as it is revealed).

In many possible worlds frameworks, truth simpliciter is defined as truth with respect to a privileged world, sometimes designated w@, that is, the actual world.

What do you mean by this? That we use the word "truth" to talk about knowledge? — Michael

You could say that, yea. Truth is the object of knowledge. It's actuality... what is, as opposed to what could be.

Frege's proof that truth is unanalyzable assumes that truth is a property of statements. Obviously there are sentences where truth does not appear in the role of a property. AP tends to dismiss these cases, preferring to examine truth as a property.

When we use "truth" as a property, we're employing metaphor, but this is generally overlooked. This is where the AP trainwreck starts... I think.