That would make our existence in current form not absolutely good, but either moving toward this state of existential being or against it. And this would nevertheless be an aspect of the existence we're in. Such an outlook would then not make "this existence morally disqualifying". — javra

We still run into the same problems though. It's just a "dynamic" SOME rather than a static. I quoted Cabrera to another poster, but his critique perhaps still applies here. I think perhaps Hegel's "Absolute" and extreme optimism might fall squarely in his critique of those philosophies which take being as "good" structurally.

Cabrera develops an ethical theory, negative ethics, that is informed by this phenomenological analysis. He argues that there has been an unwarranted prejudice in ethics against non-being, a view he calls "affirmativity". Because affirmative views take being as good, they always view things that threaten this hegemony as bad; particularly things like abstention from procreation or suicide. Cabrera criticizes affirmative ethics for asking how people should live without asking the radical question of whether people should live tout court. He argues that, because of the structural negativity of being, there is a fundamental "moral disqualification" of human beings due to the impossibility of nonharming and nonmanipulating others. Nonharming and nonmanipulating others is called by him the "Minimal Ethical Articulation" ("MEA"; previously translated into English as "Fundamental Ethical Articulation" and "FEA"). The MEA is violated by our structural "moral impediment", by the worldly discomforts – notably pain and discouragement – imposed on us that prevent us from acting ethically. Cabrera argues that an affirmative morality is a self-contradiction because it accepts the MEA and conceives a human existence that precludes the possibility of not-harming or not-manipulating others. Thus he believes that affirmative societies, through their politics, require the common suspension of the MEA to even function. — Julio Cabrera Wikipedia Article

We still run into the same problems though. It's just a "dynamic" SOME rather than a static. — schopenhauer1

I'll try to come back to this later, but can you better explain your meaning? As I so far interpret it, the "some" preferences still gets filtered by that which is morally good.

I'll try to come back to this later, but can you better explain your meaning? As I so far interpret it, the "some" preferences still gets filtered by that which is morally good. — javra

I added to the previous post with a quote that might help you see where I'm coming from.

"SOME" here means that even in a Hegelian model, SOME people's preferences are going to win out and disqualify other's preferences.

To add another layer of complexity, we can say that SOME people don't mind all worsts parts of this existence. SOME people do mind it. The people whose tolerances for the worst parts of this existence win out over the ones who don't tolerate it. This is a more complex version of simply the idea that some people's preferences will de facto negate other people's preferences.

People who don't mind the "realities" (social and physical and contingencies etc.) of this world get their preferences satisfied whilst others do not.

People who like (or at least DON'T MIND) working at X, Y, Z economic system will by default lord over those who wish to not be under this system. But human existence is fragile and requires cooperation of the situatedness of what is already here (the current system).. These people must conform/comply with the current system lest they lead an even less preferred lifestyle and/or death.

Zero-sum game!

Zero-sum game! — Agent Smith

So what do you make of Cabrera's view that I just quoted twice?

Life is a zero-sum game! Someone hasta lose (ouch!)

We need good losers! Such people must be completely at ease being boiled in oil or roasted alive! :snicker:

Just curious, is that how you are interpreting Cabrera though? I am not saying it's wrong, just wondering if that is your interpretation.

Just curious, is that how you are interpreting Cabrera though? I am not saying it's wrong, just wondering if that is your interpretation. — schopenhauer1

the impossibility of nonharming and nonmanipulating others — schopenhauer1

:nerd:

Think I got it. Cool.

ease being boiled in oil or roasted alive! :snicker: — Agent Smith

And it doesn't even need to go that far.. hence in the OP:

This existence then represents what I will call "the slow burning evil of the squishy middle". It is not an immediately intense state of pain and torture like the hell scenario mentioned at the beginning, but it is not the heavenly scenario of everyone's preferences realized in the other scenario. Rather, it is stochastic, statistical, and varies in intensity of preferences not satisfied. And this may be for the worse for humans as there will be slow realization of it being morally worse off. It also leads to continual conflict between those whose preferences are being at least minimally satisfied (those who don't mind let's say working to survive), and those who would have never asked for this if the world aligned to their preferences. — schopenhauer1

:up:

There are plenty of memes around that can make even the worst off among us want to keep breathing!

