We're trying to do different things then I think: you aim to rise above the zealous and derive superior (rational in this case) moral value from scriptures, and I aim to descend into the intellectual realm of the harmfully zealous to confront them on their own terms. — VagabondSpectre

This is a lot more tricky as people can quite easily be deceptive; the same tactics you may see with religious people can comparably be viewed with far-right ideologists, who are indirectly and inadvertently saying fairly nasty things with a smile on their face. I am glad you have pointed out that I value rational/reason as 'superior' (and not me) but so are you, only you seem to find the energy and the time to try and reason with the unreasonable by communicating in the same zealous manner in order to talk in their language. I tried such tactics previously, whether it is for the religiously zealous to someone with sharply contrasting beliefs to my own, trying to indirectly convey my point to them in a way that they may understand, but I have since come to view it to be pointless. A screamer is a screamer. A person who wants to deceive themselves and others will; look at holocaust deniers. There is no point to it, basically, and if you choose the intellectual realm, set aside the emotions and communicate with those that will actually hear you.

No matter what you say, if people refuse to listen or read what you are actually writing or saying because of their personal views and vendettas, they will not hear or see a word that you write.

Religion can also unintentionally imbue shitty moral standards into their mysticism which then poses a challenge to rational moral agents who would have people learn to wipe. — VagabondSpectre

Absolutely, but it doesn't lie merely in the realm of monotheistic religions, new ageism is as much a stain to rational, moral standards as anything else. Upon reflection, the reality of the issues is the authenticity, which reflects back to my comments about the necessity for autonomy in our appreciation of moral standards.

"Love" itself is the expression of our conscience, or what I refer to as moral consciousness. These expressions can come out in numerous ways, whether it is erotic, familial etc. Moral consciousness requires work and is initiated by the prompting of the conscience and empathy, the feeling of wanting to give or care for others and the pain you feel when you see injustice or unhappiness, and the primary source of its capacity to function adequately is reason, but knowledge without autonomy and authenticity is superficial at best. As love also involves our emotions or feelings, without an adequate understanding of ourselves, which rational thought enables, our understanding of love itself could quite easily be skewed and we will begin to do or behave incorrectly.

So yes, I do agree that there is a dark side to Christian love, but this is no different to the "wolf hiding in sheep's clothing". Religion doesn't pose a challenge to rational moral agents because they would not adhere to it; it only poses a challenge since we as humans epistemically have the need to follow and conform but attach ourselves to the wrong things.

I find many Christian tenets to be morally repulsive, disgusting, and even worthy of hate, but I've already become somewhat dispassionate in regards to how I feel about it. — VagabondSpectre

I find some to be morally repugnant; I went to the Vatican several years ago and thought that I was in hell. And of course, there are many bad people who hide themselves behind the opportunity that institutions provide, confessing their sins or putting on this moral show before going off and abusing or hurting people because they are repugnant enough to believe that if someone or a person can be fooled by them than so can God (hence the authenticity), but my understanding of the scriptures is the reverse. If you think of Jesus speaking to the Christian community today, what he says will probably make sense to you.

You're trying to strain historicity from this, but why? Why not consult historical research? That said, historical/theistic genealogy isn't the take-away which concerns me, which should be clear at this point — VagabondSpectre

I published about the origins of the syncretistic religions of the near east and it is necessary to consult both historical research but also compare and contrast anthropological observations, but whatever the case is, there will always be a gap or a hole in our understanding that will ultimately rely on possibilities.

Aside from the fact that history is a turn-on for me in many ways ( >:) ) you need to appreciate the subtle differences between contemporary and ancient attitudes, practices, symbols in order to make better sense of the text without falling into the trap of being lured into the mystical.

Morally, metaphorically, literally, abstractly, historically, not at all: all are options for interpretation. My main target is the mainstream moral one, but if I can tag the other bases while I'm at it (even if only to reinforce my moral criticism), I'll do it. — VagabondSpectre

Ok. For me, the utility of this is pointless, you are better off using your time elsewhere. But hey, each to themselves.

I totally disagree. The more reliably you treat people as they want to be treated the more reliably they reciprocate. Such reliability is actually one of the virtues which causes us to place intrinsic value in the lives of those who display it. Surrounding one's self with reliable and moral people is both greedy and rational. There is indeed reciprocation. Yes some places have immoral customs, but reciprocation exists even in such places within whatever arbitrary bounds their customs mandate (usually customs which are religiously inspired and perpetuated I might note...). — VagabondSpectre

I totally agree, but it depends. If you treat a Christian who values those morals that you find repugnant reliably but inform them of your views, how would this reciprocation work? Assisting the disadvantaged, supporting people who need your help and rely on you requires an objective distance; what you think and feel is irrelevant and even unwarranted except for who you bring home with you.

When I read the bible (around age 15) I couldn't understand why god wasn't pleased by Cain's sacrifice of fruits and vegetables but was very pleased with Abel's offering of dead animals; did Cain not work equally hard for his bounty? The answer can only be that to sacrifice a living thing is inherently a greater sacrifice (therefore worthy of more appreciation). — VagabondSpectre

That is not the way that I see it; I feel the story ameliorates the importance of the subjectivity of the individual, that the intentions within matter more than the practice of offerings or giving. "For you are so careful to clean the outside of the cup and the dish, but inside you are filthy - full of greed and self-indulgence!" Very similar to the Ring of Gyges parable. The result between the brothers proves this.

