Everything you say is true, but that doesn't change the fact that if we exclude how normal people see and understand the normal world on a normal day from what we call "reality," it's goofy. It's philosophy at it's most useless. — Clarky
You say "value system," I say "metaphysical system." Facts don't necessarily change metaphysics, but metaphysics may have to change in order for us to see reality in new ways. I'm not sure how that works. It's at the top of my list of things to figure out. — Clarky
He talks about presuppositions in terms of the space of reasons, and makes use of Sellars’ distinction between the manifest image and the scientific image. — Joshs
because their starting point a fact, frame or truth but self-reflexivity itself. — Joshs
It seems to me that phenomenological and postmodern approaches recognize the metaphysical and the real, the formal and the empirical, the subjective and the objective, the ideal and the real , the valuative and the factual as two inseparable poles of each moment of experiencing. — Joshs
That isn't what I wrote. — Clarky
We note only that the concept of normal perceptions have no bearing on reality. — Hanover
My comment about you referenced how I suspected you had a notion of normal, which was in reference to your internal standard. — Hanover
What is the the normal response to hot peppers? Are they really hot or mild? — Hanover
I think the more sophisticated version of the question is, can quantum effects manifest within our "classical" framework and I think the answer is that under certain conditions they can. Quantum phenomena are utilized for a variety of technical purposes. — Pantagruel
I think that the primitive hunter who masters the art of hurling a stone over a long distance "understands" gravity extremely well. — Pantagruel
but we aren't on the same page either.... — Pantagruel
For hundreds of thousands of years, people have lived more or less full lives without ever knowing about quantum mechanics. — Clarky
Can you explain that? Isn't the very act of a starting point (even if self-reflexivity) a foundation? I've not read the writers you mention - except in small portions and I find them mostly incomprehensible, so generally I'm just looking for a high level overview if possible. :wink: — Tom Storm
I think I largely agree with you but I suspect this is because I am not a philosopher or an academic. — Tom Storm
So, in the end who (except the hobbyist and academic) really gives a rat's arse about 'noumena' or 'being' or the 'really real'? — Tom Storm
I don't think we are in a survival prison. There is more to life than eating and shitting. — Jackson
Even the physicist would deal with it more like the hunter most of the time. — Clarky
However, the main point which Murdoch is making is making is the emphasis on empiricism. — Jack Cummins
the main point which Murdoch is making is making is the emphasis on empiricism — Jack Cummins
:up:As Collingwood says, metaphysical positions are not true or false. They have no truth value. — Clarky
:fire:[W]e never leave the starting point or beginning, only repeat it different. i[n] this way, they are radically temporal, and radically historical. When I think this beginning, I am not capturing any discrete content but thinking from out of the midst of becoming. I am not pointing to anything that I stand outside of but enacting it, always differently, and I can speak from this ‘always different’ beginning in a self-reflexive way. — Joshs
In An Essay on Metaphysics (1940) (Collingwood) attacked the neo-empiricist assumptions prevalent in early analytic philosophy and advocated a logical transformation of metaphysics from a study of being or ontology to a study of the absolute presuppositions or heuristic principles which govern different forms of enquiry. Collingwood thus occupies a distinctive position in the history of British philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century. He rejects equally the neo-empiricist assumptions that prevailed in early analytic philosophy and the kind of metaphysics that the analytical school sought to overthrow. His logical reform of metaphysics also ensures a distinctive role and subject matter for philosophical enquiry and is thus far from advocating a merely therapeutic conception of philosophy or the dissolution of philosophical into linguistic analysis in the manner of ordinary language philosophy.
Collingwood is critical of those philosophers who, like Bradley (1874), bring the presuppositions of natural science to bear upon the study of the historical past. It is not the role of historians to dismiss as false the testimony of historical agents who attest to the occurrence of miracles on the grounds that since nature is uniform and its laws do not change, the miracles past agents attested to could not have happened because their occurrence contravenes the laws of nature. This “positivistic spirit” encourages a judgmental attitude towards the historical sources rather than an attempt to understand their meaning. This is not to say that historians need to believe that miracles happened in order to understand the sources, but rather that understanding the role that belief in the supernatural had for the agents who witnessed to them is more important for the historian than assessing whether belief in the supernatural is true or false.
Her overall argument is that there needs to be a rational, empirically basis for philosophy and that this is 'A House of Theory'. — Jack Cummins
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.