I'm not surprised. — Banno

There's no reason to be surprised, and many reasons not to be.

So... where to with all this?

It seems a reply to your quoting me here:

What this shows is that we need the notion of "belief" in order to make a basic distinction between what we think is true and what is actually true.
— Banno — praxis

Is there a point of disagreement here?

After all, the title is "A few Strong words..."

The etymology appears neck deep in theology.

believe (v.)
Old English belyfan "to have faith or confidence" (in a person), earlier geleafa (Mercian), gelefa (Northumbrian), gelyfan (West Saxon), from Proto-Germanic *ga-laubjan "to believe," perhaps literally "hold dear (or valuable, or satisfactory), to love" (source also of Old Saxon gilobian "believe," Dutch geloven, Old High German gilouben, German glauben), ultimately a compound based on PIE root *leubh- "to care, desire, love" (see belief).

Meaning "be persuaded of the truth of" (a doctrine, system, religion, etc.) is from mid-13c.; meaning "credit upon the grounds of authority or testimony without complete demonstration, accept as true" is from early 14c. General sense "be of the opinion, think" is from c. 1300. Related: Believed (formerly occasionally beleft); believing.

Perhaps like God, the term is dead.

Interesting. The proto-Germic "hold dear" is presumably pre-christian, dating from before the fifth century. SO that perhaps precedes any theological influence.

Etymonline.com also has

Meaning "conviction of the truth of a proposition or alleged fact without knowledge" is by 1530s; it is also "sometimes used to include the absolute conviction or certainty which accompanies knowledge" [Century Dictionary].

I could not find a dictionary that equated "belief"with "certainty", only with trust, confidence and so on. Nothin to support the idea of belief implying certitude.

The latin would be fides, fidelity, again to do with trust and reliability, whereas certanitatem is that which is certain, settled, exempt from doubt.

Hence the distinction to which I would draw attention has a long history.

I could not find a dictionary that equated "belief"with "certainty", only with trust, confidence and so on. Nothin to support the idea of belief implying certitude. — Banno

Have I claimed otherwise?

What I find most problematic with belief is its meaning as described in the etymology: "be persuaded of the truth of" (a doctrine, system, religion, etc.) is from mid-13c.; meaning "credit upon the grounds of authority or testimony without complete demonstration, accept as true"

Have I claimed otherwise? — praxis

I'm not at all sure what your position is.

Where are you looking for your etymology? Nothing I have access to has anything like "be persuaded of the truth of...". Checked my SOED, which has no such sense. There is the sense of trusting, then of assenting to a proposition, then the thing believed, and finally a creed. In the etymology I find there is "believe in a thing...", to be persuaded of the existence of, say, ghosts, from Boswell, a phrase using the second sense - assenting to the existence of ghosts.

"credit upon the grounds of authority or testimony without complete demonstration, accept as true" is belief without certainty, which I do not see as problematic.

I could not find a dictionary that equated "belief"with "certainty", only with trust, confidence and so on. Nothin to support the idea of belief implying certitude. — Banno

Yeah, this turn of events from @Janus has surprised me too. I've never heard of "I believe" being equated with "I'm certain", it seemed out of the blue.

Like...

What one believes is not necessarily true, of course, but one believes that it is necessarily true, which means that one cannot acknowledge that it might be false without ceasing to believe it. — Janus

I'm quite confused by this introduction of a distinction between what I believe and what I'm merely 'entertaining might be the case'. I don't see any linguistic support for it (who talks like that?), and there's certainly no neurological support for it (it's not how brains work) - so I can't really see where it's coming from.

Unless we are to argue that "I believe the keys are in the car, but I might be wrong" makes no sense at all, then we have to acknowledge that 'believe' ranges across degrees of certainty. One can believe something with a near pathological certainty, and one can believe something as merely being the more likely of two options.

As to...

I could not believe (feel sure) that they were in all three of the places that I imagine. — praxis

You absolutely could. It's perfectly possible to believe (even to feel sure of) two contradictory things at once, people do it all the time. What one can't do is act on both beliefs, but one can hold both beliefs. Were it not possible, each alternative would have to be completely modelled from scratch in the brain as an when it was needed.

"credit upon the grounds of authority or testimony without complete demonstration, accept as true" is belief without certainty, which I do not see as problematic. — Banno

Take the 2020 American presidential election, for instance. Trump was a leader and an authority figure who made a claim that his supporters 'felt sure' was true, despite a lack of supporting evidence. This sort of thing is characterized as a "big lie". You're cool with big lies? This directly relates to Ken Edwards's experience in WW2, btw.

