we cannot determine whether the neurons act representatively, through reference to the model, because the model represents how the thing behaves, not the reason (why) for that behaviour. — Metaphysician Undercover
...is exactly what I'm arguing for. There is nothing whatsoever about these 'hidden states' which prevents us from naming them. In fact, I think that's exactly what we do. The 'hidden state' I'm sitting on right now is called a chair. It's hidden from my neural network because the final nodes of it's Markov boundary are my sensorimotor systems. It's not hidden from me, I'm sat right on it. — Isaac
I have an image of cognition occurring somewhere between one's body and those things that the body manipulates - embedded or extended cognition. To this we now add enactive cognition, that it is in our manipulation of things that cognition occurs. I'm puzzling over the extent to which the mathematics here assists in that choice, and I'm supposing for the moment that it is neutral. — Banno
Why is there even a reason for the behaviour of neurons? They just fire according to physical laws, they don't have a reason. — Isaac
Put simply, a Markov boundary is the set of states which separate any system we're interested in studying from the parts we're not. — Isaac
They just fire according to physical laws, they don't have a reason. — Isaac
The point was, that you haven't the premises required to logically conclude that there is no reason for the behaviour of neurons. — Metaphysician Undercover
Systems theory is extremely flimsy. — Metaphysician Undercover
What about those "hidden states"? Those unknown aspects disqualify this conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover
* In fact I distinctly remember reading a paper on that very subject, but I don't seem to have it in my biblio database. I might do a Google trawl for it later. — Isaac
What are the internal states of the niche? And what are the causal regularities that they model? We suggest that internal states of the niche are a subset of the physical states of the material environment. Namely, the internal states of the niche are the physical states of the environment, which have been modified by the dense histories of different organisms interacting in their shared niche (i.e., histories of active inference).
10.1177_1059712319862774-fig1.gif — Isaac
Strictly speaking, you know what you inferred. Inference is not extra-sensory perception. — Tate
Thanks for posting those papers — jorndoe
Didn't see the image you posted; is that from a different paper? — jorndoe
I guess they don't address the Levine / Chalmers thing directly, yet the models give their own insights. — jorndoe
So we're not trying to be serious here? — Tate
Of course this all depends on your theory of selfhood (what is 'me'?) but that's probably a whole 'nother can of worms we don't want to open here.
I don't need premises. I don't consider ants have bank accounts. I don't consider atoms have feelings. I can't for the life of me think why anyone would consider neurons having reasons for long enough to even consider the premises required. — Isaac
Ha! But the notion that neurons have reasons is practically watertight? — Isaac
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