An emotion is very much a narrative style. You were taught (by family and culture -- mostly culture) to explain certain inner events by recourse to the language of emotions.

If you look at the Iliad you'll see that there is much less talk of emotions there. Agamemnon is not a jerk in his own eyes -- "the gods made me do it". Different narrative styles. The wrath of Achilles is more like a force of nature than our modern subjective "I'm really pissed off".

The distinction between symptoms and the language being used to articulate them is quite artificial if you ask me. The problem (as you correctly identify it when you allude to Cartesianism) is that we are not used to assimilate our bodily reactions (they are re-actions, note, they are not actions per se) as part of our psyche. Blame Descartes for it if you will. We are not used to think of ourselves as bodily entities. We think that the self has a body (rather than being, perhaps partially, a body). This is a narrative style with strengths and weaknesses. I don't like it.

So you think the way we see emotions as "separate" from their symptoms is more of a social-language thing than an actual ontological thing?

Also:

If you look at the Iliad you'll see that there is much less talk of emotions there. Agamemnon is not a jerk in his own eyes -- "the gods made me do it". Different narrative styles. The wrath of Achilles is more like a force of nature than our modern subjective "I'm really pissed off". — Mariner

It's probably wrong, but the bicameral theory of mind uses the Iliad and the Odyssey and other ancient works of literature as examples of the transition of a split-mind consciousness to a unity consciousness. The fact that Agamemnon says "the gods made me do it" is seen as evidence of the way consciousness actually operated back in the day - where there was a slave and a master psyche. Once these two aspects were joined, people were left wondering what happened to "the gods" who had told them what to do. Lost and confused, they attempted to retrace their steps and connect back with the gods that had abandoned them.

The fact that people talk about a bicameral theory of mind shows that the Cartesian allure is really too strong.

Yes, I think that we can learn to speak differently, and that how we speak about stuff like that determines our interpretations of the world and of ourselves.

The trick, though, is to recognize that the distinction between "social-language" and "actual ontological" is a social-language distinction :D. Language is ontology. The words we use and how we use them are constituents of the world, they are not superimposed on it as a separate layer. Words are not a blanket, they are more like atoms.

I think that we can learn to speak differently, — Mariner

Language is ontology. — Mariner

I'm having difficulty putting these two together. If language is ontology, then speaking differently is an act of creation ex-nihilo - is that right? That puts the poet/ novelist/ playwright at the heart of things...

I think we all come with some very basic functionalities. We can feel intensities of pleasures and pain, and we have certain basic drives like hunger and sex & certain very basic reflexes such as the sucking and the grasping reflexes. We learn how to apply and combine these basic responses normatively, these applications become much more complicated as we mature.

A Cartesian-style homunculus is out of date — darthbarracuda

...

but there still remains the very real experience of having a self that emotions somehow act upon. — darthbarracuda

There’s the rub, eh? Cartesian dualism may be currently out of philosophical fashion but it still remains the most accurate description of conscious experience.

I understand this to mean that language defines our ontological commitments. And that would be a social constructionist position on emotions that I would agree with.

When we are talking about feelings like fear or bravery, we are talking about our notions of "some thing" that exists with real substantiality. So already there are all kinds of grounding presumptions made by such talk. And higher human feelings like bravery are clearly more social scripts of proper ways to think and behave. So to the degree we believe in their existence, it is an act of creation in that sense.

A Cartesian-style homunculus is out of date — darthbarracuda

Really? https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-imprinted-brain/201407/come-back-homunculus-all-is-forgiven
Anyway how can pain or anything be realized without reflecting back to a "self"? It is realized and expressed by the (whole) person surely? I don't distinguish between the emotions/dreams/imagination it is all something being reflected upon and understood.

Also hi everyone, I had an account on http://forums.philosophyforums.com/ last year.
Is that place dead forever now?

