My experience doesn’t show me the nature of the world independent of experience, the Standard Model and other scientific theories do. — Michael

But how if all you have is your experience? How did we come to have scientific theories of how the world is independent of experience if not by some experience? You seem to be saying that you have knowledge of the world independent of experience. How is that possible unless you're omniscient?

Why is it the words and not the events that inform us?" ?

Or "why are the words still about the events?" ?
— bongo fury

The former.

There seems to be chain of causality - events -> (various perception processes) -> (various executive process) -> writing words to convey the events -> looking at words conveying the event -> (various perception processes) -> (various linguistic process) -> (various executive processes) -> (working memory storage) -> (more executive functions and long term memory processes - collectively called 'learning').

There seems a lot of stages between words and learning, so if stages between is what leads to the charge of indirectness, then the we indirectly learn from the words too. — Isaac

Right. Reading words informs us as much as reading someone's behavior, or the color of an apple, or the sound of waves crashing, etc. Scribbles and utterances (can be) just as informative as any other visual and auditory experience. The "philosophers" on this forum tend to separate language from the world much like theists separate humans from the world. That is a mistake.

Much in the same way that Fitch’s paradox shows that the knowability and non-omniscience principles are incompatible, direct realism and scientific realism are incompatible: if the mind-independent world is as the Standard Model says it is then it isn’t as we ordinarily perceive it to be and vice-versa.

So pick your poison: either indirect realism or scientific instrumentalism.

But then if you want to say that scientific realism is incompatible with indirect realism as well then unless there’s some third alternative we have to reject scientific realism in favour of scientific instrumentalism.

And if we reject scientific realism then we lose all empirical evidence of there being a mind-independent world at all, and so we lose any kind of realism and are left with something like phenomenalism or idealism.

Direct realism doesn’t appear to work under any scenario.

Much in the same way that Fitch’s paradox shows that the knowability and non-omniscience principles are incompatible, direct realism and scientific realism are incompatible: if the mind-independent world is as the Standard Model says it is then it isn’t as we ordinary perceive it to be and vice-versa.

So pick your poison: either indirect realism or scientific instrumentalism. — Michael

The distinction between direct vs. direct realism is non-sensical when you include the experience as part of the world your experiencing, and understand that effects carry information about their causes. The (right or wrong) interpretation of that causal relationship is what creates the distinction between direct and indirect. A mirage is exactly what you'd expect to experience given the nature of light and and it's interaction with an eye-brain system when you arrive at the correct interpretation and not the false one (interpreting it as a pool of water).

Direct realism doesn’t appear to work under any scenario. — Michael

Do you not have direct access to your experience and isn't your experience part of the world as much as what your experience is of?

You still seem to know what the case is even though your experience is indirect. So what's missing? What's the difference between indirect and direct if you are still able to know what the case is in either case if not the interpretation itself?

We accessed what Kant had taken to be an inaccessible world. — Banno

“....That there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no one has ever observed them, must certainly be admitted; but this assertion means only, that we may in the possible progress of experience discover them at some future time....”

The hypothesis is that what we see might be totally different to a conjectured, inaccessible world about which we can say nothing. — Banno

Not a hypothesis, but a logically provable axiomatic principle.

“....we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition....”

If this world is inaccessible, and if we can say nothing about it, then how could it be the cause of what we do see? — Banno

The cause of what we do see must be accessible.....

“....For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd....”

The cause for perception in us, re: human sensibility (cause = object/effect = representation of object), is not the kind of cause for that which is perceived by us, re: principled natural law (cause = object/effect = object).

The corrected hypothesis, therefore, should be......for us, apodeictic certainty that what we know corresponds precisely with what actually is, is impossible.

Kant has a lot to answer for. — Banno

As does anyone who isn’t perfect.
(Cue soundtrack of one hand clapping)

if the mind-independent world is as the Standard Model says it is then it isn’t as we ordinarily perceive it to be and vice-versa. — Michael

And yet you've still failed to even present an argument as to why it cannot be both.

have had extensive experience with psilocybin, LSD, DMT. mescaline and salvinorin, although not with ketamine. What you claim has not been my experience, however powerful the hallucinatory experience has been, if I have had the presence of mind to test it in the way I outlined — Janus

You didn't enter into a dissociative state, then. As it pertains to the thread, just the fact that you had to check makes the point that experience of the world and hallucinations are very similar in character.

A poster had denied that, but the discussion was a dead end.

