The “hard problem” of suffering

Angelo Cannata

If Chalmer’s hard problem of consciousness does not exist, then there is no difference between a living human body suffering and a computer built to imitate all happenings and behaviours of suffering. As there is nobody suffering inside a computer, no matter how complex it is, the same way we have no evidence that somebody is suffering inside a body showing alarm signs of suffering.
Nobody would say that we should protect computers from violence; why should we protect humans from violence, if nobody is suffering inside a suffering body? A suffering human body can be interpreted just like the frog’s legs in Galvani’s experiment. We act against violence on animals; would anybody act against violence on dead animals whose body is still able to show reactions?

Now, this seems like a blakmail, or a Catch 22 situation: if you say that something like the “I”, the subject, the self, does not exist, then you are indirectly supporting violence, even if you say explicitly that you are against violence and you will always do everything possible to act against violence. On the other hand, if you say that somebody is suffering inside a suffering body, then you are saying that we need to agree that something, that science is absolutely unable to prove, exists and, as a consequence, needs to be explored, studied, cultivated, discussed. The problem is that, for these discussions, studies and explorations, we won’t have any evidence, any objective material to work on, so that the whole matter is highly exposed to a lot of discretion; I mean: everybody will be able to say anything about it and we will have no serious material to work on. This can explain also the hard, never ending, debates about abortion.

I think that philosophy needs to face this challenge: what, better than philosophy, can be able to face it? At the moment, I think the only way to manage this question is a permanent research, discussion, study, that most probably must never be considered closed. I mean, I think the solution is exactly not stopping discussions, while, on the opposite side, the root of the problem is not violence, but when we close, or look for closing, discussions.

M777

↪Angelo Cannata

Probably people mirror their own emotions onto others. A weak person, who is afraid of all kinds of suffering or violence, will be overly protective of others. Same a person who is ok with suffering himself as an inevitable part of life, doesn't have an urge to rid the world of suffering at any cost, as they understand that some degree of suffering is needed for one's growth and without it people would become weak and pathetic.

Agent Smith

growth — M777

:snicker:

Agent Smith

I had similar thoughts - there doesn't seem to be an I unique to an individual i.e. if someone else were in my shoes, they'd think/speak/act in exactly the same way as I think/speak/act. Put in a different way, the brain is a generic device and depending on the complex interaction of memes it has installed and the experiences it undergoes, it will behave in a way that, to the unaware, could be taken as identifying a unique individual; nonetheless, as outlined above, this is an illusion.

However, this realization, speaking only for myself, doesn't diminish the suffering I have to bear. I don't feel better about someone belittling me in public just because I happen to know that I am in illusion, an accident of circumstances, having no real essence and so on. In short, there is no self, doesn't necessarily imply there is no suffering.

Did I miss the point of the OP? :chin:

180 Proof

↪Angelo Cannata

Suffering is not a "problem" – hard or easy – to be "solved" but a reality (i.e. our facticity) to which, to degrees, we are adapted / maladapted (according to e.g. Buddha, Epicurus, Hillel the Elder, et al). Consider these links to old posts / threads:

My interpretation of "an examined life" is 'unlearning misery as a way of life', as an endless, sisyphusean task (i.e. self-overcoming). — 180 Proof

... to prevent increases in and/or to reduce the gratuitous harms (re: suffering, misery) ... — 180 Proof

We suffer, therefore I am.

:death: :flower:

T Clark

Probably people mirror their own emotions onto others. — M777

This is probably true.

A weak person, who is afraid of all kinds of suffering or violence, will be overly protective of others. Same a person who is ok with suffering himself as an inevitable part of life, doesn't have an urge to rid the world of suffering at any cost, as they understand that some degree of suffering is needed for one's growth and without it people would become weak and pathetic. — M777

I think this is probably not true.

Angelo Cannata

there is no self, doesn't necessarily imply there is no suffering — Agent Smith

This is exactly the point of my question: if there is no self, who is suffering?
I think that, even about animals, when we think that they suffer, we are assigning to them at least some degree of “self”.

T Clark

This is an interesting way of looking at things.