Certainly anxiety cannot just simply be reduced to physical processes like a churning stomach, an elevated internal temperature, shifty eyes, etc, for these are simply symptoms used to diagnose an emotional state, behaviorist black-box style. — darthbarracuda

In this case, the social narrative - understanding this variety of symptoms as a single feeling - is fairly accurate of the biology. We are naturally organised to respond to the demands and opportunities of the world in a dichotomous fashion - either relaxing or tensing in some appropriate holistically orienting and prepatory fashion. There is a sympathetic nervous system and a parasympathetic one. And we can be aware of all the telltale sensations of switching between the two - if we learn to pay attention to them.

Of course we would need to know when we feel scared or hungry. Biologically we need sensations about out own state, as well as the state of the world. But then in the same way, a modern psychological take would want to get away from the resulting "passive representational dualism" of talking about the "us" that experiences "feelings and precepts" to an active or ecological framing of the way minds model worlds.

So the OP sets everything up in the usual dualistic fashion - as if we are naturally observers of our own experiences. But biologically, we simply react to life with appropriate feeling. No mystery. And then humans have language with which they can socially construct a secondary narrative state of being. We can start to talk about "being scared" - and thus raise the counterfactual possibility of "being brave".

That is, we can be quivering in our boots and yet choosing to act according to some different behavioural script - as if fear is what we over-ride in favour of a tougher socially-approved course of action.

So the power of narrative is indeed to inject this "self" into the middle of our biological reacting. Counterfactual thinking becomes a new layer of response for socialised humans.

Hello. I wrote a short document about emotions a while back.
Emotional Feeling: An effect an individual experiences, which results from experiencing an "Event" (an experience directly perceived by the individual). Emotional feelings have two properties like a vector:
1. A direction: positive called pleasure, and negative called pain.
2. A magnitude or intensity or degree: a strong versus weak emotional response.

Much like you can learn about a cause from its effect, the purpose of emotional feelings is to reflect the meaning of the event that triggered it. If the feeling is positive, then it is an indication that the event must have been positive. If the feeling is negative, then it is an indication that the event must have been negative.

Emotions are what is felt on the inside. And I don't think this necessarily has to resort to a Cartesian subject who feels the feeling. Aren't feelings actually shared, after all? Aren't they even infectious? When someone I know is scared I will often feel worry, when someone is laughing I will often feel humor even without knowing the joke. This is why comedy is best in the theater or in person -- one person's laughter builds another persons, and everyone slowly feels the humor more deeply as the infection spreads.

Emotions are relatively basic to our lives. They are similar to object-kinds, in this way. "What are objects?" or "What are chairs?" we might ask. "What is doing the sitting?" or "What is doing the seeing of these objects?". And so many other variations. But is there any more of an answer, here, than there is with emotions? If we believe we see because light hits objects and reflects off into our eye which sends a signal to our brain to give us an image, won't we believe similarly so with emotions? "The brain is at work" -- "the chemicals are released"


Or, is the question more akin to asking how it is possible to perceive an inside? "We grant objects and all that, but what do we make of our internal lives? Why do we have internal lives at all? What is an internal life?"
??

Interesting analogy of the vector.

I feel emotions. But what are emotions, and how do I feel them? — darthbarracuda

Emotion: a mental condition having environmental and/or biochemical causes, and physiological (autonomic activation), cognitive/intuitive (thought), and behavioural (affect display, action), effects.

Lisa Feldman Barrett's Theory of Constructed Emotion, 2016 (formerly, Conceptual Act Model of Emotion, 2006) describes emotion as a physical/mental construction of interoception, concepts, and social reality. http://www.affective-science.org/pubs/2017/barrett-tce-scan-2017.pdf

Plutchik, Robert (1980), Emotion: Theory, Research, and Experience: Vol. 1. Theories of Emotion 1, New York: Academic describes basic and secondary emotions:
1) Basic Emotions: emotions which are experienced, displayed and recognized similarly across cultures (involving fast brain pathway processing through the limbic system).
2) Secondary Emotions: a larger and more refined set of emotions which vary in arousal intensity and valence (i.e., the attraction or aversion associated with an experience) as a result of cognitive appraisal.

