Taking if further now, what should we do with the rest of the people already and still existing? I assume you would think that many or all of these people will continue to harm themselves and others. According to your morality should we kill or eliminate those people, since it may not be moral to allow human suffering to exist in any way? Should the whole planet commit mass suicide? — punos

Again, how on earth is any of that implied by my argument? I have said that innocent persons deserve respect, good will, the promotion of their happiness and no harm whatsoever. So, in a world full of innocent persons that's what we ought to give each other. See? What perverted reasoning gets you to the conclusion that my view is that we should kill each other?!?

And no, of course we shouldn't commit mass suicide. Again, pay attention to my claims. If we're innocent then we don't deserve to die, do we? Write that down. Bartricks claims that we do not deserve to die. Then tell me how you get from that to "therefore we ought to kill ourselves". Go on. Fill in the missing premise.

I have also emphasized that death is itself an incredible harm. So why the hell do you think it's a good idea to visit on ourselves?

We're innocent. That means we're entitled to a happy harm free life. And we're entitled - up to a point - to do what's necessary to secure it for ourselves. We deserve a lot more than we're going to get. But we deserve all the happiness we can secure for ourselves. We do not deserve to die, and thus we are entitled to do what we can to delay its occurrence.

Quite.

It seems absurd to say that the idea that innocents do not deserve to come to harm tout court comes from God, when it is God as creator who purportedly created this world wherein innocents may indeed, due to misfortune, be harmed. — Janus

Above not addressed by you.

You're not taking account of the point that several have now made that innocents don't in any absolute sense deserve to be harmed or protected from all harm. Another point is that maybe we all need to experience some pain in order to grow and mature. — Janus

It is self-evident that those who have done nothing do not deserve to come to harm. You don't challenge that claim by confirming it. You have just said that innocent people do not deserve to be harmed. That's my claim. Sheesh!

In any case as compassionate beings, we have a natural tendency to want to protect innocents from deliberate or even random 'bad luck' harm; we don't need to invoke the idea of deserving or not deserving to feel that. — Janus

Relevance? Which premise are you trying to challenge?

Thinking in terms of deserving or not deserving is a category error when it is taken out of the context of what is earned and of reward and punishment. — Janus

What?

↪Bartricks
It seems absurd to say that the idea that innocents do not deserve to come to harm tout court comes from God, when it is God as creator who purportedly created this world wherein innocents may indeed, due to misfortune, be harmed.
— Janus

Above not addressed by you. — Janus

Because it's not relevant to my argument.

My argument's conclusion is normative. The claim that morality requires God is a metaethical claim.

Look, Hugh, try and focus on the actual argument I made.

Here's how you do that. You first assess whether the argument is valid. That is, you assess whether the conclusion follows from the premises.

Then - and only then - you move on to assess the premises. And to do that you need to focus on the actual premises of the argument, not unrelated claims.

And you assess the premises by considering whether they are self-evident to reason or follow from self-evident truths of reason.

Here's a tip: consider the negation of the premises and see if they seem self-evident to reason.

So, one of my premises is that a person who has been created is innocent. The opposite of that - the negation - is that a person who has been created is guilty. Now, that's not self-evident to reason, is it? Indeed, it's stupid.

And if a person is innocent then they do not deserve to come to harm. That's also self-evident to reason - indeed, it's a conceptual truth (that's technical for 'you don't know what you're talking about if you deny it").

The negation of that claim is that innocent people deserve to come to harm. Is that self-evident to reason or really bloody stupid? That latter, yes?

And what follows from my two premises: that people who are created don't deserve to come to any harm.

Now, don't fanny about asking unrelated questions about the nature of morality. Focus. To deny that conclusion you need to deny a premise, and neither is reasonably deniable. That doesn't mean you won't deny one. It just means that if you do, you're unreasonable.

And then there's my additional claim: that a life here will be full of harms, including the harm of death. That is, no life here can reasonably be expected to be entirely harm free.

Now, is that reasonable? Yes. Obviously.

What follows? This: that procreative acts create people who deserve to come to no harm, but who will come to harm. That is, procreative acts create an injustice.

Deal with it.

But that a person will be subject to a great many harms in a lifetime is true beyond a reasonable doubt. Of course, recognizing that requires that one be reasonable, which you clearly aren' — Bartricks

I gave you a specific example that disputes what you take for granted. It clearly does even if you like it or not. Of course it's not the only wrong premise that you use but others mentioned the fallacies in the rest of your OP.

