What it does though is give us the principles required to understand the priority of the spiritual over the material. — Metaphysician Undercover

I hear you. But I guess it is saying there is no 'material', so there is only ideas or mind. In such a reality, is there a difference in how we develop a priority of ideas and how would we go about determining what is important for human beings?

I hear you. But I guess it is saying there is no 'material', so there is only ideas or mind. In such a reality, is there a difference in how we develop a priority of ideas and how would we go about determining what is important for human beings? — Tom Storm

Such an idealism, one which says that there is no matter, is an extreme form of idealism which is very difficult to understand. I can only understand it under the terms of process philosophy. We must remove the idea of a static, passive, inert matter, and assume that there is absolutely nothing which remains the same, from one moment to the next. That which persists through a change is said to be the "matter", so no matter would mean that everything has changed from one moment to the next.

In this type of philosophy, it is difficult to establish a temporal coherency, or a continuity of existence from one moment to the next in time. So process philosophers end up positing some sort of spiritual element which produces a relationship between one moment of time and the next, to account for the observed temporal continuity and apparent consistency of being as time passes.

I really haven't studied this philosophy enough to know how they would develop an ethics, i.e. how they would determine what is good.

In this type of philosophy, it is difficult to establish a temporal coherency, or a continuity of existence from one moment to the next in time. So process philosophers end up positing some sort of spiritual element which produces a relationship between one moment of time and the next, to account for the observed temporal continuity and apparent consistency of being as time passes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Goodness. Sounds messy and almost unachievable. But thanks for that.

Challenges to Metaphysical Realism

At the risk of taking this thread back on topic, there is an article on SEP directly addressing the titular issue.
Challenges to Metaphysical Realism

Five counter-arguments to realism are listed:

• Dummett’s Manifestation Argument
• Dummett’s Language Acquisition Argument
• Putnam’s Brain-in-a-Vat Argument
• Putnam’s Conceptual Relativity Argument
• Putnam’s Model-Theoretic Argument

Each would be a source of further discussion.

But I guess it is saying there is no 'material', so there is only ideas or mind. — Tom Storm

Even given a consistent idealist ontology, that the fundamental constituents of knowledge are not objects but ideas and sensations, this doesn't mean that pain is not real, because it is experienced as real, and that experience is apodictic (cannot plausibly denied).

Also note that Berkeley, who is the textbook idealist, does not deny that matter exists, but that it exists apart from or independently of sensations and ideas.

More on 'fear of idealism':

Physicalism—whether it ultimately turns out to be philosophically correct or not — is hypothesized to be partly motivated by the neurotic endeavor to project onto the world attributes that help one avoid confronting unacknowledged aspects of one’s own inner life. — Bernardo Kastrup, The Physicalist Worldview as a Neurotic Ego-Defense Mechanism

Compare Michel Henri 'Barbarism'

Metaphysical realism is the thesis that the objects, properties and relations the world contains, collectively: the structure of the world [Sider 2011], exists independently of our thoughts about it or our perceptions of it. Anti-realists either doubt or deny the existence of the structure the metaphysical realist believes in or else doubt or deny its independence from our conceptions of it. Realists about numbers, for example, hold that numbers exist mind-independently.

Curiously, I favour realism about numbers, in other words, mathematical platonism, even though my other views are closer to what is described as anti-realism in this article.

Actually, I think it should be noted that 'realism' in pre-modern (or medieval) philosophy referred to realism concerning universals, whilst realism today is generally synonymous with scientific realism, that being the commitment to the mind-independent reality of objects of scientific analysis. They're practically opposite in some ways. I don't know if the article talks about that.

It is an interesting source. I will try and take some time to take it in.

Even given a consistent idealist ontology, that the fundamental constituents of knowledge are not objects but ideas and sensations, this doesn't mean that pain is not real, because it is experienced as real, and that experience is apodictic (cannot plausibly denied). — Wayfarer

I got that much already from Mr Kastrup. :wink:

Ah, @Banno ... No, I didn't noitice, sorry. Well, nevertheless ...

