It does follow that we experience the world directly and that there is a connection between oneself and the object for the same reasons I stated earlier. Real, physical connections, for instance light touching the eyes, hands touching the object etc. occur in these interactions. — NOS4A2

That shows only that we contact the world directly. To show that we 'experience' the world directly, using that argument, you'd have to also show that what we call 'experience' is the sum total of all processes from the sensory receptors onward.

I'm assuming when I see and handle an apple, my perceptual apparatus provides matter (the apple) with all its qualities - colour, size and shape, smell, texture, even taste. This is all an elaborate construction work that humans seem to (largely) share. A bat would have a different range of experiences with this fruit, but it would still be of the apple, right? (....) Where have I gone wrong? — Tom Storm

I detest the taste of Lima beans, and if you like the taste....how can the exact same matter have one quality for me and a completely different quality for you?

When you see and handle the matter provided by your perceptual apparatus, and I see and handle the matter provided by my perceptual apparatus.....why should, and what determines whether or not, we agree about what’s been provided to us?

If matter with all its qualities is provided by perceptual apparatus......why should anything need to be constructed?

How did “matter”, a general term, get to “apple”, a particular term? By what rights do matter and (the apple) belong together as stated in the assertion of that which perceptual apparatus provides?

So if the construction work humans share is how matter gets to “apple”, then it must be the case the qualities of the matter are not contained in it, but are provided by the construction. Otherwise, there would be no justification for the change from the general to the particular, and the questions above obtain only insufficient answers.
————-

To say a bat has different experiences, then to ask if it would still experience “apple”, is a categorical error of relations. Given different experiences, that which is given from one kind of experience is necessarily incompatible with any other kind, which makes explicit the bat cannot experience “apple”. We know this to be apodeitically certain because it is absolutely impossible for us to echo-locate flying bugs. All that can be supposed is that the bat experiences, and that only insofar as bats are known to have integrated sensory systems, and it is at least a non-contradictory presupposition that any sensory system is sufficient ground for experiences compatible with it. And THAT....only insofar as humans have determined it to be so, in relation to themselves, in the resolution of the error.

Matter has only been “apple” since some human said so, which makes explicit the perceptual apparatus does not provide matter (the apple), but provides matter alone, the common human construction, whether brain machinations or speculative metaphysics, is that which determines that matter to be apple. Apple, then, is provided post hoc by common human constructions, or, that which we all know as.......waaaiiiitttt fooor ittttt......experience.

I submit that you’ve conjoined matter (the apple) as a given singular only because you already know what an apple is, you’ve met with that experience. But there was a time when you didn’t, you haven’t, so.....what happened?

You haven’t gone wrong. Just haven’t gone far enough.

That shows only that we contact the world directly. To show that we 'experience' the world directly, using that argument, you'd have to also show that what we call 'experience' is the sum total of all processes from the sensory receptors onward.

I’m not sure I understand. When I observe people interacting with the world, I assume they are experiencing it. Do you mean to say that only a part of them are experiencing?

Do you mean to say that only a part of them are experiencing? — NOS4A2

No, nothing of the sort. Your argument is that we are in direct connection with the outside world therefore we directly experience the outside world.

You've not shown that that with which we are in direct connection is that which we experience.

I mean to say we can only experience that with which we are in direct connection, not that that which with we are in direct connection is that which we experience, if that makes any sense.

I don’t think I need to show it because it is observable. If someone is to experience a doorknob he must see it, touch it, turn it, etc.

I mean to say we can only experience that with which we are in direct connection — NOS4A2

...

If someone is to experience a doorknob he must see it, touch it, turn it, etc. — NOS4A2

What the latter shows is that direct connection is necessary to experience a thing. It does not then follow that all things we experience are external world objects, nor that we experience all external world objects.

For your argument to hold it is necessary to show that the causes of our sensations match the objects we experience since the 'direct connection' you theorise is between an external world and a sensory receptor. But I do not experience 200,000 firing neurons when I lift my tea cup. I experience the lifting of my teacup. So the object of my experience is the teacup. You've yet to show that this teacup is also the thing in contact with my nerve endings.

What the latter shows is that direct connection is necessary to experience a thing. It does not then follow that all things we experience are external world objects, nor that we experience all external world objects. — Isaac

I followed a little this recent exchange of yours with @NOS4A2. I'm not sure what tou both mean by or undestand with "direct connection". Is it a physical connection, involving perception via our senses? From your answer I undestand that we can also experience other things thn external objects, e.g. feelings/emotions/sensations, is that right?
What I didn't understand was "nor that we experience all external world objects". Do you maybe mean "nor that we can experience all external world objects"?

You've yet to show that this teacup is also the thing in contact with my nerve endings. — Isaac

Is this what "direct connection" implies or requires?

You’ll need to figure out a better argument because you’re still viewing the TV screen directly. — NOS4A2

I'm not asking about the TV. I'm asking about the rock. When I see a rock on a TV screen, am I seeing the rock directly?

