Ok. Thanks again.

Physicalism is a factual truth-claim. It's the claim that the physical, which is mind independent, is ontologically more primitive than experience; that the physical supervenes on everything that is. Arguably this definition is too broad to be particularly meaningful... — Count Timothy von Icarus

Isn't it the case that many physicalists subscribe to methodological naturalism, not philosophical naturalism? They don't say there is no supernatural - they maintain that all we have access to and can investigate is the apparent natural world. In other words, the physicalist who is a methodological naturalist, doesn't make truth claims about the nature of reality.

A definition (e.g. "idealism" "physicalism" etc) is not a factual truth-claim.

I don't think that's the same thing. Physicalism is an ontology, it's an explicit claim about the nature of reality. Epistemological/methodological considerations stand beside that. If "the physicalist who is a methodological naturalist doesn't make truth claims about the nature of reality," then in what way is their position physicalist?

You can claim the ontological question is meaningless metaphysical mumbo jumbo, or just not worth debating, but then you're not arguing for physicalism anymore. "Epistemological physicalism" or "methodological physicalism," do not make sense as concepts, they're conflating two different things, "how you can gain knowledge of the world," and "how reality is."

At their worst, those titles represent a bait and switch, where arguments are offered up in favor of the methods of science, and then the successes of the methods science are offered up as evidence for physicalism. At their best, the "physicalism," part of the term is just superfluous.

But obviously you can be a physicalists, not want to debate ontology, and advance methodological naturalism. That makes perfect sense to me; you just pass over the questions you don't think you can answer.

So:

"Everything in the world is Brahman and is caused by Brahman."

"Only things that are experienced actually exist. If no one is around to see the Moon it ceases to be."

"Only my mind exists. What appears to be other people, with other minds, do not actually exist."

"The world we experience is a simulation run by advanced AIs who use our body heat to generate power."

None of these are claims? The existence or non-existence of other minds isn't a factual state of affairs that can make solipsism true or false?

Ontologies are definitionally sets of claims. I'm giving the definition because they are defined by the claims they make.

If "the physicalist who is a methodological naturalist doesn't make truth claims about the nature of reality," then in what way is their position physicalist? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, for me it is not a lot different to atheists who claim there is no good reason to believe in god but they do not say there is no god. That would be an unfalsifiable potion. The argument might be, there's no good reason to accept that there is anything to reality other than physicalism.

None of these are claims? — Count Timothy von Icarus

They may be. If they are factual truth-claims, then there are truth-maker facts to which they correspond. Thus, they're expressions of science, not philosophy.

I don't think these are analogous. One about God is saying "there is no evidence for X, so even though X can't be excluded by necessity, it does not make sense to believe that X is true."

The formulation re: physicalism would be: "There are no solid reasons to accept Q, R, S, etc. (other ontologies) so we should accept X."

The problem here is that the same arguments for why Q, R, and S can't be shown to be true all apply for physicalism. We know there is a reality, hence the formulation of ontologies. I don't see how you make the argument that "unless other ontologies can prove they are true, we should go with physicalism." Why is that ontology the default we need positive evidence to move away from?

They may be. If they are factual truth-claims, then there are truth-maker facts to which they correspond. Thus, they're expressions of science, not philosophy.

I totally agree. The truthmaker for solipsism would be that the solipsist's mind is indeed the only mind that exists. The truthmaker for subjective idealism would be the lack of anything existing outside of experience. Other minds existing is a state of affairs. The Milkyway rotating in space even when there is no first-person awareness of it would be a state of affairs. How is the claim that "things do not exist without experience," different from "smoke does not exist without fire," such that one is a claim/proposition and the other is not? I'll allow that one does not seem falsifiable, but that doesn't mean it can or can't correspond to reality.

So, I don't think I understand your objection.

"unless other ontologies can prove they are true, we should go with physicalism." Why is that ontology the default we need positive evidence to move away from? — Count Timothy von Icarus

This may not be premium philosophical reasoning, but I guess you would say that there's no good evidence of anything supernatural or non-physical. The time to believe something is when there is good reason to believe it. The default ontology is physicalism until this is defeated by new information.

@180 Proof how would you tidy this up or piss it off?

And what is the evidence that that supports the position of ontological physicalism in the first place? Does anything make it the default?