In addition, the following have been observed:

1) Common Phobias
2) Social Emotions: emotions that result from the attribution of mental conditions to others (e.g., embarrassment/confidence, guilt/innocence, remorse/joy, shame/self esteem, kindness/cruelty, sympathy/discord, compassion/indifference).
3) Social Phobias

We are naturally organised to respond to the demands and opportunities of the world in a dichotomous fashion - either relaxing or tensing in some appropriate holistically orienting and prepatory fashion. — apokrisis

Given that human descriptions generally reduce to a dichotomy, or complementary opposites, what could be the psychological cause of this?

I'm having difficulty putting these two together. If language is ontology, then speaking differently is an act of creation ex-nihilo - is that right? That puts the poet/ novelist/ playwright at the heart of things... — unenlightened

Yes, very much. Though it is not "ex nihilo" -- we work with existing materials -- it is very much an act of creation.

The best essay about this that I know of is Tolkien's lecture, "On Fairy Stories". (You can find it on the web).

And one of the best examples that I know of, in English, is Blake's Marriage of Heaven and Hell.

If we were talking about Portuguese, Fernando Pessoa would rank very high.

the purpose of emotional feelings is to reflect the meaning of the event that triggered it. If the feeling is positive, then the event must have been positive. — Samuel Lacrampe

So, for example, the positive feeling that a junky might have when s/he finds some drugs would reflect the positive meaning of what? Why must it be positive? And whence the assumption that emotions would have a purpose?

If the feeling is negative, then the emotion must have been negative. — Samuel Lacrampe

The emotion is the feeling.

Given that human descriptions generally reduce to a dichotomy, or complementary opposites, what could be the psychological cause of this? — Galuchat

I'm not sure I understand your question. But we reason in this fashion as it is effective. Reducing our choices to a pair of polar opposites means we can act with counterfactual definiteness. There is simple clarity.

Reducing our choices to a pair of polar opposites means we can act with counterfactual definiteness. There is simple clarity. — apokrisis

Excellent! That's great. Thanks.

The following is based on the Impure Somatic Theory of Barlassina & Newen, very detailed abstract here.

There is a question whether emotions are caused by our perceptions of our own bodily states. Do we fear because we tremble or do we tremble because we fear. Or, are our somatic and our cognitive processes fully integrated so that emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states.

An adequate theory of emotion has to account for facts concerning the intentionality and the phenomenology of emotion. If I am sad due to the death of a child, this is not due to my bodily state it is due to the loss of a child. The emotion has a particular object , the child and a formal object (relational property), the loss. Sadness is a basic emotion (animals can also display basic emotions), higher emotions such as guilt can be cognitively constructed from lower emotions such as sadness (most animals can not demonstrate higher emotions).

From the linked abstract:

In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. — Luca Barlassina

This sounds similar to Barrett's Theory of Constructed Emotion. I agree with the Author that Prinz's Pure Somatic Theory (2004) is untenable.

the very real experience of having a self that emotions somehow act upon — darthbarracuda

I've been doing a module at undergrad level on 'philosophy of emotions'. Broadly, theory suggests

- physical response to some object, an idea which derives first in the modern era from William James
- emotions are appraisals of an object (Martha Nussbaum strong on this in a rather austere way)
- emotions motivate (Helm argues)

I'm with apo in that I don't see that we need dualist language. Emotions are a way of describing how we are in the world. They tend to get written out of cognitive-style accounts, or get contrasted to 'reason', but empirically emotions and reasons intertwine. A man called Roddy Cowie did some interesting empirical work (to try to work out how to help computers relate to emotionality). He found that some feeling we call 'emotional' is in place more or less all the time, on people's own first-person accounts, but that the role of 'the emotions' is exaggerated by commentators, in that most emotional moments can't easily be tied to a single emotion. There are quite a lot of essays by people waffling on about 'grief' or 'love' or whatever that, for me, would be best replaced by poetry or song, both of which are highly eloquent about emotion.

There's also some interesting feminist work on 'emotional labour', the work done for instance by smiling air hostesses (as they used to be), an idea which leads here and there to the possibility of thinking about the *distribution* of emotions - that we aren't all capable of the same range of emotionality, nor culturally are 'the same' emotions observed over here and over there.

