Read Spinoza (re: substance / natura naturans which is both eternal and infinite – the only real, everything else that exists are merely ephemera necessarily dependent on substance). Or read Epicurus / Lucretius (re: the void which is both eternal and infinite ...) There are many other "infinite foundations" – the absolute, god, ground of being, the one, dao, xaos, etc – throughout the history of metaphysics. — 180 Proof

Muchas gracias señor!

@Bob Ross $\uparrow$

Same question: Why does metaphysics tend to have foundations that use $\infty$?

I want to emphasize that the above example is incredibly over-simplified — Bob Ross

Thanks. It's a matter of chains of encompassing superordinate categories with possible overlaps, I suppose. If so, I can see where you deal with infinities.

superordinate category

Thanks.

Same question: Why does metaphysics tend to have foundations that use ∞?

To be honest, I think this is an entirely separate question from the essay, as you are questioning the entirety of the branch of metaphysics: which is not addressed therein. Honestly, I cannot authoritatively assert why, in a generic sense, philosophers have posited countless formulations of limitless foundations for their views; but I can state that any other form of "foundation", with regards specifically to the provided essay, would simply not be a foundation. A limited foundation, to me, begs the question of its further, higher abstraction--unless, that is, it is posited as axiomatic or arbitrary (or something similar), which, in that case, it simply is conceded as not foundational in the sense the essay is contending with.

With respect to your other post:

In short, your system/theory is based not on knowledge but on ignorance

I don't honestly think that the proposed sense of an unbounded infinite in the essay is a grounding in ignorance. If you could specify exactly what about a sine qua non is problematic to you, then I would be able to respond more adequately.

Also, I would like to note that nothing within the essay is based on knowledge (and, moreover, the essay explicitly states that): it is ascertainment, which is defined very precisely therein. There's no epistemic consideration, in a formative sense, as the essay's sphere of discourse is meant of that which precedes the formulation thereof.

Bob

Thanks. It's a matter of chains of encompassing superordinate categories with possible overlaps, I suppose. If so, I can see where you deal with infinities.

If I am understanding you correctly, then, as a simplification, yes. With respect to the image you linked, the all encompassing circle would be the superordinate and the smaller ones within would be subordinate. Now, imagine that contextual relation continued forever.

Bob

Now, imagine that contextual relation continued forever. — Bob Ross

And complicated by the fact that different contexts could mean different superordinate circles.

If by "complicated" you merely mean that it is more complex than the provided illustration, then I agree.

Bob

:ok: Please carry on.

forget everything I said, let's try this a different way.

Ok so you have all of these things tools whatever you want to call them for simplistic speediness of referencing sake that way I don't have to elaborate on each individual one let's just call a tool like for instance your wrench is a "sine qua non"

Or any one of the other things you pointed out and explained

So with that said everybody's got their tool belt on that you laid out in detail ready for the next essay to arrive for us to then use our tool belt on to work out whatever that essay is talking about

But my question is even though we can use these tools do they actually exist in the sense that it's possible to even have a tool that is what it says it is?

The one that's on the top of my head is the tool called "sine qua non" is it even possible to know a sine qua non? I know it's easy to say that something could be a sine qua non but are we even capable of knowing something like that can even exist there's so many variables in the world so many possibilities for things so much information that one person cannot know so then to say something like something is a
sine qua non seems to be stating something that is impossible to actually know if it really is a sine qua non or not

So my question is why don't we question if these tools can actually truly exist or if we're just pretending that they exist

Ok so you have all of these things tools whatever you want to call them for simplistic speediness of referencing sake that way I don't have to elaborate on each individual one let's just call a tool like for instance your wrench is a "sine qua non"

Or any one of the other things you pointed out and explained

By “tool” I am understanding you to mean “a means to an end”. Correct me if I am wrong, but, for the intents of my response here, I will be assuming that definition.

So with that said everybody's got their tool belt on that you laid out in detail ready for the next essay to arrive for us to then use our tool belt on to work out whatever that essay is talking about

If by this you mean that the subsequent essay(s) will utilize the concepts explained in the antecedent essay(s), then I agree.

But my question is even though we can use these tools do they actually exist in the sense that it's possible to even have a tool that is what it says it is?

Can you please elaborate on what you mean by “actually exist”? For example, if you mean to question whether there is a sine qua non that exists outside of my body (or what have you), then I would say that the essay doesn’t argue for or against it: there’s no “objective” vs “subjective” consideration as such is only via the principle of regulation and, therefore, it holds its rightful place in a subsequent essay.

Likewise, can you please elaborate on what you are referring to by “have a tool that is what it says it is”? The concepts within the essay are defined concisely and precisely, so I am imagining you are more contending with where (if anywhere) they exist (in an ontic sense). Is that correct?

The one that's on the top of my head is the tool called "sine qua non" is it even possible to know a sine qua non?

To be incredibly precise with my terminology, as it relates to specifically the essay put forth, it was proven to be “ascertained” but purposely and explicitly not “known” (in an epistemic sense); that is, epistemology is not something which is constructed within the essay as that is out of the sphere of that essay’s jurisdiction, so to speak.

Whether a sine qua non can be known depends entirely on its reevaluation via the individual’s accepted epistemology, which has no bearing on what was being proved in the essay.

I know it's easy to say that something could be a sine qua non but are we even capable of knowing something like that can even exist there's so many variables in the world so many possibilities for things so much information that one person cannot know so then to say something like something is a
sine qua non seems to be stating something that is impossible to actually know if it really is a sine qua non or not

Again, I would need further, more precise elaboration on what you mean here. Are you questioning whether there is a sine qua non in the “outer world”? What exactly do you mean? A sine qua non is defined precisely and the principle of regulation is proven to be “true” in the essay. In another essay, I will demonstrate, given more than likely a set of axioms, that the principle of regulation resides within “reason” of a given “subject”, contrary to being grounded in an “object”, but that is beyond the scope of the current essay in the OP. Is that the realm of discourse in which you are contending?