If Chalmer’s hard problem of consciousness does not exist, then there is no difference between a living human body suffering and a computer built to imitate all happenings and behaviours of suffering. — Angelo Cannata

Saying that the hard problem doesn't exist isn't the same as saying consciousness, in the sense that suffering is an aspect of consciousness, doesn't exist.

On a separate note, there is a case to be made that a computer built to imitate human conscious behavior seamlessly and completely is conscious. Not sure where I come down on that. This brings us into the land of P-zombies, which drives me crazy.

if you say that something like the “I”, the subject, the self, does not exist, — Angelo Cannata

I think I understand what eastern philosophies mean when they say that the self is an illusion. It's a useful way of looking at things. There are times when I can even experience things that way. On the other hand, most of the time it's me sitting here typing. Doing things the good old fashioned Amurican, western way. As the Beatles sang - "All I can hear, I me mine, I me mine, I me mine. Even those tears, I me mine, I me mine, I me mine."

then you are saying that we need to agree that something, that science is absolutely unable to prove, exists and, as a consequence, needs to be explored, studied, cultivated, discussed. — Angelo Cannata

Science doesn't prove things exist, it shows they can be measured in a rigorous, repeatable way. If we call that "existence," which is not unreasonable, then the self exists as much as gravity, electrons, and popcorn.

The problem is that, for these discussions, studies and explorations, we won’t have any evidence, any objective material to work on, so that the whole matter is highly exposed to a lot of discretion; I mean: everybody will be able to say anything about it and we will have no serious material to work on. — Angelo Cannata

Of course we have evidence. I can report my personal experience of my self - suffering, thinking, awareness, happiness - everything that people experience. I can get similar reports from lots of different people. I can't use my eyes to see a self directly, but that's true of many things - electrons, x-rays, gravity... Maybe you don't think the evidence for selfhood is very good. I disagree.

Nobody would say that we should protect computers from violence; why should we protect humans from violence, if nobody is suffering inside a suffering body? A suffering human body can be interpreted just like the frog’s legs in Galvani’s experiment. — Angelo Cannata

Maybe, logically, we shouldn't care about other people's suffering for the reason you've given. Fact is, though, we do. For most of us empathy is part of our standard equipment. It's built in. For most of us, caring about other people is important. That's a value. Values are not generally rational or logical, not to say they are irrational or illogical. If this computer you're discussing can perfectly simulate suffering and perfectly simulate empathy, then we're really talking.

Agent Smith

This is exactly the point of my question: if there is no self, who is suffering?
I think that, even about animals, when we think that they suffer, we are assigning to them at least some degree of “self”. — Angelo Cannata

We need to tread carefully....these are treacherous waters.

You might want to take a closer look at what we mean by self.

bert1

We suffer, therefore I am. — 180 Proof

Is there any significance to your use of 'we' rather than 'I'? You may have just been careless, or it may have been deliberate.

Angelo Cannata

Perhaps it is good to specify that the problem I am talking about involves philosophy, not us in general as persons. It is easy to solve the difficulty from the point of view of us as persons, as some of you have already done: we as persons don’t need evidence, nor clear definitions, nor systems of thought, we just need to be human.
Philosophy, instead, either from a metaphysical point of view, or from what I think is like the current scientific drift of philosophy, needs definitions, clarity, evidence, logic, consistency. Even nihilists or postmodern thinkers need some kind of clear context where to put questions. This is where Chalmer’s hard problem, or my modification of it by referring to suffering, becomes a challenge.
It seems to me that, in the context of philosophy, not just humanity, however we define the self, we are in the Catch 22 situation: if the self is something clear, then we are like machines with some kind of particular phenomenon that we can call “self”, that, as such, can be referred even to computers properly made; in this case we have the challenge of agreeing that a machine can suffer and, as such, can deserve empathy, fighting for its rights, even making laws to punish those who make violence against computers. In the opposite case, if the self is unclear, then there is not anywhere anybody suffering, so there is no philosophical need to defend the rights of oppressed people.