Human sacrifice is therefore a greater sacrifice if we value human life more than animal life. The life of Jesus himself then becomes the greatest sacrifice of all. Christians spend a lot of time reflecting on the sacrifice that Jesus made so that we could be forgiven and it causes us to feel thankful to him for doing so, but they spend very little time asking themselves why they need god to forgive them in the first place, or why god needs a sacrifice in order to do actual forgiving. — VagabondSpectre

(Y)

Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause. We further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavors to have, and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who hates endeavors to remove and destroy the object of his hatred. — John

I think I understand, but I would be mindful of the use of 'love' in such a context. I wonder what the original was? I think his original works were Latin, right? So, I wonder if the word was 'amor'? In any case, it is a discussion of pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings or emotions in their connection or relationship with 'objects of sense'. And I don't know if that really corresponds with the idea of agápē as being a kind of unconditional love. It is more like what philosophers would call 'the passions'. Whereas the overall aim of Spinoza's philosophy was

The intellectual love of God (amor dei intellectualis) is the highest blessedness to which humans can aspire. This deeply satisfying love arises from an immediate and intuitive knowledge of God—whom Spinoza identifies with Nature—and of oneself as a part and product of God/Nature. Spinoza’s conception of the intellectual love of God resonates with the long tradition of philosophical thinkers in the West, going back at least to Plato and the Neoplatonists, who celebrate the emotional satisfaction to be derived from reflective contemplation of what is ontologically ultimate—sometimes called “the God of the philosophers.

Although, that said, I would be wary of interpreting 'nature' in a modern way, I think for Spinoza, it is more like 'the totality':

Spinoza is not entirely a modern thinker and that his God in fact has antecedents in the Middle Ages. It is too easy to get carried away with the evident conformity of Spinoza's system to the requirements of science and overlook the foot that it still has planted firmly in Mediaeval Jewish mysticism. Mediaeval Jewish philosophy, in fact, was closely allied to the Neoplatonic philosophical tradition of Late Antiquity, as this had been taken up and developed during the intellectual flowering of Islâm in the 9th century.


.....Thought and extension are just two, out of an infinite number of, facets of Being. A reductionistic scientism that wants to claim Spinoza as one of its own typically overlooks this aspect of the theory: Spinoza's God thinks, and also is or does many other things that are beyond our reckoning and comprehension. Thus, although Spinoza was condemned by his community for the heresy of saying that God has a body (denying the transcendence of God common to Judaism, Christianity, and Islâm), God is nevertheless much more, indeed infinitely more, than a body.

http://www.friesian.com/spinoza.htm

Although, that said, I would be wary of interpreting 'nature' in a modern way, I think for Spinoza, it is more like 'the totality': — "Wayfarer

He's actually pretty close to the modern way of interpreting nature.

God is totality, the infinite, expressed in the workings of the world. Spinoza is, metaphysically, a materialist: things are given of themselves (with the expression of totality--i.e. are of God). In this, there is no room for mysticism. Everything is accounted for. The world does (whatever that might be) and it is of God.

In recognising the infinite for what it (not reducible or captured by anything else), Spinoza sometimes sounds like a bit mystic, referring to God which cannot be reduced, categorised or explained by other terms, but he's really the antithesis of a mystic.

Spinoza's God cannot do anything in the traditional sense. God is totality, not some specific actor within the world, who causes one state rather than another. Indeed, the totality of God is what renders God incapable of being a causal mode or explanation. Spinoza understands the "mystery" of totality or infinite isn't a failure to grasp how or why the world works the way it does. Rather, it is the truth there is no outside explanation for the world-- it can only be responsible for itself.


He also has a pretty good grasp of agape. Later on in Part III of Ethics:

Prop. 39: Note
He who conceives himself to be hated by another, and believes that he has given no cause for the hatred. will hate the other in return.
Prop. 40
He who conceives, that one whom he loves hates him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.
Prop. 40: Corollary 1
If a man conceives that one, whom he has hitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in kind.
Prop. 40: Corollary 2
The endeavor to injure one whom we hate is called Anger; the endeavor to repay in kind injury done to ourselves is called Revenge.
Prop. 40: Note
If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love that other in return.

Spinoza is, metaphysically, a materialist — TheWillowOfDarkness

That can't be right. If he was a materialist, all he would be doing is saying 'the cosmos is God'. Carl Sagan might believe that, but I don't think Spinoza believed it. Besides, that would be attributing to matter, the status of a real substance, where in reality, material objects are only modes or aspects of the infinite being of God.

referring to God which cannot be reduced, categorised or explained by other terms, but he's really the antithesis of a mystic. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Ditto. According to Kelly Ross, Spinoza is rather like Islamic or Hindu mysticism, in that individual selves are illusory.

The purpose of mystical rapture [which is what Spinoza's "intellectual love of God" means] is often not just to see God or know God directly, but to become one with God through complete loss of self. This is what we often see in Islâmic mysticism, Sûfism, but also in India, where the self can ultimately be identical (advaita, "non-dual") with Brahman. In Spinoza, indeed, there is no independent substantial self. The Qur'ân says that God is as close to us as the jugular vein, but Spinoza goes rather further than this. Everything that we are is just a modification of an attribute of God, just a small and transient part of the existence of God. We are absolutely nothing apart from God. This gives a considerably stronger impression that we might think from the notion of the "intellectual love of God" that Spinoza is often said to recommend. To really feel an absolute absorption into God and abolition of self (fanâ', "extinction" in Arabic) would be a mystical rapture indeed. This may be the key to the emotional pull of Spinoza's theory for him: It would be a consolation of religion indeed for him to lose all sense that his life, circumstances, and misfortunes are of more than the most trivial consequence. Sub specie aeternitatis, from the viewpoint of eternity, nothing imperfect ever happens, and we can imagine Spinoza transported right out of his own rather sad and solitary existence into the comforting companionship of God.