Yeah, this turn of events from Janus has surprised me too. I've never heard of "I believe" being equated with "I'm certain" "I feel certain", it seemed out of the blue. — Isaac

Perhaps you're misconstruing what was said.

I could not believe (feel sure) that they were in all three of the places that I imagine.
— praxis

You absolutely could. It's perfectly possible to believe (even to feel sure of) two contradictory things at once, people do it all the time. — Isaac

Can you give an example?

What one can't do is act on both beliefs, but one can hold both beliefs. Were it not possible, each alternative would have to be completely modelled from scratch in the brain as an when it was needed.

In my example, there is one set of keys and three places that are imagined they could be located. How could someone feel sure that they are in all three places?

Obviously, we can imagine all sorts of things without believing them.

The kinds of things I have listed as knowledge cannot be seriously doubted, let alone discovered to have been wrong. — Janus

Like...?

So you're saying that you've never held an idea that you though could not be seriously doubted, yet only to discover later that you were wrong?

Sounds like you're saying that you've never been wrong in your life.

Perhaps you're misconstruing what was said. — praxis

Then I don't really see the conflict with what @Banno is saying. If "feel certain" is just another way of saying "believe", perhaps wanting to emphasise a bit more confidence.

The key is if there's room for doubt. If "I feel certain the keys are in the car, but I'm probably wrong, I've got a memory like a sieve" seems a normal expression to you then 'to believe' entails any amount of doubt.

Can you give an example? — praxis

Not really no. The comment was on the presumption of this distinction @Janus was making between a mental state and an expressed belief. A belief as a mental state has no barrier to being contradictory. Beliefs here are simply propensities to act as if some state of affairs were the case and such a propensity is carried in the brain by dynamic networks. Since these are stochastic and unstable, it's perfectly possible to hold contradictory beliefs (propensities to act as if two contradictory states of affairs were the case). In fact, it's quite a normal state.

If you thought to yourself 'now, where's my keys' the image or concept of their location that comes to you would be the result of a resolution of that network at the state it's in at the time.

As for 'feeling sure'... Feelings are all post hoc narratives invented after the event. One could 'feel' anything which makes some sense of what just happened. It tells us absolutely nothing beyond our abilities as storytellers.

Can you give an example?
— praxis

Not really no. The comment was on the presumption of this distinction Janus was making between a mental state and an expressed belief. A belief as a mental state has no barrier to being contradictory. Beliefs here are simply propensities to act as if some state of affairs were the case and such a propensity is carried in the brain by dynamic networks. Since these are stochastic and unstable, it's perfectly possible to hold contradictory beliefs (propensities to act as if two contradictory states of affairs were the case). In fact, it's quite a normal state.

If you thought to yourself 'now, where's my keys' the image or concept of their location that comes to you would be the result of a resolution of that network at the state it's in at the time.

As for 'feeling sure'... Feelings are all post hoc narratives invented after the event. One could 'feel' anything which makes some sense of what just happened. It tells us absolutely nothing beyond our abilities as storytellers. — Isaac

Maybe I can help provide a real-world scenario, if I'm following you correctly.

A plant has the propensity to bend towards the sun. With mirrors, or simply turning the plant around if it's in a pot, the plant can be made to bend in different directions. One day at a particular time we can make it bend to the East and the next day at the same time we can make it bend to the West.

One day the plant believes (has a propensity to act) that the sun is in the East and the next day it believes the sun is in the West, dynamically adapting to the circumstances of the moment.

Feelings are all post hoc narratives — Isaac

Feelings are narratives? That doesn't seem right.

You might say feelings play a role in the construction of narratives...

"credit upon the grounds of authority or testimony without complete demonstration, accept as true" is belief without certainty, which I do not see as problematic.
— Banno

Take the 2020 American presidential election, for instance. Trump was a leader and an authority figure who made a claim that his supporters 'felt sure' was true, despite a lack of supporting evidence. This sort of thing is characterized as a "big lie". You're cool with big lies? This directly relates to Ken Edwards's experience in WW2, btw. — praxis

A day later I still do not see what you are trying to get at.

Dictionaries provide an outline of the many ways a word is used. One such definition is that "belief" is used as "credit upon the grounds of authority or testimony without complete demonstration, accept as true". I do not see this definition as problematic - it is one of the ways in which the word is used.

That is an utterly different question than whether one ought accept the word of a liar such as Trump.

Your equating to two makes no sense to me.

Then I don't really see the conflict with what Banno is saying. — Isaac

I'm glad you said that. Nor do I.

