I don't think you understood Schopenhauer. Go back and get the vibe of it. Then come back and examine N. — Tate

Are you saying that Deleuze did not understand Schopenhauer?

Schopenhauer was a hard determinist, so there's no denying the Will in that sense. — Tate

What assumptions must be made about the nature of the will in order to argue that it must be denied in a Buddhist-like pose of nothingness? How can a hard determinism lead to that conclusion, and does hard determinism not presuppose metaphysical assumptions about the nature of the real?

This is why I believe that a thoroughly scientifically-aware form of idealism is the philosophy of the future. Materialism in its classical sense - the idea that the Universe consists of inanimate lumps of matter and undirected energy which somehow give rise to life - will be consigned to history. — Wayfarer

I’m not quite sure of what to think of the last sentence. The way I see it, the fact that science, which assumes materialism, has itself proved that the world as we experience it is a mental construction, does seem to deal quite a blow to materialism.

But at the same time, I don’t think materialism as you defined it will ever be consigned to history. We can’t perceive the world without or mental processes getting in the way, so we can’t ever truly know what the universe is made of. Best we can do is use sensory data, which is an imperfect source of knowledge, but still the best source of knowledge about the universe. So I think materialism could instead be viewed as the best explanation for the different patterns in the human experience. Not a description of the world, but an explanation based off our experience of it.

Are you saying that Deleuze did not understand Schopenhauer? — Joshs

I'm saying Deleuze wouldn't know Schopenhauer if he was bitten in the ass by him. Actually, I don't know anything about Deleuze. He may have dwelt profoundly with S the way N did.

Schopenhauer was a hard determinist, so there's no denying the Will in that sense.
— Tate

What assumptions must be made about the nature of the will in order to argue that it must be denied in a Buddhist-like pose of nothingness? — Joshs

Beats me. What do you think?

and does hard determinism not presuppose metaphysical assumptions about the nature of the real? — Joshs

It's about the ways we're bound to think. Discussions of the real get tossed to Kant.

The way I see it, the fact that science, which assumes materialism, has itself proved that the world as we experience it is a mental construction, does seem to deal quite a blow to materialism. — Hello Human

Don’t confuse science and materialism. Science assumes materialism for practical reasons, it’s when it becomes a philosophical ideology that it is problematical. There are many scientists who don’t hold to it.

You ignore my line of argument that idealism (as you present it) doesn't oppose materialism, then you respond to Banno making much the same point with a hand-waiving "too technical". It's not 'too technical' at all. — Isaac

That's one line I would follow: that 's comments are true of realism. It does not look to be an account of idealism, which has at its core the notion that mind is intrinsic to reality.

It is apparent that one cannot know about how things are without having a mind. Any idealism worthy of the name goes further, insisting that there cannot even be a way that things are without mind. Mind is somehow intrinsic to reality.

The clearest way to understand this difference is in terms of truth. A realist will claim that there are truths that are not known.

An idealist will claim that there cannot be unknown truths.

So let's take an example. Is there a teapot in orbit around Jupiter (an example from Russell)? We cannot be certain if there is or is not such a teapot. It seems unlikely, but we have not yet inspected every item in orbit around Jupiter.

A realist will say that nevertheless the statement "there is a teapot in orbit around Jupiter" is either true, or it is false.

An idealist will say that the statement "there is a teapot in orbit around Jupiter" is neither true nor false until some mind has made a determination.

Effectively, a realist differentiates between belief and truth, claiming that we can believe or disbelieve in a Jovian teapot, but that this is an entirely seperate issue to there being a Jovian teapot. An idealist will say that the very truth or falsity of there being a Jovian teapot is dependent on a mind variously believing, knowing, perceiving or more generally standing in some relation to that teapot.

This way of analysing the distinction came about towards the end of last century when idealists started to call themselves anti-realists. Anti-realism was characterised by Dummett as the view that all truths are knowable, or verifiable. The view falls victim to Fitch's paradox, resulting in anti-realism resorting to paraconsistent logics.

