I was you until you called the one reality "natural". Why would one use that word? Is it not better to employ a different word and keep the natural/supernatural distinction? It is useful to distinguish between gods and things, even if they are part of the same reality. — Mariner

It would be useful to keep the natural/supernatural distinction were it not for the contradictory nature (pun intended) of this distinction, as I pointed out in my last two or three posts in this thread.
If you want to distinguish between gods and other things, then use the terms, "gods" and "things". We could also make the distinction between the two by using the terms, "imaginary" and "real".

Because if the universe has a beginning, then there must be a first thing. The only logical alternative is no beginning. But finiteness is a simpler hypothesis than infinity, and so, as per Occam's Razor, it becomes the prima facie until proven otherwise.
- Then this first natural thing is caused by another thing which has no cause (the first cause), for nothing can be the cause of itself.
- And everything in the natural universe has a cause, as we have established earlier.
- Therefore this first cause must be supernatural.

I also agree with ↪Mariner
here. Maybe we should find clear definitions of 'natural' and 'supernatural', if it is not already done. — Samuel Lacrampe

If the universe has a beginning, then that would be the first "natural" cause. If the universe was the effect of some cause, then that cause would be "natural" too, as there would be a causal relationship between the cause and the effect. There would be no reason to use the term, "supernatural". This has been my point all along, yet people seem to dense to get it.

f you want to distinguish between gods and other things, then use the terms, "gods" and "things". We could also make the distinction between the two by using the terms, "imaginary" and "real". — Harry Hindu

So, reality would be composed of real and imaginary beings?

Isn't "reality/real" falling prey to the same problem that you identified with "nature"?

I don't see the difference between your formulation and "nature is composed of natural and supernatural beings" -- which, as you properly say, is a strange phrase.

Much better is the traditional "reality is composed of natural and supernatural beings" (leaving to the side, for the moment, whether imaginary/real is a proper dichotomy).

There would be no reason to use the term, "supernatural". This has been my point all along, yet people seem to dense to get it. — Harry Hindu

"Reality can be properly addressed through the use of the word X". You claim that "Nature" is an adequate X. I prefer "Reality", not surprisingly, and I maintain that any X will be less adequate than "Reality", due to the construction of the phrase (i.e., regardless of what you or I think about it).

"Reality and Nature are synonyms" is simply false (nowadays, in 2017), it has been false throughout history, and if it becomes true at any point in the future, a new word (and world) will have to be coined to address what we, nowadays, in 2017, refer to as "Nature".

So, reality would be composed of real and imaginary beings?

Isn't "reality/real" falling prey to the same problem that you identified with "nature"?

I don't see the difference between your formulation and "nature is composed of natural and supernatural beings" -- which, as you properly say, is a strange phrase.

Much better is the traditional "reality is composed of natural and supernatural beings" (leaving to the side, for the moment, whether imaginary/real is a proper dichotomy). — Mariner

Good point. Yes, definitions matter. So let's define "imaginings" and "reality" in a way that makes sense and see if we can maintain the gist of their meaning as most people understand them.

Yes, imaginings are real things and therefore part of reality. In this sense we could say that imaginings are real things themselves, but they don't refer to anything out in the world in the way that our experiences of the world do. This is the key difference of what we mean by something being real, or imaginary.

"Real" things we can all objectively experience at once. Imaginary things we cannot. Imaginary things can only be experienced subjectively. Imaginings are real in the sense that they exist, but because they are inaccessible by other minds, they appear to others as if they don't exist, or we know that they exist but they don't provide any useful information about the world other than someone is imagining something. This is probably the key difference - that imaginings don't provide any useful knowledge about the world, other than the knowledge that someone is imagining something.

In this sense, what is "real" is what is objective and what is imaginary is what is subjective, but both the objective (the world as it is without a perspective) and the subjective (a perspective of the world, within the world) are both part of reality. Actually, I would re-word this to say that imaginings are part of the category of what is real, but isn't the only thing that is real. Reality is composed of everything - imaginings and non-imaginings.

Remember that perspectives aren't everywhere. Not only are there a finite number of perspectives in a seemingly infinite world, but perspectives by their very nature are limited in the amount of information they can possess of the world, so they can only represent a small fraction of the world and not the world as a whole, which would be an objective perspective, or the "real" world, or the world as it is that includes all perspectives and all non-perspectives.