You absolutely could. It's perfectly possible to believe (even to feel sure of) two contradictory things at once, people do it all the time. What one can't do is act on both beliefs, but one can hold both beliefs. Were it not possible, each alternative would have to be completely modelled from scratch in the brain as an when it was needed. — Isaac

Trust you to raise the issue of inconsistency in such an uncomfortable way. :wink: "Uncomfortable" because those with a philosophical inclination tend to take rationality for granted, as if it were impossible to be irrational. And here you are pointing to the fact of irrationality in the way people live their lives. Damned inconvenient.

Philosophers sometimes forget that appeals to rationality are themselves normative. That we are sometimes irrational means we can ask if we ought be rational.

Here:

I believe the keys are in the car, but I might be wrong
I am certain that the keys are in the car, but I might be wrong.


Do we agree that there is a problem with the second sentence, but not with the first? — Banno

'I believe the keys are likely to be in the car' is more consistent. That is keys being in the car seems to be the most plausible option, but of course they may not be. I cannot, without contradiction, simultaneously believe the keys are without doubt in the car, and believe that that they may not be. If I acknowledge that they may not be in the car, then it would be absurd to firmly believe they are in the car.

I'm not going to explain this again; if you can't see it then that is your loss. No one has offered an actual argument for why my more subtle distinctions re believing are not preferable to the common parlance; riddled with ambiguity as it is. If someone does come up with such an argument then I'll listen, and respond; or concede the point.

Since these are stochastic and unstable, it's perfectly possible to hold contradictory beliefs (propensities to act as if two contradictory states of affairs were the case). In fact, it's quite a normal state. — Isaac

This, and the rest of what you say is not relevant to my argument since I am addressing what can be consistently, i.e.' rationally, believed; that is, what can be believed without contradiction.

'I believe the keys are likely to be in the car' is more consistent. That is keys being in the car seems to be the most plausible option, but of course they may not be. I cannot, without contradiction, simultaneously believe the keys are without doubt in the car, and believe that that they may not be. If I acknowledge that they may not be in the car, then it would be absurd to firmly believe they are in the car. — Janus

So we agree that (1) is consistent, (2) is contradictory.

I'm not going to explain this again... — Janus

You cannot explain it again, since you did not explain it in the first place. This is from one of your first replies:

It is not possible to believe something without feeling certain about it. — Janus

This has been shown to be wrong. With it your position collapses.

One day the plant believes (has a propensity to act) that the sun is in the East and the next day it believes the sun is in the West, dynamically adapting to the circumstances of the moment. — praxis

Interesting you put it like this. Does the plant not move towards the same direction each time and if it must have beliefs, could it not feel it has been moved? :razz:

Philosophers sometimes forget that appeals to rationality are themselves normative. That we are sometimes irrational means we can ask if we ought be rational. — Banno

That's discomforting - does it suggest a moral dimension to the use of reason? Do you feel that the use of reason as a foundational principle is tendentious? I imagine postmodernists might say reason is a construct of no particular merit, except when located in the value system of an intersubjective community. Do we forfeit conventional communication if reason is no longer priviledged?

So we agree that (1) is consistent, (2) is contradictory. — Banno

No, (1) as you framed it is the same as (2).

It is not possible to believe something without feeling certain about it. — Janus

This has been shown to be wrong. With it your position collapses. — Banno

I've said plenty to clear up any ambiguity in what you quote there. It should be obvious in light of what I've said that I meant rationally believe. It seems it suits you to ignore that and go for the low-hanging fruit.

To believe something is to feel certain about it, to be convinced of it. The psychological fact that people are able to (irrationally) believe (feel certain about) contradictory things is irrelevant to my argument that it is not possible to rationally be convinced of two contradictories or inconsistencies.

You haven't even attempted, let alone succeeded, in addressing anything I've said.

Interesting you put it like this. Does the plant not move towards the same direction each time and if it must have beliefs, could it not feel it has been moved? :razz: — Tom Storm

Hmm, maybe we should switch to people beliefs and try to come up with a real-life scenario where a person has an equal propensity to act in contradictory ways.

Say there's a person who is pro-life and this person has the propensity to act in ways that are in line with the pro-life movement. This person becomes pregnant and due to circumstances that are out of their control they desire an abortion and therefore have the propensity to act in ways that are contrary to the pro-life movement. If they have an abortion does that mean that they never actually believed in the pro-life movement? It would appear so.

If the pro-life belief was fake then what purpose did it serve? I propose that it functioned to help bind a group with shared "beliefs".

That's discomforting - does it suggest a moral dimension to the use of reason? Do you feel that the use of reason as a foundational principle is tendentious? I imagine postmodernists might say reason is a construct of no particular merit, except when located in the value system of an intersubjective community. Do we forfeit conventional communication if reason is no longer priviledged? — Tom Storm

It's discomforting perhaps because of the multitude of issues it raises. I'll try to give a sense of what is involved.

