You should be a billionaire!
— Agent Smith
Yes, I too agree that 180 Proof is a modern day version of Socrates. :grin: — dclements

:snicker:

Say I am arguing for free will, AND I get to define free will. I can make a definition for free will which is easy to argue for.

I think we would learn more about free will, if we forgot (for the time being) about whether it existed or not, and deeply picked apart the thing to which all the definitions imperfectly (or so I would argue) try to point. As soon as a definition is agreed upon, yes, our discussion can progrees better, which is importnat, but if a discussion progresses, which is nevertheless about something completly vapid and pointless, then the members of the discussion have wasted their time!

Consider this proscess:

1. There is a "thing" in the universe which a human experiences and it inspires the creation of a "concept" which the human terms "free will"

2. "Free will" is then refered to on a consistant basis and articuations of the "concept" inspire more humans to think about the "concept" and NOT the "thing". Because all of the linguistic definitions, and articulations of "free will" are only robust labels (just as "free will" itself is only a label), none of them are the original "thing"

3. Since all discussion only revolves around the definitions and articuations of the "concept", the "thing" is never understood. All discussions therefore, even if frutiful, are only fruitful in service of the "concepts" which are ultimately empty labels for the "thing".

The strongest argument against this (that I can think of) is that when a "concept" is artucatied with a definition, such that the definition bears enough similarity to the "thing", then a fruitful discusssion can still take place, AND we have many such definitions.

I would agree with this counter argument, in part, but insist upon pushing it further. The proposition that "we have many such definitions" needs demonstration. Such demonstration cannot take place if we only have discussions which begin with quickly refering to agreed upon definitions. I think an entire discussion is wanting, about the "thing" and wheather the "concepts" and definitions which we use to discuss it in fact bear enough similarity.

If we did this, even once in a while, we would probably clear up a few deeply rooted misunderstandings, no?

(another way to put my whole argument , is that we may need to understand and surpass postmodernism before we can continue doing philosophy).

Clearly there were/are very good reasons to philosophize rather than daydream which was what people were doing pre-philosophy (mythological sense-making). Like all good ideas, the ship of philosophy was launched successfully using rationality as an advanced engine. All was going well until the philosophical counterparts (Agrippa the skeptic being one) of Kurt Gödel wrecked the whole project, blew it clean out the water.

All that's happenning these days in philosophy is the spirits of people who don't know they're dead and lying at the bottom of the ocean in the wreckage are still going about their lives as if the ship of philosophy never sank, as if they're not dead but alive or those who've realized this rather unfortunate state of affairs are conducting salvage operations in and around the sunken ship. No, not rescue missions; everyone on board perished, they just don't know it.

:snicker:

The limits of philosophy -
What is it that philosophy can and cannot do?

Argument -
What is the goal of argumentation?

What is it that philosophy can and cannot do? — Fooloso4

It cannot cook!

What is the goal of argumentation? — Fooloso4

To find a good reason to get into a fist fight!

:snicker:

I can make a definition for free will which is easy to argue for — SatmBopd

Why create a definition? There are standard definitions around. Again, this is what dictionaries are for.

I think we would learn more about free will, if we forgot (for the time being) about whether it existed or not, and deeply picked apart the thing to which all the definitions imperfectly (or so I would argue) try to point. — SatmBopd

Can't get this. In order to learn more about dogs, we should forget (for the time being) that they exist? What then are we going to talk about? Makes no sense.

1. There is a "thing" in the universe which a human experiences and it inspires the creation of a "concept" which the human terms "free will" — SatmBopd

What is that "thing"? Shouldn't it be described? There's a thing that inspires humans, which they call "love". So what?