It is worth noting, again, that only a very small minority of professional philosophers call themselves idealists. Realism is overwhelmingly accepted by those who have considered the issue. Put simply, most philosophers hold that there are unknown truths.

So let's take an example. Is there a teapot in orbit around Jupiter (an example from Russell)? We cannot be certain if there is or is not such a teapot. It seems unlikely, but we have not yet inspected every item in orbit around Jupiter. — Banno

An idealist might just as easily say that it's a meaningless statement, a trifling hypothetical that's not worth debating.

Mind is somehow intrinsic to reality. — Banno

This is true, and I think it's also why h. sapiens are designated 'beings'. But it's important to grasp that in saying that, you're not necessarily positing mind as an objective constituent of reality, in the sense that atoms or quantum fields might be.

An idealist will claim that there cannot be unknown truths. — Banno

That's a novel line of argument, I've never encountered that before.

The fact that not many philosophers currently endorse idealism may be nothing other than an indication of the current stagnation of the subject of philosophy in the academy. Before about the first world war, idealism in various forms was the dominant school of philosophy.

So it is that ordering and categorising which creates the life-world which is the world in which we dwell, which is synthesised by the observing mind, comprising sensory data combined with the structures of conceptual understanding (and much else besides, language, culture, and so on). — Wayfarer

What seems odd to me is that I entirely agree with what you have said above, and yet I would, casually, count myself as a realist.

I think I understand the intuitive objection to that, which is the strong sense we have of the distinction between what is 'inside' and what is 'external' to us, and that what is external is real, while what is internal is 'only' subjective. — Wayfarer

I hope it is clear from our previous discussions that this is not an intuition I share. I've argued for several years that the mooted distinction between an internal and an external world is misguided. This very discussion between us has a long history.

Hence,

↪Wayfarer What is it in the account that you gave that you take to be incompatible with realism? — Banno

What seems odd to me is that I entirely agree with what you have said above, and yet I would, casually, count myself as a realist. — Banno

I don't think idealism is opposed to realism. I think it's opposed to the notion of the 'mind-independent reality of the objects of the physical sciences.' Materialism is just the belief that the objects of the physical sciences have an intrinsic or inherent reality, independent of your or my or anyone else's observation of them, and the corollary that the mind is the product or output of those essentially unconcious and undirected material entities, as expressed by Daniel Dennett thus:

Love it or hate it, phenomena like this [i.e. organic molecules] exhibit the heart of the power of the Darwinian idea. An impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scrap of molecular machinery is the ultimate basis of all the agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the universe. — Daniel Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life

An idealist might just as easily say that it's a meaningless statement, a trifling hypothetical that's not worth debating. — Wayfarer

A humourless realist might concur. We might revert to the ubiquitous cup-in-the-cupboard argument, if you prefer; or the chairs at the end of the universe - remember that? Or whether there were dinosaurs. Or whether Everest was 8,849m tall before it was measured. The point is the characterisation that a realist will say there are things that are true yet not known, while an idealist will deny this.

Mind is somehow intrinsic to reality.
— Banno

This is true, — Wayfarer

I do not think mind is intrinsic to reality. It is obvious that we can posit a possible world without a mind. I think that it is the case that mind is intrinsic to our believing, and hence to our knowing, about reality. But that is not the same.

An idealist will claim that there cannot be unknown truths.
— Banno

That's a novel line of argument, I've never encountered that before. — Wayfarer

Yes, you have. I've made the point before, in threads in which you have participated.

Before about the first world war, idealism in various forms was the dominant school of philosophy. — Wayfarer

And was decimated by the criticisms of Russell and Moore, before the very distinction itself was dismissed by Wittgenstein, only to be reanimated by the interest in alternative logics. Yes, I agree the statistics are not a good argument in themselves, but given that less than 5% of philosophers count themselves as idealist, one might at least conclude that there are reasonable arguments against idealism. I don't think a conspiracy of anti-idealist sentiment will cut it.