"Reality can be properly addressed through the use of the word X". You claim that "Nature" is an adequate X. I prefer "Reality", not surprisingly, and I maintain that any X will be less adequate than "Reality", due to the construction of the phrase (i.e., regardless of what you or I think about it).

"Reality and Nature are synonyms" is simply false (nowadays, in 2017), it has been false throughout history, and if it becomes true at any point in the future, a new word (and world) will have to be coined to address what we, nowadays, in 2017, refer to as "Nature". — Mariner

I fail to see how "reality" and "nature" aren't synonymous.

na·ture
1. the phenomena of the physical world collectively, including plants, animals, the landscape, and other features and products of the earth

2. the basic or inherent features of something, especially when seen as characteristic of it.

re·al·i·ty
1. the world or the state of things as they actually exist, as opposed to an idealistic or notional idea of them.

2. the state or quality of having existence or substance.

What is the distinction you are seeing that I'm not?

What is the distinction you are seeing that I'm not? — Harry Hindu

To use your words:

In this sense we could say that imaginings are real things themselves, but they don't refer to anything out in the world in the way that our experiences of the world do. — Harry Hindu

I would re-word this to say that imaginings are part of the category of what is real, but isn't the only thing that is real. Reality is composed of everything - imaginings and non-imaginings. — Harry Hindu

Note that the definition of "nature" addresses the "physical world", i.e., it specifically distinguishes the referent of the world from non-physical aspects.

Note also that "non-physical" is not at all synonymous with "supernatural". Numbers, concepts, values, all of them are non-physical, and most people would not call them supernatural.

I didn't take the word, "physical" in the definition that way. It could be that all there is is the physical. I don't necessarily agree with the definitions, as I even edited one of them because it defined nature as things of the earth that are not human or made by humans, yet I have made the case earlier in this thread that humans and their creations are products of the Earth too, and that "artificial" and "natural" is a false dichotomy, just as these other terms we are talking about are.

I think we're getting side-tracked now by the terms "physical" and "non-physical" (another false dichotomy), which could be a whole other discussion. Let's stick with the terms we've been discussing as we already have enough terms to use as examples to get at what we are talking about.

I can happily leave out the term, "physical" in the definition of "nature". I'd rather point at the second definitions of both "reality" and "nature", as they both seem to be synonymous and the meaning I was thinking about when I think of them being synonymous. "Nature" can refer to the properties of some thing as something inherent - of the properties that make the thing what it is, which could include just one thing (the nature of an organism) or the whole thing (all of nature). "Reality" is simply that same state of affairs or properties that makes the thing what it is, which could include just one thing (a piece of reality), or the whole thing (all of reality).

"Nature" can refer to the properties of some thing as something inherent - of the properties that make the thing what it is, which could include just one thing (the nature of an organism) or the whole thing (all of nature). "Reality" is simply that same state of affairs or properties that makes the thing what it is, which could include just one thing (a piece of reality), or the whole thing (all of reality). — Harry Hindu

Ok, let's focus on the second definitions.

"Nature" is strong on "basic", "inherent", "characteristic". The idea here is to distinguish essential from non-essential attributes. "Dogs have four legs", even though we've seen three-legged dogs. The three-legged dogs are "not natural" in the sense of this second definition: having three legs is not a

"basic or inherent features of [dogness], especially when seen as characteristic of it."

The second definition of "Reality" is more abstract. The three-legged dog has "the state or quality of having existence or substance". It is a real three-legged dog.

What about Santa Claus? He lacks the state or quality of having existence or substance... but it has some basic, inherent features. He has a white beard. He wears a red suit. He lives in the North Pole. He can have basic, inherent features even though he lacks the quality of having existence or substance. And the same applies to Frodo, Dracula or Sherlock Holmes.

The bottom line -- according to these two definitions, all beings have "a nature" (basic, inherent attributes), even non-existent beings, i.e., even non-real beings.

***

The core of our disagreement is whether the word "supernatural" can be put to rest in the graveyard of old words. And we've seen that, just because something does not exist (i.e. "lacks the quality of having existence or substance"), we can't assume that it does not have a nature (basic, inherent features).

Let's explore what that means as it pertains to the matter of supernatural beings. Supernatural beings have "a nature" in that sense -- they have basic, inherent features. Why should we call them "supernatural", then? Because "nature" in the composition of the word "supernatural" is not related to "basic, inherent features"; it is related to the first definition ("physical world and its components"). In other words, supernatural beings have basic and inherent features -- one of them is that they are beyond and above (hence, "super") the natural world.

