What I'm arguing in all of those is that quantum physics has a tendency to undermine scientific realism. — Wayfarer

I think it's more the case that quantum physics does not seem to offer a realistic picture of what is going on at the "fundamental" level; but that does not equate to "undermining scientific realism", it' seems more that it just doesn't appear to support it.

Also, if it is true, as has been claimed, that the MWI is the interpretation that enjoys majority consensus, then that would mean that a realist interpretation is the one most favored among physicists.

if it is true, as has been claimed, that the MWI is the interpretation that enjoys majority consensus, — Janus

I can't find anything that supports this.

Poll carried out by Maximilian Schlosshauer, Johannes Kofler, and Anton Zeilinger at a quantum foundations meeting. The pollsters asked a variety of questions which were patiently answered by the 33 participants. Here are the results:



From here.

Excellent interview with the founder of QBism here.

Philip Ball on why the many worlds interpretation sucks.

Bernard D'Espagnat says what we call reality is just a state of mind.

The only definite fact in all of this is that quantum physics undermines realism.

I would not presume to have a favorite interpretation of a subject in which I am not qualified — Janus

I definitely have favorite interpretations of subjects I'm not qualified in, can't seem to help it. But I certainly attempt to approach discussion of those subjects with a little humility, especially when speaking to experts on it.

I admire your nonpartisanship, but I don't always manage it.

So what's the question again? — Wayfarer

Why you consider the conclusion of cognitive science to place no constraints on what one can believe metaphysically about the mind, but the conclusions from physics do place a constraint on what one can believe metaphysically about the world.

What has physics got that cognitive science doesn't?

It seems an awful lot like cherry-picking. You've found some results in the sciences which support your pre-existing beliefs so you bang that drum. When results from the sciences do not support your pre-existing beliefs, you claim science has no place in philosophy.

The only definite fact in all of this is that quantum physics undermines realism. — Wayfarer

No it doesn't. I have a book on my shelf about many worlds in which the intro reads "All the chapters start from the point of realism". It's by Simon Saunders a professor in the philosophy of physics at Oxford.

His position is that of structural realism. The SEP describes it as...

... the most defensible form of scientific realism

OK, I had thought I had read that claim somewhere, but looks like it may not be true. That poll was only of 33 physicists at a particular conference in any case, and may well not be representative of the whole QM community.

The only definite fact in all of this is that quantum physics undermines realism. — Wayfarer

But again this is not a fact, since it is only that QM doesn't offer a realistic picture of what seems to be going on, and that is not the same thing as "undermining realism".

Apparently several interpretations qualify as realist; it would be interesting to find out overall percentages of support for realist vs anti-realist interpretations.

I should qualify what I said: I don't refrain from having opinions about some subjects, even though I am not officially qualified therein. If I have read a lot in some area I may feel I am sufficiently qualified to hold an opinion. That definitely doesn't apply to QM, because it is not merely a matter of reading; it is arguable that you are not qualified unless you understand the math.

Over and out on this one.

Cheers. I'd formed the opinion that many worlds interpretation is favoured on Youtube videos but not by actual physicist. I hadn't seen it garner above about a fifth of votes in various polls of the priesthood.

The only definite fact in all of this is that quantum physics undermines realism. — Wayfarer

I don't think so.

Further confusion arises if the two senses are conflated. This can lead to the notion that the condition OD is equivalent to the metaphysical thesis that physical reality exists and possess properties independent of their cognizance by human or other agents. This would be an error, as stochastic theories, on which the outcome of an experiment is not uniquely determined by the physical state of the world prior to the experiment, but is a matter of chance, are perfectly compatible with the metaphysical thesis. One occasionally finds traces of a conflation of this sort in the literature; — Bell’s Theorem: 3.3. On “local realism”

My bolding. There are devils in the detail here, to be sure, but the only definite fact in all of this is that the metaphysical implications of quantum mechanics, if any, are far from settled.

the metaphysical implications of quantum mechanics, if any, are far from settled. — Banno

Sure. But if it didn’t challenge scientific realism, then there wouldn’t even be a metaphysical question.

if it didn’t challenge scientific realism — Wayfarer

Well, herein lies the problem. We now have "local realism", "realism" per se, and "scientific realism"...