Joshs

↪Angelo Cannata

It seems to me that, in the context of philosophy, not just humanity, however we define the self, we are in the Catch 22 situation: if the self is something clear, then we are like machines with some kind of particular phenomenon that we can call “self”, that, as such, can be referred even to computers properly made; in this case we have the challenge of agreeing that a machine can suffer and, as such, can deserve empathy, fighting for its rights, even making laws to punish those who make violence against computers. In the opposite case, if the self is unclear, then there is not anywhere anybody suffering, so there is no philosophical need to defend the rights of oppressed people. — Angelo Cannata

There are two ways to dismiss Chalmer’s hard problem. The first is to solve it by making materiality primary and declaring humans to be complex machines. Dan Dennett holds to this view. I think that even though for him a conscious self is just an artifact , a convenient function, he would still argue that humans operate on the basis of complex motivational systems that computers currently lack, but that eventually we will be able to construct machines with such systems , and those machines es will indeed be capable of ‘suffering’.

The second way to do away with the hard problem is to dissolve it. This is the approach of phenomenology and postmodern theories. For them bodily and social
systems of differential drives , values and affects, what e than materiality, are fundamental and irreducible a prioris. This makes suffering intrinsic to reality, even without a constituting ‘self’.

Angelo Cannata

This makes suffering intrinsic to reality — Joshs

This seems dogmatic, which is, a truth without explanation, which, as such, is quite different from postmodern thought.

T Clark

Philosophy, instead, either from a metaphysical point of view, or from what I think is like the current scientific drift of philosophy, needs definitions, clarity, evidence, logic, consistency. Even nihilists or postmodern thinkers need some kind of clear context where to put questions. — Angelo Cannata

As I noted, I think selfhood has sufficient definition, clarity, evidence, logic, and consistency to be considered real, existent.

Joshs

↪Angelo Cannata

Are you familiar with Heidegger’s writing on authentic anxiety and guilt, or Nietzsche’s views on the primacy of suffering?

Levinas writes:

“Suffering qua suffering is but a concrete and quasi-sensible manifestation of the non-integratable, the non-justifiable. The `quality' of evil is this very non-integratability...In the appearing of evil, in its original phenomenality, in its quality, is announced a modality, a manner: not finding a place, the refusal of all accomodation with..., a counter-nature, a monstrosity, what is disturbing and foreign of itself. And in this sense transcendence!"(TE180)

Heidegger writes of Nietzsche’s
Zarathustra:

“Zarathustra invokes his ultimate recesses and so conducts himself to himself. He becomes what he is and confesses himself to be the one who he is: "the advocate of life, the advocate of suffering, the advocate of the circle." Living, suffering, and circling are not three distinct matters. They belong together and form one: being as a whole, to which suffering, the abyss, belongs and which is inasmuch as, circling it recurs”

Joshs

↪Clarky

As I noted, I think selfhood has sufficient definition, clarity, evidence, logic, and consistency to be considered real, existent. — Clarky

Does the self have a core that remains self-identical
over time , or is it always a slightly new and different self that come back to itself minute to minute , day to day? Have you read Varela and Thompson’s ‘The Embodoed Mind’? There , they use neuropsychological evidence to make the argument that there is only a contingent center of agency, and that the organism is a community of temporary selves.

T Clark

Does the self have a core that remains self-identical over time , or is it always a slightly new and different self that come back to itself minute to minute , day to day? — Joshs

I think both are good ways of looking at things, depending on the situation. When I'm dealing with people on a day to day basis, of course it makes sense for me to think of them as having a consistent identity. On the other hand, as @Angelo Cannata and others have noted, in some situations it may make sense to think of the self as changeable or even non-existent.

Tom Storm

here , they use neuropsychological evidence to make the argument that there is only a contingent center of agency, and that the organism is a community of temporary selves. — Joshs

How does one deal with addictions in the light of this? Surely the need to gamble or use substances - even if just for psychological reasons - should be temporary?

Joshs

↪Tom Storm

How does one deal with addictions in the light of this? Surely the need to gamble or use substances - even if just for psychological reasons - should be temporary? — Tom Storm

This article may help give a sense of how a ‘groundless’, embodied self forms addictions.