What would constitute evidence of something supernatural? If tomorrow someone made a giant breakthrough in M theory that made amazingly accurate predictions about our world and:
- The theory also included "soul particles" that enter our dimension from another dimension and suffuse conscious entities; and
- Experiments based on the theory that aimed to confirm (at least to the standards of top scientific journals) the existence of the soul particles did indeed appear to confirm the existence of the particles, their extra dimensional nature, and the fact that they only enter our world in relation to intelligent entities;

...wouldn't people just claim that "well yes, of course soul particles are physical, look at this evidence for them." Likewise, we have a lot of experiments that have verified that an observation of one thing can instantaneously affect another thing at any distance; this non-locality is now considered physical. We also have a few experiments that seem to suggest that there is no one objective description of events at a fundamental level, that is, which observer you are determines what you observe. If these results do keep piling up, I have little doubt that "the lack of a single objective, public world" will also be considered physical. This is Hemple's Dilemma.

Point there is that asking for evidence of non-physical phenomena doesn't work when the definition of physical expands to include all phenomena we think we have good reason to accept. Historically, this is what has happened. But any other ontology can just as easily do the same thing.

It's really very simple: one should not start with a worldview. One should simply follow reason.
In practice what this means is that worldviews should turn up in the conclusions of arguments, not the premises. The premises should be self evident truths of reason (or apparent ones).

If one sticks to that practice then one will be following reason rather than simply applying one's arbitrary worldview to the world and only accepting as evidence that which is consistent with your worldview. The latter is what most do. And it's just silly. It's not proper philosophy. It's just echo chamber construction. If you start with a worldview then all you'll do is confirm it. Stop it. Follow reason, don't follow whatever worldview appealed to you first.

Now, if one does that - if one follows reason - then idealism is revealed to be true. This is because Berkeley provided an argument for it that seems to demonstrate its truth. He did not just assume it is true and then interpret everything else accordingly. He just reasoned to the conclusion that it was true.

I'm a philosophical naturalist and methodological materialist-physicalist; to my mind, the latter presupposes the former. These are not truths (re: philosophy), they are principles or criteria for determining – approximating – truths (re: science, history, politics, art, love). To confuse a philosophy with truth, as many (dogmatically) do, begs the question of 'how to determine that a philosophy is true' – à la the problem of the criterion. Thus, skepticism of philosophy itself and fallibilism with respect to all other practices. :mask:

The premises should be self evident truths of reason (or apparent ones). — Bartricks

In other words "faith" (Plantinga) :eyes: :rofl:

No, following reason.
Note how you describe your worldview first. Worldview in, same worldview out. Tedious and pointless.
All you are going to do is tell others that idealism isn't your worldview. By why should anyone care about that? That's not evidence of anything.

Sure, but this debate can go on endlessly, right? My experience of living in the world sufficiently demonstrates the existence of physicalism (this may be illusory, but robust evidence isn't really there for alternatives), so I am satisfied that I have to assume humans are physical beings living in a physical world. And even if I were to make the leap of faith towards an idealist ontology, it changes nothing. I still need to earn money and be careful crossing the road, behaving as though physicalism is all there is.

These are not truths (re: philosophy), they are principles or criteria for determining – approximating – truths (re: science, history, politics, art, love). — 180 Proof

Thanks.

There's a practice of following reason to try and find out what's true. There's a word for it. Philosophy. One 'does' philosophy.
If you try and use reason to support the worldview you happen to hold, then you are not doing philosophy. You are just a dogmatist. You are using reason, but not following reason. You think you already know what's true and so you have made yourself, and not reason, the measure of things.

Berkeley did philosophy. He presented an argument that had premises that appear self evident to reason and that entail that the world is made of an external mind's sensations.

To challenge him one would need to do philosophy. That is, one would need to show that one or other of his apparent self evident truths of reason conflict with others that are even more self evident.

One does not challenge him if all one does is point out that the worldview described in his conclusion is not your worldview

Context, kid. Pay attention.

I am satisfied that I have to assume humans are physical beings living in a physical world. And even if I were to make the leap of faith towards an idealist ontology, it changes nothing. I still need to earn money and be careful crossing the road, behaving as though physicalism is all there is. — Tom Storm

:up:

For my sake....what is scientific idealism? Single sentence kinda thing? — Mww

Scientists who don't accept that matter (matter/energy) is the fundamental substance. e.g. Richard Conn Henry The Mental Universe, Bernard D'Espagnat What we call Reality is a State of Mind. But, hey, I was one of the first to enroll in Science and Nonduality and went to the first conference in 2009.

By realism I mean simply the idea that there is something "out there" which has a casual role in perceptions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The distinction I see is between scientific/philosophical materialism/physicalism, and idealism. Idealism is a realist philosophy, but it has a different conception of what constitutes reality, one which seems unreal from the materialist point of view.

