You've mistaken me for someone else, Wayf. I have not claimed or implied that Collingwood "dismisses" metaphysics like Carnap and Ayer. To say (agree) that 'statements of metaphysics' are not propositions, or truth-apt, is not to "dismiss" them (re: problem of the criterion, vide Sextus Empiricus, vide Witty).

No probs, just wanting to clear up that possibly ambiguous reading of @Clarky's statement.

As Collingwood says, metaphysical positions are not true or false. They have no truth value.
— Clarky
:up: — 180 Proof

A bit simplistic. That belongs more to Carnap than Collingwood, of whom SEP says: — Wayfarer

Seems you are commenting on my comment about Collingwood. This is from "An Essay on Metaphysics."

Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or group of persons, on this or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking.

Prop. 5. Absolute presuppositions are not propositions.

This is because they are never answers to questions; whereas a proposition is that which is stated, and whatever is stated is stated in answer to a question. The point I am trying to make clear goes beyond what I have just been saying, viz. that the logical efficacy of an absolute presupposition is independent of its being true: it is that the distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to absolute presuppositions at all, that distinction being peculiar to propositions...

...Hence any question involving the presupposition that an absolute presupposition is a proposition, such as the questions ‘Is it true?’ ‘What evidence is there for it?’ ‘How can it be demonstrated?’ ‘What right have we to presuppose it if it can’t?’, is a nonsense question.

We see the detritus of this tendency in the many "physicists" who kindly drop in here to "fix" philosophy. — Banno

:up:

Joshs :100:
[W]e never leave the starting point or beginning, only repeat it different. i[n] this way, they are radically temporal, and radically historical. When I think this beginning, I am not capturing any discrete content but thinking from out of the midst of becoming. I am not pointing to anything that I stand outside of but enacting it, always differently, and I can speak from this ‘always different’ beginning in a self-reflexive way.
— Joshs — 180 Proof

I don't quite understand what this means. Can these ideas be summarized in plain English?

am a reasonably normal person and I think my understanding of reality is consistent with how most people in my culture see it. — Clarky

Why is your culturally relative evaluation of reality relevant here? Are you presenting an argument based on that?

That quoted passage means something different from saying that 'metaphysical positions have no truth value'. That is very much the line of the 'vienna circle positivists' for whom metaphysics are nonsense. Collingwood's concern is more with interpretation: how are we to interpret metaphysical statements, so as to better understand those who made them? It's not dismissive of metaphysics in the way the positivists were.

You are as much a philosopher as 95% of us here. You certainly are more well-read than I am, in spite of your aw shucks, I'm just a jumbuck playing my didgeridoo next to the billabong in the outback way of talking about yourself. — Clarky

:lol:

That is different from saying that 'metaphysical positions have no truth value'. That is very much the line of the 'vienna circle positivists' for whom metaphysics are nonsense. Collingwood's concern is more with interpretation: how are we to interpret metaphysical statements, so as to better understand those who made them? It's not dismissive of metaphysics in the way the positivists were. — Wayfarer

You're right. Collingwood was not dismissive of metaphysics and neither am I. Recognition that metaphysical statements, i.e. absolute presuppositions, are not true or false is fundamental to an understanding of how reality and our knowledge about it work.

I don't think Collingwood's concern was with interpretation, I think it was with identification and recognition. Absolute presuppositions are often, usually, unacknowledged, unrecognized by those who make them. The purpose of metaphysics is to bring those unacknowledged, unrecognized assumptions out in the open.

The purpose of metaphysics is to bring those unacknowledged, unrecognized assumptions out in the open — Clarky

:up:

Why is your culturally relative evaluation of reality relevant here? Are you presenting an argument based on that? — Hanover

If you care enough to follow the chain of posts back to how this started in a response to a post by Tobias a few pages back, you can find how the questions arose in the context of this thread. I don't imagine you want to do that, so let's leave it there.

That quoted passage means something different from saying that 'metaphysical positions have no truth value'. That is very much the line of the 'vienna circle positivists' for whom metaphysics are nonsense — Wayfarer

No one can escape metaphysics; isn't it entirely a question of how 'fancy' you wish to make it? Even hard core physicalist scientists make a metaphysical assumption that reality can be understood. I think there is a difference between something having no truth value or being nonsense, or even being impossible to verify. It is entirely possible that one can be open to idealism whilst considering the matter impossible to verify. This doesn't make it nonsense, it just means nothing much can be said and, perhaps, that there is no intrinsic truth value (for humans) to the position.