So my question is why don't we question if these tools can actually truly exist or if we're just pretending that they exist

The essay is meant to prove its truth, not prove that we ought to pretend it is true. If you don’t think that was adequately proven, please elaborate further on what exactly was inadequate about it. Furthermore, “existence” (in an ontic sense) is out of the scope of the essay; however, feel free to continue to utilize it to convey your contentions and I will do my best to respond.

Bob

Can you please elaborate on what you mean by “actually exist”? For example, if you mean to question whether there is a sine qua non that exists outside of my body (or what have you), then I would say that the essay doesn’t argue for or against it: there’s no “objective” vs “subjective” consideration as such is only via the principle of regulation and, therefore, it holds its rightful place in a subsequent essay.

Likewise, can you please elaborate on what you are referring to by “have a tool that is what it says it is”? — Bob Ross

I can't speak for Mayael but I can say how I understood his questions. By 'tools that actually exist' I understood the question to mean the same as I asked. Let's suppose that everything you wrote is the exact opposite of the truth. Let every sentence be negated. Let the principle of regulation be rejected and let sine qua nons go back to being what they were before. If we do that, what has been lost? What problems would that create for us? Is the whole thing a chimera, an airy nothing - a non-existent - a pretence? I am putting the matter more starkly - rudely - than Mayael - who in any case may not have had quite that in mind. So, for what it's worth.

By "a tool that is what it says it is" I understood to mean use of language with clear sense and purpose and without equivocation or confusion. For example:

“existence” (in an ontic sense) — Bob Ross

'Ontic' means 'related to existence' and there is no special ontic sense of the word 'existence'. Ontic existence is a kind of existence only in the way that canine dogs are a variety of dog. It's about not chucking in technical terms that lack technique - tools that don't work - or don't exist. Again, I'm not speaking for Mayael but it's my interpretation.

It's about not chucking in technical terms that lack technique - tools that don't work - or don't exist. — Cuthbert

With my scant knowledge of philosophy (or metaphysics) I can't tell whether Bob is out on the cutting edge or is being cleverly deceptive, ala Sokal affair. Has he taken simple ideas of generational derivations and convoluted them on purpose, or am I just failing to appreciate his insight?

Whatever. He has stirred up a conversation. :cool:

I can't speak for Mayael but I can say how I understood his questions. By 'tools that actually exist' I understood the question to mean the same as I asked. Let's suppose that everything you wrote is the exact opposite of the truth. Let every sentence be negated. Let the principle of regulation be rejected and let sine qua nons go back to being what they were before. If we do that, what has been lost? What problems would that create for us? Is the whole thing a chimera, an airy nothing - a non-existent - a pretence? I am putting the matter more starkly - rudely - than Mayael - who in any case may not have had quite that in mind. So, for what it's worth.

I can see how your contention is similar to Mayael’s; however, I have not understood, as of yet, Mayael to be making your contention (but I could be wrong). Thus far, I need further clarification from Mayael to help me understand what they are precisely trying to convey.

In terms of your contention, if you could please review my response here, then that would be much appreciated. Perhaps you did respond and I simply missed it?

Please feel free to refer me to your response if that is the case; otherwise, I would love to continue our conversation if you could provide a response to mine.

By "a tool that is what it says it is" I understood to mean use of language with clear sense and purpose and without equivocation or confusion

As far as I have comprehended, Mayael is speaking much more broadly than “use of language” as a tool: it seems as though, although again I could be wrong, they are speaking in terms of “a means to an end”. However, Mayael can most certainly provide an alternative definition if I am misunderstanding here.

'Ontic' means 'related to existence' and there is no special ontic sense of the word 'existence'. Ontic existence is a kind of existence only in the way that canine dogs are a variety of dog.

Let me clarify what I meant by “ontic”.

Language is utilized most definitely not used in one universal contextual sense and the most generic subdivision is “colloquial” vs “formative” usages of languages: by the former I mean a looser, but adequate for everyday life, use of a term, whereas the latter is a highly specialized and precise definition for the branch of study (or even particularized further if you will) meant for the formation of new ideas (or critiques or what have you of existing ideas within that given field). A word can quite literally be the exact same and be posited in an utterly different manners depending on the context (and each within their own rights and proper justifications).

By “ontic”, I do not merely mean “related to existence”, I mean something related to “ontology”--which is a branch of study pertaining to what “really exists”. It is, as I was utilizing it, quite literally a contextual usage that is not within the realm of colloquial use (i.e., it is within a formative sense). For example, I may proclaim to my friends, at a casual gathering, that “this cup I am holding exists” and everyone , unless it is a highly philosophical moment, will know exactly what I am referring to—as I am merely deploying the term “exists” in a loose, colloquial sense (and that is totally fine). However, that was not an ontic claim, whereas if I were to claim that noumenon, one substance, one will, etc., then that would be. Ontology is about what “really exists” as opposed to a looser, colloquial use of the term (which usually is deployed to merely depict something resides outside of imagination or what have you). Therefore, that is why I was asking for clarification and I can assure you it is no pointless, superfluous invocation of fancy terminology.

Bob

With my scant knowledge of philosophy (or metaphysics) I can't tell whether Bob is out on the cutting edge or is being cleverly deceptive, ala Sokal affair. Has he taken simple ideas of generational derivations and convoluted them on purpose, or am I just failing to appreciate his insight?

