And what's a truth-bearer? A sentence, e.g. an utterance? — Michael

A proposition.

You're not providing a meaningful account of what a proposition/truth-bearer is. Is it a physical entity? Is it a mental concept? Is it a Platonic Idea? Is it some magical substance that is able to "attach" to concrete utterances?

You're not providing a meaningful account of what a proposition/truth-bearer is. Is it a physical entity? Is it a mental concept? Is it a Platonic Idea? Is it some magical substance that is able to "attach" to concrete utterances? — Michael

It's usually thought of as an abstract object, which just means a proposition is "beyond" any particular person. I can be wrong about the status of a proposition, so it's not just a resident of my noggin. Mathematical entities are also abstract, so you can compare propositions to things like numbers.

Propositions are the things people assert or agree to. If you adopt an ontology that rules them out, you're headed for some type of behaviorism.

Philosophers don't usually feel required to give an ontology to them.

It's usually thought of as an abstract object, which just means a proposition is "beyond" any particular person. I can be wrong about the status of a proposition, so it's not just a resident of my noggin. Mathematical entities are also abstract, so you can compare propositions to things like numbers.

Propositions are the things people assert or agree to. If you adopt an ontology that rules them out, you're headed for some type of behaviorism. — Tate

I'm not ruling out propositions, I'm questioning what it means for a proposition to exist. Do propositions exist when nothing is said? Do propositions exist when nothing is thought? If they do then it strikes me as Platonic realism. Is that what you're arguing for?

I'm not ruling out propositions, I'm questioning what it means for a proposition to exist. Do propositions exist when nothing is said? Do propositions exist when nothing is thought? If they do then it strikes me as Platonic realism. Is that what you're arguing for? — Michael

They exist as abstract objects. The set of all non-penguins exists whether anybody ever refers to it or not. I guess it's part of a logical landscape. They don't exist in time, in other words. They don't age.

I personally wouldn't argue for something Platonic. I would say they're residents of human thought. They're part of the way we interact with our environment.

They exist as abstract objects. The set of all non-penguins exists whether anybody ever refers to it or not. I guess it's part of a logical landscape. They don't exist in time, in other words. They don't age. — Tate

This sounds like Platonic realism.

I personally wouldn't argue for something Platonic. I would say they're residents of human thought. They're part of the way we interact with our environment. — Tate

But then if they're "residents of human thought" then presumably they don't exist when not thought?

They exist as abstract objects. The set of all non-penguins exists whether anybody ever refers to it or not. I guess it's part of a logical landscape. They don't exist in time, in other words. They don't age.
— Tate

This sounds like Platonic realism. — Michael

I guess you could take it that way. You don't have to.

But then if they're "residents of human thought" then presumably they don't exist when not thought? — Michael

Things that only exist when thought are called mental objects. The taste of your breakfast was a mental object. It doesn't exist when you aren't thinking about it.

You and I can't agree on mental objects because yours aren't available to me. This points to what's at stake if you reject propositions as abstract.

It's like so many avenues in philosophy: pick your poison.

Then as a reductio ad absurdum it would appear that my argument proves Platonic realism. — Michael

:scream:

Then as a reductio ad absurdum it would appear that my argument proves Platonic realism (of truth-bearers). — Michael

We could borrow from philosophy of math because it's the same issue. Here is an SEP article about math ontology.

Alternatively, perhaps that it deduces Platonic realism (of truth-bearers) is a reductio ad absurdum to prove anti-realism? — Michael

Platonic realism isn't obviously absurd. It's just not fashionable.

Platonic realism isn't obviously absurd. It's just not fashionable. — Tate

The same could be said of idealism/anti-realism.

The same could be said of idealism/anti-realism. — Michael

True.

It's usually thought of as an abstract object, which just means a proposition is "beyond" any particular person. I can be wrong about the status of a proposition, so it's not just a resident of my noggin. Mathematical entities are also abstract, so you can compare propositions to things like numbers. — Tate

What does it mean for a proposition to exist "beyond" any particular person? Where, in relation to a person, does a proposition exist?
You being wrong is a relationship between your idea of a thing and the real thing. Propositions can be true or false. A wrong (false) proposition can only exist in your head. True propositions only exist in your head as well because the proposition and what the proposition is about are two separate things. Propositions do not exist anywhere except within a mind as a relation between some scribbles and what the scribbles refer to.