Mr Kastrup — Tom Storm

'Doctor', to us. (Actually, he has two doctorates.)

At the risk of taking this thread back on topic, there is an article on SEP directly addressing the titular issue. — Banno

Idealism vs materialism is not actually the same debate as realism vs non-realism. Idealism is not non-realist, but claims that the external material world has no intrinsic or inherent reality outside the experience of it. So it may be opposed to what you think is 'realist' but to declare that it is non-realist actually begs the question, that is, assumes what needs to be proven (that the external material world is inherently real and that the denial of this constitutes non-realism.)

I think the assumed version of realism behind that article is scientific realism.

Heidegger spent a whole career introducing a new way to think about the word ‘is’, such as S is P. — Joshs

OK, so then we're back to "why?". I don't see a way out of this. Before diving into Heidegger, I'd rather just make sure we've got the frame of investigation right. If a claim is about the way the world is, it is a factual claim. If a claim is about some way we could look at the way the world is, then it's a normative or aesthetic claim and it needs a 'why' - why ought I look at thing that way, as opposed to any other.

That 'why' must itself be a factual claim "it will make you happier", "it will work better", "it's more useful"...etc. A claim which takes a position on the way the world is.

If all we have is a series of 'ways of looking at things' which never terminate in a claim about the way the world is (such as to advise I look at things that way) then I'm not sure I see the point.

I think the assumed version of realism behind that article is scientific realism. — Wayfarer

And you think @Hello Human's "external material world" isn't? You should ask.

Does a walk exist? Does a cartwheel exist? Does a backflip exist? — NOS4A2

There's you doing a cartwheel, right?

There's you experiencing a tea cup, yes?

The latter is clearly not the same thing as a teacup.

You experiencing a teacup is not itself a teacup. We're talking about aspects of you experiencing a teacup. The particular aspect we're talking about is the model of a teacup your brain creates. It's an aspect of you experiencing a teacup, and as such is very obviously not a teacup.

Yes indeed it is. Actually reading it again - probably should have done that before now - I think the OP advances a weak argument for idealism. I think we’ve covered it well.

'Doctor', to us. (Actually, he has two doctorates.) — Wayfarer

Of course.

Doctor! Doctor! Can't you see I'm burning, burning
Oh, Doctor! Doctor! Is this love I'm feeling?

Sorry...

I think we just rehashed old material for a new audience.

But that is the performer's lot; same show every night.

idealism vs materialism is not actually the same debate as realism vs non-realism. Idealism is not non-realist, but claims that the external material world has no intrinsic or inherent reality outside the experience of it. So it may be opposed to what you think is 'realist' but to declare that it is non-realist actually begs the question, that is, assumes what needs to be proven (that the external material world is inherently real and that the denial of this constitutes non-realism.)

I think the assumed version of realism behind that article is scientific realism. — Wayfarer

What a lovely string of words, it deftly encapsulates the sorts of wonderful discussions we have here. :pray:

I think we just rehashed old material for a new audience. — Banno

And yet no one seems bothered by a discussion about reality which fails to even address the question of what criteria we're using to declare something 'real'. The play being staged seems more a farce than a drama...

Well, a few tried to address that issue. Perhaps that's the positive.

Well, a few tried to address that issue. Perhaps that's the positive. — Banno

Am I wrong in thinking that this was only something taken seriously by those defending physicalism? Is it possible an idealist position actually depends on a failure to define criteria fro 'real' such that there can be equivocation on what does and does not belong in that category?

There's the general term 'real' which is clearly used in a number of different contexts. "Santa isn't real" means something different to the claim "mathematics isn't real", or "morality isn't real". The former meaning simply that no physical person fitting that description can be found, whereas to treat the latter claims that way would be to trivialise them (as you said earlier, no one expects to bump into a number 5).

But this second sense seems nebulous at best. The closest I've got from this discussion is something like 'universally applies' (but then @Wayfarer denied that of logical rules, which he still maintains are 'real'), something like 'exists outside of individual minds', but then idealism is in hot water requiring God already (usually reserved for the end of a conversation!). The latest is the oddest meaning of them all, something like 'is important'....? Well, what can we possibly do with that?

