Are moral truths accessible? — rickyk95

They are if you possess empathy.

They are if you possess empathy. — Galuchat

On what grounds do you justify your assertion that empathy is the means by which we can access moral truths?

You seem to be implying that something is moral if it makes others feel good and something is immoral if it makes others feel bad?

You seem to be implying that something is moral if it makes others feel good and something is immoral if it makes others feel bad? — Michael

You seem to be implying that empathy is something that makes others feel good or bad, without reference to the accessibility of moral truths?

You seem to be implying that empathy is something that makes others feel good or bad, without reference to the accessibility of moral truths? — Galuchat

Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of another. Therefore if empathy is a means to access moral truths then moral truths have something to do with the feelings of others. Correct?

Or are you saying that empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of another and the ability to access moral truths? That would strike me as a very unusual use of the term "empathy". Why use the term "empathy" to refer to two very different abilities? What if I have the ability to understand and share the feelings of another but not the ability to access moral truths?

Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of another. Therefore if empathy is a means to access moral truths then moral truths have something to do with the feelings of others. Correct? — Michael

Empathy is identification with, and the vicarious experience of, the thoughts and/or feelings of another person.

Empathy has affective and cognitive components:
(1) Affective Empathy: the capacity to understand the emotional conditions of others.
(2) Cognitive Empathy: the capacity to understand the cognitive conditions of others.

Rogers K, Dziobek I, Hassenstab J, Wolf OT, Convit A (Apr 2007). "Who Cares? Revisiting Empathy in Asperger Syndrome". J Autism Dev Discord 37 (4): 709–15. doi:10.1007/s10803-006-0197-8. PMID 16906462.
http://www.cog.psy.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/papers/2007/Rogers(2007)_JAutismDevDisord.pdf

Empathy is identification with, and the vicarious experience of, the thoughts and/or feelings of another person.

Empathy has affective and cognitive components:
(1) Affective Empathy: the capacity to understand the emotional conditions of others.
(2) Cognitive Empathy: the capacity to understand the cognitive conditions of others.

Rogers K, Dziobek I, Hassenstab J, Wolf OT, Convit A (Apr 2007). "Who Cares? Revisiting Empathy in Asperger Syndrome". J Autism Dev Discord 37 (4): 709–15. doi:10.1007/s10803-006-0197-8. PMID 16906462.
http://www.cog.psy.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/papers/2007/Rogers(2007)_JAutismDevDisord.pdf — Galuchat

So what does that have to do with moral truths? As I said, you seem to be implying that rightness and wrongness are concerned with the emotional (or cognitive) conditions of others (and my assumption is that you're implying that rightness is concerned with "positive" conditions and wrongness with "negative" conditions).

How do you justify this position?

So what does that have to do with moral truths? — Michael

It has to do with defining empathy, which is important since we appear to have different ideas about what empathy is, unless you now prefer my definition to your own?

As I said, you seem to be implying that rightness and wrongness have something to do with the emotional (or cognitive) conditions of others (and my assumption is that you're implying that rightness is concerned with "positive" conditions and wrongness with "negative" conditions. — Michael

It seems rather that more definitions are required. Rightness and wrongness have nothing to do with defining what is moral and what is immoral (i.e., accessing moral truths).

If it were the case that moral truths existed (I tend to believe they do) — rickyk95

If there were inaccessible moral truths, what would be the mechanism by which one would know there were such truths?

It has to do with defining empathy, which is important since we appear to have different ideas about what empathy is, unless you now prefer my definition to your own? — Galuchat

So what does empathy as you've defined it – identification with, and the vicarious experience of, the thoughts and/or feelings of another person – have to do with moral truths?

It seems rather that more definitions are required. Rightness and wrongness have nothing to do with defining what is moral and what is immoral (i.e., accessing moral truths).

I was using "rightness" and "wrongness" in place of "moral" and "immoral". If you take them to mean different things (grammar notwithstanding) then I'll rephrase my remark: "As I said, you seem to be implying that moral truths have something to do with the emotional (or cognitive) conditions of others (and my assumption is that you're implying that something or someone being moral is concerned with 'positive' conditions and something or someone being immoral is concerned with 'negative' conditions)."

