Connectionist models are just representations, so they are built for a reason other than the reason for which the thing represented was built, as they are built to represent that thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
Again, it pays to consider a wide range of examples. I think your argument here has complications caused by colour being a secondary quality. Try making the same point with a primary quality instead - does it still work?
SO the eggs might be rendered something like:
"Some object is an ovoid if it causes most humans to see an ovoid ..."
Is that something you wish to assert? Because it seems to me to be wrong. — Banno
It is easier to think of a thing no longer being red when the light goes out than to think of it no longer being ovoid. — Banno
No. Rather, I've no clear idea what oviod-as-seen might be as distinct from ovoid. — Banno
So the egg is not ovoid? What could "mistaken" mean here? — Banno
The egg is ovoid, external things (i.e. waves/particles) aren't ovoid — Michael
No. Rather, I've no clear idea what oviod-as-seen might be as distinct from ovoid. — Banno
Ovoid is a property of some hidden state which causes your 'ovoid-as-seen' and 'ovoid-as-felt'.
There. What's not clear about that? — Isaac
You can use the word "pain" to refer to the external cause of pain if you like, but when I talk about pain in everyday conversation I'm talking about the feeling, not any external cause. — Michael
I have no clear idea what "ovoid" might be as distinct from either ovoid-as-seen or ovoid-as-felt. Ovoids are only meaningful as an appearance — Michael
I really do find that argument risible. Was there ever a clearer case of special pleading?The egg is ovoid, external things (i.e. waves/particles) aren't ovoid, and so eggs aren't external things. — Michael
Ovoids are a shape — Banno
Eggs are ovoid, and are in the chicken coop or fridge, not in your mind. — Banno
Enactivism is a position in cognitive science that argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. It claims that the environment of an organism is brought about, or enacted, by the active exercise of that organism's sensorimotor processes. "The key point, then, is that the species brings forth and specifies its own domain of problems ...this domain does not exist "out there" in an environment that acts as a landing pad for organisms that somehow drop or parachute into the world. Instead, living beings and their environments stand in relation to each other through mutual specification or codetermination" (p. 198). "Organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, which they then translate into internal representations. Natural cognitive systems...participate in the generation of meaning ...engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions: they enact a world."
An ovoid egg being in the fridge isn't an external cause of perception. It's something seen or felt. — Michael
DO you really think that the view described as "enactivism"view is a form of idealism? — Banno
we interact with the environment and then colour, shape, eggs, etc. are "enacted" by that interaction. — Michael
In short, given a Markov blanket partition, it is fairly straightforward to show that internal states can be interpreted as encoding Bayesian beliefs about external states that cause its sensory states – and so play a central role in the construction of free energy, which is defined relative to these beliefs
So answer me this: are there true propositions of which we do not know the truth value? — Banno
I think that there are, when we talk about stuff like cups and eggs and planets and so on. — Banno
So what is person B seeing and what is the blue dress? Because it isn't hidden state X. — Michael
But the (naive) realist would be trying to say something more than just this, and I think that their interpretation is wrong. — Michael
...hidden... — Michael
So person B can still 'see' the same hidden state as person A even though they respond differently to it because having a policy toward X is part of the process of 'seeing' X*. — Isaac
seeing differently is seeing different things. — Michael
So person A and person B are not seeing the same thing, therefore one (or both) of them isn't seeing the hidden state X. — Michael
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