).instead, they are methodological criteria (not merely "worldviews") for excluding "immaterial" data and "nonphysical" concepts, respectively, fromthe construction of explanatory models of nature (i.e. phenomena
I have repeatedly responded to 180's demands for empirical evidence to support the Enformationism thesis by pointing out the obvious : it's not a scientific thesis, and I am not a scientist. In 180's own words : it is not "an attempt to solve scientific problems". It's also not a vetted academic thesis. Enformationism is instead a personal philosophical thesis. Others are free to take it for what it's worth to them.A. In science, what specifiable problem does "Enformationism" solve falsifiably?
B. In philosophy, what non-trivial, coherent question does "Enformationism" raise without begging any (or translate into a more probative question or questions)? — 180 Proof
These are good challenges to enformationism. Does 'materialism' pass A & B? or physicalism? — Bylaw
This is false.180's demands for empirical evidence to support the Enformationism thesis — Gnomon
More barking at a strawman's shadow. Another falsehood. I've proposed to you my own unorthodox understanding of metaphysics (with several links to further elaborating posts) here .I'm not sure what to call his anti-idealism ideology, but it seems to be opposed to Metaphysics-in-general (non-physical aspects of reality),
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