I think I understand, but I would be mindful of the use of 'love' in such a context. I wonder what the original was? I think his original works were Latin, right? So, I wonder if the word was 'amor'? In any case, it is a discussion of pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings or emotions in their connection or relationship with 'objects of sense'. And I don't know if that really corresponds with the idea of agápē as being a kind of unconditional love. It is more like what philosophers would call 'the passions'. Whereas the overall aim of Spinoza's philosophy was

The intellectual love of God (amor dei intellectualis) is the highest blessedness to which humans can aspire. This deeply satisfying love arises from an immediate and intuitive knowledge of God—whom Spinoza identifies with Nature—and of oneself as a part and product of God/Nature. Spinoza’s conception of the intellectual love of God resonates with the long tradition of philosophical thinkers in the West, going back at least to Plato and the Neoplatonists, who celebrate the emotional satisfaction to be derived from reflective contemplation of what is ontologically ultimate—sometimes called “the God of the philosophers. — Wayfarer

I believe the Latin word used by Spinoza in the Ethics, that has been translated as 'love' is 'amor'. As I see it Spinoza is intending to deal with love in its most general sense. So his discussion is not, by any means, confined to "pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings or emotions in their connection or relationship with 'objects of sense'". I believe Spinoza sees no inherent difference between the 'lower' forms of love, motivated by sensory experiences, and the 'higher' forms of love motivated by intellectual contemplation. Of course love will be more or less active or passive depending on the degree of consciousness that is present of its causes, whether the causes be sensory or intellectual.

Spinoza, I believe, would not countenance the notion of "unconditional love" at all. I think the very idea is a chimera; all love has its conditions; which we may think of as either "higher" or "lower", if that is our tendency.

I think the interpretation of Spinoza expressed in the quoted passages from the 'Friesian' site is somewhat eccentric. If you want to understand Spinoza, you have to read Spinoza, and try to do so without refracting him through the lens of other philosophers; whether it be Kant, Fries, Schopenhauer, Hegel or anyone else.

That can't be right. If he was a materialist, all he would be doing is saying 'the cosmos is God'. Carl Sagan might believe that, but I don't think Spinoza believed it. Besides, that would be attributing to matter, the status of a real substance, where in reality, material objects are only modes or aspects of the infinite being of God. — Wayfarer

What you're not getting is that Spinoza understood thought (mind) and extension (matter) to be just two of an infinite suite of attributes of God or Nature. These attributes of the one substance are expressed as modes which are seen either as extension or as thought, depending on perspective. So thought and extension (mind and matter) cannot be, for Spinoza, substances at all. When Spinoza identifies God with nature, he is not speaking of nature as "nothing more than bare material actuality" as you seem to be interpreting it in your comment above.

That passage might be OK, as long as you don't fall into imagining that Spinoza thinks we can have a personal relationship with God, meaning that God is capable of loving us in return; Spinoza specifically denies this.

. So thought and extension (mind and matter) cannot be, for Spinoza, substances at all. — John

Right. Which rules out him being materialist. I don't think that Spinoza understands 'nature' in the way that 'modern naturalism' understands 'nature', because, as Kelly Ross says, he was not a modern thinker.

If you want to understand Spinoza, you have to read Spinoza, and try to do so without refracting him through the lens of other philosophers; whether it be Kant, Fries, Schopenhauer, Hegel or anyone else. — John

I did study Spinoza as an undergraduate.

. I believe Spinoza sees no inherent difference between the 'lower' forms of love, motivated by sensory experiences, and the 'higher' forms of love motivated by intellectual contemplation. — John

But his philosophy is, like all philosophy, a corrective. It is a cure for the condition of ignorance that the unwise have as a consequence of them not understanding the nature of reality. How could it not be?

It's more than that. We are only illusionary finite beings. Even when we see sub specie aeternitatis.

We aren't a part of God at all and never will be. The best we can do is, sometimes, understand or experience the infinite. We cannot absolve the self to become a part of God, no matter what we do. In terms of sub specie aeternitatis, we are nothing. We are apart form God and always will be.

Yet, that is how our meaning is defined. Since we are illusionary finite forms apart form God (meaning, infinite), God is not dependent on any form for us to be. Be I rich or poor, sick or healthy, moral or immoral, the infinite is true. God is total. Meaning is expressed. I don't need to live forever or get what I want to be meaningful. Even if my life is nothing but suffering, I am still meaningful. My distance from infinite perfection not only means I can never become it, but it needs nothing from me to be.

Spinoza goes much further than even Ross describes. God is not as close as the jugular vein. In fact, God is not here at all, not in my existence nor anything close to me. God is always apart from me, an infinite I can never become. But this also means God is also always with anyone and everyone, for God is so no matter what finite illusions occur or happen to be doing to each other.

It's why Spinoza is materialist: God has nothing to do with defining the functions of causality. God can't enter our finite world to set or alter what happens to us. As for Sagan, the interplay of finite illusions can only be responsible for themselves. In terms of what happens to anyone in the world, the states of the Cosmos of "God," the beings of power which make one event happen rather than another. It's just these states of existence aren't God.