I've argued for several years that the mooted distinction between an internal and an external world is misguided. — Banno

And the reason I think it's fundamental is because it is the very condition of individual existence - even of the existence of the very simplest lifeforms. The very most basic thing that any life form has, is a sense of itself in the environment - the ability to avoid harm, seek nourishment, find conditions suitable for growth and so on. These capacities have been observed in even single-celled organisms. And in developmental psychology, one of the primary divisions that is formed in early infanthood is the ability to differentiate the self from the world, a sense which is almost entirely absent in newborns.

The net result of all of this is that the sense of self and other, mine and not mine, what is internal to me and what is in the world, is very deeply rooted in the psyche (or soul). It's a fundamental condition of existence. And my intuition is, that this is also fundamental to the Gordian knot that a transcendental philosophy has to untie. It's a deep and difficult topic and one rarely encountered in today's philosophy.

I don't think a conspiracy of anti-idealist sentiment will cut it. — Banno

It's not a conspiracy so much as a cultural artefact. I enrolled in formal philosophy, as you know, under David Stove and others - they told me philosophy, as it is now taught and understood, is not what interests me. Which is true! And that's because it's become an academic parlour game, a technical subject of specialists who talk mainly to themselves. I have no time for many of the 20th c analytical philosophers, if I thought that constituted philosophy I'd have no interest in the subject.

I'm with Pierre Hadot and Lloyd Gerson, and the others of that ilk, who say that modern analytic philosophy radically departs from the real concerns of philosophy. I'm gradually getting through Gerson's last, Platonism and Naturalism: The Possibility of Philosophy.'Gerson contends that Platonism identifies philosophy with a distinct subject matter, namely, the intelligible world, and seeks to show that the Naturalist rejection of Platonism entails the elimination of a distinct subject matter for philosophy. Thus, the possibility of philosophy depends on the truth of Platonism.' And the reason for all this is that philosophy has a spiritual facet - it's not the same as religion, but shares a common border, if you like. And because of secular culture's fear of religion, it can't be tolerated.

I don't think idealism is opposed to realism. I think it's opposed to the notion of the 'mind-independent reality of the objects of the physical sciences.' Materialism is just the belief that the objects of the physical sciences have an intrinsic or inherent reality, independent of your or my or anyone else's observation of them, and the corollary that the mind is the product or output of those essentially unconcious and undirected material entities, as expressed by Daniel Dennett thus: — Wayfarer

The characterisation I presented above is I think fairly standard at present - happy to be show to be wrong. On that characterisation idealism is opposed to realism. The realist holds that there are unknown truths. The idealist denies this.

At stake is the relation between mind and world. Seems to me that you would juxtapose them, in order to defend against the hegemony of science, and so reject physicalist reductionism.

But mind is part of the world. It would be whole surprising if it could be shown that mind does not in some way emerge from the way the world is. @Isaac has on his own account invested much effort in working through this problem; he and his peers have made extraordinary progress. Ignoring their work would be self-defeating.

It would be misguided to deny before the fact that science has much to say about consciousness. More so if the reason for that denial is an attempt to maintain this or that view of spirituality.

Perhaps the divide should be placed not at materialism and idealism, but at direction of fit. Science can tell us how things are, but not how they ought be.

That is an entirely different discussion.

And the reason I think it's fundamental is because it is the very condition of individual existence - even of the existence of the very simplest lifeforms. The very most basic thing that any life form has, is a sense of itself in the environment - the ability to avoid harm, seek nourishment, find conditions suitable for growth and so on. — Wayfarer

You seem to have:

• The very simplest lifeforms have the ability to avoid harm, seek nourishment, find conditions suitable for growth and so on;
• Hence, the very simplest lifeforms have a sense of themselves as distinct from their environment.

That argument does not convince me. Allostasis does not imply consciousness. Jellyfish are allostatic but not conscious.

It's not a conspiracy so much as a cultural artefact... — Wayfarer

And all that.

I moved from science to philosophy when I found that science does not address and cannot answer the questions in which I was interested. Considerations in analytic philosophy showed me that these questions were either confusions of language or inherently unanswerable. No sooner is that "spiritual facet" introduced than it is diminished in being reduced to language.