“The enactive account of addiction is a nonreductive, naturalistic model that views addictive processes (e.g
craving, mental obsessions, abnormal reactions) as “dynamic and embedded interactions” (McGann et al. 2013, 203) between IWEA ( individuals who experience addiction)and their environment.1 Addiction is not seen as residing in IWEA, but “as emerging, existing dynamically in the relationship between [IWEA] and their surroundings, including other agents” (203). Such a model of addiction “groups central concepts (such as action, sense, and agency) in the autonomous organization of [IWEA] and their value-laden, meaningful engagements with their environment” (203).
Two analogies, borrowed from McGann et al. (2013), may be useful. For example, a handshake does not exist except during its enaction. With the enactive approach, the same is true of addiction—it is “intrinsically relational and dynamic in nature” (McGann et al. 2013)
A dance endures “only while the dancers continue to act, and is defined by the coordination, the mutual sensitivity, and reciprocal influence between the dancers and the music” (203). With enaction, addiction “is a dynamically constituted process and, like a dance, or a handshake, should be studied and understood in dynamic, contextualized terms”

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Nicholas-Zautra/publication/285747009_Embodiment_Interaction_and_Experience_Toward_a_Comprehensive_Model_in_Addiction_Science/links/5820c24608aea429b29bc06f/Embodiment-Interaction-and-Experience-Toward-a-Comprehensive-Model-in-Addiction-Science.pdf?origin=publication_detail

Heracloitus

↪Joshs

What are the implications of considering addiction in such a manner (enactive model)?

Tom Storm

↪Joshs

:up:

180 Proof

↪bert1

"It may have been".

Heracloitus

Does the self have a core that remains self-identical
over time , or is it always a slightly new and different self that come back to itself minute to minute , day to day? Have you read Varela and Thompson’s ‘The Embodoed Mind’? There , they use neuropsychological evidence to make the argument that there is only a contingent center of agency, and that the organism is a community of temporary selves. — Joshs

I wonder how they account for continuity. Maybe I should read it ...

Paine

↪Angelo Cannata

What Chalmer is trying to do as a scientist does not dissolve the use of the "I." Isn't the immediacy of experience a given quality in the discussion?

We have other experiences that serve as evidence in scientific inquiry. For instance, when we try to understand why certain things hurt, it doesn't make the hurt less like hurt to treat it as a result of a process. There is a considerable difference between being able to explain some of a phenomenon and explaining it away.

Agent Smith

We suffer, therefore I am. — 180 Proof

:fire:

There's a connection between suffering and self-awareness. When suffering we feel most alone and being so isolated, one naturally drifts towards metacognition.

Happiness, on the other hand, tends to be a group affair and one's sense of self is lost in the joyous crowd so to speak.

Our evolutionary history is one consecrated to Algos (the lord of pain) and that explains why we're self-aware, unlike other animals.

Tom Storm

. When suffering we feel most alone and being so isolated, one naturally drifts towards metacognition. — Agent Smith

I don't think this is a necessary response. In suffering I often feel most connected to others and reminded of a process that ends in death - a unifying feature all living creatures share.

Agent Smith

I don't think this is a necessary response. In suffering I often feel most connected to others and reminded of a process that ends in death - a unifying feature all living creatures share. — Tom Storm

Misery loves company - the loneliness of suffering is obvious/evident, oui?

Tom Storm

the loneliness of suffering is obvious/evident, oui? — Agent Smith

No. :wink:

Jackson

In suffering I often feel most connected to others — Tom Storm

Why do you feel connected?

Agent Smith

No. :wink: — Tom Storm

I don't think you're right about this.

Tom Storm

Why do you feel connected? — Jackson

Generally because I seek comfort and receive it - friends, family, care professionals. Because suffering is something we all share. Comfort and privilege is something fewer share.

But having worked with people in palliative care (often dying from excruciating illnesses) there are a few things I've seen regularly that seem to contradict commonly held views. 1) dying is often done with family and friends and is often the first time people have felt connected to others in many years. This feedback I've heard too often to ignore. But sure, it's not true for everyone. 2) People with faith often turn away from their beliefs as they die. But this is a separate subject.

I don't think you're right about this. — Agent Smith

That's because the idea challenges you. That's ok.

The “hard problem” of suffering

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