Note that this is true even if they lack the quality of existence or substance (i.e., even if we are talking of beings more akin to Frodo, Dracula and Sherlock Holmes than of beings more akin to you and me).

If the universe was the effect of some cause, then that cause would be "natural" too, as there would be a causal relationship between the cause and the effect. — Harry Hindu

You are contradicting yourself, because you agreed earlier that "everything in the natural universe has a cause". The first cause, by definition, has a causal relationship, but no cause.

Perhaps there was a misunderstanding and you meant instead that "everything in the natural universe has a causal relationship"? But that statement is false: Miracles have a causal relationship with the thing acted upon, and yet they are not classified as natural events. God has a causal relationship with his creation, and yet is not classified as a natural being.

I've come to depreciate definitions over time, in this context, not because they're useless or anything, but because their employment can be misleading.

Whatever is real, does not require our definitions to exist. Rather the opposite, we try to converge on quiddity of whatever is real by means of discovery, something like that. Oftentimes this involves predication. Merely defining quiddity of reality-constituents seems fraught.

Of course, in terms of our language, it's always a good idea to express things concisely, which may involve definitions. Going by dictionaries and encyclopedias, definitions are inherently circular, but that can work wonders in context-building.

For a large class of cases — though not for all — in which we employ the word ‘meaning’, it can be explained thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. — Wittgenstein

So, anyway, what are we on about with "natural" and "supernatural" here...?

You are contradicting yourself, because you agreed earlier that "everything in the natural universe has a cause". The first cause, by definition, has a causal relationship, but no cause.

Perhaps there was a misunderstanding and you meant instead that "everything in the natural universe has a causal relationship"? But that statement is false: Miracles have a causal relationship with the thing acted upon, and yet they are not classified as natural events. God has a causal relationship with his creation, and yet is not classified as a natural being. — Samuel Lacrampe

That is my point - that miracles and God are mislabelled as "supernatural" when they should be labeled as "natural" especially if they existed prior to the creation of the natural. The structure AND meaning of the word, "supernatural", shows that it stems from the world, "natural", which means that it is dependent upon the existence of the natural, which means that the natural came first and then the supernatural. As I have said before, the structure and meaning of the terms is contradictory to their use. It would make more sense to call miracles and God "natural" and then the creation, "supernatural", but I'm sure most theists will be offended at that.

Ok, let's focus on the second definitions.

"Nature" is strong on "basic", "inherent", "characteristic". The idea here is to distinguish essential from non-essential attributes. "Dogs have four legs", even though we've seen three-legged dogs. The three-legged dogs are "not natural" in the sense of this second definition: having three legs is not a

"basic or inherent features of [dogness], especially when seen as characteristic of it." — Mariner

Here, I would simply use the qualifiers, "normal" and "abnormal". There are normal dogs in nature, and there are abnormal dogs in nature. As a matter of fact, mutations are natural events. Accidents are natural events, too.

The second definition of "Reality" is more abstract. The three-legged dog has "the state or quality of having existence or substance". It is a real three-legged dog.

What about Santa Claus? He lacks the state or quality of having existence or substance... but it has some basic, inherent features. He has a white beard. He wears a red suit. He lives in the North Pole. He can have basic, inherent features even though he lacks the quality of having existence or substance. And the same applies to Frodo, Dracula or Sherlock Holmes.

The bottom line -- according to these two definitions, all beings have "a nature" (basic, inherent attributes), even non-existent beings, i.e., even non-real beings. — Mariner

Here, I just go back to my qualifiers of "imaginary" and "non-imaginary" (notice how I didn't use the word, "real", as that seems to have this connotation that it would not include the imaginary.). To say that Santa Claus doesn't have existence or substance is to fall into the false dichotomy of dualism. As I said before, imaginary things exist, just as non-imaginary things do. They just exist differently, or have different characteristics. You can tell the difference between an imagining and a non-imagining, right, and you would agree that imaginings and non-imaginings exist, right?

I didn't invent the English language. I simply came into the world one day and started learning it. It's not my fault that no one has come along and updated the meanings to reflect our modern knowledge and so that we can be consistent about what talk about.