So the thing that you take for "granted" isn't at all. No, not even all people experience "great many harms" as you keep repeating. Even death when you actually don't realize that you are dying, then you don't experience-feel any harm at all either. You are just dead in a second without even experiencing-feeling it.

But you consider death as "at least one harm that you experience in life". So since death exists, life is harmful for sure. That was your response to my example and that's the final root of all of your premises also. And since you choose that as to build your "theory" on, you start from a total false base. That's the whole point.

So since you believe that, tell that from the beginning. Why you mentioned all that bullshit about "innocent people and staff"? And you name it a " new argument" also? Pff..You just can't admit it cause it ruins your little story.

Anyway you antinatalists are an easy prey when it comes in arguments. You just make an intellectual salad of them, using and bending terms like "innocent", "deserving", "moral", "harm"" etc the way it is more convenient for you,as just to justify the actual hate you have for human nature itself.
So I leave you with your "sparrow reasoning".

In other contexts, the fact an act will significantly affect another person without their
prior consent typically operates as a powerful wrong-making feature of such deeds. — Gerald K. Harrison- Antinatalism and Moral Particularism

No it doesn't. We do this all the time. Practically the whole of modern child-rearing involves this, our entire criminal justice system relies on this, all actions on shared resources (air, water, built environment) rely on this. Practically everything you do has a profound effect on the others who share your world, we do not ask their consent. In fact the number of things we do assuming consent far outweighs the number of things we do asking for it.

if I know that, were I to have a child, the child’s life would be one characterized by intense suffering, then — Gerald K. Harrison- Antinatalism and Moral Particularism

And this is clearly incorrect too. People do not see the harms of life as being significant enough to meet the threshold of "characterized by intense suffering" that would be required to initiate this 'wrong-maker'. Not all harms comes under this category, so the question is where the threshold lies. Harrison gives no argument at all as to why the threshold ought to lie with the normal harms of life.

Same old nonsense

No it doesn't. We do this all the time. Practically the whole of modern child-rearing involves this, our entire criminal justice system relies on this, all actions on shared resources (air, water, built environment) rely on this. Practically everything you do has a profound effect on the others who share your world, we do not ask their consent. In fact the number of things we do assuming consent far outweighs the number of things we do asking for it. — Isaac

So in moral particularism and particularism in general, you can look at context. Here, for example, are we doing something to a specific individual or on the level of government action? Child rearing is relative to weighing against worse options. Procreative decision is deciding on all X harms. It’s deciding that a life with known and unknown kinds of harms that will befall a person should take place unnecessarily on someone else’s behalf. Unlike child rearing, you aren’t mitigating a circumstance. Quite the opposite you are creating the circumstance in the first place which then needs mitigating.

As Harrison said:

The point here is that there are many of them and that, other things
being equal, the fact that an act will subject another person to many harms is a fact
about an act that, typically, operates with a negative moral valence. The fact that
stepping on your toe will cause you the harm of pain provides me with a moral reason not to step on your toe. Likewise, then, the fact that procreative acts will subject
another to a catalog of harms of the kind mentioned above, and others besides, is a
fact that — Gerald K. Harrison- Antinatalism and Moral Particularism

Harrison gives no argument at all as to why the threshold ought to lie with the normal harms of life. — Isaac

Normal harms? Fuck that idea. More of the same logic whereby anytime a person debates harms with an antinatalist all harms become trivial harms :roll:.

See my comment to Bartricks above.

Animals are innocent too. But why bring animals into the equation? — Bartricks

No, animals are not innocent in the proper sense. Innocent is only the one who can become guilty. Animals cannot do that. They are beyond guilt and innocence. I brought animals into the equation because babies resemble them in terms of beyond guilt and innocence.

So, the capability to become guilty must be given in order to be innocent. If you disagree, your concept of innocence is more metaphorical, symbolic, allegorical, or just fictional.

It's not question begging. — Bartricks

Okay, you may be right about that. But as far as I know, God represents for you an ultimate axiom in all questions of morality and values. If God's existence or being is the absolute good, then any form of being, including suffering, is always better than non-being.

Innocent is only the one who can become guilty. — spirit-salamander

The term “deserve” can be preserved here. No one “deserves” to be unnecessarily harmed. To me, that’s basically what this translates to. That way, you needn’t get caught up in the particular term innocent if that is the only objection.

