In philosophy there is space for 'the unconditioned' — Wayfarer
There is also the fundamental philosophical maxim, 'know thyself' with the concommitant emphasis on self-awareness — Wayfarer
in this discipline 'we are that which we seek to know'. — Wayfarer
what we perceive is experienced as being perceived immediately, or do you experience some time lag between turning to look at, say, a tree and seeing it? — Janus
As to how it "informs my art" it's the difference between accepting what you perceive just as it immediately appears to you, giving yourself over to it and becoming absorbed in it — Janus
Whenever a terminological framework has the purpose of explaining human consciousness(meaningful human experience) and/or other kinds of consciousness(such as non-human meaningful experience), and it is based upon either internal/external, or physical/non-physical, or even perhaps both, then those practices are doomed to fail as a result of not having the explanatory power to be able to take proper account of that which consists of both internal and external things, physical and non-physical things. — creativesoul
Meaningful experience exists in its entirety, in simpler forms, prior to our knowledge. <-------That's the pivotal ontological consideration which ought inform the selection/creation of our terminological framework. — creativesoul
1) the science of Markov blankets doesn't directly address the philosophical issue of subjective experience (as explained in the first paper) — Michael
2) colour terms like "red" don't (only) refer to some property held by some external world cause but (also) by something that happens "in the head" (even if you want to reduce qualia/first-person experiences to be something of the sort described in the second paper). — Michael
We need to understand the meta-problem in a way that is (broadly speaking) behavioral rather than making essential reference to phenomenal experience itself. In practice, this means the goal is to explain the things we say and do, while bracketing the question of whether or not they reflect phenomenal experience.
seeing red and feeling pain (just like seeing dogs, cats, vicars, and even (Letheby and Gerrans (2017)) having a sense of self) are themselves inferred causes.
Instead, our brains construct qualia as ‘latent variables’ – inferred causes in our best ‘generative model’ (more on that later) of embodied interactions with the world.
.Qualia – just like dogs and cats – are part of the inferred suite of hidden causes
in perception, we seem to become highly confident of something, where that something does not quite mandate high-level beliefs about the state of the distal world itself
not some kind of raw datum on which to predicate inferences about the state of body and world.
the claim is that qualitative contents reflect mid-level sensory encodings apt for the selection of local action, and/or steeped in interoceptive information. These strikingly certain, sensorially-rich content states are then mistaken for something else (something ‘beyond content’) when we engage in certain kinds of imaginative exercise that hold them fixed while varying the distal realm
What is at question is the truth or falsity of the models, in the sense of correspondence, and that is whether the models are a fair representation of what is supposed to be being modeled. — Metaphysician Undercover
That is exactly the evidence I have been giving you — Metaphysician Undercover
I clearly indicated that overlapping does not prevent a system from being defined. I said it prevents a system from being defined as "discrete" — Metaphysician Undercover
do you see that the "cell membrane" in your example is a third thing? — Metaphysician Undercover
the definitions employed by systems theorists are false premises — Metaphysician Undercover
when the system acts in a way such that it is influenced (caused) to behave in a way which is neither the result of observable external causes, nor the system itself (2nd law), then we ought to conclude internal causes which are not part of the system itself. To conclude "hidden" external causes is a false conclusion, because properly designed experiments have the capacity to exclude the possibility of unobservable external causes. — Metaphysician Undercover
by your description, it is not inside the system, it is the boundary. — Metaphysician Undercover
you did say neither one nor the other of the two possible explanatory methodologies — Mww
If it be agreeable that the domain of philosophy is rational thought in accordance with logical law, and the domain of science is empirical experiment in accordance with natural law, and furthermore that no human ever performed an experiment without first thinking how it should be done in order to facilitate an expected outcome.....we arrive at both a clear chronological succession and a clear methodological distinction — Mww
If that were true, there would never be such a thing as a paradigm shift, whether in science, ethics, metaphysics or anything else. If there ever was that which is sufficient reason to cause the collapse of an antecedent condition, then that thing could not be contained in that which collapsed. — Mww
Is it a far-fetched personal cognitive prejudice, or is it a case of the more things change, the more they stay the same? — Mww
If you were arguing that all of us should abandon realism and avoid the tendency to use terms that suggest we believe there is an unshackled truth beyond our models I’m all for that. By all means challenge me whenever I let such vocabulary slip in. — Joshs
if I understand you correctly,
you believe such realist terms SHOULD be part of our scientific and philosophical claims — Joshs
anything we say about such a cultural-independent realm is contingent on and relative to our practices, which are always changing. — Joshs
Any claim of an asymptotic movement of scientific knowledge toward representation of something independent of that movement itself is a claim within a practice that is itself changing — Joshs
It is an invitation to see for yourself if what appears to be an internally generated representational model of an outside doesn’t qualtiatively alter the sense of that outside in the act of representing it. — Joshs
Yes, but it seems that to you this is a bug, a contextual imposition of cultural bias and distortion on an autonomous scientific enterprise from the “outside”. — Joshs
In other words. We do not 'see' qualia. They are (in the paper) an inferred part of our internal model of how perception works. — Isaac
The active state. We move, interact with the world, harvest data, even change the world to fit our models better... and all this is part of the process of inference. Does Kant have an equivalent? — Isaac
Whenever a terminological framework has the purpose of explaining human consciousness(meaningful human experience) and/or other kinds of consciousness(such as non-human meaningful experience), and it is based upon either internal/external, or physical/non-physical, or even perhaps both, then those practices are doomed to fail as a result of not having the explanatory power to be able to take proper account of that which consists of both internal and external things, physical and non-physical things.