The thought is phrased in terms of absolutes, namely, absolute good. I take there’s no controversy to our current existence not being absolutely good. Also likely noncontroversial is that we can closer approach that which we intuitively deem to be absolutely good or further distance ourselves from it.

But there are two implicit questions to this issue: “What is the absolute good in explicit terms?” and, “Does the absolute good in any way existentially occur?” I don’t find that a forum such as this can definitively answer either.

Cabrera presumes to adequately define absolute good in terms of conditions set upon interacting selves and further presumes that which is absolutely good to be an impossibility. If the premises are true, then so would appear to be Cabrera’s conclusion. Only that the same unanswered question presents itself: “Morally disqualifying” accordant to what moral standard if not that of a platonically real idea/form of the morally good? - for the occurrence of this platonically real moral good as standard for "morally disqualifying" contradicts the premise that no such thing occurs.

For me, the premises aren’t true. I again will lean on those typically unliked metaphysics of Buddhism and Neo-Platonism: both uphold the reality of a nondualistic absolute good – the first Nirvana and the second “the One” – wherein there is pure being devoid of selfhood (i.e., where no selves occur so as to interact) and, furthermore, both maintain the existential occurrence of this absolute good (such that the actualization of this absolute good is possible to accomplish). And, if these general premises are true, then Cabrera’s position would be unsupportable.

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As to some people’s preferences winning out, if there is a moral good, how can society progress toward it without those preferences aligned to it succeeding at the expense of those that aren’t? This by sheer necessity of their so being a moral good.

For me, the premises aren’t true. I again will lean on those typically unliked metaphysics of Buddhism and Neo-Platonism: both uphold the reality of a nondualistic absolute good – the first Nirvana and the second “the One” – wherein there is pure being devoid of selfhood (i.e., where no selves occur so as to interact) and, furthermore, both maintain the existential occurrence of this absolute good (such that the actualization of this absolute good is possible to accomplish). And, if these general premises are true, then Cabrera’s position would be unsupportable. — javra

But then here we have your preference for what is good winning out perhaps...thus starting the cycle.

As to some people’s preferences winning out, if there is a moral good, how can society progress toward it without those preferences aligned to it succeeding at the expense of those that aren’t? This by sheer necessity of their so being a moral good. — javra

So I think we have to parse out the structure of the system versus various attempts at morality within it. That is to say, within this system, it can certainly be said that there could be a case that one can do good or do "better" towards someone and one can do bad or "worse" towards someone. Perhaps good here is something like helping a friend when they are sick or visiting them in the hospital. Bad here would be picking on someone who is already down.. Just giving various examples. None of these "truths" of INTRA-WORLDLY ethics can justify or make up for the fact that perhaps the world where these intra-worldly ethics takes place is ITSELF a morally disqualified world for aforementioned reasons.

But then here we have your preference for what is good winning out perhaps...thus starting the cycle. — schopenhauer1

Whomever presumes that what you’ve quoted in regard to an Absolute Good constitutes my personal preference is, to be blunt, mistaken. To be clear, if there is a platonically real, hence existentially occurring, good that thereby takes absolute/complete form, it’s occurrence and attributes would then necessarily be bias/preference-independent - irrespective of whether these biases/preferences are mine, yours, some deity’s, or some other agent's. This, for example, in parallel to the occurrence and attributes of a particular truth regarding the external world being bias/preference-independent. Despite their partial contingency on minds, truths too have nothing to do with what one might prefer to be.

So I think we have to parse out the structure of the system versus various attempts at morality within it. — schopenhauer1

I don't find this adequately addresses my question - it was structure in "if-then" format. Nevertheless, in reply, this is exactly what both Buddhism and Neo-Platonism - in their own disparate ways - attempt to do.

That is to say, within this system, it can certainly be said that there could be a case that one can do good or do "better" towards someone and one can do bad or "worse" towards someone. Perhaps good here is something like helping a friend when they are sick or visiting them in the hospital. Bad here would be picking on someone who is already down.. Just giving various examples. None of these "truths" of INTRA-WORLDLY ethics can justify or make up for the fact that perhaps the world where these intra-worldly ethics takes place is ITSELF a morally disqualified world for aforementioned reasons. — schopenhauer1

This still doesn’t address the by now repeatedly stipulated issue of “via what ethical standard would any such world be deemed morally disqualifying if no platonically real ethical standard is deemed to occur”. It seems to me that one needs to explicitly present this ethical standard for what is morally disqualifying if even the possibility of such a morally disqualified world is to be rationally entertained.