What the hell are you on about?

In any context you are only doing philosophy if you're engaging in the practice of using reason to find out what's true.

And in any context you are doing no more than expressing your conviction that your worldview is true if you're just expressing your conviction that your worldview is true.

Try and refute Berkeley without assuming that materialism is true.

Try and refute Berkeley without assuming that materialism is true. — Bartricks

What "self-evident true premises" (A) do you believe Berkeley reasons from and to what sound truth-claims (B) do you believe Berkeley concludes? Specify those and I'll refute them.

Previously refuted :smirk:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/715694

I thought you'd read Berkeley? It seems not.

Here are the apparent self-evident truths of reason that Berkeley appeals to (as you'd know if you'd read him): a) mental states cannot exist absent a mind whose states they are; b) the mental states constitutive of our sensations constitute perceptions of the world insofar as they resemble it; c) mental states can only resemble other mental states. From these it follows that any world our sensations constitute perceptions of would itself be made of sensations and thus would be made of the sensations of a mind.

I say "almost", due to the fact that if realism, idealism and solipsism are understood to refer to grammatical stances, and if one is free to choose one's grammatical stance in accordance with one's circumstances, then the so-called "ontological commitments" that are entailed by these contrary positions can only refer to the state of mind and intentions of their asserters, in which case the public debate between realism and idealism amounts to psychological differences among the public that have no relevance to the empirical sciences at large. — sime

:up: Nor, I would add, to any other aspect of human life. These different systems of ideas are interesting and illuminating just in that they exemplify what is variously imaginable, in my view.

lol. Definitional equality isn't a reflexive relation as definiendum isn't definiens. Otherwise not only is Berkeley refuted, but so is the entire Oxford English Dictionary.



I believe "qualia" to be the closest modern translation of Berkeley's "ideas", as that term serves as an indexical that carries no theoretical meaning, unlike the modern understanding of 'mental states' that is theory laden with inferential semantics.

I am not sure what your point is.

Sensations - visual, textural, auditory and so on - are mental states, yes? That is, to be seeing or feeling is to be in a mental state. (A 'mental state' is just 'a state of mind'; that is, a state that a mind is in)

That's all he needs. Put what label on them one wants, the fact remains that mental states do seem to require a mind to have them (the idea of a mental state that is not the state of any mind seems a 'manifest contradiction' to use his expression).

And when it comes to how those mental states can constitute perceptions of a sensible world, they would need to resemble it.

For example, one cannot see a smell. A smell in no way resembles a sight, and thus it is not by seeing that one can perceive smells. And if I read a book about Napoleon, then although I become aware of Napoleon via the content of the book, we could not say that I am perceiving Napoleon by means of the book. For the book does not sufficiently resemble Napoleon. (This is not to say that resemblance is sufficient for perception, just that it is necessary).

Similarly, if the external world in no way resembles any sensation we are undergoing, then we are not perceiving it. On the assumption that at least sometimes we are perceiving a world by means of our sensations, the world we are perceiving must itself resemble those sensations and thus must itself be made of sensations.

I still need to earn money and be careful crossing the road, behaving as though physicalism is all there is.

Sure, but this seems like the opposite of your atheist argument. If the existence of God / the physical nature of reality don't have any practical import, and if no evidence supports their being true over their not being true, wouldn't it make more sense to be agnostic?

Anyhow, to come fill circle, I think the rationale for this sort of speculation, aside from being idle navel gazing, is that assumptions tied to our ontology bleed into our methodology and science whether we like it or not. This is probably even more true in we don't critically examine our ontology, but instead pick it up by osmosis, as a default.

As an example, absolute time was an assumption of materialism in the Newtonian era. It appeared to be a fact verified by a great deal of data and experimentation. Einstein's great insight re: relativity was to identify this fact as arbitrary, simply grounded beliefs about the nature of reality.

Ideas about "how reality is," work their way into science all the time. After the paper on special relativity Einstein rewrote his equations to include a constant that would keep a static-sized universe from having all its mass collapse back in on itself. This ontologically motivated addition has stayed ever since, even after the idea that the universe was expanding became mainstream, and now it has a second life in conceptions of the "metric field," and the weight of empty space.

Similarly, biologists found themselves in a bind due to the elimination of formal and final causes from consideration on the grounds that "all that exists is the elementary units of physics and the rules of their interactions." This reduced formal and final causes to useful mental shortcuts at best. Increasingly there is pushback on this. The prohibition of these being "real causes," stems from ontological commitments.