Although I may be misunderstanding, I am slowly extrapolating that you may be refraining from voicing your full concerns (pertaining to the essay) because you are not vastly knowledgeable in metaphysics: my friend, I want to clarify that I would nevertheless love to hear your contentions—regardless of your knowledge on the subject at hand. If you don’t want to, then that is completely fine as well though.

On a separate note, I can assure you that my intention is not even in the slightest to convolute a simple idea; however, if you think that is the case, then I would love to hear why! I think, with respect to the essay, it is incredibly easy to deviate from the intentions of it and, therefore, I am doing my best to be as precise as I possibly can. I think for some it is being interpreted as mere whimsical, superfluous verbiage that means arguably less than nothing, but I can assure that that is not my intention and, consequently, I am genuinely interested to hear everyone’s contentions.

Bob

Zero is powerful because it is infinity’s twin. They are equal and opposite, yin and yang. They are equally paradoxical and troubling. The biggest questions in science and religion are about nothingness and eternity, the void and the infinite, zero and infinity. The clashes over zero were the battles that shook the foundations of philosophy, of science, of mathematics, and of religion. Underneath every revolution lay a zero – and an infinity. — Charles Seife

Ontology is about what “really exists” as opposed to a looser, colloquial use of the term (which usually is deployed to merely depict something resides outside of imagination or what have you). — Bob Ross

So your cup exists but it does not really exist. It exists in a colloquial sense but not in an ontic sense.

The ontic sense is clarified by adding italicised 'really' to 'exists'. But this does not seem to add anything to the sense. I'm writing this post. Am I really writing this post? If I'm writing it, then I'm really writing it. If I'm really writing it, then I'm writing it. 'Really' is an intensifier, adding to emphasis, but not to sense.

In terms of your contention, if you could please review my response here, then that would be much appreciated. Perhaps you did respond and I simply missed it?

Please feel free to refer me to your response if that is the case; otherwise, I would love to continue our conversation if you could provide a response to mine. — Bob Ross

Thank you, I did see your response to my questions. At the risk of summarising inadequately, you seem to be saying 'wait and see how I use these concepts to make an argument in a future essay.' Fair enough. You have laid out the tools. Are they useful tools? What did you create them in order to achieve? Are they valid - do they exist? What questions or problems are you trying to address - what task did you create the tools for? You seem to be looking for validation that they are good, useful tools. I am sorry that I can get little sense out of the one you emphasise most. The principle of regulation as formulated seems not to have a clear meaning.

The only valid, thus far, determined sine qua non is that the subordinate rules cannot be affirmed and denied in accordance to the superordinate rules within the given operation of derivation; the derivation of derivation, and its recursive utilization, is this principle—which shall be termed the principle of regulation.

I asked whether this principle can be denied or asserted with equal consequence. Suppose I say - hang on, the opposite is the case - what difficulties would that create for me, what absurdities or contradictions would it land me in? In short, what problem does the principle of regulation solve?

yes that's pretty much exactly what Im trying to say

You said it more precise than I'm capable of formulating

Like you were saying this entire essay in subsequent essays might work under the rules established in the original essay and everything might function perfectly fine but like you said how do we know that it's real beyond the confinements of the essay itself like you said if we take the essay and throw it away what are we left with how does it affect other things because although it might function the way it says it will function within the essay does it actually function that way in the real world or is it just a mirage

And kudos to Bob for being so patient with us he truly has a virtuous personality LOL it's like a single daycare worker working overtime by themself with a room full of 3-year-old brats that their parents forgot to pick up from school and somehow in the midst of this he remains calm if that ain't zin then I don't know what is LOL

So add to my previous statement that I'm also trying to see why we aren't investigating if these things are even possible to know in the sense that they claim to be example being

Let's say there are two kids playing with their bicycles one kid does this cool stunt going really really fast totally impresses the other kid so when they go to school the other kid is bragging about his friend and how fast he was and says he's the fastest bicycle rider in the world now when other kids hear this they want to test him so they go out and have a little competition and he beats all of them

now does that mean he's the fastest bicycle in the world?
No not hardly however saying he's the fastest bicycle in the world is an easy thing to say and testing it it seems to be proven to be true according to their limited understanding and resources however fundamentally speaking or from a big picture standpoint it's not in the slightest bit

and accurate statement to make despite the fact it very well could be true it's most likely not for many reasons but that doesn't matter because to those kids the phrase is easy to say and the tests prove it to be true according to their limited perspective


Likewise why aren't we questioning if that is in fact what is happening with the things presented in your original essay?

I believe you answered this and you replied to me saying that that was beyond the scope of this essay which is fine if that's the case but my question is why?

Me personally I tend not to waste my time with things that aren't as true as possibly can be and I don't find interest in exercising my brain with exercises that don't actually reflect a bigger picture usability and only work within the scope of their intended use because I feel like that can create bad habits and or give a person a false sense of reality kind of like playing video games too much makes you less sociable with people because it's not a good representation of actual reality likewise I only entertain things that are as real as can be

I'm not saying I'm judging your essay by any means in a negative way I understand people like to do mental exercises for various reasons and that's totally cool I was just stating my personal preference

@MAYAEL thank you, very thoughtful post, and when we talk about patience I think you are making a better show than I can often manage! best wishes

you wouldn't say that if you were in the same car with me when I'm driving lol

So your cup exists but it does not really exist. It exists in a colloquial sense but not in an ontic sense.

The ontic sense is clarified by adding italicised 'really' to 'exists'. But this does not seem to add anything to the sense. I'm writing this post. Am I really writing this post? If I'm writing it, then I'm really writing it. If I'm really writing it, then I'm writing it. 'Really' is an intensifier, adding to emphasis, but not to sense.