So in moral particularism and particularism in general, you can look at context. — schopenhauer1

Right. So the context of child-bearing is one in which an as yet non-existent person is brought into existence. So is that one of the contexts which makes non-consent OK, or one of the contexts which doesn't? Seems you've just arbitrarily decided it's the latter.

Unlike child rearing, you aren’t mitigating a circumstance. — schopenhauer1

Of course you are. There's an existing generation which will suffer from a lack of children. You're mitigating a circumstance.

Normal harms? Fuck that idea. More of the same logic whereby anytime a person debates harms with an antinatalist all harms become trivial harms — schopenhauer1

Who said anything about 'trivial', the word used was 'normal'. There is a threshold of harm at which it would be morally wrong to subject another to them no matter the benefits. Most harms we consider reasonable to impose are those outweighed by benefits. Harrison just arbitrarily draws the line at 'the harms of life'. He give absolutely no argument as to why it should be there.

If the OP's argument is based on the premise that the innocent shouldn't be harmed because they don't deserve it then, they don't deserve joy/happiness either, oui? They haven't done anything to deserve anything.

Is this back to square one now?

No one “deserves” to be unnecessarily harmed. — schopenhauer1

This is the basic error in @Bartricks's appalling bad argument. That we do not deserve harm is not the same as that we do deserve non-harm. I don't deserve a sports car, that doesn't be mean I do deserve people preventing me from getting a sports car. I don't deserve to stub my toe, I don't expect the world to rally round and prevent me from stubbing my toe.

There are countless situations where we neither deserve something nor do we not deserve its opposite.

For someone to deserve something means (in the context it's used here) there is a duty of moral agents to provide them it. For someone to not deserve something does not impose a similar duty on moral agents to prevent them from having it. It may be that they obtain it by chance, and no moral approbation comes along with that.

So the argument that we have a duty to avoid harm befalling innocents cannot be derived from the intuition that innocents do not deserve harm. They don't deserve harm, but they don't deserve non-harm either.

I am quite capable of calling someone a complete cunt and yet taking their argument as an argument detached from said cunt. — I like sushi

:clap: :smirk:

If you make the most basic behaviour of humans immoral, it's your judgement of moral intuition that's wrong, not humanity. — Isaac

:fire:

So the argument that we have a duty to avoid harm befalling innocents cannot be derived from the intuition that innocents do not deserve harm. They don't deserve harm, but they don't deserve non-harm either. — Isaac

:100:

If the OP's argument is based on the premise that the innocent shouldn't be harmed because they don't deserve it then, they don't deserve joy/happiness either, oui? They haven't done anything to deserve anything. — Agent Smith

:up:

My child would be my flesh and blood, mine, and of course I wish to have no harm come to him, so I would do everything to prevent any such harm, including not conceiving the child at all.
— baker

Interesting that you have already chosen a gender for your imagined child and suggested a singular ownership rather than joint ownership with your imagined partner in procreation. — universeness

It's no good being female in this world; and men cannot be relied on.

Can you give a clear idea of exactly which harms you might be unable to protect your imagined child against?

Illness, old age, disease.
Not being able to satisfactorily answer his existential questions.

Are you ok with, accidental bumps/bruises/scratches/throwing up/nappies containing something akin to nuclear waste?

Sure.

would you also not have a child because it might become a drunk or a junkie or even worse, a UK tory or a US Republican later in life?

Are you concerned your imagined child might become a serial killer or be the antichrist?

No.

What actual list of harms/learning opportunities do you want guarantees against?

Growing up, I had existential questions that the adults refused to answer, or gave useless, or worse answers to.
Such as, "When you'll get older, you'll become numb, and then life will be much easier."

Early on, I swore I would rather not have a child at all than to give him such answers.

Illness, old age, disease — baker

Science can help you with all three of those? If not you then your kids or their kids but if there are no more kids then the human adventure dies along with the suffer/learn why/ prevent the suffering process, due to the whims of spoilsport antinatalists.

Such as, "When you'll get older, you'll become numb, and then life will be much easier."