First, not all normative evaluations are moral. So one prefers a sharp knife, and makes normative claims such as "I prefer this knife because it is sharp", but that's not a moral evaluation.

We prefer talking with those who are rational, and judge that by, for example, rejecting those who contradict themselves or are inconsistent or incoherent (see for an example). One ought be rational, but is that a moral norm? Or just good manors? or a pragmatic preference - we get more done with those who are consistent?

There is a sense in which irrationality misfires. So if someone claims to have a square circle, we can be confident that they are mistaken, because "square circle" does not refer to anything. But this does not render irrationality in a conversation senseless. I just made use of square circles in the previous paragraph, and hope that it made sense for you. So despite being contradictory and irrational, it can have meaning.

Similarly, from Janus' contention that we must be certain of our beliefs and yet we can acknowledge that our beliefs might be wrong, we can conclude that Janus has gone astray somewhere. The inconsistency shows that something has gone astray in the account, or if you prefer, that there may be a better account, one that is consistent. We ought prefer consistent narratives.

The postmodern position remains a mystery. Sure, rationality is a construct, as is all language and all ubiquitous, enveloping social institutions. It does not follow from this alone that rationality is without merit.

There's something deeply problematic in accepting contradictions. It's shown most clearly in the logical Principle of Explosion, (p & ~p) → q; that is, if both a statement and it's contradiction are true, anything follows. If one accepts a contradiction, then anything follows. It means that we can accept any narrative we like; and hence we no longer have a basis for any decision making.

Compare the criticism of Feyerabend mentioned elsewhere, that if anything goes, everything stays. If we have no good reasons for changing how things are, we may as well leave them as they are.

So whatever kudos one might gain by cleverly showing that reason is of no merit immediately dissipates, as narrative is then incapable of producing change. To forfeit conventional communication is to accept self-serving bullshit. Post modernism is in danger of throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Rationality underpins our social institutions, so that a commitment to living in a society is a commitment to rationality. It's not as if morality could be unreasonable...

If they have an abortion does that mean that they never actually believed in the pro-life movement? It would appear so. — praxis

They changed their mind. It happens. Beliefs are subject to change without notice.

A better example might be a pro-lifer so certain of the sanctity of life that they are willing to kill doctors who perform abortions. Hence,

It's perfectly possible to believe (even to feel sure of) two contradictory things at once, people do it all the time. — Isaac

Rationality underpins our social institutions, so that a commitment to living in a society is a commitment to rationality. It's not as if morality could be unreasonable... — Banno

Agree. Thanks for the wonderfully clear and useful overview.

Thanks, but I'd rather you found issue with what I said and sort to correct my errors...

:wink:

This person becomes pregnant and due to circumstances that are out of their control they desire an abortion and therefore have the propensity to act in ways that are contrary to the pro-life movement. If they have an abortion does that mean that they never actually believed in the pro-life movement? — praxis

My take would be different. We could also say the person was a hypocrite or that they were a case of 'do what I say not what I do.' Nothing could be more human than advocating one thing and doing another. I am not sure this changes what they believe but just demonstrates the gap between theory and practice.

But other than this I get what you are saying.

Do I recall you posting something about logic earlier that questions the notion of non-contradiction? As I recall you weren't entirely convinced - what was it called again? I'm assuming it is still right to say that the laws of logic or logical axioms make reason possible?

Yes, indeed, a few of them, but the one you may mean was Logical Nihilism. Gillian Russell's work has lead me to doubt that there are completely general logical principles. Rather one chooses a logical frame in which to pose one's narrative. This sits reasonably comfortably with some compelling aspects of both Wittgenstein and Davidson.

It's worth pointing out that this is not a rejection of logic but an enlargement of the scope in which we can put formal logics to use. Formal logic provides a template for rationality, but rationality is much broader.

Similarly, from Janus' contention that we must be certain of our beliefs and yet we can acknowledge that our beliefs might be wrong, we can conclude that Janus has gone astray somewhere. — Banno

No, you've gone astray again because you conflate being certain with feeling certain. We can only (excluding the absurd kind of radical, artificial doubt) be certain of what we know. But we can feel certain of our beliefs; and in fact if to believe is to be convinced, then that is what it means to believe something; to feel certain of it. Are you eventually going to present any counter-argument or are you just going to go on trying to make it seem like you have one up your sleeve? :roll:

Do you agree that there is a problem with the second sentence, but not with the first? Am I wrong here, and if so, how? — Banno

Yes, you're wrong. Here's how:

I am certain the sun will rise in the morning. But I could be wrong.