So which is it? And what is it that is challenged? What is realism?

And just for the record, here's my own present favourite again, for the purposes of full disclosure: Quantum Wittgenstein

'd formed the opinion that many worlds interpretation is favoured on Youtube videos but not by actual physicist. — Banno

The physicist Sean Carrol (Mindscape podcast) favors it. I've listened to a sampling from a few physics-related podcasts recently, and the Copenhagen Interpretation has been heavily criticized on all of them for the measurement problem (and the idea of probability waves interacting to form interference patterns), while MWI tends to get a lot of respect. I do know that the physicist Sabine Hossenfelder (popular YT channel), who works on the foundations of physics, criticizes both. But she's a fan of Superdeterminism, which isn't terribly popular. I don't see it in the poll above. It's a hidden variables realist version that doesn't violate locality, because experimental results are predetermined (or known) by the universe in advance, somehow.

The only definite fact in all of this is that quantum physics undermines realism. — Wayfarer

But again this is not a fact, since it is only that QM doesn't offer a realistic picture of what seems to be going on, and that is not the same thing as "undermining realism". — Janus

But if it didn’t challenge scientific realism — Wayfarer

I note that you've downgraded your claim from "undermining" to "challenging". I'm not sure QM even challenges realism, although I think it's fair to say that some interpretations don't offer a realistic picture of what is going on at the "fundamental" level. I guess you could count that as a challenge for realism if you accept an anti-realist interpretation.

The key realisation arising from quantum physics was the fact that the observer has a direct role in determining the outcome of the observation of purportedly the fundamental building blocks of the world. That is what disturbed Einstein's realist assumptions, it is why he asked the question 'Doesn't the moon continue to exist when nobody's looking at it?'

What is at issue is the naturalist assumption that the Universe just is as it is, and will be that way, without any observer present. That is what I call 'realism', and it has been called into question by these discoveries. It is documented in many books, such as Manjit Kumar: Quantum: Einstein, Bohr, and The Great Debate about the Nature of Reality. Ask yourself: why would this book have that sub-title if there were no such debate? Do you think he's just making stuff up? (Read it if you want to find out.) Another useful book I've read is David Lindley's Uncertainty: Einstein, Heisenberg, Bohr, and the Struggle for the Soul of Science :

Werner Heisenberg's 'uncertainty principle' challenged centuries of scientific understanding, placed him in direct opposition to Albert Einstein, and put Niels Bohr in the middle of one of the most heated debates in scientific history. Heisenberg's theorem stated that there were physical limits to what we could know about sub-atomic particles; this 'uncertainty' would have shocking implications.

So, what are these 'shocking implications'? Why did Neils Bohr feel compelled to ask, after delivering a lecture to the Vienna Circle and recieving their sanguine applause, 'if you're not shocked by quantum physics, then you can't possibly have understood it!' (this anecdote is recounted in Heisenberg's book, Physics and Beyond.)

I could produce a dozen more passages, but I will only mention only a couple more from the interview with Chris Fuchs whose interpretation is called Quantum Bayesianism, normally contracted to QBism. I've bolded the passage that I think articulates the important point.

Q: In one of your papers, you mention that Erwin Schrödinger wrote about the Greek influence on our concept of reality, and that it’s a historical contingency that we speak about reality without including the subject — the person doing the speaking. Are you trying to break the spell of Greek thinking?

A: Schrödinger thought that the Greeks had a kind of hold over us — they saw that the only way to make progress in thinking about the world was to talk about it without the “knowing subject” in it. QBism goes against that strain by saying that quantum mechanics is not about how the world is without us; instead it’s precisely about us in the world. The subject matter of the theory is not the world or us but us-within-the-world, the interface between the two.

Some other snippets:

Q: Does that mean that, as Arthur Eddington put it, the stuff of the world is mind stuff?

A: QBism would say, it’s not that the world is built up from stuff on “the outside” as the Greeks would have had it. Nor is it built up from stuff on “the inside” as the idealists, like George Berkeley and Eddington, would have it. Rather, the stuff of the world is in the character of what each of us encounters every living moment — stuff that is neither inside nor outside, but prior to the very notion of a cut between the two at all.

