Thanks, something to explore

In the end, it's all down to the sauce.

One experiences one's ideas?

Seems very passive.

We could take things at face value, yeah! Nothing wrong with that except doing so means you'll think, for instance, the sun revolves around the earth when in fact, so they say, it's the exact opposite! Do you realize what this means? I could be eating a lobster, but in fact the lobster could be the one actually eating me! But that's not the end of it: It could be that though the lobster could be the one actually eating me, it could also be that I could be really, truly, eating the lobster! Never-ending story of loops in reality where the truth is always one step ahead of us. Eureka! I got it! No, you didn't!!

From John Searle’s “Seeing Things as They Are” — Richard B

Searle disagrees. Can you tell me why in your own words?

but directly perceive only our subjective experiences. — Richard B

The OP doesn't mention "subjective experiences".

The OP points out we only have 5 ways of accessing the physical world: touch, taste, hearing, seeing, and smell. Can anyone describe another way to experience a physical tree?

Putnam’s goal in introducing the vatted brain was to refute the skeptical argument. — Banno

The interesting thing about Putnam's argument is that it's about meaning, not about ontology, and depends on a causal theory of reference. I think it strange that in such a scenario the brain-in-a-vat cannot refer to itself as being a brain in a vat, and so I think that Putnam's argument is actually a reductio ad absurdum against a causal theory of reference.

In the end, it's all down to the sauce. — Banno

"the sauce is the boss"

Lets say we both are standing in front of a tree. I look at you and see you directly looking at and experiencing a tree. I don’t see you directly experiencing sense data. Is this not being objective? Whatever is occurring “inside” is not in my purview. Whatever is occurring “outside” is shared by both of us and thus we gain an understanding of what we are talking about.

Lets say we both are standing in front of a tree. I look at you and see you directly looking at and experiencing a tree. I don’t see you directly experiencing sense data. Is this not being objective? Whatever is occurring “inside” is not in my purview. Whatever is occurring “outside” is shared by both of us and thus we gain an understanding of what we are talking about. — Richard B

The point is I can directly experience only five physical senses.Based on what my senses tell me, I think of a tree.

Similarly, imagine a mirage. My eyes see light; my mind misinterprets what I see as water. Or imagine in a few decades, free-standing 3D holograms have been perfected so that the hologram appears exactly as a tree. Only when I pass my hand through the hologram do I realize it's not a genuine tree. My mind saw a tree until passing my hand through it showed the error.

I mentioned earlier all we can see on a computer monitor is light.
Check out the Adelson Checker-Shadow Illusion.
https://www.illusionsindex.org/ir/checkershadow
The squares A and B are exactly the same color. (I had to print the image and cut out the two squares to convince myself.) Our eyes see exactly the same color of squares A and B. But our mind creates the image where the squares appear different.

The point is we see only light; our mind does the rest.

The point is we see only light; our mind does the rest. — Art48

Phenomenalism just advises we not invest too much in the idea of concrete objects which possess ever changing properties.

It says that an object basically is its properties. There's no extra "object" out there that has redness, or softness, or whatever.

"Light" and "mind" wouldn't be exceptions to that. See what I mean?

It says that an object basically is its properties. There's no extra "object" out there that has redness, or softness, or whatever.
"Light" and "mind" wouldn't be exceptions to that. See what I mean? — Tate

Light and ideas are exceptional, in that we experience them directly.
We experience objects "out there" indirectly via our physical senses and our mind.

We experience objects "out there" indirectly via our physical senses and our mind. — Art48

I don't think that's what Hume was thinking. Would you want to explore his ideas more? By going through the logic of bundle theory?

In particular, some forms of phenomenalism reduce all talk about physical objects in the external world to talk about bundles of sense data. — Art48

I believe you would say that we do not directly experience electrons and proton but only indirectly. If I follow your views, I believe you will also need to say the same thing with regards "sense data". Let's take the electron/proton example. I do not directly experience electrons/protons; but with my senses and some scientific theory, I can infer their existence indirectly. Similarly, I do not directly experience sense data; but with my senses and some philosophical and analogical reasoning, I can infer their existence indirectly. What is unclear to me is if you mean the idea of sense data, or sense data itself. This confusion arise when you say "I indirectly experience the idea of a tree."

If you, and everyone else, experiences sense data directly, why do you explain what you mean by examples of illusions and other representations of reality? Does not one need a stable real external world to understand what an illusion or representation even is? (I understand what a mirage is because I actual consumed real water.) Imagine a world where the inhabitants never experience hallucinations, illusions, or vivid dreams, would they ever need a sense datum theory at all. But you might say, at least I can point to my direct experience of the sense data itself. Again, as I mentioned before, this is a private exercise that offer very little to how we actually learn, understand, and use language.