2. "Free will" is then refered to on a consistant basis and articuations of the "concept" inspire more humans to think about the "concept" and NOT the "thing". Because all of the linguistic definitions, and articulations of "free will" are only robust labels (just as "free will" itself is only a label), none of them are the original "thing" — SatmBopd

"Articuations of the 'concept' inspire more humans to think about the 'concept' and NOT the 'thing'". What is the "thing"? From Oxford LEXICO: A concept (in philosophy) is "an idea or mental image which corresponds to some distinct entity or class of entities, or to its essential features, or determines the application of a term (especially a predicate), and thus plays a part in the use of reason or language. (Any other standard definition will do.) So, when you think of a concept, you connect it and you refer to the object/entity it belongs to. This is all. Now, each person in a discussion may have a different application in mind for, knowledge about and experience regarding that concept, but they should all talking about the same thing. If, e.g., we are talking about the feeling of "being in love" and I never had an experience with that, I still undestand what we are talking about; only it's not so "real" to me.

3. Since all discussion only revolves around the definitions and articuations of the "concept", the "thing" ... — SatmBopd

Not necessarily. As I already said, the definitions just offer a frame reference. After that, the discussion may follow any course one can imagine.

Coming to your example of free will: Oxford LEXCICO defines it as: "The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion." (Any other standard definition will do.) Now, there are a lot of people who do not believe that such a thing actually exists. That's OK. Note everyone has to agree that something exists. It's enough that they are all taking about the same thing, after having it defined it in a standard, a generally accepted way. Let's say we define God as the creator and ruler of the universe and source of everything, a supreme, etc. You may believe that such an entity exists and I not. It's OK. We are still in communication and undestanding between each other.

Definitions of terms --explicit or silent-- are essential in a discussion, philosophical or other !

The limits of philosophy -
What is it that philosophy can and cannot do? — Fooloso4

:chin:

Philosophy cannot say (describe) the unsayable and therefore cannot discursively reason about (reason's) unreason; it can, however, make explicit – problematize – this horizon.

make explicit – problematize – this horizon. — 180 Proof

Many regard problematizing as the problem with philosophy. As if, if they were of any worth they would solve problems. A case could be made that this is what Modern Philosophy set out to do.

Instead of solving problems Wittgenstein attempts to dissolve them. I will leave open for the moment the extent to which he succeeded.

Wittgenstein attempts to dissolve them. — Fooloso4

What problems do you see Wittgenstein dissolving?

What problems do you see Wittgenstein dissolving? — Jackson

He regards philosophical problems to arise from linguistic confusion. By clearing up the language he shows the way out of the fly-bottle.

Our investigation is a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language. (Philosophical Investigations, 90).

Our investigation is a grammatical one.

"Grammar" gets to be a bit abstract with Wittgenstein. Though he may skirt the charge off linguistic idealism--reality is language--he sometimes treats language as a fundamental reality.

“Beware lest there be anyone who robs you by means of his philosophy and vain deceit after the tradition of men, after the elementary principles of the world, and not after Christ” -Paul, in Colossians 2

Do you want to read about ancient Greek ideas, or do you want to go to Heaven? If you weren't an ape-worshiping atheist, you would see that the Bible is true because the Bible says it is true. God has shown us that the apes can never truly be free. It's not like the philosophical ideas presented in the Bible have ever been proven not to be the word of God. If you start questioning why everything exists, it won't be long before you are convicted and poisoned with hemlock. Just think of all the people who have died while using philosophy.

The more you trust in Christ, the less you will be robbed in vain by these elementary principals of worldly men.

...the Bible is true because the Bible says it is true. — Bird-Up

:rofl:

Best post today.

He regards philosophical problems to arise from linguistic confusion. By clearing up the language he shows the way out of the fly-bottle. — Fooloso4

I wasn't aware that W had shown the way out of theism or matters connected with higher consciousness. Thoughts? Did he not just 'fly over' them?

the Bible is true because the Bible says it is true. — Bird-Up

:chin:

Either x vouches for itself or some other y vouches for x.

If the former, circulus in probando.

If the latter, who/what vouches for y? Infinite regress.

Challenge: Avoid both horns of the dilemma!

The solution: An infallible independent guarantor aka God!