Early on, I swore I would rather not have a child at all than to give him such answers. — baker

:lol: Yeah, I can appreciate that but you might have been the father of the one.
The one who wins for us all. The one who cures all cancers or who discovers how to increase human lifespan for 10,000 years or discovers how to terraform Mars into an Earth-like planet within 20 years or.... or..... and you could have picked its name as well!
I have no kids and at 58, it's too late to do the job justice but I do wonder if my child could have been 'one' who made things better for millions of people. One who could even have changed the depressing mind of an antinatalist.
I know, it could have also have been a wee f***wit. :roll:

So is that one of the contexts which makes non-consent OK, or one of the contexts which doesn't? Seems you've just arbitrarily decided it's the latter. — Isaac

To be fair, that is the part I least care about in his argument, but to be charitable, I think he is saying that the conclusions of one act doesn't normally go with the conclusions of similar situations that aren't that particular case, and therefore one would be simply following preference and not what one's moral intuition is, if X, Y, Z is normally that moral intuition. It's a call to not let moral particularism turn into merely preference-maximization.. That is my interpretation of it at least. I see his argument actually applying to moral generalism too. The examples he gives of the inconsistent application seems most important in that paper.

Of course you are. There's an existing generation which will suffer from a lack of children. You're mitigating a circumstance. — Isaac

But that would indeed be breaking the very normative claim that people should not be used. To create harms for someone in order to justify some outcome in mitigating harms for another person, creating possibly significant harm to one person to try to ameliorate preferences that others may have, is to me, using that person for some agenda. I don't believe creating purposefully, known (significant, inescapable, long-term) harms for others to mitigate other people's harm would fall under the kind of "mitigation" I am describing. I am talking about mitigation for the very person being harmed. Thus, schooling a child or mildly punishing for wrong behavior, is mitigating for the person being harmed to prevent future harm for that person. Once that child is of adult age, notice these same acts would be inappropriate and wrong due to issues relating to consent and autonomy of individuals.

Who said anything about 'trivial', the word used was 'normal'. There is a threshold of harm at which it would be morally wrong to subject another to them no matter the benefits. Most harms we consider reasonable to impose are those outweighed by benefits. Harrison just arbitrarily draws the line at 'the harms of life'. He give absolutely no argument as to why it should be there. — Isaac

So here is where I think the largest difference in our values lie. I would not presume for another person what is the "right" or "normal" amount of harm that another person should be able to endure. As Harrison noted, these harms are not trivial but significant. I would add, inescapable, long in duration, and at the end of the day, whatever your intention for "normal harm", you just DON'T KNOW what a) That person would have wanted as an adult consenting person and b) There are many many harms that you cannot foresee, even in your best attempts at evaluation. I would characterize this thinking as "messianic" in that there seems to be this "mission" that "needs" to be begotten by yet more people, and that you are the judge and arbiter of people following this mission. Notice that on the other side of the equation, there is no mission. There is no person to need a mission.

For someone to deserve something means (in the context it's used here) there is a duty of moral agents to provide them it. For someone to not deserve something does not impose a similar duty on moral agents to prevent them from having it. It may be that they obtain it by chance, and no moral approbation comes along with that.

So the argument that we have a duty to avoid harm befalling innocents cannot be derived from the intuition that innocents do not deserve harm. They don't deserve harm, but they don't deserve non-harm either. — Isaac

Perhaps I'm not quite following. I think my rephrasing clarifies otherwise confusing terms.. That is to say, no one "deserves" to be unnecessarily harmed. That is to say, there is no circumstance where someone should be harmed unnecessarily. Harm can come as punishment perhaps, or to mitigate worse things (like schooling children), but to do it with no mitigating reasons, is "undeserved" in a sense that there was no reason for that to befall someone, if you could prevent it.

What is more compelling: One's nightmare experiences in childhood and adolescence that led one to decide to not parent a child, or a logical argument? — Bitter Crank

Depends on the person or the topic.

There are many things one doesn't need to experience for oneself in order to know one doesn't want to experience them and to instead take preventative action against them.

It clearly isn't moral intuition - people disagree with you, so it can't be intuitive, can it. — Isaac

A fallacious ad populum.

People have children all the time and virtually no one judges it to be moral problem

Empirically not true. From eugenics to some people regretting that they had children to antinatalists, some people do judge procreation as a moral problem.

Unless you're reaching for some magical, or supernatural source of moral rules, you've got nothing to go on to judge intuition other than how people actually behave.

People's behavior can reflect their intution, or not. So your point is moot.

The issue at hand is, actually, who or what is the authority in these matters.

