Neither idealism nor anti-realism deny this. It's a mistake to equate "real" with "part of an external material world." — Michael

I agree*. Folk keep pointing this out, as if it were a problem for me. I don't see it.

Again, I suspect the realism/idealism, realism/antirealism discourse is a mistake. This thread is for m an exploration of the various possibilities. That's why I keep going back to the distinction based on truth, and maintaining that there are unknown truths. I suspect @Wayfarer and @Joshs would have to deny this, if they would address it. Then we would have a clear difference of opinion with which to work. But the argument has not gone that way.

*Edit: Historically, they have denied this. But that's moot.

The point is, the 'physical cup' exists - but it is not what we see. Our seeing of it is the overlay generated by our fantastically powerful VR-generating forebrain. What is physically real, then, does not exist in a meaningful sense - it only exists when it is seen to exist by an observer.

This actually makes sense out of dualism. The constructive activities of the brain are invisible to science itself, as science only deals in what can be measured and quantified. But the things that we see are generated by the brain on the basis of those bare-bones objects. So the reality we actually inhabit is not what physically exists.

That's why I keep going back to the distinction based on truth, and maintaining that there are unknown truths. — Banno

The assertion that there are 'unknown truths' is obviously only a surmise, because by definition you can never verify that until they're known. It's rather like the barber fallacy or any of those other set fallacies from Russell etc.

Each perspective is as rationally coherent as the other — Merkwurdichliebe

You know this a priori?

'cause it don't seem right to me.

You know this a priori?

'cause it don't seem right to me. — Banno

No, aposteriori. It's an informed opinion. So make an argument for either position, and I almost guarantee there is some way to refute it.

The assertion that there are 'unknown truths' is obviously only a surmise, because by definition you can never verify that until they're known. It's rather like the barber fallacy or any of those other set fallacies from Russell etc. — Wayfarer

And yet the alternative is that you know all there is to know.

Are you willing to claim omniscience?

And yet the alternative is that you know all there is to know.

Are you willing to claim omniscience? — Banno

That's why I keep going back to the distinction based on truth, and maintaining that there are unknown truths. — Banno

Two excerpts from earlier posts in this thread where I have shown that the existence of unknown truths is not a problem for ( at least some prominent forms of) idealism, so not sure why you are still banging that drum.

Since according to idealism the world is a product of Big MInd, not your mind or mine, then on that position there may indeed be truths that are not known. Have you read Berkeley at all, or are you at least familiar with his philosophy via secondary sources? — Janus

The point is that in either model, materialist or idealist. there is no problem that there should be truths unknown to us; which tells against your apparent claim that there could be no such truths under the idealist model, no? Or were you objecting because there could not be truths unknown to the Big Mind? — Janus

not sure why you are still banging that drum. — Janus

"Big mind" strikes me as a joke. The reality you have when you don't have a reality. It's a replacement for God, and so subject to the same problems as Joshs reply.

My objection is not to the content but the structure of that argument. The "supernatural" element, even if "immanent", is introduced using a fraught transcendental argument*. It is the transcendental argument that is objectionable. — Banno

"Big mind" strikes me as a joke. The reality you have when you don't have a reality. It's a replacement for God, and so subject to the same problems as Joshs reply.

My objection is not to the content but the structure of that argument. The "supernatural" element, even if "immanent", is introduced using a fraught transcendental argument*. It is the transcendental argument that is objectionable. — Banno

Sure, but your personal feelings are irrelevant as to whether the imagined models (universal mind, God, collective mind or whatever) logically preclude the possibility of unknown truths; they don't and hence your objection is misplaced.

The point is, the 'physical cup' exists - but it is not what we see. Our seeing of it is the overlay generated by our fantastically powerful VR-generating forebrain. What is physically real, then, does not exist in a meaningful sense - it only exists when it is seen to exist by an observer. — Wayfarer

But I do see the cup - "physical" or not; always with the qualifications.

Indeed, I pick it up, fill it with tea (sometimes, instead of coffee), drink from it, wash it and put back on the shelf. And it is still there when I close the door. Too much focus on the "seeing" and not the whole interaction give sone a false picture.

You do not put the VR-generated forebrain fantasy back in the cupboard.

And we are re-hashing arguments made previously in this very thread, as well as in innumerable other threads. And my fingers are too cold to type. Minus seven last night, and the house just won't get warm.

Minus seven last night, and the house just won't get warm. — Banno

Jesus, where do you live? I had thought you were in Sydney.

Monism is dualism gone astray, and that is saying a lot.

your personal feelings are irrelevant — Janus

They are relevant to whether I bother to reply.

But you haven't presented a cogent argument in favour of "Big Mind" that is worth addressing, and I've addressed similar notions n th past, so there's no novelty in working it out for you. So silence.

Nuh. I live in the Nation's Glorious Capital. Roundabouts and bubbles.

