Lets look at another example typically given to say that we are only sure or our sense data but not the thing-in-itself. Take a table in the middle of the room, we look at it and say the color is brown. However, it we get real close to it it seems to be grayish brown, and the time a day changes and lighting of the rooms changes the table looks reddish. Is it reasonable to then conclude, “see, this proves that we can never know the actual/the real color of the table, the thing-in-itself.” — Richard B

I think that our understanding of visual perception, of electromagnetic radiation, of electrons absorbing and scattering photons, etc. shows that it's a category error to talk of external world objects as having a colour-property. Take for example this photo:



It's not the case that either humans or birds (or both) are seeing the wrong colour. It's just the case that humans and birds have a different brain and eye structure, and so different sense data is triggered by the same stimulus.

You agree with phenomenalism because of subatomic particles? — Tate

I think that the science of the Standard Model shows that the character of our experiences and the nature of the mind-independent world is very different.

the phenomenal character of experience is not a property of mind-independent objects. — Michael

And

I think that our modern understanding of science shows that both a) and b) are true. — Michael

I think there are two problems with this view:

1. Difficult to understand how a scientist would observe a subject’s phenomenal character of experience since it is private to the subject.

2. Assuming that 1. Is achievable, how can a scientist compare it if mind independent objects are not directly accessible according to phenomenology

1. Difficult to understand how a scientist would observe a subject’s phenomenal character of experience since it is private to the subject.

2. Assuming that 1. Is achievable, how can a scientist compare it if mind independent objects are not directly accessible according to phenomenology — Richard B

We're able to ask people what they see. For example, there was the infamous photo of a dress that some people saw as white and gold and some as black and blue. Of course, we can never look through someone's eyes to see what they see, and it's entirely possible that everyone saw the same colours and yet described what they see differently, but I think it more reasonable to just accept that different people saw different colours.

And this itself, I think, is evidence against direct realism. Given that the character of each group's experiences were different, for at least one group either a) the properties of the mind-independent object weren't present in their experience or b) the phenomenal character of their experience was not a property of the mind-independent object (or both). Unless you want to argue that the mind-independent object was in some sort of superposition of being both white and gold and black and blue, with each group having direct access to one "version"? But that seems like quite the reach.

I think that the science of the Standard Model shows that the character of our experiences and the nature of the mind-independent world is very different. — Michael

Why do you have confidence the standard model if you learned about it through your senses?

Why do you have confidence the standard model if you learned about it through your senses? — Tate

Why wouldn't I?

Why wouldn't I? — Michael

Because:

the properties of mind-independent objects are not present in the experience — Michael

I mean, if this is true, then how do you know about mind independent objects? What source of knowledge do you have other than your senses? How does this other source support your belief in mind independent objects?

I mean, if this is true, then how do you know about mind independent objects? — Tate

They're inferred as it can be considered the best explanation for the occurrence and regularity of experience. Of course, some don't think this inference warranted and so opt for idealism instead. But I'm not sure I'm willing to commit to that.

They're inferred as it can be considered the best explanation for the occurrence and regularity of experience. Of course, some don't think this inference warranted — Michael

Why do you think it's warranted?

Why do you think it's warranted? — Tate

I'm undecided actually. I just find it simpler to argue for indirect realism than for idealism. There's at least some common ground with the direct realist that makes for fruitful discussion.

I'm undecided actually. I just find it simpler to argue for indirect realism than for idealism. There's at least some common ground with the direct realist that makes for fruitful discussion. — Michael

Is it a matter of temperament? Indirect realism just suits you better?

Unless you want to argue that the mind-independent object was in some sort of superposition of being both white and gold and black and blue, with each group having direct access to one "version"? But that seems like quite the reach. — Michael

Is this quite a reach?



I think we would both agree that the sense data is exactly the same whether you call it a image of a duck or an image of a rabbit.

Is it a matter of temperament? Indirect realism just suits you better? — Tate

I choose to argue for indirect realism because it's easier than arguing for idealism. What I actually believe is irrelevant.

Let try the link again

https://images.app.goo.gl/HXd9kw7vuDCTQ1Tq9

I choose to argue for indirect realism because it's easier than arguing for idealism. What I actually believe is irrelevant. — Michael

But what do you actually believe?

I think we would both agree that the sense data is exactly the same whether you call it a image of a duck or an image of a rabbit. — Richard B

I don't know. Perhaps we see different colours. Perhaps it's darker for me. Perhaps it's smaller for me. Perhaps your sense data is vertically or horizontally mirrored to mine. Perhaps all the lines are straight for me.