1. God is infallible.

2. The Bible is God's word

Ergo

3. The Bible is true

No circulus in probando; no infinite regress

everyone on board perished, they just don't know it. — Agent Smith

Nice. Instead of the cave, we have the sunken ship. One analogy is used to dissolve another.

"Grammar" gets to be a bit abstract with Wittgenstein. — Jackson

I like thinking of W's 'grammar' in terms of norms (as featured in Robert Brandom's work). The tacitly 'proper' way to use words, among those who are therefore 'our' people, tends to be mistaken for some deep law of reality.

He regards philosophical problems to arise from linguistic confusion. — Fooloso4

We might also say that he gave us new problems to think about.

All discussions therefore, even if frutiful, are only fruitful in service of the "concepts" which are ultimately empty labels for the "thing". — SatmBopd

Hope this isn't too much of a tangent, but this reminds me of something I read in Brandom recently. (If anyone has studied his work, it'd be fun to discuss.)

we cannot understand the ontological structure of the objective world . . . except in terms that make essential reference to what subjects have to do in order to count as taking the world to have that structure -- even though the world could have that structure in the absence of any subjects and their epistemic activities.

https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/a-spirit-of-trust-a-reading-of-hegels-phenomenology/

Nice. Instead of the cave, we have the sunken ship. Perhaps the corpse of philosophy has always also been its breakfast. — igjugarjuk

Just an analogy I found apt. Nothing else to it. Like Richard Dawkins oft repeats: there are tens of thousands of religions, they can't all be right for they contradict each other. At most there's only one true religion; the million dollar question: Who got it right? The Hindus? The Christians? The aborigines? Who, damn it, who?!

I wasn't aware that W had shown the way out of theism or matters connected with higher consciousness. Thoughts? Did he not just 'fly over' them? — Tom Storm

In a passage that has often been overlooked he says:

One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions. (PI 126)

Elsewhere he says:

I am not interested in constructing a building, so much as in having a transparent view of the foundations of possible buildings. (CV 7).

His concern is with "possibilities of phenomena" (PI 90). The possibilities of phenomena are not determined by either the facts of nature or of mind, but by our concepts. Much of Wittgenstein's work was an attempt to free us from the ways of representing things that hold us captive. This is an attempt to understand the grounds on which an alternative to science can be established.

... the words you utter or what you think as you utter them are not what matters, so much as the difference they make at various points in your life. (CV 85)

What is important about the concept of God, what God means, is a matter of how the concept is used. How the concept is used means not only how it is used within the context of one's life but also how the concept of God can be used to change one's life.

The paradox that Wittgenstein could not resolve is that in order to be saved one needs the certainty of faith, but such faith comes about only through redemption. To be saved requires that one must first be saved.

I wasn't aware that W had shown the way out of theism or matters connected with higher consciousness. Thoughts? Did he not just 'fly over' them? — Tom Storm

I want to address this again in a way that might be clearer. He did not address the question of God as a matter of fact, but rather, conceptually. He did not attempt to confirm or deny the existence of God. His concern is with how the concept of God can play a role in our lives.

He says that the way to solve the problems of life is to change the way you live, but he seems to question man's ability to do this on his own. He calls on faith to bring about this change. Philosophy, it would seem, is incapable of bringing this about:

But here we need something to move you in a new direction - (I.e.this is how I understand it.) Once you have been turned around, you must stay turned around.
Wisdom is passionless. But faith by contrast is what Kierkegaard calls a passion. (CV 52)

His attitude is on the one hand pragmatic, but on the other, from his early to his late work there is a desire for transcendence.

Thanks for the clarification. Is this a useful approach ? It seems not to provide us with much.

He calls on faith to bring about this change. Philosophy, it would seem, is incapable of bringing this about: — Fooloso4

One could read later W as a potential ally of theism in some way, right?

Is there any way of conceptualizing transcendence outside of the tropes of idealism, higher consciousness, contemplative traditions or god/s?