Those familiar with non-dualism will recognise that.

My fellow QBists and I instead think that what Bell’s theorem really indicates is that the outcomes of measurements are experiences, not revelations of something that’s already there. Of course others think that we gave up on science as a discipline, because we talk about subjective degrees of belief. But we think it solves all of the foundational conundrums.

Charles Pinter also mentions QBism in this comment:

According to quantum Bayesianism, what traditional physicists got wrong was the naïve belief that there is a fixed, “true” external reality that we perceive “correctly”. Quantum Bayesianism claims that instead, the scientific observer sees the readings on his instrument and understands that they bring him new information pertaining to his mental model of reality. He has abandoned the belief that he is seeing the real world “as it truly is”.

Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (p. 167). Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition.

My take: mind is nothing objectively existent, there really is no such thing. But we never know anything apart from it.

But if it didn’t challenge scientific realism, then there wouldn’t even be a metaphysical question. — Wayfarer

You appear to conflate two difference senses of "realism". In the context of the phrase "scientific realism" it's contrasted with "scientific instrumentalism". Scientific realism says that scientific theories are "true" in the sense that the world is as the theories say, whereas scientific instrumentalism says that our scientific theories are just useful or not.

The kind of realism that can be called into question by quantum mechanics is that of counterfactual definiteness, which asserts that there are objects and that they have properties even before they are measured.

I think it's more the case that quantum physics does not seem to offer a realistic picture of what is going on at the "fundamental" level; but that does not equate to "undermining scientific realism", it' seems more that it just doesn't appear to support it. — Janus

When the observational evidence does not support a particular metaphysical perspective, isn't this a case of undermining that metaphysics? Metaphysics, as speculative, is not "proven" per se, it is supported or not supported. How much evidence inconsistent with a particular metaphysical perspective is required before one accepts that the metaphysics is off track? Since metaphysics deals with everything, being, or existence in the most general sense, evidence which does not support a perspective, is evidence of a different perspective, therefore necessarily undermining to the former.

Metaphysical wisdom moves forward by determining which proposed perspectives are not accurate, and are therefore unacceptable. This is a process of elimination. We find that certain perspectives are unacceptable because the evidence does not support them, so we dismiss them as not rational possibilities.

When the world is modeled as consisting of possibilities, the premise of the model denies that there is such a thing as "what is the case". However, from the many possibilities, we can proceed to determine what is impossible. "What is impossible" is a determination of "what is not the case". And since "what is not the case" (what is impossible) is diametrically opposed to "what is the case", we let "what is the case" in, through the back door. So we could call this a back door realism, "what is" consists of all the possibilities which have not been excluded as impossible.

You appear to conflate two difference senses of "realism". In the context of the phrase "scientific realism" it's contrasted with "scientific instrumentalism". Scientific realism says that scientific theories are "true" in the sense that the world is as the theories say, whereas scientific instrumentalism says that our scientific theories are just useful or not. — Michael

This is a very good point. Isaac and I spent days arguing the accuracy of systems theory, only to find out in the end, that Isaac was arguing the usefulness of systems theory, and I was arguing that systems theory does not give us truth. I thought Isaac was arguing the truthfulness of systems theory. But there was really never any inconsistency between us, because usefulness is not the same as truthfulness.

I am curious as to whom your "muttered insults" are directed. — Janus

Ehhhh.....nobody. Me being flippant.
————-

How could we possibly be constantly aware of the stream of thought, when we need to be aware of other things — Janus

3B neurotransmitter connections per mm3 at somewhere around the SOL....brain can handle just about anything the senses throw at it. Experience enables relative disassociation....you no longer have to think about getting the fork squarely into your mouth. Comb your hair without a mirror. Add more and more complex numbers with less and less paper and pencil. Or, I guess, these days....reference to a phone with a calculator embedded in it.

All awareness of things just is the stream of thought.
—————

None of this makes any sense to me, or accords with my own experience of what is involved in thinking. (...) I cannot see how it is possible to think anything discursive without language. — Janus

Fine, no problem. One metaphysical doctrine may be more logically sufficient than another, but it can never be proved as more the fact.