(but then Wayfarer denied that of logical rules, which he still maintains are 'real'), something like 'exists outside of individual minds', but then idealism is in hot water requiring God already (usually reserved for the end of a conversation!) — Isaac

It's interesting. Under idealism something needs to hold all thought or 'reality' together for us to have regularities and be able to share our modest intersubjective experiences. The thesis seems to be that reality is fundamentally mental - not only in your mind alone, or my mind alone, but also (and here's the thing) in a transpersonal, spatially extended form of mind.

This seems to be an analogue to Plato's Realm of the Forms or Jung's collective unconscious - a repository full of content which transcends space and time. It's where maths lives, alongside the rules of logic and I'll guess, many idealists would argue without this realm and its contents there would be no order and human communication would be incoherent. It all sounds like transcendental arguments for god developed (via Kant) by Cornelius Van Til who argued that god is the precondition for logic, reason and morality. Anyway I think this is where the arrows point.

Yes, that's certainly how I see it. The matter of importance, however, is not the status of this realm in reality, but the origin of its constituent parts.

The important question is over whether a proposition such as "x is y" within that realm has a truth value such that it might be true but no one knows it to be true.

Is ¬(p ∧ ¬p) true by virtue of all humans thinking that way (thus creating a sort of intersubjective realm of facts within which we can determine what is the case and what is not the case), or is ¬(p ∧ ¬p) true even if nobody thought it?

The latter seems to be what idealists want to claim but the evidence brought forward to support that claim seems only to support the former, much weaker version.

Under idealism something needs to hold all thought or 'reality' together for us to have regularities — Tom Storm

Does it? On the opposite view, what is needed to hold all material things together for them to have regularities?

The thesis seems to be that reality is fundamentally mental - not only in your mind alone, or my mind alone, but also (and here's the thing) in a transpersonal, spatially extended form of mind. — Tom Storm

I think that is a fair depiction but I never tire of pointing out that whatever this form of mind might be, it's not an object of experience. That is always a major stumbling-block. I think because we are so instinctively oriented towards the objective domain (object oriented?) then the insuperable difficulty is, well what kind of thing are we talking about? As I have said, that is the subject of an essay by the French philosopher of science, Michel Bitbol, with the title 'It is never known but is the knower'. It's also the subject of that essay I often mention, 'the blind spot of science'. I think the challenge is that to grasp it requires a kind of cognitive shift - like a gestalt shift, a different perspective. Instead of being focussed exclusively on objective matters (empiricism) or symbolic logic it requires a kind of self-awareness, an awareness of the structure of thought in oneself. (This is why it is sometimes remarked that Kantian types of philosophies converge with meditative disciplines, indeed I first learned of Kant through a book called Central Philosophy of Buddhism.)

The second point that's becoming gradually clear to me, is the basically Kantian point that causality itself is a relationship in ideas. I think the 'natural attitude' is that there is the real world 'out there', the vast universe, plainly external to us, and objective, and our mind, 'in here', the subjective domain. Whereas, I am starting to see that formal logical structures, like mathematical operations and logical laws, are structures in the experience-of-the-world. They're neither private or subjective, nor external and objective - they transcend or at least straddle the subject-object distinction. So causality is neither in the world, nor in the mind, but in the experience-of-the-world. (This is the meaning of Quantum Baynsienism.)

The book I'm reading at the moment, Pinter's Mind and the Cosmic Order, points out that the world described by quantitative science has no intrinsic features or structure. The mind brings all of those to experience by way of gestalts, structured wholes. Animal cognition operates the same way, but in h. sapiens, due to abstract logic, representation and language, we are able to apply logic to the structure of experiences. So those structures are internal to the mind, but not your mind or my mind - they are how THE mind operates. So numbers, principles, laws, and the like, are uniform structures in experience. They don't exist in the sense that the objects of scientific analysis exist, but on the other hand, you wouldn't have science without them. That's also the sense in which the mind is 'one' - it's not numerically one, there's not a single instance, but it's the same in all sentient beings (individuated as Kastrup's 'dissociated alters'.)