If you make the most basic behaviour of humans immoral, it's your judgement of moral intuition that's wrong, not humanity.

Another fallacious ad populum.

People do not see the harms of life as being significant enough to meet the threshold of "characterized by intense suffering" that would be required to initiate this 'wrong-maker'. — Isaac

Clearly, some people do see it that way, at least some antinatalists do.

So the argument that we have a duty to avoid harm befalling innocents cannot be derived from the intuition that innocents do not deserve harm. They don't deserve harm, but they don't deserve non-harm either. — Isaac

It's best framed as an ideological stance.

Every day, many Buddhists chant this sutta:

Think: Happy, at rest,
may all beings be happy at heart.
Whatever beings there may be,
weak or strong, without exception,
long, large,
middling, short,
subtle, blatant,
seen & unseen,
near & far,
born & seeking birth:
May all beings be happy at heart.

Let no one deceive another
or despise anyone anywhere,
or through anger or irritation
wish for another to suffer.

As a mother would risk her life
to protect her child, her only child,
even so should one cultivate a limitless heart
with regard to all beings.
With good will for the entire cosmos,
cultivate a limitless heart:
Above, below, & all around,
unobstructed, without enmity or hate.
Whether standing, walking,
sitting, or lying down,
as long as one is alert,
one should be resolved on this mindfulness.

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/snp/snp.1.08.than.html

So the argument that we have a duty to avoid harm befalling innocents cannot be derived from the intuition that innocents do not deserve harm. They don't deserve harm, but they don't deserve non-harm either. — Isaac

This is so cold.

It's understandable that you might feel this way about some stranger or their children. But to feel this way about your own (prospective) children??

Procreating creates an innocent person. And an innocent person deserves a harm-free happy life. That's not something you can give them. So you've done wrong - a great wrong - if you create that person. — Bartricks

This view is limited strictly to some particular Western worldviews, namely, mainstream Abrahamic religions and secularism.

The vast majority of the human population, however, believe in some kind of serial reincarnation or rebirth; a view in which it takes the will and actions of at least three entities to synchronize in order for conception to occur (namely, the prospective mother, the prospective father, and the prospective child; and in the theistic variant, the will of God). In Dharmic religions, they do not believe that a newborn child is innocent; rather, that a person has a "karmic debt", and this is why they are (re)born to begin with.

IOW, for a traditionalist Asian person, your argument would be unsound. Just pointing out the limited applicability of your argument.

IOW, for a traditionalist Asian person, your argument would be unsound. Just pointing out the limited applicability of your argument. — baker

Arguing one myth against another.

Science can help you with all three of those? — universeness

No.

If not you then your kids or their kids but if there are no more kids then the human adventure dies along with the suffer/learn why/ prevent the suffering process, due to the whims of spoilsport antinatalists.

I really don't think this is something to fear.

Yeah, I can appreciate that but you might have been the father of the one.

No, it's precisely because I know I can't be that kind of parent that I don't feel qualified to have children.
Not having a definitive solution to the problem of suffering is even worse than not being able to feed and clothe the child.

This view is limited strictly to some particular Western worldviews, namely, mainstream Abrahamic religions and secularism. — baker

What are you on about? The 'west' is not a worldview, it's just the practice of using reason to find out what's true, as opposed to making shit up or believing something because one's ancestors believed it. And it's not geographical. And arguments don't go from being sound to unsound from region to region. I mean, you can't seriously think that if you get on a plane arguments that were sound when you took off will be unsound depending on where you land?

Now, which premise in my deductively valid argument do you dispute? Or are you a Buddhist?

This is the basic error in Bartricks's appalling bad argument. — Isaac

That's fighting talk. So come on, boyo, arguments are appallingly bad in two ways; they can be invalid or they can have false premises. Which one is it?

It ain't invalid. So which premise do you dispute? Say. And then I'll take you outside and show you how it is.

Oh, and incidentally this:

For someone to deserve something means (in the context it's used here) there is a duty of moral agents to provide them it. — Isaac

Is total crap. One can deserve something and no one be under any obligation to give you it. They're completely different notions. You are simply confused because often the fact a person deserves something can give rise to an obligation to provide them with it. But there's no necessary connection. To 'deserve' something is not equivalent to someone having an obligation to give it to you. Someone can deserve something and no one be under an obligation to provide it. And the reverse is true: we can be under an obligation to give someone something they do not deserve. For instance, you don't deserve my time. But I may be obliged to correct such confused thinking whenever I come across it, and thus I may be obliged to reply to your poorly thought through comments even though you do not deserve it.