— creativesoul
I can see how that might be the case, but I don't think dividing states into internal and external suffers from that problem as it still retains the possibility of modelling something which is both (a person in their environment for example). The division doesn't prevent both sides from being in the model.
Meaningful experience exists in its entirety, in simpler forms, prior to our knowledge. <-------That's the pivotal ontological consideration which ought inform the selection/creation of our terminological framework.
— creativesoul
I think you're making a mistake in assuming that because something exists prior to our accounting for it, it must be that our accounting is wrong if it doesn't represent it fully. You're making tow unwarranted assumptions. Firstly that {that which exists in its entirety prior to our accounting practices} can be represented with only one 'true' model, that there's only one 'true' way to account. There may be many, hundreds. Secondly that our accounting practices must capture the entirety of the thing they're accounting for. I see no reason why they should. — Isaac
Notice that when psychologists play ‘gotcha!’ and talk about how our naive perception is fooled by illusions and tricks, that the ‘real’ truth of what we experience is hidden from us , they are referring to a level of analysis that first needs to be constructed by us as a fresh perspective. In other words, in order for some some phenomenon to be declared ‘hidden’, the conceptual framework within which its hiddenness is intelligible must first be invented as a fresh form of conceptualization. Could one not then follow the phenomenologists and say that both the ‘naive’ and the hiddenness-savvy frameworks are different varieties of direct perception, the second being an elaboration and transformation of the former? — Joshs
Vision seems quite clearly indirect to me, I imagine a world made of solid, clear object and yet many of the I can't see clearly. That's my day-to-day experience. Not a direct one at all. — Isaac
In any case in that paper it is asseted that Kant rejects introspection, while saying that behavior can only be understood subsequent to "studying the mind". How would it be possible to study the mind other than via observing behavior, if introspection is ruled out? — Janus
It distinguishes between the 'straw man' depiction of introspection as the mere 'reporting of what comes to mind', and the discipline involved in phenomenological analysis illustrated with reference to Husserl's Logical Investigations. — Wayfarer
Absolutely, but there's consistency too, we couldn't think two straight thoughts in a row if every time we thought something it changed the model of the thing we're thinking. — Isaac
No. It's part of the cell, so part of the system. — Isaac
So, 1) the science of Markov blankets doesn't directly address the philosophical issue of subjective experience (as explained in the first paper) and 2) colour terms like "red" don't (only) refer to some property held by some external world cause but (also) by something that happens "in the head" (even if you want to reduce qualia/first-person experiences to be something of the sort described in the second paper). — Michael
Here's a Bayesian model
P(S1,…,Sn)=∏i=1np(Si|parents(Si))
What colour is it? — Isaac
Between you and ↪Wayfarer
I get all kinds of nifty stuff to rock my epistemic water vessel, so sincere thanks for it. — Mww
Dunno about changing the world to fit our models; seems sorta backwards to me. — Mww
The active state would be cognition. The process of inference would be the tripartite logical syllogistic functionality between understanding (major), judgement (minor(s)), and reason (conclusion). Now, as you’ve said, albeit in a different way, re: the talking is not the doing, this is how we talk about it, how we represent to ourselves a speculative methodology, but the internal operation in itself, functions under the condition of time alone, such that cognition is possible from that methodology.
Not sure that’s a very good answer, but best I can do with what I’m given, and considering my scant experience with Markov blankets. — Mww
You missed the point of the ontological consideration — creativesoul
nothing like that happens when I see red, — Michael
they’re the ones saying that redness is a Bayesian model, not me. — Michael
My point is only that by their own account of perception redness isn’t a property of some external stimulus, contrary to your claims. — Michael
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