"Idealism" (like materialism, etc) is neither a formal theorem nor a factual truth-claim so the question is incoherent.Is it possible to disprove idealism? — Agent Smith
"Idealism" isn't a formal theorem or factual truth-claim so the question is incoherent. — 180 Proof
No. It's a speculative supposition (or avowal), not propositional statement / thesis.It is a claim, oui? — Agent Smith
This is the basis of all evolved cognitive systems including h. Sapiens. You could say that our cognitive systems designate what ‘things’ are. — Wayfarer
No. It's a speculative supposition (or avowal), not propositional statement / thesis — 180 Proof
It's an intriguing idea. Do you believe that ideas like 'goodness' and 'beauty' are part of our cognitive heritage and how would this differ to them being instantiations of Platonic forms? — Tom Storm
Hoffman is coming from this from a materialist scientific frame of mind instead of with philosophy. — Gregory
My "proof" is that there is no truth-maker for "idealism" (e.g. reality is mind-dependent).Prove to me that idealism is nonpropositional. — Agent Smith
But it is interesting how both support the model of the mind as a constructive process that creates, generates or builds our world-picture, which seems to me to irrevocably disrupt the view of naive realism. — Wayfarer
In the wiki reference, there’s a citation, #9. — Mww
How would you separate the aspects of human thought which are innate and eternal, as platonic realism dictates, from the aspects which are constructed by the human mind, and are "evolving"? — Metaphysician Undercover
Neoplatonic mathematics is governed by a fundamental distiction which is indeed inherent in Greek science in general, but is here most strongly formulated. According to this distinction, one branch of mathematics participates in the contemplation of that which is in no way subject to change, or to becoming and passing away. This branch contemplates that which is always such as it is and which alone is capable of being known: for that which is known in the act of knowing, being a communicable and teachable possession, must be something that is once and for all fixed. — Jacob Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra
you also allow features which are constructions of the mind when you want to discredit naive realism. — Metaphysician Undercover
From this perspective, would we as human beings, have a vantage point, toward understanding the nature of true, pure, separate, independent, and immaterial Forms? If this form of dualism which you seem to be proposing places the innate, eternal Ideas, of platonic realism, as the subject matter, being the material content of the intelligible object, how can we turn this around to give true separate, existence to the independent Forms, as immaterial? — Metaphysician Undercover
And the idea of eternal, unchanging intelligible objects, as platonic forms, must be dismissed as incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover
Plainly an idealist philosophy in my reckoning. — Wayfarer
As food for thought. Bernardo Kastrup writes:
...as I’ve elaborated upon more extensively in a Scientific American essay, our sensory apparatus has evolved to present our environment to us not as it is in itself, but instead in a coded and truncated form as a ‘dashboard of dials.’ The physical world is the dials.
Once this is clarified, analytic idealism is entirely consistent with the observations of neuroscience: brain function is part of what our conscious inner life looks like when observed from across a dissociative boundary. Therefore, there must be tight correlations between patterns of brain activity and conscious inner life, for the former is simply the extrinsic appearance of the latter; a pixelated appearance. — Tom Storm
Idealism" (like materialism, etc) is neither a formal theorem nor a factual truth-claim so the question is incoherent.
Finally, you do need a definition of real and true if you set out to deny them
Color tests are tricky but in the real lived world apart from electronics someone with good eyesight can tell what a true color is.
A truthmaker is not evidence. It's a state of affairs.
This implies the dubiousness of correspondence theory, and why it's not a popular theory of truth.
A paragraph or two is spared to identify that the author is aware of issues with the correspondence theory, they invoke pragmatism, and then promptly carry on using what is essentially the correspondence definition for the rest of their work.
And I can't totally blame them because for many topics it is the most straightforward definition to use. — Count Timothy von Icarus
plus reinventing Kant's noumena that we can never know. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I've not said or implied anything about "meaning" so referring to "verificationism" is a non sequitur.
"Idealism" (like materialism, etc) is neither a formal theorem nor a factual truth-claim so the question is incoherent.
IME, Count, philosophy consists (mostly) of pre/suppositions (i.e. interpretations, meta-expressions, aporia), not propositions
As in....reinventing them so they can be known? Then they wouldn’t be Kant’s noumena, then, right? So it isn’t so much reinventing as re-defining. Which is fine; happens all the time. Historical precedent and all that.
Most common versions of physicalism would agree that a truthmaker for their claim would be that, long before any experiencing thing had time to develop, stars were doing what physics describes — Count Timothy von Icarus
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.