There was a bloody open window out the back of the house. Fixed now, and the heater is finally catching up. Fingers defrosting. I will try to be a bit more civil.

I think the immanence of "Big Mind" is sufficient to make it worth addressing. We have historical data that corroborates the likelihood of an immanent, "Big Mind". Why so hung up on the "Big Mind's" transcendence?

Well, go on then; if it is such a good argument, present it.

Well, go on then; if it is such a\ good argument, present it. — Banno

Big mind awoke in caveman. Caveman mind evolve to glorious man of present day. Voila, indirect evidence of immanent Big Mind.

That's it?

Cheers. Keep warm.

no argument? I suppose you are softening up to the notion of "Big Mind". You'll quit that monist nonsense soon enough.

You did not present an argument, you made up a story. There is nothing to reply to.

You did not present an argument, you made up a story. There is nothing to reply to. — Banno

It was an allegory. Arguments come in many forms, you should open your mind to meaning beyond the obvious.

A mind left too open soon fills with garbage.

A mind left too open soon fills with garbage. — Banno

What else is there to fill it with? The Big Mind ensures that only the recyclable materials are passed into the future, all else is relinquished to the "slaughter bench" of history.

My objection is not to the content but the structure of that argument. The "supernatural" element, even if "immanent", is introduced using a fraught transcendental argument*. It is the transcendental argument that is objectionable. — Banno

I don’t deny that Deleuze’s immanent panpsychism requires a transcendental framework. In fact he calls his approach an immanent transcendentalism. But there is no getting around a transcendental element. There is no brand of realism that does not depend on a transcendental , that is, metaphysical ground. So it isn’t a question of avoiding metaphysics but of how one’s discourse relates to it. Realist empiricisms naively depend on a metaphysical method, whereas Deleuze and other relativists make explicit the preconceptions orienting empiricism.

if "singularities are only what they are in reciprocal interaction with other singularites" then there are other singularities. Each account you give remains dependent on a something "external" to mind.

I maintain that all this theoretical stuff can be removed via the simple expedient of proposing realism. There is a world in which we are embedded, and which includes things we do not know.

Your arguments appear sophistic. Reality is a simpler option.

*and I mean argument of the form:
P; P only if Q; therefore Q.
It's valid, but only true if the second premiss can be demonstrated. — Banno

Q can be an externality in relation to mind only to the extent that it have its own internality, a subsistence , a being into itself that can be clearly separated from what causes or influences it. Realism depends on a determinably fixed distinction between inner and outer, and these tens depend on a notion of time as allowing for absolute self-identical repetition. A thing can persist as itself , and external to another thing, for so many milliseconds, for instance. This notion of how things exist in time rests on a particular kind of metaphysical thinking.

You do not put the VR-generated forebrain fantasy back in the cupboard. — Banno

No fantasy involved. And the cupboard is just the same.

Just two different ways of talking as I see it, neither of which get to the heart of the question as to what the cup is "in itself". — Janus

I noticed you mentioned that the notion of time is generally overlooked. The best solution Ive seen to this is the peripatetic idea of instantiation. There is the possibility of a cup in many things, but a possible a cup only becomes an actual cup when it become necessary for it to be a cup. It is only in these instances of necessity that it is possible to percieve a cup. Outside of the actuality (which relates to perception) it is possibility (independent of knowledge) which keeps the form of the cup alive. Raw existence is wrought with myriad possibilities (independent of mind) capable of interpenetrating all configurations of existence, ultimately becoming actual instances of whatever when they are perceived. I know I just said nothing, but it was fun.

Add: some things are harder to percieve, like justice. Until you see a horse thief hanged. :monkey:

A thing can persist as itself , and external to another thing, for so many milliseconds, for instance. — Joshs

I've dicked around with that notion myself

The VR-generated you puts the VR-generated cup back in the VR-generated cupboard; what's the problem?

:lol: :up:

There is no brand of realism that does not depend on a transcendental , — Joshs

Yes, I agree. Here is an example:

• We agree that the cup is on the table
• The only way we could agree that the cup is on the table is if there is a cup, and there is a table, and the cup is on the table.
• There is a cup, and there is a table, and the cup is on the table.

Compare:

• We agree that the cup is on the table
• The only way we could agree that the cup is on the table is if something like Q can be an externality in relation to mind only to the extent that it have its own internality, a subsistence , a being into itself that can be clearly separated from what causes or influences it. A thing can persist as itself , and external to another thing, for so many milliseconds, for instance. This notion of how things exist in time rests on a particular kind of metaphysical thinking, or something like that.
• hence... you get the point

The VR-generated you puts the VR-generated cup back in the VR-generated cupboard; what's the problem? — Janus

The Matrix will surely allow it

True, but even if it is the brain that generates the VR it still works. Of course our perception of brains would then VRs generated by what we perceive as the brain. Perhaps a bit confusing but not incoherent.