So, for example, the positive feeling that a junky might have when s/he finds some drugs would reflect the positive meaning of what? — jkop

Good point. You are a step ahead. We need to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate emotional feelings. A feeling is legit if it truly reflects the nature of the event, both in direction and magnitude. If not, then it is illegit. A junky or addict has an illegit pleasure towards its drugs, hence the addiction. But a strong feeling of fear towards encountering a tiger would be a legit feeling, because the event is strongly negative (you could die) and the feeling is equally negative.

Why must it be positive? — jkop

I meant 'must' in the sense of 'may', or 'is an indication'. But it presupposes that the feeling is legitimate, which is indeed not always the case.

And whence the assumption that emotions would have a purpose? — jkop

Every part of the human body has a purpose. Legs to move, hands to grab, nails to scratch, eyes to see, hair to protect our skin from the sun, sweat to cool down etc. Even physical feelings have a purpose: to reflect the health state of the body. Hence when the body is damaged, we feel physical pain. When the body's needs are fulfilled (e.g. drinking when thirsty) then we feel physical pleasure. If all other parts have a purpose, then emotions too must have a purpose.

The emotion is the feeling. — jkop

Typo. I meant "If the feeling is negative, then it is an indication that the event must have been negative". I have corrected the original post. Thanks.

I've been doing a module at undergrad level on 'philosophy of emotions'. Broadly, theory suggests... — mcdoodle

Shouldn't philosophy be based on current science when addressing subjects which have been addressed by science, and serve as a tool of science, asking questions which may, or may not, direct research? I only ask because William James and Martha Nussbaum aren't practitioners of current science, and who's Helm?

He [Roddy Cowie] found that some feeling we call 'emotional' is in place more or less all the time, on people's own first-person accounts, but that the role of 'the emotions' is exaggerated by commentators, in that most emotional moments can't easily be tied to a single emotion. — mcdoodle

Please provide a link and/or citation for the "empirical work" by Cowie, so I can verify whether or not:
1) "...feeling we call 'emotional' is in place more or less all the time..." refers to core affect (which was addressed by Barrett in 2006).
2) "...most emotional moments can't easily be tied to a single emotion" says anything new about Plutchik's secondary emotions.

It would also be useful if you could provide a link and/or citation for the "feminist work on 'emotional labour'," so I can verify what is meant by "...the 'distribution' of emotions...", and whether or not Plutchik's claim of cross-cultural basic emotion is valid.

Thanks in advance.

Shouldn't philosophy be based on current science when addressing subjects which have been addressed by science, and serve as a tool of science, asking questions which may, or may not, direct research? — Galuchat

My personal answer to that is no, but if you think there is something in the science which needs addressing, why not say what it is? Part of why I enjoyed Roddy Cowie's approach (lots of his articles are open source, the one I've read with a fine toothcomb is in Goldie's Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of the Emotions) was that he went to the science of emotions expecting he would find a relatively easy model which he could then adapt for the major project he was involved in - enabling computers to understand human emotion in speech and text (HUMAINE). He found the science lacked common definitions and a clear empirical basis. He then went ahead and did some empirical work of his own.

There's a lot of work going on in cross-cultural emotion comparison. Plutchik whom you quote twice was a pioneer in evolution-based explanations but I don't understand his models to be current, although the general idea of 'basic' emotions that roughly occur cross-culturally remains in currency, and there remain more than one model that tries to classify 'the' emotions as basic, secondary and so on. That's part of the trouble, there are lots of systems and a lot of tiny short-term research into countables/measurables, but the big picture is not at all clear.

As for Barrett's 'core affect', I know of that through the work of James A Russell - I think Barrett herself thinks of emotion now in terms of 'interoception', which to me is a very useful idea about how we might classify emotional experience, while 'core affect' to me has a clearer relationship to 'mood', the actual focus of my own interest.

An instance of science following the philosophy is the work of Matthew Ratcliffe, where his work on mood and depression has substantially contributed to new research on the psychology.

Emotional labour: to be frank that's not difficult to find, Hochschild's original research was in the 1970's and there's a vast literature about it, I'm not clear why you need me to tell you where to read about it. Nor do I understand why one wouldn't read William James and Martha Nussbaum, who write brilliantly and cogently if you don't agree with them.

A particular tempo.