Is this a useful approach ? It seems not to provide us with much. — Tom Storm

As Wittgenstein is using the term 'concept' he does not mean a rational construct, but rather, pictures of how things are. Such concepts do not provide a rational explanation, but rather, present ways of seeing things. Rational or scientific concepts stand in the way.

The expression "It is God's will" is taken to be an acknowledgement that we cannot know why things as they are. To posit a rational God you acts according to reason is to misunderstand this. It is also an acknowledgement that we are not in control.

One could read later W as a potential ally of theism in some way, right? — Tom Storm

In some ways both the earlier and later Wittgenstein are allies of theism, but in a way that is in line with what I pointed to in a previous post about "possibilities of phenomena". What he is doing clearing the ground to open up a way of looking at things. Tractarian silence is just such an opening up. But he is not an ally in the sense of providing arguments to demonstrate the existence of God.

Is there any way of conceptualizing transcendence outside of the tropes of idealism, higher consciousness, contemplative traditions or god/s? — Tom Storm

If by conceptualizing transcendence you mean a rational concept, then this is what Wittgenstein is struggling against. He retains a sense of mystery, wonder, and awe of life.

Can't get this. In order to learn more about dogs, we should forget (for the time being) that they exist? What then are we going to talk about? Makes no sense. — Alkis Piskas

Dogs are a little different than free will. Namely dogs are physical entities in the real world. Free will, so far as I know is not. Instead, for people to even talk about free will at all, for there to be definitions in the first place, abrtract, mental construction had to take place. This abstract, mental construction created the definitions, which (standardised in a dictionary or not) are only (at best) the second and not the primary or most interesting aspect in the prospect of creating/ understanding free will.

What is that "thing"? Shouldn't it be described? There's a thing that inspires humans, which they call "love". So what? — Alkis Piskas

One aspect of my argument here, though I do think I am only imperfectly conveying my argument in fragments (so thank you for helping me think this through), is essentially that all descriptions are nessisarily imperfect, since language is a serious of approximations and symbols. Unless you know of a way to perfectly describe love, free will, and litterely every other conceivable phoenomonon such that EVERY single concivablre aspect of the phenomonon (or "thing" as I so lazily put it) is adequatley and accurately articulated, while also (ideally) being simple enough to efficentily communicate to others for the purpose of discussion.

when you think of a concept, you connect it and you refer to the object/entity it belongs to. This is all. Now, each person in a discussion may have a different application in mind for, knowledge about and experience regarding that concept, but they should all talking about the same thing. If, e.g., we are talking about the feeling of "being in love" and I never had an experience with that, I still undestand what we are talking about; only it's not so "real" to me. — Alkis Piskas

Okay, this is interesting. I will have to think this through. I am still very sceptical that a concept such as free will, is as uneversally experienced as falling in love (falling in love is itself not a universal experience in my estimation.... remember that the greeks had 8 different words for what we call love, right? So if you try to define the english word "love" you would never fully understand the concept, because it is a historical, linguistic fact that the concept can be very inticately broken down. Probably even further than the greeks did). Nonetheless, I do have to grant that discussions and definitions do have the capacity to refer actual experiences.

Let's say we define God as the creator and ruler of the universe and source of everything, a supreme, etc. You may believe that such an entity exists and I not. It's OK. We are still in communication and undestanding between each other. — Alkis Piskas

Totally fair. I just might want to have a discussion about whether there isn't a better frame of reference to start from than "God as the creator and ruler of the universe and source of everything, a supreme, etc.". If we only talk about THAT idea of God in our discussion, even if we decide to say it does NOT exist, we are still engaging with a discussion about a specific conception of a phenomenon, which has a distinct cultural/ historical origin (so it is NOT universal) when we might genuinely be having more fruitful discusissions by examining the origin of THAT conception of God, and comparing it to OTHER possible definitions/ conceptions, instead of just taking the one definition for granted and either negating it, or not negating it.

