You mean that in order to choose we must first be able to choose to choose? And then choose to choose to choose, and so on. This sounds like nonsense, because in order to choose to choose and choose to choose to choose and so on, we must first be able to choose, no? It seems you have it backwards, and that is confusing you.

We just choose that's all; free will consists just in that capacity to choose; which, if you look at your life, you will see you do routinely.

Every time we make a choice there is a decision making process — Purple Pond

Not necessarily. Choices can be spontaneous.

There are only two solutions: an infinite regress of decision making processes, or it terminates to factors beyond our control. Since there cannot be an infinite amount of decision making process, our decisions are fundamentally beyond our control. — Purple Pond

Yes, at some level the choice will terminate in factors beyond our control. But in normal cases, those factors will not change our appraisal that a choice was made. Making a choice does not require breaking the laws of physics.

This is odd because I agree with the logic of your argument, just not in the conclusion that free will does not exist. Yes we have free will, no we are not free to choose to have free will or not. Much like a free man is free to do a lot of things but not free to tie his own hands. It follows that our free will is limited, not that it does not exist.

But all believers of free will are aware of this: No one is free to come into existence, no one is free from the laws of logic, or even the laws of physics, and no one with free will is free from free will.

If we do have a choice to control our decision making process then there is another decision making process faced with the same dilemma. — Purple Pond

I do not see the need for another decision making process, and the infinite regress you refer to. Yes, we often do refer to further decisions, but this is not necessary. Why can't we just randomly pick yes or no without referring to any further choice if we want?

It's a bit moot, at the very least, because I don't think we can tell with 100% validity that we have, or don't have, free will. For instance, if we are very very hungry, we probably don't have much free will in how we react to the offer of food (we'll eat just about anything offered). If we are not terribly hungry, we can be quite choosy about we will eat next.

First of all, you're right, we don't have true free will. Our minds are thinking machines which are governed by physical processes. Technically we cannot be absolutely sure this is the case (the no true free will bit), but the evidence for it is overwhelming (I.E: brain damage alters decision making/personality). It's an infinite regress that goes back to the big bang.

Quantum mechanics tells us that when it comes to the (far as we can tell) most fundamental particles that exist (i.e: an electron), they behave in a probabilistic fashion which may or may not be a truly random factor which can interfere with the linear progression of the causal universe. However, even if this is the case, at best we can only hope for random behavior in our most fundamental parts trickling upward through the mechanics of the brain to provide variation in conscious behavior and human will. This isn't free will as we normally envision it, but rather a will informed by randomness. Such a random will might be undetermined by Newtonian physics, but it IS determined by quantum mechanics. So yes, it's quite accurate to view our actions as a collection of prior causes.

What this means is that criminals aren't themselves the original cause of their crimes, and therefore should not be held inherently guilty. Likewise the virtuous aren't themselves inherently the cause of their own virtue. This doesn't change the fact that we still need to take action against criminals if we want to live in a criminal free society, and that we still need to go through the process of studying how to be virtuous if we want to live in a virtuous society.

One reaction I often see to this brand of determinism is something like: "Well if everything is predetermined then why don't I just sit here on my couch instead of going to the ball game?". The answer is that the results of the ballgame are totally unpredictable by anyone, so it's exciting to go and find out. Sitting on your couch forever might be what's determined to happen, but you cannot possibly know that until it happens to you. Maybe it's determined that you will become the person of your dreams, and the only way to find out is to actually try and see. Because it is impossible to predict future choices, it makes no difference from our perspective whether or not those decisions are predetermined. In other words, it's a useless fact. Fate and destiny might exist but we have no advanced access to it.

So we have the complete illusion of free will and mostly need to behave as if we have it if we want to get the things we're predetermined to want, but this understanding is only really useful as motivation to look under the surface when trying to understand human behavior rather than chalking everything up to simply broad internal characteristics.

Such a random will might be undetermined by Newtonian physics, but it IS determined by quantum mechanics. — VagabondSpectre

Explaining free will in terms of Quantum Mechanics is a category error, because Psychology doesn't reduce to Physics.

Choices can be spontaneous. — Andrew M

Much human mental activity can be described as automatic, inattentive, unintentional, involuntary, uncontrollable (e.g., procedural memory recall, priming effects, intuition, automaticity, schema activation, the application of heuristics, operation of conscience, affect display, etc.). These are semi-conscious activities which are not free or choices.

For example, I can choose when to start or stop walking, but walking itself is automatic. I don't have to make a conscious decision to lift my right foot, I don't have to make a conscious decision to swing it forward in the air, I don't have to make a conscious decision to drop it onto the ground, then repeat the process for my left foot.