The point is the characterisation that a realist will say there are things that are true yet not known, while an idealist will deny this. — Banno

Could you find a reference in support of that? I think that signifies a basic misunderstanding on your part although I'm willing to be corrected. (I think that you are mistaking idealism for solipsism in saying that.)

But mind is part of the world. — Banno

That anything is 'part of' something is a judgement, obviously. The mind is never known as an object of cognition, plainly. Otherwise you would never be able to entertain the argument about whether machines are sentient.

I'm currently midway through an interesting current title, Mind and the Cosmic Order, by Charles Pinter. It's not a philosophy text, although it has many philosophical implications (the author is an emeritus professor of mathematics). The subtitle is 'How the Mind Creates the Features & Structure of All Things', but it's based on neuroscience and maths, not philosophy per se. Pinter says 'my interest has turned to the specific problems involved in modeling structures arising in neuroscience. I am interested in perceptual mechanisms and especially the process of perceptual learning. I have worked on the theoretical aspects of training neural networks.' His theory is that the world as such has no features or objects as such, but that these are all projected onto it by the mind as a consequence of evolutionary development. All kinds of sentient beings see Gestalts, which are functional wholes, but there are no gestalts anywhere outside of perception:

"For complex objects, their Gestalt unity is a creation of the mind and is not an aspect of the underlying matter: Their global character is the way they appear to observers. Their wholeness rests on a material substrate but is not material—it exists only in perception."

Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (p. 123). Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition.

He actually gets near to a form of dualism

'It may be concluded that there are two forms of existence: One is the purely material: Its properties are fully accounted for by the addition of simples. The other form of existence is the one given to observers. They perceive in Gestalt wholes, and see an entirely different world, rich and complex. The realm of compound wholes is just as real as the realm of simples, but it is not physical. It has the same material content as the physical world, but presents itself differently.'

Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (p. 125). Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition.

'Common sense leads us to assume that we see in Gestalts because the world itself is constituted of whole objects and scenes, but this is incorrect. The reason events of the world appear holistic to animals is that animals perceive them in Gestalts. The atoms of a teacup do not collude together to form a teacup: The object is a teacup because it is constituted that way from a perspective outside of itself.'

Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (p. 3). Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition.

(Managed to bring cups into it ;-) )

Could you find a reference in support of that? I think that signifies a basic misunderstanding on your part although I'm willing to be corrected. (I think that you are mistaking idealism for solipsism in saying that.) — Wayfarer

Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability might be the most accessible account. But I've run several threads on the topic, in which you have participated.

Devitt: Dumett's anti-realism

Realism (and antirealism)

Nothing to do with Dennett's

His theory is that the world as such has no features or objects as such, but that these are all projected onto it by the mind as a consequence of evolutionary development. All kinds of sentient beings see Gestalts, which are functional wholes, but there are no gestalts anywhere outside of perception: — Wayfarer

Yes, I understand that there are others who share your view.

I think they are misguided.

If you care to present their arguments, rather than just their conclusions, we could discuss them.

Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability — Banno

Draws a wide net. And too much symbolic code. Pass on that.

I think that your concern is that idealism rejects the possibility of uknown actual objects, on the grounds that if they are not being observed, then they can't be said to exist. Berkeley solves this problem by introducing God as the ultimate and eternal knower of things.

But I think the difficulty is based on the 'imagined non-existence' of the world - the belief that idealism is saying that if all observers were not to exist, then the universe also would not exist. It is rather like G E Moore's musing that, once all of the passengers are seated, the train wheels would cease to exist on account of them being invisible from the inside of the train.

It sounds like it follows, but again, the mistake is that all of what is understood as both existence and non-existence are themselves mental constructs. This is the point where Kant, Schopenhauer, and Buddhist philosophy all seems to converge. We can't see what would, or would not, exist, in the absence of a mind to make such judgements. But I think that is all for today, life away from the screen is making demands. Thanks for your challenging comments.

Draws a wide net. And too much symbolic code. Pass on that. — Wayfarer

That's a shame, since the logic involved makes very clear the distinction. it might serve to bold any differences between our two positions.