Thanks for your thoughtful responses.

Clearly there were/are very good reasons to philosophize rather than daydream which was what people were doing pre-philosophy (mythological sense-making). Like all good ideas, the ship of philosophy was launched successfully using rationality as an advanced engine. All was going well until the philosophical counterparts (Agrippa the skeptic being one) of Kurt Gödel wrecked the whole project, blew it clean out the water. — Agent Smith

Pre-philosophy like, pre-socratic? Maybe it is unconventional, but I am somewhat sympathetic to, or at least curious about Fredrich Nietzsche's praise of pre-socratic philosophy, and of (I think a measured and specific kind of) mytholigical thinking in The Birth of Tragedy. There is a beauty and power in the Dionysean spirit that is stifled by excessive rationality, blah, blah, blah.

or there to be definitions in the first place, abrtract, mental construction had to take place — SatmBopd

But there are already definitions. Why must construction take place at all? This was my point from day one.
I can't see what is your purpose. To forget about dictionaries and encyclopedias and build definitions from scratch? And then what? Even if we construct an ideal definition of free will that is accepted by most --because by everyone, it is certainly impossible-- we would have consumed our discussion to creating such a definition. And then we woukd have to do the same for every other concept that will appear in the discussion. And that would turn us into lexicographers, without actual subjects to talk about!

Thanks for your thoughtful responses. — SatmBopd

You are very welcome! :smile:

***

BTW, I don't know if you have realized that we have gone astray from the topic, which is not about definitions but "The Limitations of Philosophy and Argumentation"! :smile:

But there are definitions. Why must construction take place at all? — Alkis Piskas

Construction took place in the beginning, that's why there are defninitions. That consticution was probably imperfect.. I think these definitions are limited in their capacity to illumitate truth... at least directly. Meanwhile all of our existing definitions in dictionaries and such, are still useful, obviosuly, for the purpose of communication. I guess I just think it should be understood that the definitions and words we use help us communicate with eachother, and work through problems, but they do not really give us anything like truth.

Language is still a useful construction, I don't think we should get rid of it, or re-start it. Just that if we want to understand truth, expand our intellectual capacities, (which maybe we don't, I guess) then we cannot (or at least, certainly don't have to) exclusively rely on discussions which are taking pre-existing intellectual capcities and linguistic/ argumentative traditions for granted.

Practically, this means things like: asking what we mean by a particular definition of God and why, and how it compares to similar concepts and ideas, rather than: does (insert definition of God) exist.

BTW, I don't know if you have realized that we have gone astray from the topic, which is not about definitions but "The Limitations of and "! :smile: — Alkis Piskas

True, but I still think I learned something haha

In some ways both the earlier and later Wittgenstein are allies of theism, but in a way that is in line with what I pointed to in a previous post about "possibilities of phenomena". What he is doing clearing the ground to open up a way of looking at things. Tractarian silence is just such an opening up. — Fooloso4

:up: But I get tired of hearing of 'that of which we cannot speak' as shorthand for 'shuddup already!' in response to bringing up anything deemed vaguely spiritual.

I notice this footnote in Thomas Nagel's essay, Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament:

The religious temperament is not common among analytic philosophers, but it is not absent. A number of prominent analytic philosophers are Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish, and others, such as Wittgenstein and Rawls, clearly had a religious attitude to life without adhering to a particular religion. But I believe nothing of the kind is present in the makeup of Russell, Moore, Ryle, Austin, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Strawson, or most of the current professoriate.

He did not address the question of God as a matter of fact, but rather, conceptually. He did not attempt to confirm or deny the existence of God. His concern is with how the concept of God can play a role in our lives. — Fooloso4

Thank you, yes that's more or less what I thought.

He retains a sense of mystery, wonder, and awe of life. — Fooloso4

Thanks for your clarifications. Useful. Seems to me when push comes to shove most thinking people end up holding on some notion of the ineffable.