I wonder how we would we describe the position of mysterianism in relation to the venerable mind body question? It maintians the issue can't be resolved (perhaps even in principle) which may be an overreach, but does it imply that the question or any proposed answers are nonsense too?

To What Extent Can Metaphysics Be Eliminated From Philosophy?

Well, see Confirmable and influential Metaphysics, which follows the line of thinking inaugurated by Popper to show that some metaphysical notions can be recognised by their logical form, and goes on to show that they are pivotal to the enterprises we call science.

See also Philosophical Plumbing — Mary Midgley, for why science cannot be rid of philosophy. Midgley was of course, along with Murdoch, one of the Sainted Four Sisters.

And Bad Physics is with us always.

which follows the line of thinking inaugurated by Popper to show that some metaphysical notions can be recognised by their logical form, and goes on to show that they are pivotal to the enterprises we call science. — Banno

:up:

I wonder how we would we describe the position of mysterianism in relation to the venerable mind body question? It maintians the issue can't be resolved (perhaps even in principle) which may be an overreach, but does it imply that the question or any proposed answers are nonsense too? — Tom Storm

This is going to be a digression but it can't be helped. I've read some brief articles and reviews by Colin McGinn who is the current mysterian-in-chief. He says that 'consciousness is a mystery that human intelligence will never unravel'. I don't necessarily accept that, or rather, I think that that it is a question which requires a radical shift in perspective.

We have previously discussed articles by Michel Bitbol and others that about the role of the subject as 'unknown knower'. These discussions often refer to a well-known passage in one of the Upaniṣads along the lines of 'the hand cannot grasp itself, the eye cannot see itself' (thereby bringing in Indian philosophy.) I've always found that principle to be what is called in philosophy 'apodictic' - it cannot plausibly be denied - although in my experience, many others don't.

The bearing this has on metaphysics is going to be very hard to articulate, but there are some pointers. Phenomenology became aware of the objectively-unknowable nature of mind and the unstatable presence of the subject, for example. Husserl said 'Consciousness is not a thing among things, it is the horizon that contains everything.'

But to appreciate that takes a perspective-shift, from the objective attitude to the self-reflective attitude. That attitude is much more pronounced in Continental than analytic (i.e. English-speaking) philosophy. It is also found in some of the post-modern theorists that @Joshs refers to, specifically Evan Thompson, and also to Michel Bitbol (mentioned above). Their perspectives come from a from a blending of phenomenology with Buddhist abhidharma (so once again bringing in a perspective from Indian philosophy.)

But notice that this shift is away from what I call 'the objective stance'. The objective stance is instinctively one of scientific realism. (I suggest that is the perspective from which Colin McGinn declares consciousness is insoluble mystery.) It is the naturalist perspective of the intelligent subject-in-the-world, close to what I understand Husserl to be saying is 'the natural attitude', which is inborn in us and also reinforced by the culture we're in. And from within that perspective, metaphysics is most often dismissed or 'bracketed out', as what is 'really there' is assumed to be the objects amenable to scientific analysis (because if they're not amenable to that, then how can we know them? Which is basically 'the hard problem' again, and it's not a pseudo-problem!) But it is precisely the 'objective stance' which has been called into question by the discovery of the 'observer problem' or 'measurement problem' in early 20th C physics, hence opening the door to contemplation of the role of the subject. And also generally by 'the rediscovery of the subject' which has also happened in more recent philosophy. And that is a momentous change in perspective, and also a cultural change, that we're actually living through, albeit in fits and starts, in today's culture.

He says that 'consciousness is a mystery that human intelligence will never unravel'. — Wayfarer

This is like saying "Apples are the mystery that human intelligence will never unravel." I answer by picking up an apple and taking a bite. Apples aren't a mystery and neither is consciousness. It's a concept, it's human-made.

Phenomenology became aware of the objectively-unknowable nature of mind and the unstatable presence of the subject, for example. Husserl said 'Consciousness is not a thing among things, it is the horizon that contains everything.' — Wayfarer

This is the kind of thing you say when you're sitting around the campfire with a flashlight under your chin trying to scare the other campers. Ooooohhh! What's that noise? It's making too much of something that is as everyday as apples. People always want to make too much of consciousness. They want to act as if, believe that, it's special, mysterious. It must be special or I'm not special. And we're not.

what is 'really there' is assumed to be the objects amenable to scientific analysis (because if they're not amenable to that, then how can we know them? — Wayfarer

And they are amenable to scientific analysis, but that's not the only way they can be known. It's not even necessarily the best, or at least the best in all possible situations.

