Not the subject of the thread but as far as I'm concerned having a de facto dictatorship and a fascist state masquerading as a democracy join forces seems like an eminently bad idea for everybody with a pulse.

Okay but do you think the US should 'pivot to China', like @Tzeentch is saying?

That's already established policy in the US (the pivot to Asia). The only thing I can hope for is both China and the US screw each other to the extent the EU benefits but that requires the EU to stop being a US lap dog.

That's already established policy in the US (the pivot to Asia). — Benkei

This wrong footed policy has been contradicted by facts. $40 bl for Ukraine ain't no pivot. Also, it wasn't the question I asked (twice). I guess questions and topics don't matter much to you...

You are making a moral argument, that the United States is better than Russia, and therefore should have the privilege to pursue its foreign policies whereas Russia does not. — Tzeentch

Am I not. Where have I said that how the US has dealt with let's say Guatemala, it has been privileged to do that?

I have continuously said that countries treat other countries very differently. So if when it comes to Sweden, the US is Mr. Nice Guy as when it comes to Central America, the US hasn't been similar as it has been to Nordic countries in general. Russia is quite friendly now with China, even if they have had a border war in their history post-WW2 and Chinese views many parts of Russia's Far East as conquered territory from it. That's the realpolitik you are after.

Yet NATO is an European defense organization. As much as Finland earlier hoped that EU would have a military capability of it's own, it's now NATO.

Your preference for the United States is clear. — Tzeentch

My preference for NATO is clear. For example having an alliance with Sweden simply doesn't cut it. Besides, as NATO countries have not participated all US escapades slavishly, it is an organization made of sovereign states, even if the US has a huge role. Just look how much a hassle Turkey did in the last NATO meeting.

But suppose we say it's better to be under the US sphere of influence than it is to be under the Russian sphere of influence. — Tzeentch

And if you really think this is just a moral judgement, I disagree.

If the US uses "Finlandization" for countries to uphold those values the country (USA) was built on, I have no objections to that. We like democracy, the rule of law and things what the US Constitution talks about very much too. We are also a capitalist country. Hence that doesn't threaten us or our way of life. The Soviet Union had an different agenda. If the US becomes a dictatorship and throws away it's constitution and starts spreading it's totalitarianism to it's allies, perhaps then is time for us to resign from NATO (if the US doesn't resign itself from the organization with so annoying members).

In the end it really comes down to if the Great power is a bully, smaller countries will see it as a threat. If the Great Power is smart enough to behave cordially with smaller countries, there's not much fear or hate towards it.

Revenge? — jorndoe

Likely. I think the tactic here is to keep Ukrainians on the edge and remind that there's a war going on and it's everywhere.

You see, if the Russians would concentrate everything on the Donbas and no action were taken anywhere else in Ukraine, Ukrainians would feel it's just like 2014-2022, which they lived quite normally. So in order for the Ukrainians not to start enjoying the summer and going out freely to the cafe and basically just go on with their lives, a "random" missile attack every once a while to Kyiv or Odessa puts the fear back to peoples minds.

That's the thinking, but of course it is a flawed idea and just hardens the resolve of the Ukrainians. As usually targeting civilians does.

There's no reason to 'pivot' anywhere. The US is perfectly capable of chewing gum and walk at the same time. — Olivier5

That may have been the case during what is called the "unipolar moment": the time after the Cold War ended where the United States was the most powerful country in the world by a large margin.

This is no longer the case, and the world has moved towards multipolarity: a situation in which there are several world powers who are roughly equal in power.



(Note this particular video is twelve years old. That's how long this transition has already been underway.)


The United States will need to apply a great deal more, if not all, of its power if it wishes to contain China.

A disguised moral argument is still a moral argument, and using 'realpolitik' to justify your moral argument is not actual realism.

You are dealing in justifications and shoulds / should nots.

Your stance seems to boil down to: Ukraine is justified in wanting to join the EU / NATO, because it prefers the EU / NATO and you present an argument as to why that is the case.

Therefore, Russia should not prevent Ukraine from joining the EU / NATO.


Yet here we are. No justifications and 'should nots' have prevented Ukraine from being invaded by Russia.

Moral judgements and idealism don't matter.


If I didn't represent your position correctly then please clarify what it is, because if this isn't it then it's completely unclear to me what is.

A disguised moral argument is still a moral argument, and using 'realpolitik' to justify your moral argument is not actual realism. — Tzeentch

Really?

Opting to be neutral than be part of Warsaw pact and then opting joining NATO after a full out invasion of Ukraine, when the every country that Russia neighbors in the West has either Russian soldiers or is in NATO, doesn't sound to me as a moral judgement, but realpolitik.

