What do you think lies at the heart of the distinction between the logical positivist's approach and Wittgenstein's? — Tom Storm
Of course logical operations are not logical operators, — Janus
How's that? — Banno
Why does "on certainty" receive little to no mention? I found it fascinating? — Merkwurdichliebe
The question this seems to beg is whether there any relation-less predicates, and whether relations are any different than logical operations. Of course logical operations are not logical operators, but the connection there would seem to tie in to the idea that facts are both states of affairs and the true propositions that represent those states of affairs. — Janus
The net result is that, whilst it's all well and good to gesture towards 'action not words', Wittgenstein often becomes a wet blanket to throw over the suggestion of anything whatever that is profound in philosophy. — Wayfarer
What is the difference between Russell's and Wittgenstein's logical atomism? — Banno
At this point one will have a perfect logical language that sets out how things are by setting out the relationships between objects.
Is that a correspondence theory of truth? Yes. — Banno
what W. meant by object and name, among other things. — Sam26
I think he moves from a correspondence to a coherence view in Investigations. — schopenhauer1
"unavailable for learning". — Banno
Sure, objects are simples. But...
↪Sam26
The question here is on of exegesis, not ontology. — Banno
For Wittgenstein, the atoms are relations between objects. — Banno
2 Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten.
What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.
what is the point of 3.1432 — Banno
3.1432 Instead of, ‘The complex sign “aRb” says that a stands to b in the relation R’, we ought to put, ‘That “a” stands to “b” in a certain relation says that aRb.’
3.144 Situations can be described but not given names.
I have never come across a persuasive argument that external relations do ontologically exist in a mind-independent world, — RussellA
From what you wrote, we agree that objects and names are not what folk mean when they talk of the atoms in Wittgenstein's logical atomism. I suggest that, whereas in Russel the atoms are things and predicates, the atoms in Wittgenstein's logical atomism are the relations, aRb. — Banno
4.221 It is obvious that the analysis of propositions must bring us to elementary propositions
which consist of names in immediate combination.
4.26 If all true elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete description of the world. The world is completely described by giving all elementary propositions, and adding which of
them are true and which false. An elementary proposition is simply one that cannot be further analyzed.
Did you get the chance to review Russell's comments in the introduction? What do you take to be the difference between Russel's and Witti's accounts? — Banno
Facts which are not compounded of other facts are what Mr. Wittgenstein calls Sachverhalte, whereas a fact which may consist of two or more facts is a Tatsache: thus, for example “Socrates is wise” is a Sachverhalt, as well as a Tatsache ...
The proposition "the tree is 3m tall" exists in the mind. — RussellA
2 What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.
2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).
2.141 A picture is a fact
2.15 The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.
Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the
possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture.
2.151 Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as
the elements of the picture.
2.18 What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it at all—rightly or falsely—is the logical form, that is, the form of reality.
2.21 A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false.
That causes a lot of confusion. — Tate
If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it, unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside! The honorable thing to do is put a lock on the door which will be noticed only by those who can open it, not by the rest.
— Wittgenstein Culture and Value
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