It does follow that we experience the world directly and that there is a connection between oneself and the object for the same reasons I stated earlier. Real, physical connections, for instance light touching the eyes, hands touching the object etc. occur in these interactions. — NOS4A2

That doesn't make it direct. There are real, physical connections when a rock is seen in the reflection of a mirror, but I'm not seeing the rock directly. There are real, physical connections when a rock is seen on TV, but I'm not seeing the rock directly.

I'm not sure what tou both mean by or undestand with "direct connection". Is it a physical connection, involving perception via our senses? — Alkis Piskas

Yes. Some physical stimulus from the external system perturbs the first nodes (the sensory nerves, in this case) of the internal one. I'm using 'internal' and 'external' here for clarity, it's to do with systems, not necessarily bodies of brains.

I undestand that we can also experience other things thn external objects, e.g. feelings/emotions/sensations, is that right? — Alkis Piskas

External to one system, yes. Internal to another. It depends on what system is doing the inferring. Any systems can only sense the outputs from those nodes to which it is directly connected, it must infer the state of those nodes to which those circumferential nodes are themselves connected.

What I didn't understand was "nor that we experience all external world objects". Do you maybe mean "nor that we can experience all external world objects"? — Alkis Piskas

Lots of eternal world objects (external to the bodily system) are not perceived (in the broadest sense) despite being in contact with internal systems. my nerve endings are detecting all the movements of my clothes right now, but I don't experience those sensations, they're filtered out by the thalamus before I'm even aware of them.

You've yet to show that this teacup is also the thing in contact with my nerve endings. — Isaac

Is this what "direct connection" implies or requires? — Alkis Piskas

Yes. I think so.

OK, thanks. I think that you have both complicated unnecessarily the subject of experience (experiencing) and perception (perceiving). But this is my viewpoint and reality! :smile:

:up:

Not everyone can do that. The inability is called aphantasia. — Tate

Not everyone can distinguish fact from fiction. But that inability is quite normal. In perception, it manifests as the mental image myth. (Leading to the binding problem.)

If I see a rock through a TV screen then I'm seeing a rock, but I'm seeing it indirectly. — Michael

The trouble is, 'indirect' is too suggestive of two or more 'directs'. Would it help to say 'non-direct'?

Someone contesting indirect realism doesn't necessarily want to claim that knowledge about the rock flows specifically from the rock to the person. It might result rather from the vast network of interactions and interpretations in the background.

Someone contesting direct realism doesn't necessarily want to claim that knowledge about the rock flows specifically from rock to TV screen to person. It might result rather from the vast network of interactions and interpretations in the background.

aphantasia

Didn't they have a hit with "John Wayne is big leggy"?

I dismissed the latter as there would be no possible way of knowing if thoughts could exist without meaning as we would be unaware of them. The argument then begs the question.

So we're left (by my reckoning) with the former. That 'inherent' means that the thought has meaning regardless of the interpreter (inherent), as opposed to meaning assigned by an interpreter as external objects like ink marks, trees, structures etc.

Hence the counterargument to Feser shows that thoughts do not have inherent meaning in this particular sense. Whether thoughts have inherent meaning in any other sense of 'inherent' is irrelevant to the argument at hand. — Isaac

OK, I didn't read the Feser piece. My point was only that thinking necessarily has meaning in a semantic sense otherwise we could not count it as thinking. We can determine the meaning of our thoughts by reflection on them, by writing them down if necessary, basically by expressing them linguistically. Any coherent linguistic expression has meaning, even if not just one literal meaning; linguistic expressions are meaningful in a symbolic way that physical objects like trees. mountains and neural nets are not.

So, I disagree with your conclusion: I think we can know that thoughts, even pre-linguistic, pre-symbolic ones, cannot exist, i.e. would not be thoughts but would be something else, without meaning. The idea of a meaningless thought is nonsense in other words; and yet even that nonsense idea itself has meaning.

But if Feser claims that a thought can have only one inherent meaning, then I agree with you that that is mistaken.

What do you think ? Is materialism right ? Is idealism right ? Is it some mix of the two ? Can we even settle the question ? Is materialism a good explanation for patterns in different experiences ? — Hello Human

From J.L. Austin:

I am not, then - and this is a point to be clear about from the beginning - going to maintain that we ought to be 'realist', to embrace, that is, the doctrine that we do perceive material things (or objects). This doctrine would be no less scholastic and erroneous than its antithesis. The question, do we perceive material things or sense-data, no doubt looks very simple - too simple - but is entirely misleading (cp. 'Thales' similarly vast and over-simple question, what the world is made of). One of the most important points to grasp is that these two terms, 'sense-data' and 'material things', live by taking in each other's washing - what is spurious is not one term of the pair, but the antithesis itself. — Sense and Sensibilia - J.L. Austin

@Banno and @Tate get to the crux of it here:

The reading bit is about raising the point that perhaps distinctions such as direct, indirect, internal, external, subjective, objective, realist and idealist are inadequate to the task set in the OP. Perhaps they misdirect us.
— Banno

I agree. Those categories assume a Cartesian framework which is so embedded in our culture that we forget that it's problematic.

We probably keep returning to it and trying to use it as a foundation because we really want to know what we are and it's all we've got. — Tate

So how do we avoid returning to it? @Michael shows how.