Your stance seems to boil down to: Ukraine is justified in wanting to join the EU / NATO, because it prefers the EU / NATO and you present an argument as to why that is the case. — Tzeentch

Either in NATO or with it's own nuclear deterrence, Ukraine would have prevented an all out attack from Russia.

Has worked with the Baltics: no frozen conflict in those countries, no Russian peacekeepers, no moving borders.

With us in NATO, the risk is higher for Russia to do a military intervention or to pressure us militarily.

Either in NATO or with it's own nuclear deterrence, Ukraine would have prevented an all out attack from Russia. — ssu

Nuclear deterrence for Ukraine is a ship that has long since sailed. No point in discussing that.

As for joining NATO as a means to prevent a Russian attack - Russia attacked Ukraine precisely because it tried to join NATO. Since 2008 it was clear to all involved that NATO membership for Ukraine would mean war.

So if your point is, "they should have joined NATO to avoid conflict" - they tried, despite Russia's warnings, and now their country is devastated.

The United States will need to apply a great deal more, if not all, of its power if it wishes to contain China. — Tzeentch

Says who? All this talk about future threats is nice but there is a very immediate threat right now in Russia...

Says who? — Olivier5

Mearsheimer, for one, in the video I linked you.

All this talk about future threats is nice but there is a very immediate threat right now in Russia... — Olivier5

If the United States wanted peace with Russia they could have it tomorrow. If they guarantee Ukraine will remain a neutral state and will not join NATO or the EU this war would be over.

But they can't. Not anymore. After 15 years of targeted foreign policy, plus all the rhetoric they have been using, it would be considered a humilation for the Biden administration and the United States as a whole.

That's exactly what makes this war so tricky.

If the United States wanted peace with Russia they could have it tomorrow. If they guarantee Ukraine will remain a neutral state and will not join NATO or the EU this war would be over. — Tzeentch

Why would they do that?

Why would they do that? — Olivier5

To avoid being dragged into a war they are not willing to pay the price of victory for.

If the United States wanted peace with Russia they could have it tomorrow. If they guarantee Ukraine will remain a neutral state and will not join NATO or the EU this war would be over. — Tzeentch

Don't forget Crimea and the Donbas, those people's Republics Russia vowed to defend when it started this war (and perhaps all Novorossiya?) :roll:



Perhaps after that the neutral Ukraine (what's left of it) would be OK for Russia.

You're looking at this from the wrong perspective.

After 2008, when it became clear the United States would not back down from incorporating Ukraine into NATO, and especially after the Maidan protests in 2013, Russia has sought to protect its strategic interests in Ukraine by force.

Previously, Russian strategic interests were protected by treaties between Ukraine and Russia. With regime change looming in Ukraine, and the United States expressly stating it wished to incorporate Ukraine into NATO, those treaties could no longer be relied on.

Right now it's clear Russia is going to take every strategically relevant region from Ukraine by force, and that map is likely a pretty accurate depiction of the territories they're after - predictably all linked to (access to) the Black Sea; Russia's primary strategic interest in Ukraine.

It's not rocket science. In fact, it's pretty obvious. The reason no one talks about the elephant in the room is because that elephant (the United States) controls the narrative in the west.

You're looking at this from the wrong perspective. — Tzeentch

No.

I've said all along that NATO enlargement has been one reason.

But just why is it so utterly difficult for you to admit that Russia has all along had territorial objectives for it's war in Ukraine (starting with Crimea)?

It's not a wrong perspective, it's a genuine reason for the war also.

But just why is it so utterly difficult for you to admit that Russia has all along had territorial objectives for it's war in Ukraine (starting with Crimea)? — ssu

What are you talking about? I outright stated it:

Right now it's clear Russia is going to take every strategically relevant region from Ukraine by force, ... — Tzeentch

If you want to argue that Russia has had these territorial ambitions before 2008 then you'll have to provide some proof.

Taking care of the Russian threat for a generation is well worth the price.

If you want to argue that Russia has had these territorial ambitions before 2008 then you'll have to provide some proof. — Tzeentch

Well, I have referred to post-Soviet era history, now many times. But of course, as this is a very active thread it might not get noticed. But basically the row especially about Crimea started basically immediately as the Soviet Union collapse. There's a lot of proof

(May 22nd 1992, LA Times) Running the risk of provoking Ukraine to new heights of fury, Russia’s Parliament on Thursday ruled invalid the 1954 transfer of the balmy Crimean Peninsula to Ukraine.

In a move sure to bring relations between the two superpowers of the Commonwealth of Independent States even closer to the boiling point, the Russian Parliament declared that Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev’s “gift” of the Crimea to Ukraine 38 years ago “lacked legal force.” It called for negotiations on the future of the choice hunk of land.