If this ethical standard in fact is platonically real, then a platonically real Good existentially occurs - resulting in some form of metaphysics wherein an absolute moral good is part of the overall world we dwell in (I gave examples of such in my previous post). If, on the other hand, some form of non-objective ethical standard that is rooted in one’s current emotive biases is maintained, all I currently have to say in reply is that neither the grunts, nor the verbally expressed emotions, of one or more agents could of themselves constitute a rationally coherent argument for the world being morally disqualified. And I so far don’t see a viable third option here.

Despite their partial contingency on minds, truths too have nothing to do with what one might prefer to be. — javra

Then "truths" don't have to conform to what I was saying with "preference-satisfaction". I did not say heaven was "truth" but simply a sort of world where preferences could be satisfied, but without infringing other people's preferences. This is not that world.

It seems to me that one needs to explicitly present this ethical standard for what is morally disqualifying if even the possibility of such a morally disqualified world is to be rationally entertained. — javra

I did give one.. one where preferences CAN NEVER be met, by default of things like the law of non-contradiction. But we can use other standards. For example, a world in which harm is entailed to survive can be considered morally disqualifying.

If this ethical standard in fact is platonically real, then a platonically real Good existentially occurs - resulting in some form of metaphysics wherein an absolute moral good is part of the overall world we dwell in (I gave examples of such in my previous post). If, on the other hand, some form of non-objective ethical standard that is rooted in one’s current emotive biases is maintained, all I currently have to say in reply is that neither the grunts, nor the verbally expressed emotions, of one or more agents could of themselves constitute a rationally coherent argument for the world being morally disqualified. And I so far don’t see a viable third option here. — javra

I don't see how it has to be "platonically real Good" for there to be some sort of morality. One can keep it at a level of "treat people with dignity" or "don't treat them as a means to an ends". A world where by its nature, you must treat people as ends to some degree, to get something done, may be morally disqualifying then. Think of a hierarchy where one would normally not want to submit to the authority of a boss, but one does anyways, because there is really (by de facto realities of the world) no better way. It is the best of worse-off options- one that you perhaps feel an indignity from. However, you must play the game anyways if you are to not languish and suffer even more, and then die.. In other words, you rather the indignity (of submitting to the boss) than the other outcome (of starvation, free-riding of society, and/or death). This de facto reality and feature of life does NOT mean that the means of survival is thus justified and good (because it's just a de facto feature of life). It is precisely because of it being a (de facto) feature of human life, that would thus make it morally disqualifying... This of course, is a mild version of "indignity".. I'm sure you can think of many other "structural" ones about being a human in a social and physical world that has to survive.

I did give one.. one where preferences CAN NEVER be met, by default of things like the law of non-contradiction. But we can use other standards. For example, a world in which harm is entailed to survive can be considered morally disqualifying. — schopenhauer1

Hmm. I'll help you out with a truism: life needs to feed off life in order to survive. Still, as was the case with previous arguments, this does not preclude there being an objective, platonically real good in the world.

I don't see how it has to be "platonically real Good" for there to be some sort of morality. One can keep it at a level of "treat people with dignity" or "don't treat them as a means to an ends". — schopenhauer1

I see the issue as being somewhat deeper than that. On what grounds is treating people with dignity morally good? The bully that outperforms the nerd (unfortunately happens often enough in our world) could very well disagree with the statement. If there is no platonically real Good, then the bully could well be right in treating others as means to personally desired ends - and could well justify this by expressing something along the lines of "the proof is in the pudding".

Then again, I don't believe this existential issue of an objective moral good (singular) vs. relativistic moral goods (plural) can be resolved in a forum format.

I just don't find the conclusion of a morally disqualified world convincing for the reasons previously given.

@schopenhauer1 –

Do you agree: 'without certainty, we cannot know anything'? (re: Academic Skeptics, Gorgias, Descartes, Kant(?) et al)