Anyhow, to come fill circle, I think the rationale for this sort of speculation, aside from being idle navel gazing, is that assumptions tied to our ontology bleed into our methodology and science whether we like it or not. This is probably even more true in we don't critically examine our ontology, but instead pick it up by osmosis, as a default. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No question. We all live in a shadow land of presuppositions,

If the existence of God / the physical nature of reality don't have any practical import, and if no evidence supports their being true over their not being true, wouldn't it make more sense to be agnostic? — Count Timothy von Icarus

A common question. The way I generally hear it expressed is this - 'atheism' goes to belief; 'agnosticism' goes to knowledge. I don't believe in god, but I don't know if god exists, or not. Like many others, I am an agnostic atheist. Similarly, I don't believe in Bigfoot, but I don't know if Bigfoot exists or not.

There's an entire essay in this question, but to answer very briefly - I think 'eternal' is oversold for Platonic ideas and the like. It's more that they're non-temporal - that they don't come into or go out of existence - they're not temporally delimited or composed of parts. — Wayfarer

Temporality is often associated with change. If something changes, it is temporal, and if it is temporal, it must be generated and destroyed. These are the ideas which Aristotle grappled with in his physics, spatial change and temporality. So Aristotle would argue that if something is non-temporal, it must be never changing and therefore eternal. This is why "eternal", in the sense of Christian theology, has the meaning of outside of time, non-temporal, never changing, while "eternal" in the materialist or physicalist sense means endless time. You can see how different the two senses of "eternal" are, the theological one requires that time has limits, in order that there can be something outside of time, non-temporal, while the materialist one denies that time is limited.

When we posit the reality of something outside of time, "eternal", we must allow for the means for a relationship between the eternal, that which is outside time, and the temporal existents. Are you familiar with Aquinas' conception of "aeviternal", or "aeviternity"? He uses this conception to describe the medium, "the aevum", which is between the eternal and the temporal, and assigns to it the existence of the angels. I believe it's based in a Platonic proposal, of something which is changed, or changes when coming into being, but then is changeless.

The evolution of h. sapiens is fairly well understood. But I share with Alfred Russel Wallace scepticism that the intellectual, artistic and creative faculties can be understood solely through the lens of evolutionary biology. — Wayfarer

I don't think that the artistic and creative faculties of any living being can be understood through the lens of evolutionary biology.

How does that square with this statement from his interview:

The central lesson of quantum physics is clear: There are no public objects sitting out there in some preexisting space. As the physicist John Wheeler put it, “Useful as it is under ordinary circumstances to say that the world exists ‘out there’ independent of us, that view can no longer be upheld.” — Wayfarer

If you listen to the interview with Hoffman on Sam Harris' site that @Mww referred to from about 40 minutes in as suggested (note 9, on the Wiki page you linked) you will find that he agrees with one of the others that whatever gives rise to our world of everyday experience must be somehow "isomorphic" with that experience, which indicates that it is not that we freely or arbitrarily construct reality (although we as part of that "whatever" obviously play a part, in that whatever gives rise to us, to our perceptible bodies and brains as we understand them to be, must also be isomorphic with that perception and understanding).

And as Annaka Harris points out several times in the discussion, this thesis of Hoffman's is not at all controversial in modern science and is quite in keeping with scientific accounts of perception and indirect realism. (It is acknowledged that Hoffmann has arrived at the thesis via a unique route, i.e. via evolutionary theory, though).

So,the salient point is that,while acknowledging that reality might not be "like" (in the naive realist sense) what we experience, what we experienced is nonetheless, in some sense isomorphic with, and determined by, it. So, in that latter sense we have reason to think that reality is "like" what we experience.

So the real world in the naive sense is not "out there independent of us" but whatever gives rise to our everyday world is. And to say this is to espouse a kind of realism.

So, the corollary here would be "I believe in physicalism, but I don't know if physical reality exists?"

This seems different to me because it is a positive claim made in the absence of knowledge as opposed to a negative claim such as: "I don't believe in physicalism, but I don't know if it is true or not."

So, the corollary here would be "I believe in physicalism, but I don't know if physical reality exists?"

This seems different to me because it is a positive claim made in the absence of knowledge as opposed to a negative claim such as: "I don't believe in physicalism, but I don't know if it is true or not." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Would it still count as physicalism if I said I believe in something real that reliably gives rise to our experience of a physical world and is somehow isomorphic with that experience, but that the concept physical would be misplaced if we attempted to apply it beyond the ambit of our experience?