The core of our disagreement is whether the word "supernatural" can be put to rest in the graveyard of old words. And we've seen that, just because something does not exist (i.e. "lacks the quality of having existence or substance"), we can't assume that it does not have a nature (basic, inherent features).

Let's explore what that means as it pertains to the matter of supernatural beings. Supernatural beings have "a nature" in that sense -- they have basic, inherent features. Why should we call them "supernatural", then? Because "nature" in the composition of the word "supernatural" is not related to "basic, inherent features"; it is related to the first definition ("physical world and its components"). In other words, supernatural beings have basic and inherent features -- one of them is that they are beyond and above (hence, "super") the natural world.

Note that this is true even if they lack the quality of existence or substance (i.e., even if we are talking of beings more akin to Frodo, Dracula and Sherlock Holmes than of beings more akin to you and me). — Mariner

I thought I already placed "supernatural" within the category of "imaginary" AND that I have shown that imaginary things exist - but only as imaginings. I made the distinction between "imaginary" and the "non-imaginary" quiet clear. It's just that not all imaginings are referred to as being "supernatural". "Supernatural" itself is an imaginary concept. This all seems fairly simple for me to grasp.
.

Here, I would simply use the qualifiers, "normal" and "abnormal". There are normal dogs in nature, and there are abnormal dogs in nature. As a matter of fact, mutations are natural events. Accidents are natural events, too. — Harry Hindu

No problem with that, but there is also -- as per the definitions you required us to use -- no problem in using the word "natural" to refer to a four-legged dog, and "not-natural" to refer to a three-legged dog. Having three legs is not a basic, inherent trait of dogness.

I thought I already placed "supernatural" within the category of "imaginary" AND that I have shown that imaginary things exist - but only as imaginings. I made the distinction between "imaginary" and the "non-imaginary" quiet clear. It's just that not all imaginings are referred to as being "supernatural". "Supernatural" itself is an imaginary concept. This all seems fairly simple for me to grasp. — Harry Hindu

I have no problem with any of this. The point of contention is rather why would you want to discard that word, since you ascribe referents to it, and you emphasize that these referents exist, only in a different way (imaginary) compared to other referents.

"God is an imaginary being", according to you. Ok. But so is Frodo, or Sherlock Holmes. One of them is supernatural, the other is not. (Heck, not even Spiderman, or Superman, would be "supernatural" according to the traditional usage). Why should we stop using the word supernatural to distinguish, say, angels from hobbits?

Because if the universe has a beginning, then there must be a first thing. The only logical alternative is no beginning. But finiteness is a simpler hypothesis than infinity, and so, as per Occam's Razor, it becomes the prima facie until proven otherwise.
- Then this first natural thing is caused by another thing which has no cause (the first cause), for nothing can be the cause of itself.
- And everything in the natural universe has a cause, as we have established earlier.
- Therefore this first cause must be supernatural.

I also agree with ↪Mariner here. Maybe we should find clear definitions of 'natural' and 'supernatural', if it is not already done. — Samuel Lacrampe

Well, perhaps the natural is whatever behaves according to the laws of physics, and the supernatural is whatever doesn't behave according to the laws of physics. Thus the argument concludes that the first cause doesn't behave according to the laws of physics.

The problem is that it's quite a leap to go from "the first cause doesn't behave according to the laws of physics" to "the first cause is God".

I've come to depreciate definitions over time, in this context, not because they're useless or anything, but because their employment can be misleading. — jorndoe

I'm the opposite. Definitions are important because in my experience, if the definition of what we are talking about isn't clarified or agreed on, then we end up talking past each other, as we end up talking about different things. If you define something one way, while I define it another way, we are essentially talking about different things.

Whatever is real, does not require our definitions to exist. Rather the opposite, we try to converge on quiddity of whatever is real by means of discovery, something like that. Oftentimes this involves predication. Merely defining quiddity of reality-constituents seems fraught. — jorndoe

Discovery comes first in the scientific process. Then comes that part about communicating your discoveries so that others may test them. How do you communicate your discoveries if not by using visual or auditory symbols to refer to these ideas in your head in a way that others will understand?

Of course, in terms of our language, it's always a good idea to express things concisely, which may involve definitions. Going by dictionaries and encyclopedias, definitions are inherently circular, but that can work wonders in context-building. — jorndoe

It would only be circular if you are using the word you are defining in the definition of the word.