I wasn’t claiming the cup does or does not exist in an ontic sense but, rather, the meaningful distinction I find between different usages of the term “existence”. Let me try to clarify with an example: let’s borrow a couple different philosophers to demonstrate what I am attempting to convey (that is, by means of my interpretations of them).

Let’s say I am holding a cup in my hand.

From my interpretation of Spinoza, he would not deny the existence of the cup in my hand as it appears, but would deny it in an ontic sense—as he would claim that the cup actually exists, in an ontic sense, as apart of one absolutely infinite substance (i.e., God).

From my interpretation of Kant, he would not deny the existence of the cup in my hand as a phenomena, but would deny it in an ontic sense—as he would claim that what exists is actually noumena, of which we can only ever know it by means of negative judgments. In other words, he would claim, in a nutshell, that the noumena conforms to the mind a priori (most notably time and space).

From my interpretation of Schopenhauer, he would deny that there is a valid separation between phenomena and noumena, and, thusly, would posit that they are the same thing; furthermore, he would posit that what actually exists, in an ontic sense, is an infinite will. In other words, the cup exists as an object (phenoma are noumena), but what really exists is an infinite, blind will.

My point here is that, to my comprehension, there’s a meaningful distinction between objects put forth in front of me and what lies at the bottom of existence (or what actually is existence); that is essentially what I am trying to convey. It is most certainly possible to assert that what “actually exists” is the same as what “exists” (which would be essentially claiming that whatever is deemed “existent” must be also in an ontic sense), but my point here is that that is not necessitous at all (personally I would find it problematic).

Are they useful tools?

“useful” is relative to the individual at hand. I can attest that I find it useful to understand, metaphysically, how derivation works, but that doesn’t necessitate that others find that useful.

What did you create them in order to achieve?

I created sine qua non (the term) and discovered whether there are any ‘true’ sine qua nons: I would clarify that I didn’t simply create the principle of regulation.

I wanted to discover whether such foundations exist, or whether it is essentially arbitrary (or contextual).

Are they valid - do they exist?

This is where, I would argue, it becomes necessary to be precise: “validity” is not necessarily linked to “existence”. One can most certainly package them together, but that is not necessary. That is why the essay proves that the principle of regulation is true (being defined precisely in the essay, which would be constituted as valid) and not what exists. So, I would answer two-fold: yes the principle of regulation is valid, and the essay doesn’t state yes or no to its existence (in an ontic sense specifically).

What questions or problems are you trying to address - what task did you create the tools for?

The task, or purpose, is to derive if there are any sine qua nons, of which one is determined to be true (i.e., principle of regulation). Given the definition of sine qua non, it essentially is meant to derive whether there are actual foundations to derivation or not. I think that is a pretty fair and important purpose, but please correct me if you think otherwise.

You seem to be looking for validation that they are good, useful tools.

Not quite, I would say. Again, the essay explicitly states that value is of no consideration therein (i.e., usefulness I would attribute to that area of discourse) and by “good”, I am not sure what you mean: can you please define it?

On the other hand, I am looking for critique of the essay, so in a way anything that remotely critiques it is fair game (so if you think the essay should address its usefulness or unusefulness, then that would be a fair critique to explore!).

But the essay proves, as it has been written as of yet, that the principle of regulation is true. Not that it is useful.

I am sorry that I can get little sense out of the one you emphasise most. The principle of regulation as formulated seems not to have a clear meaning.

By “the one you emphasise most”, I am starting to suspect that you may be under the impression that the essay proves multiple sine qua nons: it only proves one (i.e., principle of regulation). So I just wanted to clarify that that is the only one proven.

In terms of not having a clear meaning: how so?

I asked whether this principle can be denied or asserted with equal consequence. Suppose I say - hang on, the opposite is the case - what difficulties would that create for me, what absurdities or contradictions would it land me in?

The absurdity would be that the denial of the principle of regulation thereby utilizes it. However, it is still, nevertheless, possible for someone to simply reject it (as anyone can reject anything). I am not positing that the principle of regulation is something which can be separated from the subject at hand. For example, if we were to debate about whether redness is an inherent property of the cup I am holding, then we could, upon ending our discussion, continue our lives without such a consideration—as many concepts are completely independent of whether redness is an inherent property of a cup. This is not the case with the principle of regulation: if I reject, then I used it (and vice versa)--but that doesn’t negate the possibility of someone simply living their life ignorant (willfully or not) of their utilization thereof. Maybe that clarification will help resolve some of the confusion; otherwise, feel free to hammer me harder.

Bob

Like you were saying this entire essay in subsequent essays might work under the rules established in the original essay and everything might function perfectly fine but like you said how do we know that it's real beyond the confinements of the essay itself like you said if we take the essay and throw it away what are we left with how does it affect other things because although it might function the way it says it will function within the essay does it actually function that way in the real world or is it just a mirage

Within the essay, it is proven to be true. I am arguing for its proof as utilized as an unbounded infinite, which quite literally means that someone cannot even posit what “is real” without its underlying (or overlying) utilization. Even if someone were to negate the entire thing, then I would argue they still utilized it. Does that sort of answer your question?

And kudos to Bob for being so patient with us he truly has a virtuous personality LOL it's like a single daycare worker working overtime by themself with a room full of 3-year-old brats that their parents forgot to pick up from school and somehow in the midst of this he remains calm if that ain't zin then I don't know what is LOL

I appreciate the compliment, but I wouldn’t regard anyone in this discussion board (thus far) as a “brat”: I think that some of my contenders are conceptualization the essay in a different light than I am, which more conversations will help each of us understand each other better.