My experience is:
Since I was a kid, when reading something, I never saw the words, but pictured what the words say. Skim right over the words, like they weren’t even there. Now you might say that’s what you’re talking about, thinking by means of words (even if not noticed they are still causal), but there is congruent functionality when I tie my shoe (I never speak about “right hand this way, left hand that way, twist wrist, pinch with finger”....I just “see” the physical interaction and “seeing” without eyes is thinking by imaging).

But you might come back with....well, somebody had to tell you, with words, how to tie shoes way back when, right? But if that is true, and nobody told me anything about tying shoes....I’d never be able to do it? It would be absolutely impossible for me to ever put two strings together in some fashion that prevents my shoes from falling of my feet, if no one told me how or I never read the instruction manual?

Go to the grocery store. Got your “honey-do” pick-up list, full of words. Upon arrival at the appropriate aisle, you look at the list, perceive a word that represents the thing you want....you’ve been told....to load into the cart, look up on the shelf, find the thing that relates to the word. But word is nowhere to be found, it is not the word you put in the cart, it is the thing represented by the word. Off you go, next aisle, put a thing in the cart that wasn’t represented by a word on the list. Impulse purchase; spontaneous determination....Oooo, that looks yummy!!! How did you accomplish the exact same function, but under two different conditions? If you put two particular things in the cart, one because of a word on a piece of paper, and the other without words or paper, then the word cannot be the cause of things in the cart necessarily, which is the same as words are not necessary for the end result of a cognition....even if, as in this case, a mere desire.

So if...IF.....for those working scenarios so mundane as reading and shoe-tying and spontaneous whatevers.....mighten it not work for every damn thing? If it is indeed possible to acquire knowledge without spoken or written language, as is the case for the first time for everything, for everybody, then it is the case that language is always a secondary cognitive functionality.

Besides the obvious....nothing ever got a name that a human didn’t give to it, language is nothing more than an assemblage of names, therefore language is a product of, thereby related to, but not the cause of, human cognition.
————-

Your own experience is.....?

That is what I call 'realism', and it has been called into question by these discoveries. — Wayfarer

So we're back to scientific discoveries having an impact on metaphysical theories again. Perhaps now you could explain why the discoveries of cognitive science are excluded from this allowance?

I note that you've downgraded your claim from "undermining" to "challenging". I'm not sure QM even challenges realism, although I think it's fair to say that some interpretations don't offer a realistic picture of what is going on at the "fundamental" level. I guess you could count that as a challenge for realism if you accept an anti-realist interpretation. — Janus

So we're back to scientific discoveries having an impact on metaphysical theories again. Perhaps now you could explain why the discoveries of cognitive science are excluded from this allowance? — Isaac

For my money, it is not quantum physics that clearly begs for a non-realist metaphysics , but certain approaches within cognitive science billing themselves as postmodern. There is a cohesive community advocating for a post-realist postmodern science with Shaun Gallagher , Dan Zahavi, Michel Bitbol, Hanne De Jaegher and Joseph Rouse, among others. I dont think you’ll find a comparable commitment among physicists (yet. It’s only a matter of time)

As Rouse writes:

“ Epistemic objectivity as an ideal presumes a gap between us as knowers and the world to be known. An objective method, stance, attitude, or disposi­tion is put forward to bridge that gap. But any such proposal as a form of subject-positioning finds itself firmly placed on our side of the gap be­tween us as knowers and the world as “beyond” our representations of it.
The objection is that the gap between knowers and the world is thereby conceived in advance in a way that renders it unbridgeable. Moreover, this conception can itself be challenged as a dogmatic presupposition that we should reject. As Heidegger once suggested, the problem is not that the refutation of skepti­cism has yet to be accomplished once and for all but that it continues to be attempted again and again out of a dogged commitment to an un­derlying conception of a gap between knower and world to be known.”

For my money, it is not quantum physics that clearly begs for a non-realist metaphysics , but certain approaches within cognitive science — Joshs

Shaun Gallagher is a professor of philosophy at University of Memphis.