God can be said to "create" or "cause" (as Spinoza speaks of), but only in the sense that specific finite illusions express totality. If I say "God causes," I am not talking about how the world of causal actors works, how one event happens rather than another. Rather, I'm referring to how certain finite states are self-defined rather than others, a way of talking about how God (totality) is expressed by some actual states (those that exist) but not other ones (those which do not exist).

In what order should these be?

---->apprehension of God ---->virtue ---->apprehension of the good ---->love

or

---->virtue ---->apprehension of the good ---->apprehension of God ---->love

or something else? — Bitter Crank

I would equate apprehension of God with apprehension of the good because I do not think that one can apprehend God without apprehending good, and I think that any supposed apprehension of the good cannot be the true good if it doesn't involve apprehension of God. Virtue follows from this because virtuous acts are good acts, and require apprehension of good, they are not good by chance. Love follows from virtue because we are not inclined to love the vicious, and as the saying goes, "love grows".

This is reflected in our daily lives. We will not act virtuously unless we apprehend good. If the good apprehended is a true good, this will guarantee a virtuous act. A true good is one which may be judged as consistent with God. Love is what we give to others, and despite the fact that we are encouraged to forgive, and love our enemies, I do not think it is possible to love a person who displays no apprehension of good, unless it is perceived that this is good.

Agustino seems to argue that love is some sort of primary instinct, such that we are naturally inclined to love, then good and virtue follows from this love. So for instance, a mother would love her baby despite the fact that the baby displays no virtue, or apprehension of good, and therefore does not demonstrate that it "deserves" love. The baby grows, it apprehends good, and becomes virtuous, so this goodness and virtue follows from the mother's love. My argument is that the mother's love of her baby follows from an apprehension of good.

The irony is that Spinoza is the archetypal modern thinker; his greatest concern is to release our thinking from the oppressions and superstitions of traditional theology.

He is materialist and naturalist in precisely the sense that the best modern materialism and naturalism is: in that it rules out the notion of any separate "supernatural" realm. He wants to say that mind and matter are the same phenomena, just seen from different perspectives.

But his philosophy is, like all philosophy, a corrective. It is a cure for the condition of ignorance that the unwise have as a consequence of them not understanding the nature of reality. How could it not be? — Wayfarer

Yes, he wants to show that our ignorance, which is the source of our illusory belief that we are in fact radically free, consists precisely in ignorance of the conditions that determine what we are, what we think and what we do. He wants to show that genuine freedom, insofar as it is possible at all, consists only in coming to understand the conditions that determine us.

Now, I'm not saying I entirely agree with Spinoza; I'm just trying to make clear what I think he actually is claiming; and what he really is predominately concerned with. I have come to think that the, what appear to be on the surface at least, irreconcilable philosophies of Spinoza and Kant encompass the twin axes of modernism and its predominant concerns. It seems to me now that it is really an extraordinarily complex suite of issues; that I am only beginning to grasp the significance of.

The irony is that Spinoza is the archetypal modern thinker; his greatest concern is to release our thinking from the oppressions and superstitions of traditional theology — John

I think 'siezed upon by modernity' is closer to the mark. As the Kelly Ross article says, I think that he's much nearer to medieval Jewish and Islamic mysticism, than to modern naturalism. It's just very convenient to be able to say that when Spinoza uses the name 'God', what he really means is simply 'nature', as science understands it. But it's not that, because he is concerned with some kind of radical problem with our own thinking, which I'm sure revolves around our misconception of ourselves as being separate agents apart from nature. But I think his 'intellectual love of God' is much nearer to mysticism than to science.

Agustino seems to argue that love is some sort of primary instinct, such that we are naturally inclined to love, then good and virtue follows from this love. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm inclined to agree with Agostino on that point. Love in the sense of a general compassion (rather than the cosy domesticated variety) is, if you like, an attribute of the ground of being, therefore not derived, not contingent on something else.

My argument is that the mother's love of her baby follows from an apprehension of good. — Metaphysician Undercover

A mother's love for her baby follows from an apprehension of her baby. The order with which philosophers think virtue and everything else proceeds is an issue of concern to few others. It is not the case that most others are stupid dolts and philosophers are splendid wisemen.

It isn't a waste of time to think about theory, such as ---->apprehension of God ---->virtue ---->apprehension of the good ---->love, but real life doesn't consult theory first.

I think your opinion is very far from the mark, and that it's a view distorted through the much marked and dusty lens of your preoccupations, and I believe it would certainly change if you actually read Spinoza both closely and openmindedly, rather than relying on the tendentious readings of others such as Ross. If you don't want to read Spinoza, at least read those who specialize in interpreting his philosophy.

If you look up 'natura naturans' and 'natura naturata' you might begin to get an inkling of Spinoza's conception of nature as both Substance (God) and modes (of God).
Einstein said he believed in "Spinoza's God" : “I believe in Spinoza's God, who reveals Himself in the lawful harmony of the world, not in a God who concerns Himself with the fate and the doings of mankind... ". He conceived of God in this sense as being something along the lines of the eternal and necessary Laws of Nature, (substance) which manifests as the natural world (modes). He would have no truck with anything "spooky" or supernatural. "God does not play dice ".

Spinoza's intellectual love of God is conceived as the highest intuitive faculty of the intellect, and is entirely in accordance with logic, or reason, as he conceives it. What we understand as being true by virtue of pure logic just is what is intuitively obvious to us. We can rely only on this if we want to speculate about the eternal, the infinite, substance, God, the ultimate nature of nature, and so on, for the obvious reason that none of this falls under the purview of empirical inquiry.

