These are metaethical issues. If you're going to reject my argument by embracing some form of individual or collective subjectivism about morality, you're welcome as then you'd also be committed to concluding that the Nazis did no wrong. — Bartricks
Antinatalism is a normative theory, not a metaethical theory. So if you are forced to stray into metaethics, you've lost. — Bartricks
Moral properties are God given, but that's no premise in my argument. My argument requires only that one recognize that persons are created innocent and that an innocent person deserves no harm (and that it is wrong - other things being equal - to create injustices). Those claims are not reasonably deniable. — Bartricks
So yes, a fabrication of humans, but like any linguistic practice, definitely has its fuzzy boundaries. — Isaac
Yes. That is the most interesting question. It dogs all antinatalist arguments. Why are we reducing harm when there's no one around to benefit from the lack of harm? Harm is something to reduce so that someone can enjoy the lack of it, not something to reduce just because. I was talking in another thread, coincidentally, about the fetishisation of philosophical questions. I think this universal harm-reduction is just such a fetishisation. It's not a feeling anyone actually has, it's a principle it is possible to have and so people, of a certain ilk, will try it on, so to speak, like dressing up in Cowboy costume, just to see how it feels. — Isaac
A person who hasn't done anything doesn't deserve to come to harm.
That's not controversial. You think it is. It ain't. — Bartricks
Since most people do seem to prefer existence despite the harms, it doesn't seem right to solely focus on preventing harms. — DA671
If you think it is as solid as air, tell me which premise is false. — Bartricks
They deserve no harm and they deserve a happy life.
And they won't get that. — Bartricks
They deserve a harm free happy life. That is not what they are going to get. So it's shitty to do that - to create a person who will deserve far, far more than they can be given. — Bartricks
Why are we reducing harm when there's no one around to benefit from the lack of harm? — Isaac
Ahimsa (Sanskrit: अहिंसा, IAST: ahiṃsā, lit. 'nonviolence'[1]) /.../ is an ancient Indian principle of nonviolence which applies to all living beings. It is a key virtue in the Dhārmic religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahimsa
Indeed, you may be right, unfortunately. The fact that very significant impositions are taken for granted as fair and just, possibly shows this mentality. It doesn't thus make the impositions acceptable. It just indicates that it is harder for most to get. Not a problem of soundness but epistemology. A blindspot in ethical reasoning perhaps. — schopenhauer1
The problem is that it's not even an argument, because it's not interested in persuading anyone and doesn't support itself in any way other than "this is a self-evident, undeniable truth" and then making up a story. — Xtrix
The line of your debate:
You: "Don't say x, y, or z -- only tell me which premise is false!"
Interlocutor: "Premise k is false."
"No, premise k is true."
"How?"
"It's self-evidently true."
"I don't see any reason to believe it."
"That's because you're an idiot." — Xtrix
Disagree with P. However, it can certainly be true in some cases, which is what we need to avoid as much as possible. — DA671
The line of your debate:
You: "Don't say x, y, or z -- only tell me which premise is false!"
Interlocutor: "Premise k is false."
"No, premise k is true."
"How?"
"It's self-evidently true."
"I don't see any reason to believe it."
"That's because you're an idiot." — Xtrix
It is self-evident to virtually everyone that if a person has done nothing, then they do not deserve to come to any harm. — Bartricks
That's not remotely controversial. — Bartricks
Which premise do you think is false then, eh? — Bartricks
Your reason tells you that if someone has done nothing they deserve to come to harm???? — Bartricks
A thought experiment for you: imagine Tony has lived a perfectly decent life of his own free will. So, he doesn't deserve to suffer, yes? And now he's on fire. Presumably your view is that his suffering really is undeserved. — Bartricks
The more I think about it, the more this entire thread looks like a giant expression of resentment towards one’s parents because life didn’t turn out how one wanted it. — Xtrix
Kill yourself and/or don’t have kids. Stop forcing your therapy onto others. — Xtrix
Yes it is. Certainly the larger argument might be something like, "We are not obligated to create happy people (if that person isn't there to be deprived), but it seems we are obliged to not create unhappy people (who may indeed actually exist)".
However, it's not even that claim I was discussing, but more about the nature of imposing life on another and when it's justified. Pro-natalists think that life can be imposed as long as X criteria of choices is involved and X criteria of harm is involved. In other words, they recognize that there is an "acceptable" amount of harm that someone else will suffer.
For the antinatalist, both of these claims are misguided. By its very nature, presuming for another that "these range of choices are good" is wrong. I call this moralistic misguided thinking "aggressive paternalism". It presumes one knows what is meaningful, best, or good for another, when in fact they may be ignorant themselves (if these are somehow "objectively" true), or simply, wrong (if they are relatively true and that person being affected just doesn't agree).
Also for antinatalists, presuming that it is permissible to allow the conditions for X criteria of harm is also presumptuous for another. Again, it is aggressively paternalistic to assume that X types of harm are acceptable for other people to suffer. These are flawed and misguided notions that someone else should arbitrarily, by their own reckoning, be the arbiter of what is acceptable in the range of choices or the range of harms that others should encounter. The sad thing is, there is no alternative for those who would disagree.. Only suicide and cajoling that, "This life isn't that bad!" and all the cultural pressures of thousands of years of optimism bias.
Also don't forget, there is unforeseeable harm as well as expected harm for the future person that would be born. The parents might have thought that only X amount of harm would take place, but there are other (perhaps more serious) harms that can befall a person that they didn't even expect and is regrettable. I'll call this a "known unknown". We know that there is unforeseeable harms for future people, so even though we don't know the specifics, we can understand a vague idea of it, and we know that it is a frequent occurrence. — schopenhauer1
A lot of the basis for your current argument with DA671 is deontology versus consequentialism (seemingly here of the utilitarian variety). DA671 is only using consequences and population statistics as a criterion for moral behavior. In this view, a little bit of murder justifies a greater outcome to "someone doing the moral calculation it seems?", etc. and relies heavily on the netted population's view on life at any given moment for whether an act is deemed ethically good or bad (so cannibalism is good as long as 58% of the population thinks so.. same with slavery, etc.). — schopenhauer1
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