Let's say there are two kids playing with their bicycles one kid does this cool stunt going really really fast totally impresses the other kid so when they go to school the other kid is bragging about his friend and how fast he was and says he's the fastest bicycle rider in the world now when other kids hear this they want to test him so they go out and have a little competition and he beats all of them

now does that mean he's the fastest bicycle in the world?

The claim that this kid is the fastest bicycle rider in the world is false, because we can prove it. For example, let’s say we are constituting the fastest by means of the current record holder. If that is the case, then we can prove, deductively, that he is not when we time him and find out it is nowhere near the world record.

Likewise, let’s take this more literally: let’s say, by “fastest bicycle rider in the world”, we mean that literally out of every single person on the planet they are the fastest. Now, the world record is usually recorded in a manner that requires a hierarchical competitive structure, which usually omits people who didn’t have the opportunity to race. There are many factors that go into bicycle races, which I will spare you the boredom of meticulously exposing. My point here would be that we deductively know that the claim, as posited now, is an induction; that is, the premises do not necessitate the conclusion and, therefore, we cannot know that anyone is the fastest bicycle rider in the world right now.

This is not the case whatsoever with the essay (I would argue) that I wrote. It is proved deductively (which rules out the idea of my second aforementioned example of an inductive argument) by means of proving it to be true and, therefore, it is not open ended like the bicycle example.

Likewise why aren't we questioning if that is in fact what is happening with the things presented in your original essay?

Questioning anything within the essay to be true or false is perfectly within the scope of the essay, and, furthermore, I would love if you did!

However, right now, I don’t think you have contended with the actual proof in the essay, which is meant to prove it is true. If you think that the essay is not, in fact, proving that it is true, then I would love to hear why!

I believe you answered this and you replied to me saying that that was beyond the scope of this essay which is fine if that's the case but my question is why?

So, what I meant is that epistemology and ontology are out of the bounds of the essay (i.e., “is it known?”, “does it exist?”). However, questioning its truth (as in, whether it is true) is perfectly within the scope of the essay. Although I may be misremembering, I don’t think you have actually, as of yet, argued why it is false (or, at least, if not false, why it isn’t proven to be true).

The essay is most certainly meant to prove that the principle of regulation is true.

Me personally I tend not to waste my time with things that aren't as true as possibly can be and I don't find interest in exercising my brain with exercises that don't actually reflect a bigger picture usability and only work within the scope of their intended use because I feel like that can create bad habits and or give a person a false sense of reality kind of like playing video games too much makes you less sociable with people because it's not a good representation of actual reality likewise I only entertain things that are as real as can be

So, you seem to be using “as true as possibly can be” and “real as can be” synonymously; however, I am merely clarifying that (1) the principle of regulation is argued as true, and (2) epistemic and ontic claims are beyond the scope of the essay. Let me know if I need to clarify further on this, as I may still just be misunderstanding you.

I'm not saying I'm judging your essay by any means in a negative way I understand people like to do mental exercises for various reasons and that's totally cool I was just stating my personal preference

I totally understand! I think the more we discuss, the better we will be able to narrow down our differences and potentially come to an agreement!

Bob

@MAYAEL & @Cuthbert,

I would also like to clarify that, despite ontology and epistemology being considered out of bounds of the essay, I don't want you to feel like you cannot argue for why it should be a consideration (if that is something either of you wish to do). As of now, they are considered beyond the scope, which I can elaborate further if either of you would like, but I am completely open to any counter arguments you may feel inclined to provide.

Bob

why are they beyond the scope?

And with my bicycle analogy I totally agree with your reply on it and how we would conclude that he is nowhere near the fastest bicycle rider in the world that's the same way I would have come the same conclusion I agree with you on that however my point to that was that based on their limited abilities being young kids let's assume this was before cell phones in the internet being the people that they are (adolescents) they do not have all the same tools at their fingertips that adults and modern times have and so their perspective and their way of testing the hypothesis is a very limited small barbaric kids version

and that was the point that I was trying to use to compare is that you're giving parameters and limitations and within those parameters and limitations the tools appear to be real and do work in the manner that they need to because when we question them we're questioning them within the parameters you've set and when we do that they are rendered as real and usable and good but is that only because we're stuck within that narrow parameter? If we were to expand further past would we find something else? That was the point in my analogy of that

Now I'm by no means calling your essay limited stupid youthful barbaric or any of those other things by any means it's actually way more complex than my brain is used to dealing with but I was simply using the analogy in comparison of limitations not of complexity by any means.


But regardless you're still not getting the point that I'm trying to convey and I'm having hard time trying to figure out how to convey it so bear with me while I try to gather my thoughts

why are they beyond the scope?

The reason that the consideration of what exists and what is known (or lack thereof) is outside the scope of the essay is because to conclude anything with respect to either is to import an epistemology and/or ontology, which the essay is not aimed to lock anyone into or against any given epistemology or ontology; for the essay pertains not to derivation (which is what would be utilized to construct any resemblance of either) but, rather, the process of derivation itself and, therefore, the essay is true regardless of what one posits for either. Derive that this particular epistemology is most suiting to you and it will have no direct relevance to the principle of regulation; derive that this particular epistemology is not suiting, downright false, absurd, etc. and, likewise, it will have no effect on the principle of regulation (nor sine qua nons). Same goes for ontology, logical languages (i.e., theories of logic), etc.

In attempt to resolve some of the confusion, let me try to explain what I think you are asking and, thereafter, you correct me where I am wrong. Moreover, let me, for the sake of the conversation, step past the bounds of the essay to hopefully help guide the discussion.

I think that you are essentially inquiring how one can truly deem any given proposition true given the fact that they are limited in their faculties of reason and, therefore, it could be entirely possible that one is really analogous to a child who is right given the context of their limited faculty, but, on the contrary, wrong in relation to an adult (who is typically capable of much more sophisticated reasoning).