To be honest, I don't even know what your view is; for example, do you believe in a personal God, or not? If not, and you don't believe there is any infinite intentional agent, then what do you believe there could be which is separate from nature considered exhaustively as both the manifest physical world, including all the experiences and thoughts of percipient beings, and the laws that govern them both?

I'm inclined to agree with Agostino on that point. Love in the sense of a general compassion (rather than the cosy domesticated variety) is, if you like, an attribute of the ground of being, therefore not derived, not contingent on something else. — Wayfarer

So, you think the ground of being is personal? I ask that because only persons can love, as it is usually conceived.

.

....marked and dusty lens of your preoccupations — John

Tendentious, maybe, but that's ad hominem (again).

[Einstein] would have no truck with anything "spooky" or supernatural. "God does not play dice ". — John

Unfortunately for Einstein, he was proved decisively wrong in this matter, as 'god' does indeed 'play dice', and 'spooky action at a distance' has also been shown to be the case, mainly as a result of John Bell's experiments inspired by the EPR paradox, by which Einstein had set out to disprove the possibility of 'spooky action' and which ended up by proving the exact opposite. Both of these findings, incidentally, also undermine determinism.

I think Einstein referred to 'Spinoza's God' precisely because it is a model of the kind of 'God' that scientifically-respectable people can accept. As is well-known, he was dismissive of mainstream religion, but receptive to a kind of mysticism, which he identified with Spinoza. (But Einstein was certainly not atheist, as is made clear in Chapter 17 of Walter Isaacson's 2008 biography.)

As far as Spinoza and naturalism is concerned - naturalism must rely on a naturalistic ethics - of course, there being nothing beyond nature. So I can't see how that can ever be anything other than a form of utilitarian ethics, the 'greatest good for the greatest number' or human flourishing. Humans, being a natural creature like any other creature, can only seek a natural end - there is no highest good, the knowledge of which is inherently salvific. Whereas, Spinoza's vision of 'the intellectual love of God' is very much closer to a kind 'spiritual union', overcoming the 'illusion of separateness' - which is why it is nearer to mysticism than to science. Otherwise, why not simply dispose of Spinoza's 'God or nature' and simply call it 'Nature'? Why then would Spinoza's philosophy not simply be identical with science, in which case it could be done away with altogether and we could just stick to science.

In any case, we don't know enough about nature to know what is 'super' to it. A lot of what we now think is 'natural' would once have been described as 'supernatural'. The concept and boundaries of 'nature' are constantly shifting and changing.

So, you think the ground of being is personal? — John

I think there's a difference between 'personal' and 'a person'. The word 'person' is after all derived from 'persona' meaning mask, and is roughly equivalent to ego' or 'self'. I think the ground of being is not a person or a self in that sense, but is also not an insentient thing or mere physical energy. I think, whatever it is, it has been perceived as a living mind or spirit in countless different cultural milieux, and I don't think they're all mistaken in that regard.

So - yes.

but that's ad hominem (again). — Wayfarer

Not really, we all have to struggle to see past our preconceptions and preoccupations. Particular preconceptions and preoccupations will have different effects and degrees of effect when it comes to different issues.

Unfortunately for Einstein, he was proved decisively wrong in this matter, as 'god' does indeed 'play dice', and 'spooky action at a distance' has also been shown to be the case, mainly as a result of John Bell's experiments inspired by the EPR paradox, by which Einstein had set out to disprove the possibility. Both of these findings, incidentally, also undermine determinism also. — Wayfarer

It's funny that you seem to think science gives us information relevant to our understanding of reality or metaphysics when you believe it supports your world view, but not when you don't believe it does. In any case, if you are referring to what might be thought to be random uncaused events like decays of subatomic particles; are you suggesting they are really willed by God? If you are suggesting that then they would not be indeterministic at all, and if you are not suggesting that then it is hard to see what relevance God could have in this context, unless you are suggesting that He throws the dice just for the fun of seeing where they might 'land'.

So I can't see how that can ever be anything other than a form of utilitarian ethics, the 'greatest good for the greatest number' or human flourshing. Humans, being a natural creature like any other creature can only seek a natural end - there is no highest good, the knowledge of which is inherently salvific. — Wayfarer

I think this is quite untrue. Why can there not be a coherent and consistent naturalistic virtue ethics, or even a naturalistic deontological ethics based purely on rational consistency, such as Rawl's?

Otherwise, why not simply dispose of Spinoza's 'God or nature' and simply call it 'Nature'? Why then would Spinoza's philosophy not simply identical with science, in which case it could be done away with altogether and we could just stick to science.

In any case, we don't know enough about nature to know what is 'super' to it. A lot of what we now think is 'natural' would once have been described as 'supernatural'. The concept and boundaries of 'nature' are constantly shifting and changing. — Wayfarer

I am not sure the notion of a God that is not personal really counts as a coherent notion of God at all. So, I am certainly not entirely on board with Spinoza's notion of an impersonal deity. So, yes, I would say his notion of God really does just boil down to something like 'the whole of what is', or in other words, nature. But that, by no means, entails that we must just "stick to science". What about the arts and the humanities and, indeed, philosophy? The God of the philosophers has always been the impersonal deity God, a personal God is the God of faith, not the God of reason. Faith is the business of religion and mysticism, not of philosophy. "That whereof we cannot speak, we must remain silent..."