(see Giving Crimea to Ukraine Was Illegal, Russians Rule : Commonwealth: Parliament’s vote brings tensions between the two powers close to the boiling point.)

(May 25th 1992, Macleans) Russian Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi was on a visit to Sevastopol, where he put the matter more bluntly. “Common sense,” declared Rutskoi, “says that Crimea should be a part of Russia.”

(see A CRIMEAN CRISIS THE BLACK SEA PENINSULA IS THE LATEST FLASH POINT IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION)

And way more history would show this case... but I guess that should do it. It's not just Putin who came up with the idea that Crimea (and Novorossiya) are basically part of Russia. Some would put it into the "Make Russia great again!" agenda.

Russia attacked Ukraine precisely because it tried to join NATO. — Tzeentch

The Kremlin line. Others apparently bought it wholesale. Portrayed like this by some:



It's worth keeping in mind that Ukrainian NATO membership would primarily mean limiting Russia's ability to move/act freely. And anti-missile systems in Ukraine would mean a decreased nuclear threat from Russia — defensive again, a constraint on the feasibility of Putinian ambitions.

Sure, Ukrainian NATO membership might have been seen as a threat to/by Russia, or some Russians. (Odd how Ukraine, Sweden, and Finland didn't/don't consider NATO a threat, though?)

When Putin and compadres started rattling the nukes, NATO responded by dropping Ukraine's NATO membership application, and, after a bit of whining, Zelenskyy conceded the membership. On public record. The NATO excuse stopped being much of a reason a while back. Dropping it hasn't changed much on the attackers' part — they've kept the blasted bombing up, and that affects the Ukrainians on the ground.

Sweden and Finland seeking membership as protective measures (like Ukraine) have been met with a casual, yet vaguely ominous, response from Putin.

NATO as an excuse, a pretext, carries more weight than NATO as a viable reason. But I'm re-repeating, much like others.

The Ukrainian side can stop everything before the end of the current day, we need an order for nationalist units to lay down their arms, an order for the Ukrainian military to lay down their arms, and we need to fulfill the conditions of the Russian Federation. Everything can end before the end of the day. The rest is the thoughts of the head of the Ukrainian state. — Peskov (Jun 28, 2022)

It is ridiculous to think that if Zelensky gives such an order, the people will lay down their arms. People are fighting not for Zelensky, not for the president. Like some. — Evgeny Vladimirovich

And the president said that we do not need Ukrainian territories. — Victor B

I appreciate that you're bringing some sources to the table, but this hardly constitutes proof of territorial ambitions.

If you read the articles you'll see that it's exactly the same concerns that lead to tensions then as today - Russian access to the Black Sea.

And lowe and behold, after 2008 and 2013 can't we objectively state the Russians were right to view Ukraine as an unreliable partner when it came to such a crucial strategic matter as access to the Black Sea?

This doesn't support your view of Russian imperialism. In fact, drawing lines all the way back to 1992 (I didn't know they existed, to be fair, so thanks for that) pulls the rug under all of this "Madman Putin" rhetoric. Apparently this issue has existed for three decades already and, sadly, it has now reached its boiling point.

It's worth keeping in mind that Ukrainian NATO membership would primarily mean limiting Russia's ability to move/act freely. — jorndoe

It would limit Russia's influence in the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and the Middle-East significantly. That's the importance of Crimea and Sevastopol, Odessa and land bridges to these areas.

That's what's at stake here.

Maybe it's your opinion that it's not worth fighting a war over, but the Russians disagree and so they have made clear since 2008.

Sweden and Finland seeking membership as protective measures (like Ukraine) have been met with a casual, yet vaguely ominous, response from Putin. — jorndoe

Because Sweden and Finland aren't all that relevant to Russia strategically.

When Putin and compadres started rattling the nukes, NATO responded by dropping Ukraine's NATO membership application, and, after a bit of whining, Zelenskyy conceded the membership. — jorndoe

You call it a pretext, but after the 2008 NATO summit and 2013 Maidan protests, 2017 legislation being passed expressly stating that it is Ukraine's objective to become part of NATO, and continued attempts at incorporation into the European Union, isn't it more than obvious that the Russians take such words with a grain of salt?

I've already argued that all of this context matters, and that NATO / EU's role in this cannot be ignored. And you don't have to take my word for it, since this comes from independent experts like Mearsheimer and Chomsky.

I'd love to hear an expert make a serious case for why the invasion of Ukraine is an act of unprovoked Russian agression / imperialism, and why all this context should be ignored. I've yet to see anything of the sort.

but this hardly constitutes proof of territorial ambitions. — Tzeentch

The vice president of Russia saying in the 1990's that Crimea is part of Russia?