Living beings, and humans in particular, are the window through which meaning enters the Universe. That is why we're called 'beings'.

Thanks. Yes I'm starting to understand the building blocks (no materialist pun intended).

This is particularly interesting:

formal logical structures, like mathematical operations and logical laws, are structures in the experience-of-the-world. They're neither private or subjective, nor external and objective - they transcend or at least straddle the subject-object distinction. So causality is neither in the world, nor in the mind, but in the experience-of-the-world. (This is the meaning of Quantum Baynsienism.) — Wayfarer

Maybe there needs to be a separate thread on speculative models of idealism. This is controversial material. Would you also place Jung's collective unconscious here? There seems to be soft and hard ways to describe this, some of which sound like Platonism to me.

The collective unconscious appears to consist of mythological motifs or primordial images, for which reason the myths of all nations are its real exponents. In fact the whole of mythology could be taken as a sort of projection of the collective unconscious. We can see this most clearly if we look at the heavenly constellations, whose originally chaotic forms are organized through the projection of images. This explains the influence of the stars as asserted by astrologers. These influences are nothing but unconscious instrospective perceptions of the collective unconscious.

- C.G. Jung The Structure of the Psyche Collected Works 8

Does a walk exist? Does a cartwheel exist? Does a backflip exist?

Our language no doubt attempts to abstract actions from the extant being that performs them. But at no point should we take this to mean there is an actual, existing distinction between doer and deed. They are like the morning and evening star, one and the same. — NOS4A2

I wasn't trying to separate dream from dreamer. I was pointing out that if you can talk about it must exist. The manner in which it exists is irrelevant. You, as the doer, are dependent upon other things for your existence just as your dreams' existence are dependent upon your existence. The Earth is the doer and you are the deed.

Your body and mind are just as much a deed as a doer. One might even say that the deed of living and the doer (your body/mind) are one and the same.

I don’t actually regard that last post as speculative. I’m interested in Jung but I think it’s a digression.

I never said that. Plainly from the perspective of a subject, myself, other beings appear in some sense as objects, but we do not regard other beings as objects, which is why we refer to them with personal pronouns rather than as ‘it’ or ‘thing’. — Wayfarer

Language habits left over from when humans thought of themselves as special and separate from nature.

(For that matter, reflect on why humans and some of the higher animals are called ‘beings’.) — Wayfarer

When did we start calling chimps and dolphins "beings"? Who have you heard say that? I'm not saying they're wrong. I'm just wondering about the evolution of the word, "being".

Philosophy has long been aware of the paradox that we ourselves are subjects of experience, but are also objects in the eyes of other subjects. — Wayfarer

What makes something both a subject and object and not just an object? Which came first? Are subjects dependent upon their accompanying objects existence? Is a subject a part, or a fraction, of their accompanying object or does the subject exhaust what it is to be the object?

I'm just wondering about the evolution of the word, "being". — Harry Hindu

Good! Do that.

What makes something both a subject and object and not just an object? Which came first? — Harry Hindu

Recall Descartes. You may doubt the existence of anything, but not that you are doubting.

I wasn't trying to separate dream from dreamer. I was pointing out that if you can talk about it must exist. The manner in which it exists is irrelevant. You, as the doer, are dependent upon other things for your existence just as your dreams' existence are dependent upon your existence. The Earth is the doer and you are the deed.

Your body and mind are just as much a deed as a doer. One might even say that the deed of living and the doer (your body/mind) are one and the same.

The manner in which it exists is wholly relevant. It doesn’t exist at all. You cannot take a string attached to the word “dream” and attach the other end to its referent. Philosophy ought to avoid these figments if we are to ever understand what it really is we are talking about.

Yes, in every case it’s me that exists. No cartwheel, no backflip, and no model of a tea cup. We need not insert other, invisible things into the formula in order to understand what I am doing when I perceive another thing.

You've not addressed the point. Is you experiencing a cup the same thing as the cup?