Phenomenalism is, in a sense, a study of mental images (of things i.e. processed sense data) how things appear to us instead of what things really are. Those who reject the idea would call it an illicit affair with Maya (illusion).

I don't think that's what Hume was thinking. Would you want to explore his ideas more? By going through the logic of bundle theory? — Tate

I'd be interested but I think it should be in another thread.

I do not directly experience electrons/protons; but with my senses and some scientific theory, I can infer their existence indirectly. Similarly, I do not directly experience sense data — Richard B

I think this captures part of our disagreement. We have five physical senses and I'd say we experience the sense data from these sense directly. Question: do you believe we experience anything directly and, if so, what?

If you, and everyone else, experiences sense data directly, why do you explain what you mean by examples of illusions and other representations of reality? — Richard B

One reason I like posting here is to get feedback on my ideas. Perhaps I didn't write the OP as clearly as I could have. With hindsight, it may have been better if I had expressed my thoughts as follows.

We may think of a human being as having four parts: body, emotion, mind, and consciousness. Our body has five physical senses: touch, taste, seeing, hearing, and smelling. Our consciousness directly experiences three types of input: physical, emotional, and mental.

Our mind automatically processes visual sense data to create a visual picture of reality. Sometimes the picture is accurate in that it corresponds to reality. Sometimes the picture is inaccurate as in the case of an illusion, a mirage.

In the checker illusion, our eyes experience visual sense data directly (our eyes experience the same shade of grey from square A and B). Our mind automatically processes physical sense data to create a picture of reality. Our mind creates the idea of a check board with square A and B differing in color.

So, I'd describe experience of the physical world as consciousness aware of pictures created in our mind based on sense data.

You may recall that our eyes see everything upside down but flip the image so we see rightside up.
Here's a quote from https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/91177/how-our-eyes-see-everything-upside-down
So why doesn’t the world look upside down to us? The answer lies in the power of the brain to adapt the sensory information it receives and make it fit with what it already knows. Essentially, your brain takes the raw, inverted data and turns it into a coherent, right-side-up image.

don't think that's what Hume was thinking. Would you want to explore his ideas more? By going through the logic of bundle theory?
— Tate
I'd be interested but I think it should be in another thread. — Art48

Hume was a phenomenalist. Why would exploring his ideas go in a different thread?

Hume was a phenomenalist. Why would exploring his ideas go in a different thread? — Tate

OK, what ideas do you have in mind?

"Every modern philosopher accepted some version of the theory of ideas—the view that we immediately perceive certain mental entities called ideas, but don’t have direct access to physical objects. Hume holds an empiricist version of the theory, because he thinks that everything we believe is ultimately traceable to experience."


"Impressions of sensation include the feelings we get from our five senses as well as pains and pleasures, all of which arise in us “originally, from unknown causes” (T 1.1.2.1/7). He calls them original because trying to determine their ultimate causes would take us beyond anything we can experience. Any intelligible investigation must stop with them.". -- SEP on Hume

Note that this is not an ontological view. This is epistemological: it's about what we can and can't determine. The question arises: how did we determine that our knowledge stops with experience?

The question arises: how did we determine that our knowledge stops with experience? — Tate

Can I take this question in terms of Kant's thing-in-itself? Kant said we cannot know the thing-in-itself, only phenomena. I'm making a more modest claim: that what we know of the physical world is based on sensory input and ideas our mind creates in response. I don't deny the existence of the exterior physical world, only that we don't have direct access to it.

Question: do you believe we experience anything directly and, if so, what? — Art48

Yes, like I mentioned, if we both were standing in front of a tree, I am directly experiencing you looking at a tree, I don’t directly experience your sense data of a tree. Another one, I have direct conversations and debates with other human beings not sense data.

I think our disagreements is our starting philosophical positions. Yours: An individual’s private access to their sense data. Mine: Human being’s public access to a shared external world.

I am directly experiencing you looking at a tree, I don’t directly experience your sense data of a tree. — Richard B

Looking at something and seeing something are not the same thing. He might be blind.

I'm making a more modest claim: that what we know of the physical world is based on sensory input and ideas our mind creates in response. I don't deny the existence of the exterior physical world, only that we don't have direct access to it. — Art48

That's phenomenalism as I understand it. I guess my question would be: what supports this claim?