And yet you've still failed to even present an argument as to why it cannot be both. — Isaac

It’s certainly possible that the Standard Model is deficient and fails to uncover what ordinary perception shows, but I think that less likely than what is shown in perception being a product of the perception and not a way the mind-independent causes are.

I was talking about both being true. As I've mentioned before, it is true that the stars in Orion are in the shape of a man with a bow. It is also true that they are in the shape of a rainbow.

Reality can be exactly as the standard model describes, and as we ordinarily perceive it. Nothing I perceive is in contradiction with the standard model.

I was talking about both being true. As I've mentioned before, it is true that the stars in Orion are in the shape of a man with a bow. It is also true that they are in the shape of a rainbow.

Reality can be exactly as the standard model describes, and as we ordinarily perceive it. Nothing I perceive is in contradiction with the standard model. — Isaac

I agree, but this discussion isn’t about truth, it’s about whether or not the things we see are mind-independent. I see an apple, the apple is red, I eat the apple, the apple nourishes me, etc. All of this is true but none of this is some mind-independent state-of-affairs that is directly perceived.

What the realist calls "mind independent" is what the phenomenalist might call "empirically undetermined a priori".

It is empirically under-determined a priori what observations the entities of the Standard Model refer to. Yet the same is equally true regarding the ordinary public meaning of "redness". For what precisely, under all publicly stateable contexts, are the set of experiences to which "redness" refers?

Phenomenalism, i.e. logical positivism, has been said to fail as an epistemological enterprise, due to the impossibility of defining how theoretical terms should be reduced to observation terms, where the latter refer to pre-theoretic 'givens' of private experience. But a reply is to say that this only rules out phenomenalism with a priori definable semantics. One can nevertheless argue that the meaning of the standard model is empirical (after all, isn't it supposed to answer to experience?), but where it's empirical meaning is determined in situ and post hoc through judgements for which rules cannot be stated a priori.

It is empirically under-determined a priori what observations the entities of the Standard Model refer to. Yet the same is equally true regarding the ordinary public meaning of "redness". For what precisely, under all publicly stateable contexts, are the set of experiences to which "redness" refers? — sime

Wittgenstein makes this point in the Tractacus 3.221:

"Objects I can only name. Signs represent them. I can only speak of them. I cannot assert them. A proposition can only say how a thing is, not what it is."

In other words, language itself implies something beyond it: something that can't be spoken: the reference. References can only be named, though. Naming them and relating them to each other is all we do. We don't fathom what they are .

Wittgenstein is really doing a kind of phenomenology here: just describing the nature of language use.

Let's consider a robot that can pick out objects and report out the name of such objects similar to how humans would perform.

We place an orange and the robot reports out "orange". We place an apple and the robot reports out "apple". The scientist seems satisfied of the the performance. However, on occasion he places a particular apple and the robot reports "orange". On another occasion the is no object and just suddenly reports "apple". The scientist response is to examine the hardware or software and determine if there is a problem. And in these scenarios that's exactly what they find, a revision to the software and the robot no longer report "orange" when there is an apple; and a repair to the hardware and the robot no longer reports "apple" when there is no object. Should the scientist wonder if these scenarios indicate they don't have access to the "real" apple or orange? Seems absurd to say such a thing.

If a human does the same, why should our reaction be any different. What if we can re-wire human beings where they don't hallucinate, experience illusion, never dream, can we now say they directly perceive objects?

I agree, but this discussion isn’t about truth, it’s about whether or not the things we see are mind-independent. — Michael

I don't understand. Answering your second proposition there would seem to entail a truth claim.

I see an apple, the apple is red, I eat the apple, the apple nourishes me, etc. All of this is true but none of this is some mind-independent state-of-affairs that is directly perceived. — Michael

True. I don't think any of us are disagreeing about the directness of perception, we're disagreeing about the implication of that indirectness for reference/aboutness.

You seem to be simply assuming that if you see the apple indirectly you must not 'really' be seeing the apple. What I've been trying to get across is that you don't directly respond to the model either. For directness to be the criteria for aboutness, we only directly respond to fragments of action potentials in our working memory.

Should the scientist wonder if these scenarios indicate they don't have access to the "real" apple or orange? Seems absurd to say such a thing. — Richard B

We know exactly how the computer's analog to digital converter works and what the computer does with that data. No, the computer does not have direct access to the apple.

I don't understand. Answering your second proposition there would seem to entail a truth claim. — Isaac

I don’t believe that truth consists in a proposition’s correspondence to some mind-independent state of affairs, and so I don’t believe that an apple being red requires an apple being red to be a mind-independent state of affairs.