In any case, we don't know enough about nature to know what is 'super' to it. — Wayfarer

I think the very idea that anything could be 'super" to nature is incoherent, because nature is defined as "the whole of what is", whatever that whole might turn out to be or to include.

I think there's a difference between 'personal' and 'a person'. The word 'person' is after all derived from 'persona' meaning mask, and is roughly equivalent to ego' or 'self'. I think the ground of being is not a person or a self in that sense, but is also not an insentient thing or mere physical energy. I think, whatever it is, it has been perceived as a living mind or spirit in countless different cultural milieux, and I don't think they're all mistaken in that regard.

So - yes. — Wayfarer

I can't see what difference you are driving at. Persons are personal. And I certainly don't think the essence of a person consists in a mask. For me the essence of a person, and the essence of the personal, is the capacity to care, to love. I don't know what it could mean to say that the ground of being cares about us. Perhaps it could be thought as a "living mind" whose thoughts are all entities and their relations; that is pretty much Spinoza's God. But Spinoza doesn't admit that God has any thoughts or volitions beyond the actual entities and attributes of nature. Spinoza's God is not aware or caring of us over and above our awareness of and care of ourselves. Spinoza's God has no agenda.

It's funny that you seem to think science gives us information relevant to our understanding of reality or metaphysics when you believe it supports your world view, but not when you don't believe it does. — John

Not at all true. I am a scientific realist but a transcendental idealist. I have huge respect for science, progress, and democratic and liberal values - except for the sense in which they have become cut off from their (transcendent) source, where nature is thought to be self-grounded and self-explanatory, as if it contains its own origin or ground. As we have discussed many times, I don't believe science has gotten anywhere near to that point, and the larger the discoveries, the larger the questions become.

As regards to ethics, I do believe you can have a rational and consistent ethics, but, by definition, if it's purely naturalistic, then it doesn't allow for some ultimate, absolute or unconditioned good. All goods must be civic, social, physical, or what have you.

"That whereof we cannot speak, we must remain silent..." — John

If people really observed that, this forum would have practically no content.

I am not sure the notion of a God that is not personal really counts as a coherent notion of God at all — John

Whatever your belief in God is, it has to guide your actions, such that you relate to 'the whole of reality' and not some corner of it. That is the meaning of 'spiritual liberation', and I think quite possibly what Spinoza means by his 'intellectual love of God'.

And indeed it is similar to this sentiment also expressed by Einstein where he says:

A human being is a part of the whole, called by us "Universe", a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings as something separated from the rest — a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a kind of prison for us, restricting us to our personal desires and to affection for a few persons nearest to us. Our task must be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures and the whole of nature in its beauty. Nobody is able to achieve this completely, but the striving for such achievement is in itself a part of the liberation and a foundation for inner security.

I think the very idea that anything could be 'super" to nature is incoherent, because nature is defined as "the whole of what is", whatever that whole might turn out to be or to include. — John

X-)

Not at all true. I am a scientific realist but a transcendental idealist. — Wayfarer

For me that is a contradictory, and hence incoherent, position. Science either informs us about reality or it doesn't. If it informs us about reality then what it informs us about must be real independently of our experience of, or judgements about it.

then it doesn't allow for some ultimate, absolute or unconditioned good. — Wayfarer

It seems contradictory to say that there could be an "ultimate, absolute or unconditioned good" which means a good independent of human judgement, and yet to claim that there can be no reality independent of human judgement (i.e. a transcendental reality).

If people really observed that, this forum would have practically no content. — Wayfarer

Not at all; the fact that there are things which cannot be spoken of does not entail that there are not plenty of other things than can be spoken of. Whether or not any particular thing can be spoken of is itself something that must be spoken of in order to decide.

Whatever your belief in God is, it has to guide your actions, such that you relate to 'the whole of reality' and not some corner of it. That is the meaning of 'spiritual liberation', and I think quite possibly what Spinoza means by his 'intellectual love of God'. — Wayfarer

Yes, but I can't see how an impersonal notion of God can serve as a guide to action any more than the notion of nature could.

Science either informs us about reality or it doesn't. — John

Science informs us about aspects or parts of reality - and is an indispensable method for doing so. But the modern scientific method deliberately excludes certain factors from its reckonings, and then what has been excluded has been forgotten. Of course that is easy to say but it's a very deep issue which has taken centuries to unfold.

But some scientists do openly acknowledge this reality, for example, in Werner Heisenberg's well-known saying, 'What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning'. (This is very characteristic of what became known as the 'copenhagen interpretation' of modern physics.)That attitude allows for the noumenal-phenomenal, or reality and appearance, distinction. So one can be an empirical realist about scientific phenomena, without saying that these reveal any absolute truth - so knowledge, as in scientia, is in some fundamental way limited, even if it's incredibly powerful, which it obviously is.

It seems contradictory to say that there could be an "ultimate, absolute or unconditioned good" which means a good independent of human judgement, and yet to claim that there can be no reality independent of human judgement (i.e. a transcendental reality). — John

My view is that the 'objects of analysis' arise dependently with the perception of them. You can't ultimately distinguish seer and seen, as what we see is intrinsically dependent on our cognitive abilities (per Kant). So in that sense, the objects of perception are not truly observer-independent, in the way that scientific realism wants them to be. Scientific realism, as methodology, is one thing - but when it becomes instead a philosophy, it errs, because it forgets that 'the observer' is still part of the picture in the last analysis. Nothing is really 'mind-independent' in the sense of existing apart from perception, but that doesn't mean 'your perception' or 'my perception', but the whole human frame of reference.

