I think there is a sense in which we can say we see the cup and another sense in which we can say that we see a model of the cup. — Janus
These are basically assumptions - but that is the very point at issue! Do constructed artifacts have an intrinstic or inherent nature - or is that imposed on them by their makers, in line with a specific purpose? — Wayfarer
Commonality of experience shows that the gestalts or meaningful wholes do not arise arbitrarily, not merely on account of the individual perceiver, taken in isolation. So the possibilities are that either real existents, including the objects perceived, the environmental conditions and the constitutions of the perceives all work together to determine the forms of perceptions. or else there is a universal or collective mind which determines the perceptions and their commonality. — Janus
Nice work. — Banno
the end point is where the account the antirealists present begins to look so much like realism that it is difficult to see the distinction. Let's see that happens here. — Banno
scientific measurement only takes into account the measurable attributes. — Wayfarer
What am I referring to when I say "pass me the cup" when dreaming? — Michael
Does a painting of a unicorn necessarily imply that there's a unicorn? — Michael
A painting of a unicorn is not a model of a unicorn. The "models" here are weightings in neural networks. — Banno
I don't think you're referring to anything. — Isaac
Yes, I agree. Here is an example:
We agree that the cup is on the table
The only way we could agree that the cup is on the table is if there is a cup, and there is a table, and the cup is on the table.
There is a cup, and there is a table, and the cup is on the table.
Compare:
We agree that the cup is on the table
The only way we could agree that the cup is on the table is if something like Q can be an externality in relation to mind only to the extent that it have its own internality, a subsistence , a being into itself that can be clearly separated from what causes or influences it. A thing can persist as itself , and external to another thing, for so many milliseconds, for instance. This notion of how things exist in time rests on a particular kind of metaphysical thinking, or something like that.
hence... you get the point — Banno
Then you come across Tom Storm's problem of explaining the consistency between us. If there's no intrinsic property which causes us to treat an object a certain way, then why do we so consistently do so? — Isaac
There is no one “correct” way of carving up a scene. What is important for us may be of no interest in the life of a tiger or a fly, so every species has its own scheme for carving up the world according to its interests. In technical language, we say that every animal has its species-specific segmentation of reality, linked to its world-model. We are hard-wired to believe that our scheme for dividing the world into objects is the real one, because such a belief is necessary for existence. Though our segmentation of reality is partly bound to physical facts, much of it is arbitrary. However, there is one aspect of any segmentation which is non-negotiable: It must be self-consistent. What this means is that regardless of how information is received from the environment—whether visually, by sound or by touch—there can be no conflict: All the items of information must support one another. Also, when the organism undertakes actions, its plan of action must be fully aligned with its scheme of segmentation, so no discrepancy is ever encountered. So long as its segmentation is self-consistent, the animal cannot ever become aware of a difference between its world-model and reality.
So there are attributes... — Isaac
One of the most important insights of contemporary brain science is that the visual world is a constructed reality. When we look, what we hold in awareness is not an optical array but a mental construct, built from information in the array, which presents us with all that is of value to us in a scene.
for the second option we're having to invoke a whole load of speculated realms and mechanisms, just to avoid there being intrinsic properties and I can't see why. — Isaac
There is an intuition in philosophy that there is a lack, absence or deficiency in normal perception - the sense that things are not what they seem, or that the reality which most of us take for granted is not the whole story. — Wayfarer
Yes, in a sense. It comes down to what 'real' is. To paint a Unicorn (if we're to take a painting as a kind of model) there has to be a Unicorn for you to paint (model). The question is then what kind of thing that Unicorn is. In this case, it's a figment of our collective imaginations. If you painted it with three horns, you'd have modelled it wrong. — Isaac
I think there is a sense in which we can say we see the cup and another sense in which we can say that we see a model of the cup. — Janus
But for that second sense, I can't see what process you'd be using. Modelling the cup is part of the process of seeing, so to see the model, do you model the model? — Isaac
Now we can say that what has been modeled is the cup, or we can equally, from a different perspective, say that what is being modeled is "something" that results in seeing a cup which is a model of that "something". — Janus
To have a model of a cup necessarily implies there's a cup. — Isaac
We're not dreaming it up, but the sense in which it exists 'outside of' or 'apart from' that constructed reality is unknown to us. We can't 'compare' the proverbial 'cup' with 'the real cup' because the real cup is just an temporary collection of atoms. — Wayfarer
These ways of 'modeling the real world' are inherently misguided because they start with the assumption that what is in the mind represent what is outside the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's indigestible without some secret sauce. — Janus
think that this is certainly questionable. What is a proposition? Is it a sentence, e.g. an utterance? — Michael
So, if it is raining then the phrase "it is raining" is spoken? — Michael
"The term ‘proposition’ has a broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other “propositional attitudes” (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.[1]), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of sentences.". SEP — Tate
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