If I am understanding you correctly, then here is my response:

Firstly, this can be posited for any given theory, statement, assertion, etc. For example, one can most certainly question whether humanity can deem something true of anything: is Special Relativity true or are we simply like children that think they are the best bicycle rider? How can we be certain, in other words, that some of the top discoveries, the top minds, aren’t just ignorant of their child like boasting?

Secondly, I think this is, abstractly, really an issue pertaining to the postulation of something outside, or completely transcendent, of oneself: truth, knowledge, existence, etc. For the sake of conversation, let me step outside of the bounds of the essay and acknowledge that any of the aforementioned (i.e., truth, knowledge, existence, etc.) can be viewed, prima facea, as transcendent of oneself. If one does that, then they are faced with this dilemma I believe you are voicing: how do we ever know, prove to be true, or claim existence to anything when we cannot be certain that what we deem so truly coincides with that transcendent truth, knowledge, existence, etc. The problem here, I would say, is that, in a deeper sense (i.e., not prima facea), nothing transcends reason (in relation to the subject at hand): not even the very concept of nothingness. There is no transcendent truth, knowledge, existence, etc. It is a contradiction in terms to hypothesize about something “sans reason” when reason was what derived “sans itself”.

So, when I claim that the principle of regulation is “true”, I do not mean “truth” in the sense of something which transcends, in relation to me, myself, nor, in relation to you, yourself. To be honest, it’s not that I would deem it a figment of the imagination but, rather, simply a contradiction in terms.

and that was the point that I was trying to use to compare is that you're giving parameters and limitations and within those parameters and limitations the tools appear to be real and do work in the manner that they need to because when we question them we're questioning them within the parameters you've set and when we do that they are rendered as real and usable and good but is that only because we're stuck within that narrow parameter?

I can only ever provide what I deem worthy as true, which could be false (I don’t consider myself God (; ). Furthermore, I cannot prove it aligns with some sort of transcendent of myself “truth”, if that is what you are asking. In terms of the simple child analogy, I can deem it to be proven to consume all derivation, which removes the possibility for its exclusion; however, I could be wrong (as always).

If we were to expand further past would we find something else?

There’s two ways I am interpreting this: (1) expansion in the sense of allowing other considerations (e.g., importing a wide range of other held view, beliefs, etc.) and (2) the expansion of the understanding (i.e., reevaluation in hindsight).

In terms of #1, I think it is proved in the essay that expanding into other considerations is all in vain—for all of those importations would be via derivation, which the process of which is performed via the PoR. If there’s anything you would like to introduce into the mix in terms of consideration that you think would potentially invalidate my essay, then please do!

In terms of #2, I cannot, in all honesty, ever solidify any of my views as 100% guaranteed to be right, in the sense that I could guarantee that I will never be able to negate my current views. So, in this regard, I don’t really see it as an issue as this can be posited for anything.

The hidden #3 would be, I would say, the idea of expansion into what transcends the subject at hand—such as a “truth” which is “sans subject”. I think I already addressed this: there’s no such thing. However, I want to clear that, in some of this, I am overstepping the bounds of what is required to prove PoR: one can hold there are truly transcendent “truth” via PoR.

Now I'm by no means calling your essay limited stupid youthful barbaric or any of those other things by any means it's actually way more complex than my brain is used to dealing with but I was simply using the analogy in comparison of limitations not of complexity by any means.

No worries! I completely understand!

But regardless you're still not getting the point that I'm trying to convey and I'm having hard time trying to figure out how to convey it so bear with me while I try to gather my thoughts

Let me know if I did a more adequate job at addressing your contentions. If I am still completely missing the mark, then please correct me as you deem fit.

Bob

bam! You hit the nail on the head! That's what I was trying to ask and you answered it very well I might add.

So now hmmmmm... So then whats the next essay? I'm dying to see how this all ties into the next part not that I'm smart enough to know how to do anything with it LOL but nonetheless I'll pretend like I am lol

My point here is that, to my comprehension, there’s a meaningful distinction between objects put forth in front of me and what lies at the bottom of existence (or what actually is existence); that is essentially what I am trying to convey. — Bob Ross

True. The dark side of the moon exists and it is not an object put forth in front of you.

It is most certainly possible to assert that what “actually exists” is the same as what “exists” (which would be essentially claiming that whatever is deemed “existent” must be also in an ontic sense), but my point here is that that is not necessitous at all (personally I would find it problematic)

On this view, from the proposition that X exists we may not infer that X actually exists - it is not 'necessitous.' That's awkward. If you have a theory that your cup may not actually exist (having proposed it yourself as a straighforward example of something that uncontroversially does exist) then you've made a muddle. To ask "What does it mean for something to exist?" is sensible enough. To give an answer that denies actual existence to the very thing you have chosen as an example of something that exists is confused. The theory is invoked to elucidate a given fact - if it turns out that the fact is inconsistent with the theory then I think it's the theory that has to give way.

It may be that your cup exists but that your cup is not the thing that I think it is. Just as, for example, stars exist but stars are not the things that the ancients thought they were. They may not even be the things that we think they are.

The only valid, thus far, determined sine qua non is that the subordinate rules cannot be affirmed and denied in accordance to the superordinate rules within the given operation of derivation; the derivation of derivation, and its recursive utilization, is this principle—which shall be termed the principle of regulation.

The essay is most certainly meant to prove that the principle of regulation is true. — Bob Ross

You think it's clear but I say needs an example or two. E.g. a 'subordinate rule' is 'Don't walk on the grass' and a 'superordinate rule' is 'Notices in this park are posted with authority of the Town Council'. 'Derivation' is 'If p, then q. p. Therefore q.' 'Derivation of derivation' is 'If 'if p, then q. p. Therefore q', then 'If p, then q. Not-q. Therefore not p'. 'Recursive' means, well, I don't have an example. A 'sine qua non' is for example. Examples are the baby-walkers of the mind.