In any case, as regards the unconditioned, that idea is represented in various schools of philosophy and traditions, for example, in Buddhism, where the Buddha says 'there is an unborn, unmade, uncreated, were there no unborn, there would be no escape from the born, the made, the created'. But that is obviously a rather more abstract or perhaps mystical notion than that of the 'heavenly father'.

can't see how an impersonal notion of God can serve as a guide to action any more than the notion of nature could. — John

It's not so much 'impersonal', as 'not a person'. You might say, the 'absolute' can manifest as a person, but it's not itself a person. That's why I objected to the passage that Arkady quoted from (who was it) Plantinga, saying the 'God is a person who feels and wants things'. I do think those kinds of ideas are anthropomorphic - but then, different people have to relate to these ideas on different levels. Not everyone is able to, or wants to, approach it through philosophical analysis.

" Love is nothing else but pleasure joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause." Spinoza. — John

What translation are you using? Edwin Curley's reads joy. Which is exactly why I avoided the word pleasure and used joy instead. While I don't know the Latin used, I highly suspect that "pleasure" is the most accurate translation there. Here's why:

If you haven't already, you can read the beginning of an early work of Spinoza (the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect) here. It's a (younger) Spinoza detailing out his attempts at philosophy, as well as his personal motivations for engaging in it. Slightly more personal, at least in the beginning than The Ethics.

"For as far as sensual pleasure is concerned, the mind is so caught up in it, as if at peace in a [true] good, that it is quite prevented from thinking of anything else. But after the enjoyment of sensual pleasure is past, the greatest sadness follows. If this does not completely engross, still it thoroughly confuses and dulls the mind"

Spinoza (much like the Stoics) didn't have a great idea of comfort, pleasure, and the like - at least not as most people understand them.

And I've avoided Spinoza's definition because of the attachment to an external cause required by it - defining it that way does not fit in with the Christian picture where God = Love. Love in this way cannot have an external cause, because there is nothing external to love to begin with. So defining Love with respect to something external is a grave mistake according to the Christian - much like something external cannot be used to define Substance. Note that there is no question of God being personal yet - the statement isn't, like in Islam, that God is loving. Rather God is Love. (also think about comparing Christian love with Spinoza's conatus).

I'm referring to how certain finite states are self-defined rather than others, a way of talking about how God (totality) is expressed by some actual states (those that exist) but not other ones (those which do not exist). — TheWillowOfDarkness

This appears to have reduced it to nothing more than a mere metaphysical relation, since even if it is expressed by those that do not exist, there must even in non-existence be assigned a cause. And why rather than others? I am unsure if you have confused prop. 3, but exactly how have you isolated totality (substance) from whatever is must be in a substance and the cause of all that exists? Even 'ideas' are in this same order.

But the modern scientific method deliberately excludes certain factors from its reckonings, and then what has been excluded has been forgotten. — Wayfarer

I'm interested to hear what those factors are.

You might say, the 'absolute' can manifest as a person, but it's not itself a person. — Wayfarer

OK, but this does not mean that the absolute is personal. I mean, whatever it is, it can obviously manifest as persons; it manifests as human persons, at the very least

So one can be an empirical realist about scientific phenomena, without saying that these reveal any absolute truth - so knowledge, as in scientia, is in some fundamental way limited — Wayfarer

If the empirical is real, (which means independent of human opinion) then how is that not absolute? For example, it is taken as an empirical truth that galaxies and solar systems formed long before humans even existed. Now obviously the knowing of that truth is not possible without humans, but the knowing of the truth is not the truth itself; the truth itself is the actuality; the galaxies either formed in the way we think or they did not.

You can't ultimately distinguish seer and seen, as what we see is intrinsically dependent on our cognitive abilities (per Kant). — Wayfarer

I think it is very obvious that the way things are seen by humans is dependent on the 'mechanics' of human visual perception. So, in that sense alone ti could be right to say that what is seen is ( partially) dependent on our cognitive abilities. However, the specific content of what is seen is obviously also determined by what is there (whatever that might be, or be determined by, in some imagined "ultimate sense") and not wholly by our cognitive abilities. It often seems to me that you turn a willful "blind eye" to this distinction, probably because you think that to admit it would be inimical to any spiritual understanding of life. I, on the other hand, don't think it is necessarily inimical to a spiritual understanding at all.

Scientific realism, as methodology, is one thing - but when it becomes instead a philosophy, it errs, because it forgets that 'the observer' is still part of the picture in the last analysis. Nothing is really 'mind-independent' in the sense of existing apart from perception, but that doesn't mean 'your perception' or 'my perception', but the whole human frame of reference. — Wayfarer

Science takes it for granted that what is revealed by the senses is the real. What else could it be? What other real could there be? Without rational beings there would be no idea of the real. But the real would still be revealed to animal perception. Without any percipient at all, the real could not be revealed at all. And yet it is easy enough to imagine a whole world of plant life that contains no animal or human life. All those processes of nutrition, photosynthesis and cellular growth going on, and yet utterly blindly. Are you claiming that such a thing could not exist?

Science does not pretend to answer the question as to what is the "ultimate nature" of the real that is revealed to us. If there is no infinite intelligence, no God, then there is no one to know the answer to that "ultimate question". But then, perhaps the question itself is a kind of incoherent chimera that occurs only to the human mind.



