Well, if we're not 'overstating', you only know what you currently remember about what happened when you tested the model.
All thought is post hoc by at least a few milliseconds. — Isaac
...is exactly what I'm arguing for. There is nothing whatsoever about these 'hidden states' which prevents us from naming them. In fact, I think that's exactly what we do. The 'hidden state' I'm sitting on right now is called a chair. It's hidden from my neural network because the final nodes of it's Markov boundary are my sensorimotor systems. It's not hidden from me, I'm sat right on it. — Isaac
If you are the body is it not, along with the chair, a hidden state (or as I would prefer to say hidden process)? Of course we can name them, but it seems we are doing so from within the familiarity which constitutes our common and also individual experience. — Janus
I should mention that mindfulness awareness is not quite what Hussel or Merleau-Ponty had in mind — Joshs
All awareness is self-transformation, it is about something other than itself even when reflecting back on ‘itself’. — Joshs
He is attempting to explain mental features such as gestalt perception as evolutionarily formed products of simple mechanisms of material reality — Joshs
Phenomenology dumps Pinter’s rule-based material and mental realities in favor of a united reality that is relationally relative through and through. This is what I mean by rebuilding the building. — Joshs
Pinter is closer to Dennett than you might think, — Joshs
The mystery is that in an age when physics has carried us into such a fantastic and unimaginable reality, we still balk at the idea that there are mental phenomena which do not follow the rules of classical physics. Why is it so hard to accept that in a universe in which space-time bends and curves, where particles of matter weave in and out of existence, and space itself is particulate—why would it be strange to accept that the mind of living animals is something complex whose laws are not the same ones that have been familiar to us for centuries?
if we want to say it is a hidden state at all, then it seems contradictory to say that it is "really" a chair, since we have already acknowledged that we think it is "really" a hidden state, and a chair cannot be anything but a familiar object. — Janus
mathematics conforms to formal structures within conscious experience and so overcomes the perceived separation between observer and observed that seems to be a basic fact of existence, but is actually not. — Wayfarer
There is no point questioning memory as such; if we have no faith at all in memory, then we can have no faith in any knowledge at all. Memory is the foundation of who we are, to question it in a general way would be absurd. — Janus
It seems to me that [maths] feeds into the illusion of a separation by treating extension and duration objectively, when they properly belong to the a priori structure of the mind. — Merkwurdichliebe
The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve. — Wigner
There are interminable arguments in philosophy of mathematics as to whether maths is invented or discovered, whether it's in the mind of humans or is something real in the world. — Wayfarer
But I'm saying the regularities and rational relationships inhere within the conscious experience-of-the-world - so it's neither 'in the mind' nor 'in the world', and that this indicates a deep philosophical issue. — Wayfarer
The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve. — Wigner
I don't think we can know the future (in general). I'm claiming we know that which we have a successful model of. The success obviously requires testing in the present. — Isaac
If one expands “the network doing the inference” to include the sensorimotor systems, what happens to the hidden state? — NOS4A2
can an activity that only organisms can be shown to perform—experiencing, thinking, inferring, believing, seeing—be isolated to a single part of it? — NOS4A2
Well, if you consider that each and every internal organ has its own purpose, function, relative to the existence of the whole, which is a living being, then you would understand that each of these organs has a reason for its existence. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no point questioning memory as such; if we have no faith at all in memory, then we can have no faith in any knowledge at all. Memory is the foundation of who we are, to question it in a general way would be absurd. — Janus
You say we know hidden states, via inference; that our actual experience just is inference, if I've understood you. This makes no sense to me. We infer that there are hidden states, and by definition, they being hidden, we don't know them in the common sense of "knowing'. We don't know what those inferred hidden states are; if we did they would not be hidden. — Janus
I am saying that naming is just a matter of fiat: we can call the hidden state a chair, or we can call it the unknown whatever that appears to us a chair. — Janus
if we want to say it is a hidden state at all, then it seems contradictory to say that it is "really" a chair, since we have already acknowledged that we think it is "really" a hidden state, and a chair cannot be anything but a familiar object. — Janus
I was talking about hidden states in general. It makes more sense to me to say we have some degree of confidence in our inferences. That lets me distinguish hidden states from observations. — Tate
But I'm saying the regularities and rational relationships inhere within the conscious experience-of-the-world - so it's neither 'in the mind' nor 'in the world', and that this indicates a deep philosophical issue. — Wayfarer
Not how I use the word reason. — Isaac
The physical instantiation is the model. the thing represented by that model is neurons. The point being that we cannot determine the reason (why) for the thing, through reference to the reason (why) for the representation. So we cannot determine whether the neurons act representatively, through reference to the model, because the model represents how the thing behaves, not the reason (why) for that behaviour. — Metaphysician Undercover
The purpose of neurons is not to represent the outside world. — Isaac
Any pattern could symbolize something. And not all symbols necessarily appear like symbols to everyone. — Metaphysician Undercover
To be clear, I stated earlier that there is no need to assume any "external world" at all, and extreme skepticism which doubts the reality of an "external" world. is well justified. To expand on this, I will say that it is highly possible that all of our relations with the so-called external world, including sensations, and communications with others, is done internally. — Metaphysician Undercover
See the papers I cited earlier. Or any papers on inference systems. — Isaac
If you recall a specific case of a hidden state being referred to as "observed", could you point that out? — Tate
inference on models and their parameters given data) that considers hidden states
They are often referred to as hidden states because they are seldom observed directly.
Empirical priors (priors that depend on variables) relate to transitions between hidden states, which are encoded in the B matrix
An inference regarding a hidden state is never called an "observation." — Tate
Hidden causes are called hidden because they can only be ‘seen’ indirectly by internal states through the Markov blanket via sensory states. As an example, consider that the most well-known method by which spiders catch prey is via their self-woven, carefully placed and sticky web. Common for web- or niche-constructing spiders is that they are highly vibration sensitive. If we associate vibrations with sensory observations, then it is only in an indirect sense that one can meaningfully say that spiders have ‘access’ to the hidden causes of their sensory world—i.e. to the world of flies and other edible ‘critters’.
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