You do give an example of a superordinate rule:

“1” and “1” are identical but not indiscernible.

What makes this a rule? What makes it superordinate?

It looks like a proposition. I have say it also looks false. I take 'indiscernible' to mean 'impossible to tell the difference between'. I have never been able to tell the difference between "1" and "1" or between 1 and 1. I can tell the difference between several instances of mentioning the number 1. I would happily buy the proposition that 1 is identical with 1 and that to mention "1" at the start of a sentence is different from mentioning it at the end. Is that what you mean? If so, that seems OK, but it does not look like a rule. It looks like an observation helping to distinguish an entity from the mention of an entity.

Can I posit a context sans PoR? No, and that is my point. — Bob Ross

I entertain hope that your above claim expresses a/the crux of your essay's purpose. In line with this assessment, your premise says,

PoR can never be excluded from context. Proving this logically renders PoR as sine qua non WRT context.

Does this imply the concomitant> Derivation can never be excluded from context.

Does this lead us to> Context contains at least (2) sine qua nons: PoR & Derivation

Does this lead us to> Context contains at least (3) sine qua nons: PoR, Derivation & Time

If you can prove this, do you have a set foundational to logic?

Since these questions are whoppers, let's focus on PoR.

Please elaborate how regulate & modulate compare.

Please elaborate how PoR & PoM compare.

bam! You hit the nail on the head! That's what I was trying to ask and you answered it very well I might add.

I am glad I finally was able to understand and address your contentions properly!

So now hmmmmm... So then whats the next essay? I'm dying to see how this all ties into the next part not that I'm smart enough to know how to do anything with it LOL but nonetheless I'll pretend like I am lol

The next essay will pertain to the investigation of the obligation to affirm PoR (or lack thereof) and the consequences of affirming PoR. However, I do not want to actually spend the time writing it until I think that all the contentions with this essay are resolved (someone may convince me that I am partially or holistically wrong, which would render any further essay that builds off of it useless to me).

Bob

On this view, from the proposition that X exists we may not infer that X actually exists - it is not 'necessitous.' That's awkward. If you have a theory that your cup may not actually exist (having proposed it yourself as a straighforward example of something that uncontroversially does exist) then you've made a muddle.

I would say not quite. “existence” is indexical: is it awkward that I can refer to different people with the same word ‘he’? I personally don’t think so. I can posit, without contradiction, that the cup in my hand “exists” (by constituting, for example, its existence as phenomenal) while denying it as existing in an ontic sense. I gave a couple examples, such as Spinoza to illustrate this clear distinction: do you disagree with that distinction as demonstrated in the examples? If I were to posit, for example, that the cup in my hand exists (contextually to phenomena), but really exists as one infinite substance, then, regardless to its truth, there is a distinction being made there within the concept of “existence”. Another example is that a cup may exist in the sense that I can interact with it, yet not exist sans my consciousness. Again, just an example of how there is a distinction here to be made.

To ask "What does it mean for something to exist?" is sensible enough. To give an answer that denies actual existence to the very thing you have chosen as an example of something that exists is confused.

It is confusing if and only if one is conceptualizing “existence” as one universal context (as opposed to separate contexts). Again, I can say “this thing exists as a phenomena and not as a noumena”.

It may be that your cup exists but that your cup is not the thing that I think it is. Just as, for example, stars exist but stars are not the things that the ancients thought they were. They may not even be the things that we think they are.

I think that if one is to accept that something may not exist as they deem it, then there’s necessarily a split between “existence” which I constitute of things and “existence” as things-in-themselves (or potentially things from someone else’s perspective or what have you). If you are, on the other hand, uniting “existence” under one context, then I don’t see how you can state “this star exists as X, but its actual existence could be completely unrelated to my conjecture”: there’s an implicit separation into two contexts there.

You think it's clear but I say needs an example or two. E.g. a 'subordinate rule' is 'Don't walk on the grass' and a 'superordinate rule' is 'Notices in this park are posted with authority of the Town Council'. 'Derivation' is 'If p, then q. p. Therefore q.' 'Derivation of derivation' is 'If 'if p, then q. p. Therefore q', then 'If p, then q. Not-q. Therefore not p'. 'Recursive' means, well, I don't have an example. A 'sine qua non' is for example. Examples are the baby-walkers of the mind.

There is an example in the essay (as you note later on), but I suspect you found it unsatisfactory (which is totally fine).

An example of a subordinate rule can most certainly be ‘Don’t walk on the grass’ and a superordinate rule, contextually to that subordinate rule, could be “because notices in this park are posted with authority of the Town Council”. I don’t see anything wrong with this example if it makes more sense to you (it’s perfectly fine). I would note that this can be continued further (if one wants) to question the authority of the sign, etc. and through the whole process, continually, one is performing it via PoR.

By “derivation of derivation”, I mean to derive “derivation” itself. So, instead of discussing whether a particular set of premises and conclusions are true, it is a consideration of the process of derivation itself (i.e., how is derivation itself possible?). If conceptualizing that as specifically “if p, then q. p therefore q” for derivation and “if if p then q. p therefore q, then p. p therefore q” as second order derivation (i.e., derivation of derivation) then that is fine: that would be an example within the realm of “logic”, which is a form of derivation.