Michel Bitbol is a researcher in philosophy of science.

Dan Zahavi is a philosopher at University of Copenhagen

Hanne De Jaegher has at least qualified in cognitive science, but is currently at the Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of the Basque Country

Joseph Rouse is Professor of Moral Science at Wesleyan.

Where are the cognitive scientists you're referring to?

Dan Zahavi is a philosopher at University of Copenhagen.
Where are the cognitive scientists you're referring to? — Isaac

Here is a small sampling of Gallagher’s ‘philosophical’ work. Notice the wide range of scientific journals that have published him as well as the specific contributions he has made to empirical research in such areas as autism , schizophrenia, distributed cognition and anosognosia.

Newen, A., De Bruin, L. and Gallagher, S. (eds.) 2018. Oxford Handbook of 4E-Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Gallagher, S. and Daly, A. 2018. Dynamical relations in the self-pattern. Frontiers in Psychology 9: 664. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00664 (open access link: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00664/full)

Gallagher, S. 2017. Embodied intersubjective understanding and communication in congenital deafblindness. Journal of Deafblind Studies on Communication 3: 46-58.

Gallagher, S. and Trigg, D. 2016. Agency and anxiety: Delusions of control and loss of control in Schizophrenia and Agoraphobia. Frontiers in Neuroscience 10: 459. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2016.00459.

Gallagher, S. and Varga, S. 2015. Conceptual issues in autism spectrum disorders. Current Opinion in Psychiatry 28 (2): 127-32. doi: 10.1097/YCO.0000000000000142.

Arntzen,E.C.,Normann,B.Øberg,G.K.andGallagher,S.2019.Perceived bodily changes
individualized, group-based exercises are a source of strengthening self in individuals with MS: A qualitative interview study. Physiotherapy Theory and Practice. Online First: https://doi.org/10.1080/09593985.2019.1683923

Gallagher,S.2018.The therapeutic reconstruction of affordances.ResPhilosophica95(4):719-736

Gallagher,S.2018.Mindfulness and mindlessness in performance.TheItalianJournalofCognitive
Sciences 5 (1): 5-18, DOI: 10.12832/90966

Gallagher,S.2018.Deep brain stimulation,self and relational autonomy .Neuroethics.DOI:
10.1007/s12152-018-9355-x.

Natvik,E.,Groven,K.S.,Råheim,M.,Gjengedal,E.and Gallager,S.2018.Space-perception,
movement and insight: Attuning to the space of everyday life after major weight loss. Physiotherapy
Theory and Practice. doi.org/10.1080/09593985.2018.1441934

Bitbol,M.andGallagher,S.2018.Autopoiesis and the free erergy principle .CommentonRamsted,
Badcock, and Friston. Physics of Life Review. 24: 24-26 doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2017.12.011

Vincini,S.Jhang,Y.,Buder,E.H.andGallagher,S.2017.Neonatal imitation:Theory,experimental
design and significance for the field of social cognition. Frontiers in Psychology – Cognitive Science.
8:1323. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01323

Gallagher, S. and Trigg, D. 2016. Agency and anxiety: Delusions of control and loss of control in
Schizophrenia and Agoraphobia. Frontiers in Neuroscience 10: 459. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2016.00459

Gallagher,S.2015.Doing the math:Calculating the role of evolution and enculturation in the origins of
mathematical reasoning. Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology 119: 341-346

Rode,G.,Lacour,S.,Jacquin-Courtois,S.,Pisella,L.,Michel,C.,Revol,P.,Luauté,J.,Gallagher,S., P., Pélisson, D. & Rossetti, Y. 2015. Long-term sensorimotor and therapeutical effects of a mild regime of prism adaptation in spatial neglect. A double-blind RCT essay / Effets sensori-moteurs et fonctionnels à long terme d’un traitement hebdomadaire par adaptation prismatique dans la négligence : un essai randomisé et contrôlé en double insu [in English and French]. Annals of Physical and Rehabilitation Medicine 58

Gallagher,S.2014.In your face :Transcendence in embodied interaction.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8: 495. Reprinted 2016.