I'm not ruling out propositions, I'm questioning what it means for a proposition to exist. Do propositions exist when nothing is said? Do propositions exist when nothing is thought? If they do then it strikes me as Platonic realism. Is that what you're arguing for? — Michael

Propositions are a causal relation just like everything else in the universe. Any particular thing does not exist independent of the causes that led to its existence.

Propositions are a causal relation just like everything else in the universe. Any particular thing does not exist independent of the causes that led to its existence. — Harry Hindu

OK, but do propositions exist when nothing is said? Do propositions exist when nothing is thought? Does the existence of a proposition depend in some sense on us?

OK, but do propositions exist when nothing is said? Do propositions exist when nothing is thought? Does the existence of a proposition depend in some sense on us? — Michael

Did propositions exist prior to humans existing? If the answer is no, then propositions depend on our existence. If the answer is yes, then I'd have to pause and ask exactly what we are proposing when we use the term, "proposition".

Did propositions exist prior to humans existing? If the answer is no, then propositions depend on our existence. — Harry Hindu

Then we run into this issue:

T(x) ≔ x is true (definition)

1. ∀p: T("p") ↔ p (premise)
2. ∀p: T("p") → ∃"p" (from 1, by existential introduction)
3. ∀p: p → ∃"p" (from 1 and 2, by hypothetical syllogism)
4. ∀p: ¬∃"p" → ¬p (from 3, by modus tollens)

Or using a specific example in ordinary language:

1. The proposition "it is raining" is true if and only if it is raining
2. If the proposition "it is raining" is true then the proposition "it is raining" exists
3. If it is raining then the proposition "it is raining" exists
4. If the proposition "it is raining" does not exist then it is not raining

1. is fine.
I take issue with 2 and 4.

2 and 3 seem to be saying the same thing.

As I pointed out to Tate propsitions can be true or false. A true or false propsition is not synonymous with an existing or non-existing proposition. A false proposition is just as real as a true one. The difference is that a true propsition accurately represents something while a false one does not.

Can propsitions exist independently of some string of scribbles or utterances? Is a proposition a string of scribbles or utterances? If so propositions exist everywhere scribbles are drawn and utterances are made.

I take issue with 2 and 4. — Harry Hindu

2 is an application of existential introduction. 4 is modus tollens. They're valid rules of inference.

2 and 3 seem to be saying the same thing. — Harry Hindu

2 is saying that if the proposition "it is raining" is true then the proposition "it is raining" exists.
3 is saying that if it is raining then the proposition "it is raining" exists.

A true or false propsition is not synonymous with an existing or non-existing proposition. A false proposition is just as real as a true one. — Harry Hindu

I'm not saying otherwise. You appear to be denying the antecedent when looking at 2.

2 is an application of existential introduction. 4 is modus tollens. They're valid rules of inference. — Michael

That's nice, but every rule of inference is either uttered or scribbled. Where do these rules of inference exist?

I don't know. Regardless, unless you want to reject the accepted rules of logic, you have to accept that my argument is valid (and as you accepted the premise, that my argument is sound).

I don't know. Regardless, unless you want to reject the accepted rules of logic, you have to accept that my argument is valid (and as you accepted the premise, that my argument is sound). — Michael

If you can't tell me where rules of inference are, then how can you say that they even exist? Are the scribbles you made in your posts the rules of inference, or do the scribbles refer to rules of inference that are not just more scribbles? If the latter then where do the rules of inference exist relative to your scribbles?

I don't understand what you're trying to get at. Either there are rules of inference or there aren't. If there are then my argument is valid. If there aren't then I guess anything goes and we can say anything we like and we abandon all talk of reason or contradiction. I don't even understand how you expect us to engage in argument unless you accept the reality of logic.