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I agree there is a common distinction between joy and pleasure; but I think really they are essentially the same. It is just that joy is commonly understood to be a "higher" kind of pleasure; possibly an ethical or intellectual pleasure, as opposed to the lower sensual pleasures.

If 'joy' is substituted for 'pleasure' in Spinoza's formulation we get "Love is joy associated with the idea of an external cause", which is essentially not that different.

In any case it seems as though you are rejecting Spinoza's definition of love, which is fine; I would probably tend to agree about that as well. I only cited it because the exchange between you and MU reminded me of it and its pertinence.

, perhaps the question itself is a kind of incoherent chimera that occurs only to the human mind. — John

Just what an Ayer or Carnap would say, I think our conversations have run their course.

Fairy Nuff...

Ok. For me, the utility of this is pointless, you are better off using your time elsewhere. But hey, each to themselves. — TimeLine

A screamer is a screamer. A person who wants to deceive themselves and others will; look at holocaust deniers. There is no point to it, basically, and if you choose the intellectual realm, set aside the emotions and communicate with those that will actually hear you.

No matter what you say, if people refuse to listen or read what you are actually writing or saying because of their personal views and vendettas, they will not hear or see a word that you write. — TimeLine

It's certainly more tedious to intellectually engage with the emotional, but it's definitely possible; I've done it many times (sure, it's not always worthwhile or successful). The answer to persuading a screamer is either to undermine their emotion or wield a more persuasive argument.

That is not the way that I see it; I feel the story ameliorates the importance of the subjectivity of the individual, that the intentions within matter more than the practice of offerings or giving. "For you are so careful to clean the outside of the cup and the dish, but inside you are filthy - full of greed and self-indulgence!" Very similar to the Ring of Gyges parable. The result between the brothers proves this. — TimeLine

So the ring of invisibility the insignificance that Cain felt when god favored only Abel? That's what caused him to feel jealousy. The moral of the story is that jealousy corrupts, but within the story we also have god arbitrarily valuing the taking of animal life as an offering over the harvesting of produce as an offering. What's wrong with fruits and vegetables? By god's logic Cain could have killed Abel as an offering to god, and he might have been very pleased indeed. His real mistake was not telling god he did it all for Him.

When it comes to Cain and Abel, I'm O.K with the mainstream moral lesson (about jealousy) but in the interest of criticizing the divinity of the entire document, it's important for me to point out and ask "Hey, what's this bit about god preferring the taking of life as an offering over perfectly good fruits and vegetables?". This is quite related to my point about the Issac tale, the sacrifice of Jesus, and my point about old testament sacrifice in general. Blood is the currency of forgiveness. Which brings me back to my original point: why does god need blood to forgive in the first place? Is it some source of power? Magic? Is god Gargamel?

It's certainly more tedious to intellectually engage with the emotional, but it's definitely possible; I've done it many times (sure, it's not always worthwhile or successful). The answer to persuading a screamer is either to undermine their emotion or wield a more persuasive argument. — VagabondSpectre

I agree with you but it depends on your own disposition and will as a person, as well as the utility or intention of the outcome. For instance (and I am using a personal example only to elicit the point I am attempting to convey), I once cared for someone who was rather vicious but I understood why and I knew how to help him because I had been there myself, but such was his profoundly immature ego that my ability to penetrate and enable his conscience almost cost me more than just my time. He made me so sad. When you love a friend as much as I did him, tedious is hardly the word to describe what one can end up feeling when engaging with the emotionally decrepit.

You may undermine the emotion of a religious zealot, for instance, but what about undermining the emotion of a religious zealot who is sociopathic, vengeful, cruel? Is it worth the possible outcome if they decide to unleash this cruelty directly to you? When you expose the flaws in someone - particularly religious - who subjectively consider themselves morally superior, you become an enemy to them, a threat because the foundation of their identity is shaken. The anxiety this causes makes them work very hard to undermine you back, by whatever means necessary, since if they are able to beat you then it proves to them that you must be wrong and therefore so must your judgements of them.

You are right, undermine the emotion and wield a persuasive argument, but only when you are capable of emotionally investing in it yourself. As injustice can stir a raging fire within me, I would much rather dedicate my time theoretically to broader at -macro rather than -micro.

So the ring of invisibility the insignificance that Cain felt when god favored only Abel? That's what caused him to feel jealousy. — VagabondSpectre

I am not sure what you mean, are you doubting the semblance with the Ring of Gyges? Is the problem of Able what caused Cain to feel jealousy, or was the pre-existing character of Cain merely exposed by the jealousy? Temptation can expose the true character of a person despite the appearances of virtue. It is to expose the schism within humanity vis-a-vis our immoral nature, not the actual offering itself. There is a plethora of these types of parables applicable throughout many areas of thought be it philosophical or theological; to remain in line with the OP, discussions of the purpose and motive behind actions in parables like the poor widow's offering, or the rich fool.

Blood is the currency of forgiveness. Which brings me back to my original point: why does god need blood to forgive in the first place? Is it some source of power? Magic? Is god Gargamel? — VagabondSpectre

This is just insipid at best. I guess I understand what you imply when your criticism is directed to the views made by the so-called mainstream religious that I am not and will remain unacquainted with, but you are confusing God with people, that it is people that need blood for redemption, the source of the power being the effect it has on ones conscience. The forgiveness follows the redemption, since when one enables their conscience to express love correctly and become morally conscious, they become what God wants them to be and thus they are forgiven. People, though, are the ones that need the blood, which should make you ponder what the heck is wrong with people.