Which is basically 'the hard problem' again, and it's not a pseudo-problem! — Wayfarer

It is.

But it is precisely the 'objective stance' which has been called into question by the discovery of the 'observer problem' or 'measurement problem' in early 20th C physics, hence opening the door to contemplation of the role of the subject. — Wayfarer

Again, this is mixing up physics and metaphysics.

And also generally by 'the rediscovery of the subject' which has also happened in more recent philosophy. And that is a momentous change in perspective, and also a cultural change, that we're actually living through, albeit in fits and starts, in today's culture. — Wayfarer

I'm skeptical. If there's a positive change that's needed in science, it's not a rediscovery of the subject, it's a recognition that everything's connected - an ecological understanding of the world. I'd say "holistic" but that has too many associations with mysticism - mysteries and magic. New age "philosopy."

The world is the world. I'll use one of my favorite quotes again - Franz Kafka. Horrible, depressing books. Great aphorisms.

It is not necessary that you leave the house. Remain at your table and listen. Do not even listen, only wait. Do not even wait, be wholly still and alone. The world will present itself to you for its unmasking, it can do no other, in ecstasy it will writhe at your feet.

↪Tobias While one might be hopeful, my suspicion is that there is a tendency for much of what is considered nowadays as "metaphysics", to be little more than physics without the maths - that is, not physics. If one were generous one might call it speculative physics, but more often it is nonsense physics.

We see the detritus of this tendency in the many "physicists" who kindly drop in here to "fix" philosophy. — Banno

As I said before, for me, reality is puppies and chocolate chip cookies, not essences and properties. That isn't to say I don't believe what physicists say about what happens at subatomic scale, just that it isn't sensible to think that's all there is to reality. — Clarky

I agree, but neither is puppies and chocolate chip cookies. At least, not when one is asking metaphysical questions. When you eat the chocolate chip cookie for instance one might ask when the chocolate chip cookie ceased to be, or whether there is something of the cookie remaining even after eating it, or whether there is something that chocolate chip cookies and puppies have in common. We are very much on the same page I think. Indeed I too hold that it is silly to elevate what physicists say as the whole of reality. Metaphysics is a bit of a rabbit hole.

But intentionality, aboutness, embodiment, what-is-it-like, qualia; is completely different than the language I use when I talk about my own or other people's experience gained through introspection or empathy. — Clarky

Yeah, but that is just jargon. I can deal will aboutness, embodiment etc. but I am lost when it comes to qualia. Jargon is just a tool, right a short hand. Heidegger started to write his own when he found the jargon of his day lacking. Now what he wrote in turn became jargon. There is nothing more irritating than people spouting jargon at each other and I do not think that one cannot do phenomenology when one is lacking in jargon.

I'm with Collingwood - metaphysics has no and makes no truth claims. — Clarky

I am very much with Collingwood too.



I am not 'hopeful' or 'hopeless'. I am actually rather feeling anxious. This new materialist metaphysics seems to bracket any form of identification in favour of some form of existence in 'thousand plateaus' where we extend in rhizomic ways. The subject must be decentered and they see in the metaphysics of the past (subject and object, master / slave) an enormous potential for violence. I see in their type of thinking an enormous potential for violence too. Two days ago I argued for the necessity of an 'idealist moment', a moment of self overcoming in the sense that we need not be content with a description of ourselves as essentially an assemblage of things without rhyme or reason.

You might be interested in watching: (its duration is approx 27 mins)


I like the fact they did not use the term metaphysics or the idea of AFTER physics but were careful to go for the idea of 'beyond physics,' in the sense of 'the current limits of physics,' which I personally would like the term metaphysics to exclusively mean.
I would be interested in your view of the proposals made by the guy who uses the term 'morphic resonance' and how you think that idea connects/does not connect with the 'memes' of Richard Dawkins.

I like this 'closer to truth series' but I think they should include more people from the purely 'philosophical' and the purely theistic viewpoints as I think it would give a more balanced and complete coverage of the topic under discussion. I do nonetheless, like the general approach of Robert Lawrence Kuhn to such topics.