Propositions are the things people assert or agree to. If you adopt an ontology that rules them out, you're headed for some type of behaviorism.

Philosophers don't usually feel required to give an ontology to them. — Tate

Except for Heidegger , Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Nietzsche, and a host of other phenomenologists and postmodernist philosophers.

“But because discourse is always talking about beings, although not pri­marily and predominantly in the sense of theoretical statements, our analysis of the temporal constitution of discourse and the explication of the temporal characteristics of language pattems can be tackled only if the problem of the fundamental connection between being and truth has been unfolded in terms of the problematic of temporality. Then the ontological meaning of the "is" can be defined, which a superficial theory of propositions and judgments has distorted into the "copula”.( Heidegger, Being and Time)

Except for Heidegger , Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Nietzsche, and a host of other phenomenologists and postmodernist philosophers. — Joshs

Great. What are their assessments of the ontology of propositions?

Great. What are their assessments of the ontology of propositions? — Tate

For Heidegger. S is P is derived from the ‘as’ structure.
Heidegger's analysis of the derivation of propositional logic from a pragmatic ‘as' structure illustrates the immediately transformative nature of intentional aboutness. Heidegger explains that in taking something to be the case in a propositional judgement (for instance, S is P) , we are taking something as something within a wider context of pragmatic relevance. Making sense of something is an act that always has the ‘as' structure, as Heidegger tells us, but this structure of relevanting is covered over and flattened down in causal models.

“What is to be got at phenomenally with the formal structures of "binding" and "separating," more precisely, with the unity of the two, is the phenomenon of "something as something...In accordance with this structure, something is understood with regard to something else, it is taken together with it, so that this confrontation that understands, interprets, and articulates, at the same time takes apart what has been put together.”

“The most immediate state of affairs is, in fact, that we simply see and take things as they are: board, bench, house, policeman. Yes, of course. However, this taking is always a taking within the context of dealing-with something, and therefore is always a taking-as, but in such a way that the as-character does not become explicit in the act.”

That's easy for you to say. :razz:

↪Joshs That's easy for you to say. :razz: — Tate

Continental philosophy. It may have something to do with the water in Europe.

Continental philosophy. It may have something to do with the water in Europe. — Joshs

It probably doesn't have lead in it. That's our special ingredient. With a sprinkle of asbestos.

As Janus puts it...

Commonality of experience shows that the gestalts or meaningful wholes do not arise arbitrarily, not merely on account of the individual perceiver, taken in isolation. So the possibilities are that either real existents, including the objects perceived, the environmental conditions and the constitutions of the perceives all work together to determine the forms of perceptions. or else there is a universal or collective mind which determines the perceptions and their commonality.
— Janus

I accept that all of this is possible, I'm not trying to deny it, but for the second option we're having to invoke a whole load of speculated realms and mechanisms, just to avoid there being intrinsic properties and I can't see why. — Isaac

Or we could argue that discursive practices that neither originate entirely within the individual nor the community, but in a complex dance between them, establish and contest rules and techniques of reciprocal interaction with a world that we end up talking about as the experience of ‘real intrinsic objects’.
By substituting for the concept of intrinsic content the notion of reciprocal interaction we keep what intrinsic realness gives us , but gain much more.

But this requires a shift in our conceptualizations of empiricism from backward-looking notions like knowledge and epistemology to forward-looking terms like practice, production, contextual use and niche construction. I think this is the direction philosophy of science is headed( See the work of Joseph Rouse).

Continental philosophy. It may have something to do with the water in Europe.
— Joshs

It probably doesn't have lead in it. That's our special ingredient. With a sprinkle of asbestos. — Tate

And a smidgeon of Viagra to elevate the level of philosophical intercourse.

what a proposition/truth-bearer is. Is it a physical entity? Is it a mental concept? Is it a Platonic Idea? Is it some magical substance that is able to "attach" to concrete utterances? — Michael

The latter, but not magic... more like money.

Logic is licence to print (utter) valid tokens.

And to invalidate/falsify/exclude/delete/negate their negations.