Which premise do you dispute?
— Bartricks
That anyone "deserves" anything. — 180 Proof
We deserve the same nothing. — 180 Proof
An innocent person deserves to come to no harm. Thus any harm - any harm whatever - that this person comes to, is undeserved. — Bartricks
that natural persons are born innocent. — Wayfarer
More so, I object to the notion that innocence is any kind of virtue, or bestows any kind of entitlement. It is no achievement and merits no reward, not even temporary existence, for which and to which it already owes its life. — unenlightened
Most interesting. — Ms. Marple
You think of these two claims a) innocent people do not deserve to come to harm and b) innocent people do deserve to come to harm, it is 'a' that is the bizarre one? — Bartricks
A false sense of what YOU think is right for someone else doesn't justify harm — schopenhauer1
all antinatalist arguments ... start with a bizarre premise with which no-one else agrees and then proceed to show that it yields bizarre conclusions with which no-one else agrees. — Isaac
They don't deserve harm but rather need "harm" (trials) to grow — Gregory
We cause harms to others to achieve what we think is right all the time. So long as we feel satisfied that the harms were the minimum necessary most people consider this quite ethically unproblematic. — Isaac
As with all antinatalist arguments Bartricks starts with a bizarre premise with which no-one else agrees and then proceeds to show that it yields bizarre conclusions with which no-one else agrees. — Isaac
We cause harms to others to achieve what we think is right all the time. So long as we feel satisfied that the harms were the minimum necessary most people consider this quite ethically unproblematic. — Isaac
I think the innocent deserve that no harm befall them, and that others, those who exist already before the innocents, have a duty to prevent such harm. — baker
:roll: This reminds me, schop1, of the classical Academic Skeptics' canard "If we cannot know anything with absolute certainty, then it is wrong to claim we know anything at all" (i.e. letting the perfect be the enemy of the good / true). Yer bucket's got holes innit, son.I see this more clearly formulated in an argument I've made in the past that goes something like, "If you can't bring a person into a perfect version of their Utopia/Paradise, then it is wrong to bring that person into the world, period". — schopenhauer1
My child would be my flesh and blood, mine, and of course I wish to have no harm come to him, so I would do everything to prevent any such harm, including not conceiving the child at all. — baker
Yours is no exception. We cause harms to others to achieve what we think is right all the time. So long as we feel satisfied that the harms were the minimum necessary most people consider this quite ethically unproblematic. — Isaac
I believe most acts of human procreation are immoral, and I believe this despite also believing in the truth of moral particularism. In this paper I explain why. I argue that procreative acts possess numerous features that, in other contexts, seem typically to operate with negative moral valences. Other things being equal this gives us reason to believe they will operate negatively in the context of procreative acts as well. However, most people’s intuitions represent procreative acts to be morally permissible in most circumstances. Given moral particularism, this would normally be good evidence that procreative acts are indeed morally permissible and that the features that operate negatively elsewhere, simply do not do so in the context of procreative acts in particular. But I argue that we have no good reason to think our intuitions about the ethics of human procreation are accurate. Our most reliable source of insight into the ethics human procreative acts are not our intuitions those acts themselves, but our intuitions about the typical moral valences of the features such acts possess. If that is correct, then acts of human procreation are most likely wrong
If you take a hyper-individualistic, neo-liberal type approach, then maybe this isn't going to work. Maybe it does lead to antinatalism. One good reason (among many others) to discard such a morally decrepit position. — Isaac
To procreate is to create an innocent person. They haven't done anything yet. So they're innocent. — Bartricks
An innocent person deserves to come to no harm. Thus any harm - any harm whatever - that this person comes to, is undeserved. — Bartricks
Furthermore, an innocent person positively deserves a happy life. — Bartricks
It is wrong, then, to create an innocent person — Bartricks
You are simply declaring that a procreated person is "innocent"; — Bitter Crank
One does not need to be a Christian (or of any religion) to recognize the possibility that a procreated person may be capable of great wrong-doing, even if they do not actually wreak havoc. — Bitter Crank
This hinges on your definition of innocence (which is a kind of religious concept, as well as a legal concept). "No harm whatsoever" is a sweeping generalization. — Bitter Crank
There is no outside agent that defines innocence, or what a person--innocent or otherwise--deserves. There is no agency that guarantees a happy life to anyone. All of which makes your new approach unsuccessful. — Bitter Crank
The world is, in fact, a fairly harsh arrangement which guarantees a certain amount of pretty rough experience (for all creatures, great and small), while at the same time allowing for a measure of delight. Antinatalism comes down to one preferring to not have children for various reasons, from personal inconvenience (children are inconvenient) to an imbalance of suffering and delight -- like the universe had ever suggested one would get a a fair share. — Bitter Crank
Logic can't solve the problem. — Bitter Crank
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