I would say that the arguments in the volume, ' Existentists and Mystics' seemed to suggest that metaphysics and physics are interrelated. That was while I was struggling to fit it together with the 'House of Theory' essay. I guess that may be a problem of a volumes of collected writings because they include different stages of someone's ideas. Generally, it seems to make sense to see metaphysics as intrinsic to ethics because the overall understanding of reality is bound up with values as a starting point for thinking about how one should live. I think in the particular essay, she was at the point of seeing a void in understanding, which was potentially problematic.

I have just read the essay by Maritain and it is very helpful. It does seem that so many seem to see empiricism as given knowledge rather than paying attention to the way in which the understanding is based on concepts. All scientific hypotheses and theories based on the evidence which is generated by ideas and the metaphysical imagination.

The idea of beyond physics is an interesting alternative to metaphysics. It may be that many see physics almost as if it is a concrete picture of reality. The models can only go so far. The neuroscientists can point to the way in which red is perceived in the eye and the brain, but the idea of redness as a concept is harder to explain. Of course, it is a shared construct which has developed in evolution but even though languages vary and the specific details of ideas vary from culture to culture, most concepts, including love, time, and happiness exist, almost like inbuilt concepts to a large extent. It would be amazing if a group of people were found who had completely different concepts, like they were from another planet.

I am more familiar with Rupert Sheldrake's idea of morphic resonance than Paul Davies's idea of memes, but it does seem that they overlap. I read a couple of books by Rupert Sheldrake and the idea of a memory inbuilt in nature which develops seems like Jung's idea of the collective unconscious within nature. It is likely that those who reject the concept of the collective unconscious will find Sheldrake's ideas as a bit unscientific. The thing is that it is hard to prove or disprove of such ideas by scientific methods. The ideas do resemble the approach of Plato, with the
existence of Forms or archetypes. The problem which many may have with such a perspective is that it is not possible to establish their existence objectively. That is because it is not possible to get outside of the human experiences of subjective experience and look beyond it. I believe that Kant made this point.

However, even the models in physics are descriptive and constructions in the human mind. In the conception of models, the human imagination is involved. So, both physics and metaphysics involve going beyond. Some who hold a position of realism may see this as being where flights of fantasy may occur. This is true, and it may be where mythic truth steps in. On the other hand, while there is the basis of perception of the senses as an accurate portrayal of reality it is not possible to say that there are not aspects which are not known or will never be known. For example, in previous centuries there wasn't the knowledge of possible electricity and wifi. It is as if science has opened up dimensions, and maybe, there are more to be opened in the future.

I agree, but neither is puppies and chocolate chip cookies. — Tobias

I agree.

When you eat the chocolate chip cookie for instance one might ask when the chocolate chip cookie ceased to be, or whether there is something of the cookie remaining even after eating it, — Tobias

Then your friends all say "Just shut up and eat your cookie." Although if you're a professional philosopher they probably won't.

whether there is something that chocolate chip cookies and puppies have in common. — Tobias

Well, I'm sure puppies like eating chocolate chip cookies. Perhaps cookies like to be eaten by puppies.

I am lost when it comes to qualia. — Tobias

Yes. If I had 383 wishes, the 246th would be that anyone who uses that word would get kicked in the ass. Not too hard.

Jargon is just a tool, right a short hand. — Tobias

Before I retired, I was an environmental engineer. There were lots of technical words we used, but a lot of what we wrote was intended for non-technical readers. We had to find a balance. You need to be able to say technically precise things but at the same time keep it understandable to intelligent non-professionals.

We are very much on the same page I think. — Tobias

Yes, I think we are.

I am more familiar with Rupert Sheldrake's idea of morphic resonance than Paul Davies's idea of memes — Jack Cummins

I don't know what Paul Davies has said about memes. I know he is in the 'closer to you' vid I posted but I was comparing Rupert Sheldrake's 'morphic resonance' with Richard Dawkings coining and use of the term meme from his book 'The Selfish Gene.'
Wiki describes a meme as:
A meme is an idea, behavior, or style that spreads by means of imitation from person to person within a culture and often carries symbolic meaning representing a particular phenomenon or theme. A meme acts as a unit for carrying cultural ideas, symbols, or practices, that can be transmitted from one mind to another through writing, speech, gestures, rituals, or other imitable phenomena with a mimicked theme

I thought this married quite well with Sheldrake's 'morphic resonance' as he described it in the video.
He prefers the term 'habit' to 'law of physics' and suggests that morphic resonance is how these habits are formed by patterns building on previous versions of themselves, which to me sounds very similar to how Dawkins suggested memes work. So the physics law 'emerges' from recognising repeating activity which mutates/morphs/changes a little over time but is firmly based on its previous manifestations.
Eventually it becomes a 'habit' or common phenomena or a currently accepted law of physics.
In the vid, Sheldrake used the example of a new chemical compound which may become 'crystalized' and eventually become part of common everyday use.