The reading bit is about raising the point that perhaps distinctions such as direct, indirect, internal, external, subjective, objective, realist and idealist are inadequate to the task set in the OP. Perhaps they misdirect us.
— Banno

I agree. When I look at a mirror I'm looking at a mirror and I'm also looking at my reflection and I'm also looking at myself. The painting might be of a woman but it's also just paint. We can describe things in a number of different ways, all of which can be correct. — Michael

Note that there are no contentious adjectives in his comment. Everyone immediately understands what he is saying. There's no confusion or dilemma.

I think direct and indirect realists are just talking in different ways. There's not necessarily any conflict. — Michael

Maybe not. But the distinction is artificial, so talking in those ways isn't useful.

Compare a direct flight to an indirect flight from New York to London. That's a naturally-arising and useful distinction that doesn't cause any confusion or disagreement once one understands the context. Cartesian (and much other philosophical) language is parasitical on that kind of ordinary distinction. But it doesn't provide a similarly useful payoff. Instead, it's a kind of noise or pollution that needs to be cleared away before any progress can be made.

So do you accept that the fundamental furniture of the Universe is material in nature? Whatever that turns out to be? And that humans, and the mind, are the product of these entities?

No. See the J.L. Austin quote above. Just as 'sense-data' and 'material things' live by taking in each other's washing, so too do 'matter' and 'mind'.

A facile dismissal of the entire issue, then. Isn't there more at stake? Doesn't it really count whether you're an aggregation of physical forces, or something more than that, or other than that?

Neat Summation.

...do you accept that the fundamental furniture of the Universe is material in nature? — Wayfarer

Isn't it clear by now that this is a muddled question?

If you are going to talk about something's being fundamental, you have to be clear about what it is you are doing. What is fundamental when designing bridges is not what is fundamental when planning birthday parties, nor to what is fundamental to doing paraconsistent logic.

This is the same error you made here:

To a fruit-fly, an apple is host to its eggs. If I throw an apple at an annoying bird, it's a weapon. To fruit bats and primates it is food, whereas it wouldn't necessarily register to a carnivore. Which is 'the real apple'? — Wayfarer

They are all real.

Isn't it clear by now that this is a muddled question? — Banno

No, it's not a muddled question, it is crystal clear to me. Just because you don't think in such terms, doesn't mean that it's a muddled question. I was going to say yesterday, the neat summations of all these plain-language philosophers are really designed philosophy lecture rooms, seminars and publications. They don't address existential questions.

If you are going to talk about something's being fundamental, you have to be clear about what it is you are doing. — Banno

What really matters, what counts, what is real. In a philosophical context, not a quotidian context of designing bridges and stowing cups.

They don't address existential questions. — Wayfarer

Yes, they do, just not in a way that you find comfortable.

What counts as fundamental, as simple, what is taken as granted, depends on the task at hand.

Asking what is fundamentally fundamental, asking what is really real - that's the stuff of philosophy lecture rooms, seminars and publications.

asking what is really real - that's the stuff of philosophy lecture rooms, seminars and publications. — Banno

And that's not where life is lived.

And that's not where life is lived. — Wayfarer

in philosophy lecture rooms, seminars and publications? Sure. You can show the philosopher the way out, but some philosophers are more comfortable in the fly-bottle.

Thanks for explaining your position with such clarity.

You're welcome.

Seems to me you have made your position very clear, too. For you, mind is a different substance to the other things around us. That leaves wide open the problem of how mind interacts with those other substances - the basic problem for dualism.

The alternative is that mind is not a substance, but something that substance does.

mind is a different substance to the other things around us. — Banno

Just bear in mind, again, the difference between 'substance' in philosophy, translated from 'ousia', 'being' or 'subject', and 'substance' in normal speech, 'a material with uniform properties'. Post-Descartes, these two meanings became confused, so that when 'substance' is spoken of, it's thought to be an actual substance. That's where the problem lies.

That leaves wide open the problem of how mind interacts with those other substances - the basic problem for dualism. — Banno

That problem was solved long ago by Plato. Moderners who like to try and reintroduce it simply haven't studied enough to understand the resolution.

That isn't an answer.

Perhaps this thread is nearly spent. Send in the clowns.

That isn't an answer. — Banno

It's the single most important problem in philosophy as far as I'm concerned. It addresses the very question that you and everyone else puts about the 'interaction problem', but it seems to go right by most people.

Cartesian anxiety refers to the notion that, since René Descartes posited his influential form of body-mind dualism, Western civilization has suffered from a longing for ontological certainty, or feeling that scientific methods, and especially the study of the world as a thing separate from ourselves, should be able to lead us to a firm and unchanging knowledge of ourselves and the world around us. The term is named after Descartes because of his well-known emphasis on "mind" as different from "body", "self" as different from "other".

Richard J. Bernstein coined the term in his 1983 book Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis.

I take the question of how things are to be subservient to the question of what to do. We only need to know how things are so far as it helps working out what to do.

Meaning as use and all that. It's what one does.

I get it, you've explained that. Hey I think it's good we've articulated our differences so clearly. And to think that it only took ten years.