For a large class of cases — though not for all — in which we employ the word ‘meaning’, it can be explained thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. — Wittgenstein — Wittgenstein

The idea in someone's head that triggered the use of the word is what the word means, as the intent to communicate that idea existed prior to the use of the word. The meaning of words has nothing to do with their use. It has everything to do with the intent of the communicator. If "meaning" were use, then the word, "God", wouldn't refer to anything - not even the idea in someone's head. It would only refer to the use. So, god isn't a divine entity, not even an imaginary one? God is simply some use of some scribbles? Does that make sense?

So, anyway, what are we on about with "natural" and "supernatural" here...? — jorndoe

Did you read the thread? Are you asking Mariner and I to repeat ourselves?

The idea in someone's head that triggered the use of the word is what the word means, as the intent to communicate that idea existed prior to the use of the word. The meaning of words has nothing to do with their use. It has everything to do with the intent of the communicator. — Harry Hindu

I don't think that's right. Consider something like shaking your head. Does shaking your head mean what you intend it to mean ("no") or does its meaning depend on how it's used in the given community (e.g. in Bulgaria it means "yes")?

Even if you intend to express disagreement by shaking your head, shaking your head doesn't mean "no" in Bulgaria; it means "yes".

So I think there needs to be a distinction between what you mean by the expression and what the expression means. The former is a matter of intention, but the latter is a matter of convention.

No problem with that, but there is also -- as per the definitions you required us to use -- no problem in using the word "natural" to refer to a four-legged dog, and "not-natural" to refer to a three-legged dog. Having three legs is not a basic, inherent trait of dogness. — Mariner

Then having, three, four, or no legs isn't an inherent trait of being a dog. It seems to me that things have several traits, not just one, and it is these several traits that exist at once that defines the nature of some thing. A dog is still a dog even if it only has 3 legs, but he still barks, licks your face, smells other dogs' rear ends, and generally interacts with others of it's kind in a different way than it does with others that aren't of it's kind.

I have no problem with any of this. The point of contention is rather why would you want to discard that word, since you ascribe referents to it, and you emphasize that these referents exist, only in a different way (imaginary) compared to other referents.

"God is an imaginary being", according to you. Ok. But so is Frodo, or Sherlock Holmes. One of them is supernatural, the other is not. (Heck, not even Spiderman, or Superman, would be "supernatural" according to the traditional usage). Why should we stop using the word supernatural to distinguish, say, angels from hobbits? — Mariner

What makes angels supernatural, and hobbits not? "Divinity"? - another imaginary word?

I don't think that's right. Consider something like shaking your head. Does shaking your head mean what you intend it to mean ("no") or does its meaning depend on how it's used in the given community (e.g. in Bulgaria it means "yes").

Even if you intend to express disagreement by shaking your head, shaking your head doesn't mean "no" in Bulgaria; it means "yes". — Michael

Well, I did include in that same post the idea that for communication to happen, that your listener would have to understand your use of terms. If you knew that shaking your head in Bulgaria means the opposite, you wouldn't do it. If you did, and did it anyway, then you still have the idea, "no", in your head and your behavior is a representation of that idea. It's just that the observer has a different idea associated with that behavior.

Then having, three, four, or no legs isn't an inherent trait of being a dog. — Harry Hindu

How do you know that?

I'd bet 99.99% of people (including the dictionary, encyclopedias, etc.) would say that dogs have the inherent trait of having four legs. There is even a scientific term for that -- they are quadrupeds, so say the wise scientists.

A dog is still a dog even if it only has 3 legs, but he still barks, licks your face, smells other dogs' rear ends, and generally interacts with others of it's kind in a different way than it does with others that aren't of it's kind. — Harry Hindu

And what if it stops barking? And then licking your face? And then smelling other dog's rear ends? This is a sorites problem that could only appear in a philosophy forum.

Frankly, if your argument hinges upon "having four legs is not a basic, inherent, natural trait of being a dog", then there isn't much more to discuss.

What makes angels supernatural, and hobbits not? "Divinity"? - another imaginary word? — Harry Hindu

Look at the dictionary. Your answer is there. (And by the way, neither Supernatural nor Divinity is an imaginary word. I can see it with my eyes in my screen. Stick to your definitions).

How do you know that?

I'd bet 99.99% of people (including the dictionary, encyclopedias, etc.) would say that dogs have the inherent trait of having four legs. There is even a scientific term for that -- they are quadrupeds, so say the wise scientists.