Here’s some more for ya:

103. Gallagher, S. 2012. The body in social context: Some qualifications on the ‘warmth and intimacy’ of bodily self-consciousness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84: 91–121
104. Gallagher, S. 2012. Time, emotion and depression. Emotion Review 4 (2): 127-32. doi: 10.1177/1754073911430142
105. Gallagher, S. 2012. In defense of phenomenological approaches to social cognition: Interacting with the critics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2): 187-212.
106. Gallagher, S. 2012. Multiple aspects of agency. New Ideas in Psychology 30: 15–31.
107. De Bruin, L. and Gallagher, S. 2012. Embodied simulation: An unproductive explanation. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences 16 (2): 98-99.
108. Gallagher, S. 2011. Embodiment and phenomenal qualities: An enactive interpretation. Philosophical
Topics 39 (1): 1-14.
109. Gallagher, S. 2011. The self in the Cartesian brain. Perspectives on the Self: Conversations on Identity
and Consciousness. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1234: 100–103.
110. Sternberg, E., Critchley, S., Gallagher, S. and Raman, V.V. 2011. A self-fulfilling prophecy: linking
belief to behavior. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1234: 83–97.
111. Gallagher, S. 2011. Fantasies and facts: Epistemological and methodological perspectives on first- and
third-person perspectives. Phenomenology and Mind 1: 49-58.
112. Gallagher, S. 2011. Somaesthetics and the care of the body. Metaphilosophy 42 (3): 305-313.
113. Gallagher, S. 2011. The overextended mind. Versus: Quaderni di studi semiotici 113-115: 55-66.
114. Gallagher, S. 2011. Strong interaction and self-agency. Humana-Mente: Journal of Philosophical
Studies 15: 55-76
115. Gallagher, S. and Cole, J. 2011. Dissociation in self-narrative. Consciousness and Cognition 20: 149-
155 doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.003.
116. Bedwell, J., Gallagher, S. Whitten, S. and Fiore, S. 2011. Linguistic correlates of self in deceptive oral
autobiographical narratives. Consciousness and Cognition. 20: 547–555. Published online, October
2010. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.001.
117. Gallagher, S. 2010. Defining consciousness: The importance of non-reflective self-awareneess.
Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (3): 561-69.
118. Cole, J. Dascal, M., Gallagher, S. and Frith, C. 2010. Final discussion. Pragmatics and Cognition 18
(3): 553-59.
119. Gallagher, S. 2010. Joint attention, joint action, and participatory sense making. Alter:Revue de
Phénoménologie 18: 111-124.
120. De Jaegher, H., Di Paolo, E. and Gallagher, S. 2010. Does social interaction constitute social cognition?
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (10): 441-447.
121. Froese, T. and Gallagher, S. 2010. Phenomenology and artificial life: Toward a technological
supplementation of phenomenological methodology. Husserl Studies 26 (2): 83-107.
122. Crisafi, A. and Gallagher S. 2010. Hegel and the extended mind. Artificial Intelligence & Society. 25
(1): 123-29.
123. Gallagher, S. 2009. Two problems of intersubjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8): 289-
308.
124. Gallagher, S. 2009. Deep and dynamic interaction: Response to Hanne De Jaegher. Consciousness and
Cognition 18 (2): 547-548
125. Gallagher, S. and A. Crisafi. 2009. Mental institutions. Topoi 28 (1): 45-51.
126. Gallagher, S. 2008-09. Intercorporality and intersubjectivity: Merleau-Ponty and the critique of theory
of mind [in Japanese]. Gendai Shiso (Review of Contemporary Thought) 36 (16): 288-299.
127. Gallagher, S. 2008. Inference or interaction: Social cognition without precursors. Philosophical
Explorations 11 (3): 163-73.
128. Zahavi, D. and Gallagher, S. 2008. The (in)visibility of others: A reply to Herschbach. Philosophical
Explorations 11 (3): 237-43.
129. Gallagher, S. 2008. Intersubjectivity in perception. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2): 163-178
130. Gallagher, S. 2008. Are minimal representations still representations? International Journal of
Philosophical Studies 16 (3): 351-69.
131. Ratcliffe, M. and Gallagher, S. 2008. Introduction to special issue on situated cognition. International
Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3): 279-280.
132. Gallagher, S. 2008. Another look at intentions: A response to Raphael van Riel's “Seeing the invisible’.
Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2008) 553–555