Regardless, even if in this case our sense data is the same, direct realism wouldn't follow. What you appear to be doing here is denying the antecedent. That two people having a different character experience shows that the mind-independent object isn't present in at least one of their experiences isn't that two people having the same character experience shows that the mind-independent object is present in both of their experiences. You might as well say that because everyone who sees the dress as black and blue sees the dress as black and blue then a mind-independent black and blue dress is present in the experience, ignoring the fact that there are (or can be) people who see the dress as white and gold.

Please explain what direct access means. — Richard B

In means no intermediary. I take it I have direct access to what my eyes see, my mind thinks, etc.

We do, in fact, not experience reality past our senses — Christoffer

Yes.

We don't have to accept the illogical conclusion of reality only existing because of our perception of reality in order to accept the importance of differentiating perception versus actual reality. — Christoffer

And yes, again.

Is it reasonable to then conclude, “see, this proves that we can never know the actual/the real color of the table, the thing-in-itself.” — Richard B

It's reasonable to believe the table has no color independent of us.
A color-blind person does not see the table's color as we do.
An alien who sees in the infrared or ultraviolet or x-ray bands of the electromagnetic spectrum would see the table quite differently. Look at an infrared image of the table. Does the image show the table's "true" color? No, because the table has no true color independent of the perceiving being.

Does the image show the table's "true" color? No, because the table has no true color independent of the perceiving being. — Art48

Ok, but this does prove there is anything we don't have access to when it comes to “the table”. Like my example with car painted in ChromaFlair, the car has multiple colors depending on the light and the angle of perceiver, but it does not follow that I don't have direct access to car, that there is something additional called the thing-in-itself.

In means no intermediary. I take it I have direct access to what my eyes see, my mind thinks, etc. — Art48

Ok, your eyes don't see sense data of trees, they see trees. You mind constructs the idea of sense data of trees. This seems consistent with your views. Thus, you have direct access.

Ok, but this does prove there is anything we don't have access to — Richard B

We have indirect access to physical objects.

Ok, your eyes don't see sense data of trees, they see trees. — Richard B

My eyes only see light. If free-standing 3D holograms existed indistinguishable from real trees, my eyes would see exactly the same thing.

My eyes only see light. If free-standing 3D holograms existed indistinguishable from real trees, my eyes would see exactly the same thing. — Art48

All this shows is that we need to do a little more investigation into whether it is a real tree or a fake tree. However, it does not show we lack direct access to an external world or to a tree or the thing-in-itself.

What is this thing-in-itself that I do have direct access? To use my house example, it is like you are saying, I don’t have direct access to the house because I need to indirectly access it by climbing thru the second floor window and all along you don't have a front door. I think you can say you have direct access thru the second floor window.

Isn't the scientific data about things that are past your senses? — Tate

Such information isn't sensory information, but complex information that is backed up with mathematical logic. Our perception of an apple doesn't explain how outside objects can scan and analyze the apple arriving at repeatable conclusions. The end result is that the apple is still the apple, regardless of our perception of that apple. It might look vastly different from other perceptual perspectives, but if we and a bunch of aliens, with extremely different perceptions, were to analyze the apple, even with different types of tools, it would still confirm the existence of an object that we could apply definitions to that are descriptive of what we define as an apple. The aliens would also reach conclusions of the object, therefore the object exists outside of our perception, regardless of our experience of the object.

You may be right. :grin:

Our perception of an apple doesn't explain how outside objects can scan and analyze the apple arriving at repeatable conclusions. — Christoffer

Can you give an example of an outside object (without just being programmed to detect what humans already think of as apples) detect apples. I can't think of a single example.

without just being programmed to detect what humans already think of as apples) — Isaac

Again, "Science has made me into a skeptic".

If that was true, you would have become skeptical about the scientific findings as well and arrived at the top of the ladder. :razz:

Indeed, science is based on human perception, logic and imagination. So if human perception, logic and imagination are deemed problematic, then so should science be.

Indeed, science is based on human perception, logic and imagination. So if human perception, logic and imagination are deemed problematic, then so should science be. — Olivier5

Exactly!

A fairly obvious point when you think of it, but then few people do think of it.

A fairly obvious point when you think of it, but then few people do think of it. — Olivier5

I think of it as like being in a room and you're really preoccupied with something fascinating. Every now and then you glance at the walls and realize there's something wrong, but you don't pursue it. You just go back to being fascinated.

If you spend time allowing yourself to know what's wrong with the walls, you just laugh, and go right back. Do you know what I mean?

I think of it as like being in a room and you're really preoccupied with something fascinating. Every now and then you glance at the walls and realize there's something wrong, but you don't pursue it. You just go back to being fascinated. — Tate

Something like this?