So the argument that we have a duty to avoid harm befalling innocents cannot be derived from the intuition that innocents do not deserve harm. They don't deserve harm, but they don't deserve non-harm either. — Isaac

And what on earth do you mean by 'they don't deserve non-harm either'? Unpack it. What are you trying to say with those words? Do you mean that if a baby is in agony, that the suffering in question is not undeserved? There's no injustice in it, right? It's just a burning baby. Nothing to worry about. It isn't bad. It isn't an injustice. The suffering isn't undeserved. It's 'non-deserved'. Yes? What an unbelievably implausible view.

A thought experiment for you: imagine Tony has lived a perfectly decent life of his own free will. So, he doesn't deserve to suffer, yes? And now he's on fire. Presumably your view is that his suffering really is undeserved. But the baby who is also on fire - well, that baby's suffering is non-deserved. So, there's an important moral difference, in your view, between Tony's suffering and the baby's suffering such that Tony's suffering constitutes an injustice whereas the baby's does not - yes? That's absurd.

Now, again, dispute a premise.

No, animals are not innocent in the proper sense. — spirit-salamander

Yes they are. To be innocent is to be a person who has not freely done anything wrong. Animals are persons - there's something it is like to be an animal, they have a mind. And they have not freely done anything wrong as they lack free will. So they're innocent. As are newly created human persons.

I brought animals into the equation because babies resemble them in terms of beyond guilt and innocence. — spirit-salamander

Why not just stick to babies? They're the less controversial case. Babies are persons and they have not freely done wrong. So they're innocent.

There is only one way in which a person can come positively to deserve harm. And that is by freely doing wrong.

Thus, newly created persons do not deserve to come to harm. And that means that any harm they come to - with one exception - is undeserved. The one exception is harm that a person freely subjects themselves to.

Procreative acts create a person who does not deserve harm, but who will come to harm. That's to create an injustice. And we are obliged not to create such situations, other things being equal.

But as far as I know, God represents for you an ultimate axiom in all questions of morality and values. If God's existence or being is the absolute good, then any form of being, including suffering, is always better than non-being. — spirit-salamander

That does not represent my view. God is not an 'axiom' - that's incoherent. God's a person. And my view that morality requires God is not a view asserted in any of the premises of my argument, so you're just changing the topic.

But that would indeed be breaking the very normative claim that people should not be used. — schopenhauer1

What normative claim? We use people all the time. It's quite normal, we're a social species and we act as a group and expect members of that group to do their bit. Without a group there's no morality at all since the entire field is about how we get along with each other for mutual benefit.

So here is where I think the largest difference in our values lie. I would not presume for another person what is the "right" or "normal" amount of harm that another person should be able to endure. — schopenhauer1

Absolutely. I think we've identified this before. But this position is a very unusual one, so we should not be surprised that it leads to unusual conclusions. Most people do have a fuzzy, but reasoned view of what harms it is justifiable to impose on others for the greater good.

but to do it with no mitigating reasons, is "undeserved" in a sense that there was no reason for that to befall someone, if you could prevent it. — schopenhauer1

There is a duty on others to supply what is deserved, yes? If I deserve a reward it means someone ought to give me a reward.

But there is no concomitant duty on others to prevent that which is not deserved. If I don't deserve an award, it just means no-one has a duty to give me one. It doesn't mean everyone has a duty to prevent me from getting one.

So if I don't deserve harm, it just means there's no duty on anyone to harm me, it doesn't mean everyone has a duty to prevent me from harm.

A fallacious ad populum. — baker

Ad populum arguments are not fallacious here unless you're arguing for moral absolutism. The argument presented in the OP assumes moral intuition, hence ad populum arguments are all there is. Otherwise we just have the ridiculously messianic claim that whatever@Bartricks feels is moral, is, in fact, moral.

(which is, incidentally, where this thread will end up as @Bartricks's threads always do - with the delusional claim that whatever he happens to feel is the case is, in fact, the case)

One can deserve something and no one be under any obligation to give you it. — Bartricks

Good. That's the argument settled then.

Children deserve a good life, free from harms but no-one is under any obligation to give it them so procreation is fine.