That which is currently 'beyond physics or beyond science,' may become within physics or science in the future. Michio Kaku seemed to confirm this idea earlier in the vid, when he talked about physics a hundred, a thousand or a million years from now.

So, both physics and metaphysics involve going beyond. Some who hold a position of realism may see this as being where flights of fantasy may occur. This is true, and it may be where mythic truth steps in. — Jack Cummins

I think there can be common ground between physics and metaphysics or science and spirituality if we see where they can be complementary. The musings of the Imagination can motivate the will to find out the truth about something. Some people can embark on a lifelong quest based on such 'motivations' and our whole species can benefit from it.
I just don't see why those who want to use terms like 'spiritual' or metaphysical' cant be happy with the idea that such feelings/motivations are probably from their own natural existence rather than from some external supernatural source. Why do we need the supernatural when the natural can be so super?

Why do we need the supernatural when the natural can be so super? — universeness

Depends what one means by nature. For science, it is only the movement of particles.

It's not clear to me what "two inseparable poles" means in this context. Metaphysics is the context of seeing, knowing, experiencing; not what is seen, known, or experienced. — Clarky

What makes a context a context? Isn’t it the intertwining of memory and what appears? Husserl articulated the subjective and objective contributions to perception and conception in terms of a noetic and noematic pole. The noetic side contributes memory and anticipation, the reaching out into the event with a framing expectation, the seeing, knowing aspect. But the noematic object that is seen , known , experienced, fills out the expectation but never completely fulfills it. Thus the metaphysical is a pole , a subjective contribution to the act of seeing and experiencing. But it can never subsist in itself as its own ‘context’. There is never a seeing or knowing without the seen or known contributing a new aspect to what is being anticipated. Experiencing is always contextual , and context is always a new use. Thus the breath of the metaphysical and that of the empirical go hand in hand in every moment of experience .

Depends what one means by nature. For science, it is only the movement of particles. — Jackson

Or whatever can be mathematizable, which may come down to something similar.

I only managed to see a bit of the video because it kept breaking up. I have a lot of problems with the signal where I am, so I often have to do certain things in cafes. But, I had read the authors, and at one stage, I found Rupert Sheldrake's ideas important. It was probably the point at which I was trying to see the natural explanations rather supernatural ones. I also found Lyall Watson's book, 'Supernatural' fairly helpful, because I had grown up with a clear ingrained belief in God. Even now, I do find myself slipping into times of seeing an external cause.

It may be a form of projection, but, there again, thinking through a lot of the issues of philosophy, especially those related to religion is hard work. Some people have been brought up with no supernatural explanations, so these seem peculiar to their thinking. But, the mixture of being exposed to different and opposing ideas can give rise to a lot of conflicting ideas. Certainly, that is where I come from and I know a lot of people who are confused about how to think about reality amidst exposure to various systems of ideas, especially the metaphysical aspects, because they are central to understanding life and existence.

Depends what one means by nature. For science, it is only the movement of particles — Jackson

Well, I think that suggests that science has a rather shallow view of nature. I think science studies nature from the macro to the subatomic. Even the term 'particle' is very much in dispute against 'field excitation.'

Even the term 'particle' is very much in dispute against 'field excitation.' — universeness

Particle in a field. Same thing, isn't it?

Well, I think that suggests that science has a rather shallow view of nature. — universeness

Agree. Science is shallow, but useful.

But, the mixture of being exposed to different and opposing ideas can give rise to a lot of conflicting ideas. Certainly, that is where I come from and I know a lot of people who are confused about how to think about reality amidst exposure to various systems of ideas, especially the metaphysical aspects, because they are central to understanding life and existence. — Jack Cummins

I can only hope that I demonstrate understanding and appreciation of what you describe above.
Full credit to you and your like who will at least ponder and struggle with the conflicting viewpoints instead of just blindly accepting either side.

Agree. Science is shallow, but useful — Jackson

:lol: You can be a little tricksy Mr Jackson. I was not saying science had a shallow view of nature but I accept the old switcheroo attempt.