I think that your concern is that idealism rejects the possibility of unknown actual objects — Wayfarer

I've not that much of an interest in the metaphysical concerns that you hold central. I see the realism/idealism schism as a difference not in how the world is, but in what grammar we should choose to talk about the world. Those metaphysical concerns dissipate when viewed in this way.

By way of an example:

We can't see what would, or would not, exist, outside our minds. — Wayfarer

Well, no, of course not, since seeing is done with a mind.

But nothing in that statement implies that there are not things outside one's mind. It is entirely possible that there are things unseen; in fact I am certain of it.

This is an example of the sort of overreach that seems to permeate idealist thinking, the false argument that one can't taste the oyster except with one's tongue, and hence one can never really taste the oyster...

It's Stove's Gem, again, this time with a twist of lemon.

It doesn't work.

Here's the damage done by philosophy, ...

But at the same time, I don’t think materialism as you defined it will ever be consigned to history. We can’t perceive the world without or mental processes getting in the way, so we can’t ever truly know what the universe is made of. Best we can do is use sensory data, which is an imperfect source of knowledge, but still the best source of knowledge about the universe. So I think materialism could instead be viewed as the best explanation for the different patterns in the human experience. Not a description of the world, but an explanation based off our experience of it. — Hello Human

"...we can’t ever truly know what the universe is made of."

Yet we do know what the universe is made of.

Right up until we read Zeno or Descartes. :wink:

It's Stove's Gem, again, this time with a twist of lemon. — Banno

You should take the time to read Jim Franklin's criticism of Stove's Gem.

The view I have only sounds trite because of the necessity of having to explain it in simple terms. The key term as I tried to explain previously is mind independence.

You should take the time to read Jim Franklin's criticism of Stove's Gem. — Wayfarer

I have. I suspect I introduced it to you.

The view I have only sounds trite because of the necessity of having to explain it in simple terms. — Wayfarer

Then go complex. Perhaps the wall of words will hide its sins better.

I suspect I introduced it to you. — Banno

I found it through Google. Franklin acknowledges that there are some 'Gems' but pointedly excludes Kant from susceptibility. And he acknowledges that there is a genuine philosophical issue at the bottom of it, which I think he subtly suggest that Stove doesn't see.

It is obvious that we can posit a possible world without a mind. — Banno

There’s a mind entering this picture in the very act of positing it. Of course you can imagine a world with no mind in it, but that still relies on a perspective. It's the conceit of naturalism to think otherwise.

It would be misguided to deny before the fact that science has much to say about consciousness. — Banno

If there is to be a science of consciousness it has to take into account the first-person nature of the subject - which is exactly what phenomenology set out to do. (Oh that's right, phenomenology's on your no-go list.)

And he acknowledges that there is a genuine philosophical issue at the bottom of it, which I think he subtly suggest that Stove doesn't see. — Wayfarer

Franklin proposes three "How-to-get-out plans". Earlier in this thread I joined in the first.

Of course you can imagine a world with no mind in it, but that still relies on a perspective. It's the conceit of naturalism to think otherwise. — Wayfarer

And the Gem here is that because one cannot imagine a possible world without a mind, without employing a mind, there can not be a possible world without a mind... :razz:

(I recall discussing Franklin's article with Gassendi, of loving memory. Were you involved then? Does this discussion go that far back?)

(I went hunting through my archives and came across:

I am beginning to believe that, as David Stove wrote, people become Idealists because they cannot abide the view that the world is an alien place, that as the poet wrote "I am alone and afraid in a world I never made" and not being able to adopt religion which makes the world a much more congenial place, adopt Idealism which allows for them to make the world a part of themselves. — Gassendi

If there is to be a science of consciousness it has to take into account the first-person nature of the subject — Wayfarer

But what answer do we get when we ask what that "first-person nature of the subject" is?

We are heading back to the beetle again, where phenomenology insists on talking about the ineffable. That's fine, so long as it doesn't claim to say anything about the ineffable.

But what answer do we get when we ask what that "first-person nature of the subject" is? — Banno

That is the subject of 'facing up to the hard problem of consciousness'. You may think that insignificant, but it's one of the papers that got the whole modern philosophy of consciousness movement started. Probably not your cup of tea though.