. I don't deny the existence of the exterior physical world, only that we don't have direct access to it. — Art48

Please explain what direct access means. What is an example of having direct access? If we want to confirm “Yes, we have direct access” don't we need some idea what that would be like when it is achieved?

For example, do you have direct access to the house? No, I don't have a key to the front door but I have indirect access, I climb to the second floor and enter thru the bedroom window.

I'm making a more modest claim: that what we know of the physical world is based on sensory input and ideas our mind creates in response. I don't deny the existence of the exterior physical world, only that we don't have direct access to it.
— Art48

That's phenomenalism as I understand it. I guess my question would be: what supports this claim? — Tate

I agree with this. There's a difference between making the conclusion that reality does not exist outside our own perception and that we cannot truly observe reality except through our own perception.

The latter is true because of the logic of our human nature. We do, in fact, not experience reality past our senses. We can use fantasy or mushrooms or whatever to enhance sensory experience, but we cannot transcend the perception that we have. Adding to this we have an extreme amount of scientific data that is testable and provable that tell us about a world past our perception, like how light consists of more wavelengths than what we can perceive.

That reality exists because of our perception of it has no real foundation in science or logic whatsoever. Therefore we can use the theories as a guide for us to have a better perspective of how to define reality and our sense of existence. We perceive a fraction of reality as the foundation for what we experience as reality.

Take for example all the people who has a different "wiring" of their brain. Like how some has interconnections between the perception of sound and visuals, meaning that they experience sound as visual artifacts, lights and shapes etc. Their perception of reality is vastly different from other people due to this physical defect, but it is an important aspect of the nature of our existence.

Imagine all the animals with different perceptions than us, how other animals experience the perception of time differently, how some see more colors and some less, how some have a sense of smell so intense that they almost perceive the air or water around them as a cloud of experiences informing them about their reality.

We don't have to accept the illogical conclusion of reality only existing because of our perception of reality in order to accept the importance of differentiating perception versus actual reality. And most importantly, including our perception of reality when defining ourselves as objects within that reality.

We do, in fact, not experience reality past our senses. — Christoffer

Adding to this we have an extreme amount of scientific data that is testable and provable that tell us about a world past our perception — Christoffer

Isn't the scientific data about things that are past your senses?

That's phenomenalism as I understand it. I guess my question would be: what supports this claim? — Tate

Please explain what direct access means. What is an example of having direct access? If we want to confirm “Yes, we have direct access” don't we need some idea what that would be like when it is achieved? — Richard B

I think the section on The Character of Experience here gives a simple explanation: "the phenomenal character of experience is determined, at least partly, by the direct presentation of ordinary [mind-independent] objects."

What I understand this to mean is that if experience is direct and if I see something as white then that thing has that property of whiteness (as seen).

This is consistent with the motive of the direct and indirect realists to answer the epistemological problem of perception: does perception provide us with information about the nature of the mind-independent world?

As such, to answer Tate's question, Art48's assertion that we don't have direct access to the external world would be supported by showing either that a) the properties of mind-independent objects are not present in the experience or that b) the phenomenal character of experience is not a property of mind-independent objects.

I think that our scientific understanding of perception shows that both a) and b) are true. Pain and colour are not properties of mind-independent objects, and a mind-independent object being a collection of subatomic particles that absorb and/or reflect electromagnetic radiation isn't present in the experience.

a) the properties of mind-independent objects are not present in the experience — Michael

I think that our scientific understanding of perception shows that both a) and b) are true — Michael

So science has access to the properties of mind independent objects? How is this possible if those properties are not present in experience?

So science has access to the properties of mind independent objects? How is this possible if those properties are not present in experience? — Tate

I'm not a scientist, I don't know how it works (I've only read about the results), but I presume scientists don't actually see subatomic particles.

Lets look at another example typically given to say that we are only sure or our sense data but not the thing-in-itself. Take a table in the middle of the room, we look at it and say the color is brown. However, it we get real close to it it seems to be grayish brown, and the time a day changes and lighting of the rooms changes the table looks reddish. Is it reasonable to then conclude, “see, this proves that we can never know the actual/the real color of the table, the thing-in-itself.”

I don’t think this necessary follows. Take for instance a car painted with ChromaFlair. ChromaFlair is a pigment used in paint systems, primarily for automobiles. When the paint is applied, it changes color depending on the light source and viewing angle. There is not an actual/real color behind the ChromaFlair but many colors depending on the viewing angle.

but I presume scientists don't actually see subatomic particles. — Michael

You agree with phenomenalism because of subatomic particles?