A dog is still a dog even if it only has 3 legs, but he still barks, licks your face, smells other dogs' rear ends, and generally interacts with others of it's kind in a different way than it does with others that aren't of it's kind. — Harry Hindu


And what if it stops barking? And then licking your face? And then smelling other dog's rear ends? This is a sorites problem that could only appear in a philosophy forum.

Frankly, if your argument hinges upon "having four legs is not a basic, inherent, natural trait of being a dog", then there isn't much more to discuss. — Mariner

If having four legs were an inherent trait of being a dog, then what prevents you from labeling all four-legged animals, "dogs"?

What makes angels supernatural, and hobbits not? "Divinity"? - another imaginary word? — Harry Hindu


Look at the dictionary. Your answer is there. — Mariner

Ok.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hobbit
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/angel

Neither definition includes the term, "supernatural". So where do we go from here?

Oh, and by the way, the definition of "dog" doesn't include the mention of four legs.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dog

I just couldn't help myself:
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DAJV5kOUIAArzDz.jpg

...too funny.

If having four legs were an inherent trait of being a dog, then what prevents you from labeling all four-legged animals, "dogs"? — Harry Hindu

Logic.

To expound on my earlier answer: "All As are Bs" does not imply that all B's are A's.

The idea in someone's head that triggered the use of the word is what the word means, as the intent to communicate that idea existed prior to the use of the word. The meaning of words has nothing to do with their use. It has everything to do with the intent of the communicator. If "meaning" were use, then the word, "God", wouldn't refer to anything - not even the idea in someone's head. It would only refer to the use. So, god isn't a divine entity, not even an imaginary one? God is simply some use of some scribbles? Does that make sense? — Harry Hindu

What do you learn when you learn the meaning of a word? Is it the idea that is in your head? Is it the idea that is in someone else's head?

Exactly. Just because something has four legs doesnt make it a dog. There must something more to being a dog than just having four legs. In fact, it is an inherent feature of, not just dogs, but most things, to possess more than one inherent feature.

To say that the inherent feature of some thing is that it has four-legs is to say that it is the only thing that has four legs. Because dogs are not the only thing with four legs (chairs have four legs to), means that four legs aren't the single, defining feature of dogs. There is more to being a dog than just having four legs.

It is the shared meaning of the word that I learned.

If intent isnt related to meaning then why do we say things like, "What did you mean?" or, "what I meant was..." as if meaning is related to the idea in someones head and the correct string of scribbles or sounds were not used properly to transmit that idea to another mind.

When we translate words from other languages, what are we translating? The fact that you can translate at all, when you think about it, shows that meaning is more than word use because what would it mean for two sentences in different languages to be translations of each other if not for the fact that both of them have the same meaning?

It is the shared meaning of the word that I learned. — Harry Hindu

If "the idea in someone's head that triggered the use of the word is what the word means," how can this be shared?

Maybe you mean something different by "the idea in someone's head" than I think you do. (I think of that as, more or less, "what comes to mind," when you hear a word.)

By "the idea in someone's head," do you mean an intention of theirs? (The intention to speak, to communicate a thought, to be understood to be attempting to communicate--there are lots of intentions.)

The problem is that it's quite a leap to go from "the first cause doesn't behave according to the laws of physics" to "the first cause is God". — Michael

It is. But we can bridge that gap a couple of ways:
1. In Revelation 22:13: "I am the Alpha and the Omega, the First and the Last, the Beginning and the End". God himself says he is the first cause.
2. God is traditionally defined as 'that which nothing greater can exist'. Combine this with the principle that 'no effect can be greater than its cause(s)', and we deduce that the first cause is that which nothing greater can exist, and therefore the first cause is God.

we deduce — Samuel Lacrampe

No we don't.

The structure AND meaning of the word, "supernatural", shows that it stems from the world, "natural", which means that it is dependent upon the existence of the natural, which means that the natural came first and then the supernatural. — Harry Hindu

I see your point. We just need to differentiate between the epistemological order and metaphysical order of the two words. Epistemologically, we humans first experience the natural world and then may call some things supernatural when these don't behave as per the laws of our natural world. Metaphysically however, the supernatural is the cause of the natural, and thus existed prior to it. Sure, you can switch the labels around if desired, as long as the definitions are clear to everyone. For practical purposes though, I would stick to the conventional definitions.