You count David Chalmers as a phenomenologist?

Searle sometimes describes himself as doing phenomenology.

The usual way of speaking about the world is in terms of a "physical world", because there is more to the universe than matter.

But the word "material", or even "physical", does not matter much, it's a terminological preference. What matters is whether there is an external world or not, this is irrespective of the terms used to describe the stuff of this world.

The external material world could be mind-created but that doesn't make it less real (think creator deity) or the external material world isn't an illusion.

The external material world could be mind-generated i.e. it's akin to a (mass) hallucination or in other words it's an illusion.

The external material world could be mind-independent i.e. there exists a (material) world with a mind population = 0.

The external material world could be mind-dependent i.e. there doesn't exist a (material) world with a mind population = 0.

:snicker:

Interesting, oui?

That's a great summary, thanks. I was getting mired. What I was trying to draw out is that I could not see a way idealism, as @Wayfarer presented it, was in any way opposed to materialism (other than to sniff at it as somewhat uncouth). As you say, I don't think it's particularly surprising to anyone that we interpret the world with our minds (I contest that it is surprising the extent to which we do this - it surprised me anyway), but it remains that there is a world to interpret and that, most importantly, the activity of interpreting is one going on within that world.

My understanding (which is limited) is that materialism is synonymous with physicalism (since the pure idea that "all is matter" has been long rejected by physics), and that both hold some form of the idea that the physical properties of the world necessitate, cause or simply are, all properties of that world.

So it seems to me that the notion of our minds constructing the objects of reality out of those physical properties is entirely consistent with physicalism. @Wayfarer seemed to disagree, but I couldn't get him to explain why. End of discussion it seems. Unfortunate.

In some respects, I can put the objection down to a distaste of reductionism - a distaste I'd share. Some, it seems want to make the world actually dependent on minds so as to really forcefully lock away any notion that we might ever be able to understand the world solely in terms of atoms and forces. But, of course, understanding how the properties of the world arise from physical properties is not the same as the simple theory that they do.

What still bothers, though, me are things like...

which is exactly what phenomenology set out to do. — Wayfarer

At the end of every discussion in which the failure of reductionism is hinted at, there always seems to be an attempt to switch in something even more vague as replacement. Despite my years attempting to do so, I completely agree with "We cannot ever understand the mind fully via neuroscience, or cognitive science". What I disagree with is the inevitable accompanying "...but we can with phenomenology/dualism/bible studies/LSD/...whatever" Such approaches are no less constrained and in many cases, more so.

Anyway. Thanks for the clarity. Seeing it as Realism vs Anti-Realism makes more sense, wherein I see the most interesting discussion as being between direct and indirect forms of Realism, rather than entertaining any kind on Anti-Realism.

Cheers.

Indeed presented what claimed to be an account of idealism, but it was indeed missing the key ingredient, as you spotted. There was nothing in that account that ran contrary to materialism. My questions "When one's mind constructs reality, what is it it constructs it from?" and "Whence the data that the senses are processing?" were intended to draw that out. Tom's

how it is (under idealism) that the world appears consistent day to day? — Tom Storm

may have been along the same lines, since the obvious source for continuity is a shared world.

...it remains that there is a world to interpret and that, most importantly, the activity of interpreting is one going on within that world. — Isaac

Here's I think a hint at an answer to a presumption found in and , the OP, and many others, who talk of an external world as if this were obvious and unproblematic. But as you point out, all that interpreting takes place in the very same world that is described by physics. The difference is not internal and external worlds, but something closer to internal and external accounts of the very same thing. Roughly, neuroscientific accounts and intentional accounts are different ways of saying the same thing. We've discussed this elsewhere.

This approach potentially bypasses reductionism. I've in mind something like Davidson's anomalism of the mental. Again, roughly, metal events described intentionally ("I want to go to the pub") do not have a direct correspondence to brain states. This is, I understand, what one would expect in a neural network.

We are using materialism as roughly synonymous with physicalism, which is misleading. The SEP article on physicalism is pretty clear.