Every time we make a choice there is a decision making process. — Purple Pond

I agree. Decision-Making: learned strategies which control mental processes resulting in the choice of a proposition, course of action and/or consequence.

The amount of time available for decision-making varies along a continuum between immediate and delayed depending on the exigencies of a situation. Immediate decision-making requires semi-conscious, automatic processing. Delayed decision-making permits conscious, controlled processing.

To what extent is a choice free if it is the outcome of automatic processing?

Explaining free will in terms of Quantum Mechanics is a category error, because Psychology doesn't reduce to Physics. — Galuchat

Doesn't it?

What do you suppose it reduces to?

Metaphysics?

*stares off into empty space*

P.S, I wasn't explaining free will in terms of QM, i was refuting it in terms of QM.

It is thought by some that Psychology reduces to Biology, in which case, the use of physiological terms would be appropriate to describe free will.

However, the higher level explanations provided by Psychology contribute new qualities (emergent properties) to mental phenomena, and are undetermined by, hence; independent of, the lower levels.

Emergent properties are in fact determined by lower levels. The lower level complexity is why we consider it emergent.

The separation has to do with the lower level complexity through which higher level phenomenon are created.

Emergent properties are in fact determined by lower levels. The lower level complexity is why we consider it emergent. — VagabondSpectre

Then please explain foreign language acquisition or culture shock in terms of quantum-mechanical interactions between elementary particles.

I wasn't giving an entire quantum theory of mind, I was explaining how appealing to quantum mechanics to justify claims of free will are inherently flawed: it's because randomness does not equate with freedom.

I was explaining how appealing to quantum mechanics to justify claims of free will are inherently flawed: it's because randomness does not equate with freedom. — VagabondSpectre

I agree that randomness does not equate with freedom. Psychologically, it may equate with creativity, or insanity.

Much human mental activity can be described as automatic, inattentive, unintentional, involuntary, uncontrollable (e.g., procedural memory recall, priming effects, intuition, automaticity, schema activation, the application of heuristics, operation of conscience, affect display, etc.). These are semi-conscious activities which are not free or choices.

For example, I can choose when to start or stop walking, but walking itself is automatic. I don't have to make a conscious decision to lift my right foot, I don't have to make a conscious decision to swing it forward in the air, I don't have to make a conscious decision to drop it onto the ground, then repeat the process for my left foot. — Galuchat

That's true. But I'm thinking of occasions where we might spontaneously answer a question or select from some range of options. For example, my normal preference is tea over coffee. If asked, I would normally respond "Tea, thanks" without consciously thinking about it. Yet I would still consider that I had chosen tea.

If asked, I would normally respond "Tea, thanks" without consciously thinking about it. Yet I would still consider that I had chosen tea. — Andrew M

I would consider that to be an example of automaticity ( a semi-conscious response pattern resulting from habituation).

What's wrong with an infinite regression of decision making processes? If the past is eternal, then such a regression becomes possible.

As usual with these philosophical questions, it comes down to the definition of "free will".

If free will is simply the ability to make decisions, then that gives computers free will.

If free will is related to the amount of choices one has at the moment of decision then free will comes in degrees as it is related to the amount of choices, which could be just one, or several. This still allows computers to have free will as they can have long bits of IF-THEN-ELSE (after all, IF-THEN-ELSE is what making a decision entails) statements with several options depending upon the current situation.

As usual with these philosophical questions, it comes down to the definition of "free will". — Harry Hindu

Agreed.

If free will is simply the ability to make decisions, then that gives computers free will. — Harry Hindu

Only by a purely physical definition of decision-making.

If free will is related to the amount of choices one has at the moment of decision then free will comes in degrees as it is related to the amount of choices, which could be just one, or several. — Harry Hindu

Agreed.

I could limit human choices to three types, and further limit choices according to genetically predisposed preference. To wit, generally:

1) Human choice is ultimately limited to satisfying corporeal desires (being mindful of mortality), social desires (being mindful of a transcendent public good, and obligations imposed by social norms, laws, etc.), or ethical desires (being mindful of moral obligations imposed by conscience, intersubjective morality, etc.).

2) Human preference with regard to satisfier choice:
a) First Choice: personal satisfiers.
b) Second Choice: social satisfiers.
c) Third Choice: ethical satisfiers.

But is this the sense (i.e., limited v. unlimited choice) in which free will has been debated in past ethical discourse? Probably not. It's probably been more concerned with issues such as agency/autonomy/self-determination.

Inasmuch as human mental processing is a combination of controlled and automatic functions, free choice is an illusion, however; personal responsibility obtains in the absence of compulsion.

So, the human will is never free from human nature, but often free from compulsion, and it's the latter condition that determines personal responsibility.