By “recursive utilization”, I mean that the idea is to abstract up to higher orders of derivation until (if at all) we reach a recursive use forever. By “recursion”, I mean, like a program, the utilization of itself by itself. This is most common in software engineering, wherein programmers will code functions that invoke themselves some finite set of times. However, within the essay, it would be a recursive use for an unbounded infinite (that is, to be more precise, an unbounded infinite of negations). A sine qua non is not an example, I would say, of a recursive principle, as it is merely a definition: without which, not. If some principle were to exhibit that sort of concept (i.e., sine qua non), then it would be an example of a recursive principle that is unbounded infinite of negations. It is entirely possible to have finite set of recursions, like in programming, which is not the focus of a sine qua non.

What makes this a rule? What makes it superordinate?

The reason it was a superordinate rule was because it was, within the context of the example, “a regulating principle (rule) having greater importance or rank as another”. In other words, it was meant as an example of an explication of the implicit overlying guiding affirmations of the subordinate rule (in this case: 1 = 1 was the subordinate rule, which can be also simply noted as an conclusion).

It looks like a proposition. I have say it also looks false

As noted explicitly in the essay, the focus of the example is not the truth or falsity of the derivation, it was about the higher principles involved: it is about what is occurring for the derivation to occur:

“However, before the demonstration, a couple clarifications must be noted. Firstly, the proof of the principle of regulation has no bearing on the derivation demonstrated in the example but, rather, on the higher form of derivation itself; that is, the higher procedure, as abstracted, utilized to perform derivation itself. Therefore, the reader is urged to focus heavily on the higher principle(s) engaged in the derivation of derivation as opposed to focusing on the derivation.”

You can most certainly negate my example derivation (for example, that “1” and “1” are actually indiscernable as opposed to what I claimed) by means of deriving that conclusion which, in turn, inevitably is by means of the PoR. The point is the overarching process in play, not the specific conclusions themselves. With that being said, let me address your contentions with the derivation:

I take 'indiscernible' to mean 'impossible to tell the difference between'. I have never been able to tell the difference between "1" and "1" or between 1 and 1. I can tell the difference between several instances of mentioning the number 1. I would happily buy the proposition that 1 is identical with 1 and that to mention "1" at the start of a sentence is different from mentioning it at the end. Is that what you mean?

I mean more of what you said at the end there: the law of identity. That is, we use 1 and 1 interchangeably for most situations but understand that they are discernible. As you noted, location and time are arguably the two biggest factors that make 1 and 1 most definitely not equivocal. Nevertheless, I am still able to postulate, assert, command, state, etc. that 1 = 1.

If so, that seems OK, but it does not look like a rule. It looks like an observation helping to distinguish an entity from the mention of an entity.

By “rule”, I mean “a regulating principle”. Within the context of my derivation in the example, 1 and 1 being identical but not indiscernible was the superordinate rule guiding my conclusion that 1 = 1 (in part); in other words, a regulative principle determining the course of my derivation. Does that make more sense? If not, let me know!

Bob

I entertain hope that your above claim expresses a/the crux of your essay's purpose.

I think that the two biggest cruces are (1) whether the individual at hand can transcend their own context (which is what you and Philosophim brought up, I would say) and (2) whether the idea of the essay preceding “logical languages” (or theories of logic) is question begging. Those, I would say, are the most concerning aspects, fundamentally, of the essay. So I would agree with you on that.

PoR can never be excluded from context

I agree, but I want to clarify that, more abstractly, it is “PoR can never be excluded”--it isn’t just contexts. For example:

Proving this logically renders PoR as sine qua non WRT context.

I am not sure what “WRT” stands for, but a sine qua non has no prepositions (as noted in the essay), so it is not sine qua non of WRT context. This may be me just splitting hairs though, because a context that is universal I really wouldn’t constitute as a context, but if that is what you mean, then I would agree in saying that PoR is a sine qua non (without a preposition).

Does this imply the concomitant> Derivation can never be excluded from context.
Does this lead us to> Context contains at least (2) sine qua nons: PoR & Derivation

Although I completely understand why you were inclined to conclude this, I don’t think it is correct. Firstly, a sine qua non is “without which, not” (where “not” is an unbounded infinite negative) and, therefore, the possibility of “without PoR, not derivation” invalidates “derivation” as being a sine qua non. Secondly, this is exactly why, derivation not being a sine qua non, produces the possibility that someone can completely remove it within their derivation (no matter how irrational it may be, as someone else could easily mention that I just literally said “someone can remove derivation from their derivation”), whereas they cannot remove PoR without utilizing it. Let me know if I need to explain more, as this is definitely where it starts becoming necessary to be precise with my terminology.

Likewise, time is by no means something one can posit as sine qua non, as “without PoR, not time” and, honestly, there are many principles that are required for it to be affirmed in the first place (i.e., faculties of reason which allow one to determine that time is enveloping of oneself, or that there is a non-temporal true claim, or neither true nor false, etc.).

I think where you may be misstepping (or I may just be wrong) is that the essay does not utilize a logical language and, therefore, many axioms that most people are more than comfortable swiftly deploying is beyond my reach in the essay. All that is utilized is the use of PoR to derive if there are any sine qua nons and, thereafter, the proof of one.

Likewise, you may have also noticed that it isn’t logically (meaning from a constructed logical language) coherent (at least on most logical theories) to claim multiple sine qua nons as true—for if there existed two then they are thereby not sine qua nons (that’s a contradiction). In other words, if a sine qua non is “without which not”, if we allow ourselves the importation of useful logical axioms, then only one can be true by definition (otherwise we have a situation where two principles are supposed to be negatable in relation to one another, but yet the source of an unbounded infinite of negations respectively). However, this is not argued for in the essay because it is, albeit enticing, something which would require the use of logical axioms and, therefore, I don’t think, as of yet, it can be argued for.

Please elaborate how regulate & modulate compare.

By “modulate”, what are you referring to? I am not completely following.

Bob