133. Gallagher, S. 2008. Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition 17: 535–543
134. Zahavi, D. and Gallagher, S. 2008. A phenomenology with legs and brains. Abstracta 2: 86-107.
135. Gallagher, S. and Zahavi, D. 2008. Précis: The Phenomenological Mind. Abstracta 2: 4-9.
136. Overgaard, M, Ramsoy, T. and Gallagher, S. 2008. The subjective turn: Towards an integration of first-
person methodologies in cognitive science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (5): 100-120.
137. McNeill, D. Duncan, S. Cole, J. Gallagher, S. & Bertenthal, B. 2008. Neither or both: Growth points
from the very beginning. Interaction Studies 9 (1): 117-132.
138. Gallagher, S. 2007. The natural philosophy of agency. Philosophy Compass. 2 (2): 347–357
(http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00067.x)
139. Tsakiris, M. Bosbach S. and Gallagher, S. 2007. On agency and body-ownership: Phenomenological
and neuroscientific reflections. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3): 645-60.
140. Gallagher, S. 2007. The spatiality of situation: Comment on Legrand et al. Consciousness and
Cognition. 16 (3): 700-702.
141. Gallagher, S. 2007. Social cognition and social robots. Pragmatics and Cognition 15 (3): 435-54.
142. Gallagher, S. 2007. Sense of agency and higher-order cognition: Levels of explanation for
schizophrenia. Cognitive Semiotics 0: 32-48.
143. Gallagher, S. 2007. Moral agency, self-consciousness, and practical wisdom. Journal of Consciousness
Studies 14 (5-6): 199-223.
144. Gallagher, S. 2007. Pathologies in narrative structure. Philosophy (Royal Institute of Philosophy)
Supplement, 60: 65-86.
145. Gallagher, S. 2007. Simulation trouble. Social Neuroscience. 2 (3-4): 353-65.
146. Gallagher, S. 2007. Moral personhood and phronesis. Moving Bodies 4 (2): 31-57
147. Gallagher, S. 2007. Introduction: The arts and sciences of the situated body. Janus Head 9.2: 293-95.
148. Gallagher, S. and Jesper Brøsted Sørensen. 2006. Experimenting with phenomenology. Consciousness
and Cognition 15 (1): 119-134
149. Gallagher, S. 2005. Intentionality and intentional action. Synthesis Philosophica 40 (2): 319-26.
Croatian translation: 2006. Intencionalnost I intencionalno djelovanje. Trans. S. Selak. Filozofska
Istrazivanja 102, 26 (2): 339-346.
150. McNeill, D., Bertenthal, B., Cole, J. and Gallagher, S. 2005. Gesture-first, but no gestures?
Commentary on Michael A. Arbib. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 28: 138-39
151. Gallagher, S. 2005. Phenomenological contributions to a theory of social cognition [The Aron
Gurwitsch Memorial Lecture, 2003]. Husserl Studies 21: 95–110.
152. Gallagher, S. 2004. Consciousness and free will. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 39: 7-16.
153. Gallagher, S. 2004. Les conditions corporéité et d'intersubjectivité de la personne morale [Embodied
and intersubjective conditions for moral personhood]. Theologiques 12 (1-2): 135-64; includes comment by S. Mansour-Robaey. Le corps, ses représentations et le statut de la personne morale. Theologiques 12 (1-2): 156-59.
154. Gallagher, S. 2004. Understanding interpersonal problems in autism: Interaction theory as an alternative to theory of mind. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (3): 199-217.
155. Gallagher, S. 2004. Body experiments. Interfaces 21-22 (2): 401-405
156. Gallagher, S. 2004. Hermeneutics and the cognitive sciences. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-
11): 162-174. Chinese translation (2004), Polish translation (2011), Italian translation (2019).
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The kind of realism that can be called into question by quantum mechanics is that of counterfactual definiteness, which asserts that there are objects and that they have properties even before they are measured. — Michael

By the Copenhagen Interpretation. Different interpretations bite different bullets. The Many Worlds doesn't give up counterfactual definiteness realism, but it multiplies realities and makes probability problematic. Superdeterminism bites the bullet of the universe knowing in advance what measurements will be made (as I understand it). Bohmian mechanics gives up locality for a non-observable pilot-wave.

