I sometimes wonder if idealism's great strength is its ineffability and its contrast to the materialist model which has atrophied over time and is rather easily undermined by philosophers. — Tom Storm
Again, appeals to empiricism are perfectly warranted. It's a very convincing form of evidence. — Isaac
It's just a model I find most convincing, that's all. Just like Catholics and God. — Isaac
But you've already agreed in respect of the issue at hand that there can be no evidence for materialist theories of mind: — Wayfarer
someone who makes constant appeals to empiricism — Wayfarer
Isn't materialism what empiricism is defined by? — Jackson
The main characteristic of empiricism, however, is that it endorses a version of the following claim for some subject area:
The Empiricism Thesis: We have no source of knowledge in S or for the concepts we use in S other than experience.
how can minds arise from mindless matter? — RogueAI
So, If I understand well, idealism is the view that the nature of reality as we know it is all grounded in the human mind? — Hello Human
This is why I believe that a thoroughly scientifically-aware form of idealism is the philosophy of the future. Materialism in its classical sense - the idea that the Universe consists of inanimate lumps of matter and undirected energy which somehow give rise to life - will be consigned to history. — Wayfarer
consciousness is an active agent which constructs reality — Wayfarer
Your mind is continually synthesising, combining and judging ... — Wayfarer
The idealist sees his or her mind as fundamental to reality. Nothing is greater than their own mind. — Real Gone Cat
Kant was deeply disturbed by Hume’s attack on causality. His respect for the physical science developed by Copernicus, Galileo and Newton was so great that he simply could not stomach Hume’s dismissal of causal laws. Where Hume went wrong, according to Kant, was in his assumption that causality, if it exists at all, must be a feature of external reality, in other words, that causal connections must be connections between real objects, independent of our consciousness. But, as Kant argued, such external objects are “nothing to us”. Objects become something for us, i.e. they become accessible to us as experienceable and knowable objects, only if they conform to our forms of cognition, and causality is one such form. Raw sensations do not yet give us experiences of objects. The sensations have to be ordered by our forms of sensory intuition (space and time) and our forms of conceptual understanding (the categories, prime among which is causality); only then do we experience a single, ordered, integrated reality consisting of interconnected objects. Hence Kant’s Idealism: the world to be known by us is not an “external world” outside of consciousness, but a construction within consciousness, an ordering of sensory material by means of cognitive forms such as time, space and causality.
It's just possible that your mind is not the pinnacle of creation. Maybe subjective experience is actually the result of your brain's limitations! Limitations imposed by our faulty means of interfacing with external reality (i.e, the senses), and limitations imposed by our faulty cognitive abilities. Subjective experience is just our brains trying to make sense of it all. On the scale of paramecium to omniscience, we're much closer to the paramecium. — Real Gone Cat
The physicalist sees his or her mind as just one of many products of a greater reality. They know that if all human minds cease to exist tomorrow, the Earth will go on circling the Sun.
It's the difference between hubris and humility. — Real Gone Cat
As said, from the data provided by the senses, co-ordinated by the mind, the limbic system, and the other sub-systems that comprise the human - quite in keeping with Platonic (objective) Aristotelian (hylomorphic) and Kantian (transcendental) forms of idealism. — Wayfarer
Your mind is continually synthesising, combining and judging, and that activity is what constitutes your reality, or should we say, your being. The task of philosophy is understanding that, as Schopenhauer says in the opening paragraph of World as Will and Idea. — Wayfarer
Whence the data that the senses are processing? — Banno
Probably a bit too technical to go into. — Wayfarer
I think it can be supported with reference to science. — Wayfarer
Whence the data that the senses are processing?
— Banno
It's true that idealism is not solipsism. — Wayfarer
Within modern philosophy there are sometimes taken to be two fundamental conceptions of idealism: — SEP
Whence the data that the senses are processing? Where does the data originate? — Banno
At risk of being insulted again... — Wayfarer
I would aver that what idealism calls into question is the mind independent nature of matter. — Wayfarer
↪Joshs He's talking about S's idea that the will is the thing in itself. S eventually decided against that.
N is here agreeing with Kant. — Tate
Tate
Deleuze argues that Schopenhauer’s pessimism is a result of thinking Will as representation and illusion. — Joshs
Schopenhauer does not inaugurate a new philosophy of the will in any of these respects. On the contrary, his genius consists in drawing out the extreme consequ-ences of the old philosophy, in pushing the old philosophy as far as it can go. — Joshs
Limiting the will is therefore not going to be enough for Schopenhauer. The will must be denied, it must deny itself. — Joshs
According to Nietzsche the philosophy of the will must replace the old metaphysics: it destroys and supersedes it. Nietzsche thinks that he produced the first philosophy of the will, that all the others were the final avatars of metaphysics.“ — Joshs
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