So what does empathy, as you've defined it, have to do with moral truths? — Michael

Empathy is an ethical perception faculty which develops after theory of mind has been attained (between 2-7 years of age per Jean Piaget). It informs the ethical interpretation of social situations (except in the case of mental disorders such as psychopathy), cf. Francis Hutcheson's Moral Sense.

Empathy permits a judgement to be made regarding the experience of others in terms of one's self (i.e., a decision is made regarding experience goodness or badness). This results in the acquisition of ethical knowledge, hence; a person's morality construct develops in parallel with mental maturation, personal experience, and social influences.

Empathy is an ethical perception faculty which develops after theory of mind has been attained (between 2-7 years of age per Jean Piaget). It informs the ethical interpretation of social situations (except in the case of mental disorders such as psychopathy), cf. Francis Hutcheson's Moral Sense.

Empathy permits a judgement to be made regarding the experience of others in terms of one's self (i.e., a decision is made regarding experience goodness or badness). This results in the acquisition of ethical knowledge, hence; a person's morality construct develops in parallel with mental maturation, personal experience, and social influences. — Galuchat

You're just reasserting the claim that being able to identify with and vicariously experience the thoughts and/or feelings of another allows one to access moral truths. But until you explain the relationship between the thoughts and/or feelings of another and moral truths, this claim isn't justified.

But until you explain the relationship between the thoughts and/or feelings of another and moral truths, this claim isn't justified. — Michael

If truth is an accurate description of experience, and I decide my experience of this is good and my experience of that is bad, those are moral truths (albeit subjective ones).

If truth is an accurate description of experience, and I decide my experience of this is good and my experience of that is bad, those are moral truths (albeit subjective ones). — Galuchat

By "good experience" and "bad experience" do you mean "moral experience" and "immoral experience"? If so then I'd question the concept of a moral/immoral experience. What are such things? If not then you're conflating moral goodness with non-moral goodness and moral badness with non-moral badness. Your claim is akin to claiming that because this flower smells bad, it smells immoral.

By "good experience" and "bad experience" do you mean "moral experience" and "immoral experience"? — Michael

Yes.

If so then I'd question the concept of a moral/immoral experience. What are such things? — Michael

A moral experience pertains to the satisfaction of, and an immoral experience pertains to the frustration of, a fundamental human need, as defined by Manfred Max-Neef, et al.

Max-Neef, Manfred A. with Elizalde, Antonio; Hopenhayn, Martin. (1989). Human Scale Development: Conception, Application and Further Reflections. New York: Apex.
http://www.wtf.tw/ref/max-neef.pdf

A moral experience pertains to the satisfaction of, and an immoral experience pertains to the frustration of, a fundamental human need, as defined by Manfred Max-Neef, et al. — Galuchat

So to piece this together, one can have access to moral truths if one can identify with or vicariously experience the thoughts and/or feelings of another and where the content of these thoughts and/or feelings is one of satisfying or frustrating a fundamental human need?

Two things to question here:

1) Is empathy really necessary? Can I not just have my own thoughts and/or feelings regarding the satisfaction or frustration of a fundamental human need, without having to identify with or vicariously experiencing the thoughts and/or feelings of another?

2) How do you justify your assertion that satisfying a fundamental human need is moral and frustrating a fundamental human need is immoral?

If there were inaccessible moral truths, what would be the mechanism by which one would know there were such truths?

How about a transcendental method? Kant does not prove morality (or evil), he accepts that both are real. All you have to do is look around to see examples of both. Kant tried to determine the form of the transcendental principles necessary for there to be a moral law. The transcendental in itself is inaccessible to our understanding, forming a limit on what we can know, but which we can still can think.

How about a transcendental method? Kant does not prove morality (or evil), he accepts that both are real. All you have to do is look around to see examples of both. Kant tried to determine the form of the transcendental principles necessary for there to be a moral law. The transcendental in itself is inaccessible to our understanding, forming a limit on what we can know, but which we can still can think. — Cavacava

I accept morality as real in some way. Kant presumed the existence of a God, even though he claimed secular grounds for the moral. Without gods, the realness of morality is present in ethical / moral practice, immanently, but I don't understand where the knowledge of inaccessible truths would come in.

Are moral truths accessible?

No. Because there are no moral truths.

Empathy is an ethical perception faculty — Galuchat

For one, the definitions you gave didn't imply that we're perceiving ethics.