The Duma deciding that the joining of Crimea to Ukraine in the 1950's was an illegal act?

If those aren't proofs of territorial ambitions on the highest level, I don't know what is.

I just have to simply disagree with you on this one.

If you read the articles you'll see that it's exactly the same concerns that lead to tensions then as today - Russian access to the Black Sea. — Tzeentch

Access which Russia actually has even without Crimea. (Remember where Sochi and overall Krasnodar Krai are).



Hence your argument would make more sense if it would be to have control about the Sebastapol naval base. Which btw was leased until 2042, so good time to build perhaps a new base on Krasnodar Krai.

(21st Apr 2010, the Guardia) Ukraine's president, Viktor Yanukovych, today agreed to extend the lease on Russia's naval base in the Crimea, in the most explicit sign yet of his new administration's tilt towards Moscow.

Yanukovych said the lease on Russia's Black Sea fleet that was due to expire in 2017 will be prolonged for 25 years, until 2042 at least.

The vice president of Russia saying in the 1990's that Crimea is part of Russia?

The Duma deciding that the joining of Crimea to Ukraine in the 1950's was an illegal act?

If those aren't proofs of territorial ambitions on the highest level, I don't know what is. — ssu

When you say "territorial ambitions" I take it to mean as much as territorial ambitions brought about by imperialism or some such.

I don't think you've shown any proof of that. Nor have you made any attempt at linking what was said in 1992 to what is happening today. To me it shows that the same concerns that prompted Russia's invasion of Ukraine today were what created tensions back then.

Access which Russia actually has even without Crimea. — ssu

Hence your argument would make more sense if it would be to have control about the Sebastapol naval base. — ssu

Sevastopol is Russia's access to the Black Sea, and the source of its influence in the region.

It's no surprise that over the course of history many nations have attempted to hold the Crimean peninsula.

The question why the Russians don't simply carve a new Sevastopol out of the mountainside in Krasnodar Krai is simple; not only would it cost a lot of time and money, it's also a strategically inferior position. It's located on the edge of the Black Sea instead of in the middle, and it's seperated from Russia by a mountain range which makes it vulnerable.

(21st Apr 2010, the Guardia) Ukraine's president, Viktor Yanukovych, today agreed to extend the lease on Russia's naval base in the Crimea, in the most explicit sign yet of his new administration's tilt towards Moscow.

Indeed. Yanukovych signed that deal. Yanokovych was then removed from office during the Maidan Revolution. Isn't the significance of that event already made clear by the fact that Russia's invasion of Crimea was launched in response to it?

I can't spell it out more clearly than I already have. You're basically spelling it out yourself at this point. It's up to you to connect the dots.

When you say "territorial ambitions" I take it to mean as much as territorial ambitions brought about by imperialism or some such. — Tzeentch

It seems you have very confusing ideas about just what contributes territorial ambitions and what don't.

You've got it backwards.

Your position hinges almost entirely on the idea that the Russians act out of territorial greed (the "madman Putin" argument), and not on the protection of key strategic interests. Obviously the protection of Sevastopol and the Russian power projection in the Black Sea and the Middle-East cannot be classed under "territorial ambition".

Also, why don't you respond to the contents of my post?

Your position hinges almost entirely on the idea that the Russians act out of territorial greed (the "madman Putin" argument), and not on the protection of key strategic interests. — Tzeentch

Be it "protection of key strategic interests", "joining Crimea back to after an illegal act by the Soviet leadership" or whatever else, territory has been annexed and a full scale war is ongoing.

If you annex part of countries, I think that quite clearly shows you have (or had) territorial ambitions. That the Russians are even changing school curriculum at the occupied territorial doesn't seem like the annexations will stop (or the creation on new buffer states will end here).

Do you believe Russian actions in Crimea and Ukraine were acts of "unprovoked agression"?

You seem to believe that everything I've offered in terms of context are just pretenses that the Kremlin has used to disguise banal territorial greed.

I think such a stance is foolish, and even the sources or "proof" you have presented so far explicitly state they are part of this wider context which you seem to dismiss in favor of your view this was a 30 year old Russian scheme to expand their borders.

all of this context matters, and that NATO / EU's role in this cannot be ignored — Tzeentch

It matters (and, sure, there is a measure of blame to be tossed around), just not as much as Putin's ambitions and his imperialist compadres. Hasn't this been re-repeated often enough in the thread?

limit Russia's influence in the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and the Middle-East — Tzeentch

So, a land grab it is?

^{(From memory, Putin and compadres haven't complained much about Ukraine/EU relations, at least not as an excuse for invading/bombing Ukraine. By the way, the opinions/analyses of Mearsheimer matter as well, giving more angles; that being said, they're not the be-all-end-all of the situation.)}