Since there's multiple interpretations and no experiment so far to decide between them, it's probably too soon to say QM undermines some form of reality. There's no quantum theory of gravity, no grand unified theory, no explanation for dark energy and so on. But this is a philosophy forum, so people are free to pick sides.

It's just if you use one particular interpretation, you can't truthfully say the science supports your philosophical conclusion, because there is non empirical confirmation or consensus.

Yes, by saying that it “can” be called into question I meant to suggest that it was depending on the various interpretations. Sorry if that wasn’t clear.

Cheers. I'm really not too fussed. There are precious few physicist who do not think that the world is real.

The key realisation arising from quantum physics was the fact that the observer has a direct role in determining the outcome of the observation of purportedly the fundamental building blocks of the world. — Wayfarer

It's regrettable that folk used the word "observation" when they meant "measurement".

Sure, there is discussion, mostly outside of physics, on youtube and in pop media and philosophy forums. But this does not amount to support for your claim that "The key realisation arising from quantum physics was the fact that the observer has a direct role in determining the outcome of the observation of purportedly the fundamental building blocks of the world", and is even further from negating the view that" the Universe just is as it is, and will be that way, without any observer present".

I doubt very much that you will find many physicist who hold that the moon disappears when not observed.

Nor is the uncertainty principle support for such a view, as you suggest.

Nor does a quantum Bayesian view suggest such a thing. From your own quote: "Quantum Bayesianism claims that instead, the scientific observer sees the readings on his instrument and understands that they bring him new information pertaining to his mental model of reality." Read that with care. It should be clear that since there is a Bayesian model of reality,there is a reality to be modelled.

My take: mind is nothing objectively existent, there really is no such thing. But we never know anything apart from it. — Wayfarer

So we don't know stuff unless we have a mind. Well, knowing something is a relation between a fact and a mind, so that's hardly a surprise, and does not need the support of quantum mechanics. And if you would go the step further by claiming that therefore we never know anything, then your are committed to Stove's Gem: we only ever eat oysters with our mouths, and therefore we never eat oysters as they are in themselves... Do you want to do that?

In summary, the question of the OP is phrased so as to be problematic: "Is there an external, material world?" Drop the "external" and the "material" and the answer is "Yes".

:up:

mistakes a copy-and-paste for an argument.

All awareness of things just is the stream of thought. — Mww

I can be aware of the bare visual character of the visual field in a state of suspension of thought. Of course to tell you or myself what I see then thought, language, must be engaged.

Fine, no problem. One metaphysical doctrine may be more logically sufficient than another, but it can never be proved as more the fact. — Mww

I agree; we go with what seems the more plausible to us.

My experience is:
Since I was a kid, when reading something, I never saw the words, but pictured what the words say. Skim right over the words, like they weren’t even there. — Mww

That's my experience too. Words are tools and as Heidegger says when using a tool skillfully the tool "disappears". Hammering nails is like this. My point is only that complex thought is impossible without language. Could you think all the thoughts (or any) in the CPR without language, for example?

For my money, it is not quantum physics that clearly begs for a non-realist metaphysics , but certain approaches within cognitive science billing themselves as postmodern. — Joshs

It seems to me that any science relies on there being some inter-subjectively determinable reality to warrant the veracity of its observations. I have no argument against the free-flowing associations and insights of postmodern thought; they may indeed be illuminating and open new avenues for contemplation and research, but they can never command the kind of inter-subjective corroborability that science or everyday empirical observation can, as far as I can see.

When the observational evidence does not support a particular metaphysical perspective, isn't this a case of undermining that metaphysics? — Metaphysician Undercover

Not necessarily; it depends on whether the observational evidence is relevant to the metaphysical perspective in question and it is never the bare observation that is relevant in any case, but some interpretation of it, which rather begs the question.