You seem to be simply assuming that if you see the apple indirectly you must not 'really' be seeing the apple. — Isaac

I’m not. I’ve mentioned before that direct and indirect realists tend to talk past each other. The direct realist says something comparable to “we read about history” and the indirect realist says something comparable to “we read words”. Both are true. But in terms of the metaphysics, reading doesn’t provide us direct access to history, and perception doesn’t provide us direct access to their external cause. This by itself says nothing about “aboutness”.

Regarding my stronger phenomenalist/anti-realist claims, it’s not that we don’t “really” see an apple, it’s that an apple isn’t whatever mind-independent things causes me to see an apple. Something more than just a causal connection is required to say that the external thing is an apple. The vat or the computers that control it are not the apple that they cause the brain-in-a-vat to see. At the very least there needs to be some sort of resemblance between the thing I see and what causes me to see what I see. I think that this resemblance fails in the case of so-called secondary qualities like colour, and even, contrary to perhaps many indirect realists, that this resemblance fails in the case of so-called primary qualities like shape. And so it is a mistake to say that an apple is whatever causes us to see an apple. The apple that I see and the mind-independent wave-particles that are responsible for me seeing an apple are two very different things.

I don’t believe that truth consists in a proposition’s correspondence to some mind-independent state of affairs — Michael

I don't think what I'm asking requires an explanation of your theory of truth. Merely that when one says "X is Y" one is making a truth claim about X. For us to say "the things we see are mind-dependent" one is saying that's the way things are. The world is such that the things we see are mind-dependent, X is Y.

in terms of the metaphysics, reading doesn’t provide us direct access to history — Michael

Neither do the events.

there needs to be some sort of resemblance between the thing I see and what causes me to see what I see. — Michael

This just begs the question. The counterargument is that the thing you see is what causes you to see what you see.

The counterargument is that the thing you see is what causes you to see what you see. — Isaac

So if I put a brain in a vat and configure it to cause the brain to see a cat then the cat that the brain sees is the vat (or me)? Seems to me that it would be more accurate to say that the brain doesn’t see the vat (or me).

Or for a more realistic example, when I see crazy shit after taking LSD I’m seeing the LSD?

So if I put a brain in a vat and configure it to cause the brain to see a cat then the cat that the brain sees is the vat (or me)? — Michael

It's whatever inputs you used (probes, computers, whatever). The brain has modeled them as a cat. It's not a very good model. When it tries to interact with the cat it may find that out.

If, however, it lived in a society of other BIVs who all refer to the same hidden state (judged by joint interaction) as 'cat' then that's clearly what the word means in that language community.

It's whatever inputs you used (probes, computers, whatever). The brain has modeled them as a cat. It's not a very good model. When it tries to interact with the cat it may find that out.

If, however, it lived in a society of other BIVs who all refer to the same hidden state (judged by joint interaction) as 'cat' then that's clearly what the word means in that language community. — Isaac

I don’t find this interpretation at all reasonable. I think a far more reasonable interpretation is to accept that the brain doesn’t see the vat that it is contained in, or whatever mechanical devices control its sight.

You may have missed my edit, so to reiterate: after taking LSD I don’t then see that LSD when seeing the things it causes me to see. Even a direct realist can accept that. They’ll say that the LSD is in my stomach and bloodstream and that I can’t see through my skin to see it.

after taking LSD I don’t then see that LSD when seeing the things it causes me to see. — Michael

LSD disrupts neurotransmitters which allows for an abnormal data exchange (among other things). What you see is whatever triggers the image (often an actual object, but sometimes an interocepted internal state). You're still modeling hidden states, the subject of your inferences. I really can't see how the fact that your inferences aren't very good changes what the subject of them is. It strikes me as a really odd way of doing things.

Consider a child's drawing of a cow. It's rubbish, doesn't look anything like a cow. The drawing is still a drawing of a cow. It's just a really bad one.

The alternative seems to be that we say a model of a thing is only a model of that thing if it exactly corresponds to that thing. Well then it's no longer a model.

You're still modeling hidden states, the subject of your inferences. — Isaac

According to you I don’t know enough about cognitive science to address this comment so I won’t bother. We’ve already gone through it enough in the other thread anyway. Suffice it to say, I don’t find the attempt to “Bayes” qualia at all convincing.

Suffice it to say, I don’t find the attempt to “Bayes” qualia at all convincing. — Michael

Can't say fairer than that. What is unpersuasive is unpersuasive.

At times, the empirical needs to set the boundaries for the creative mind.

We can easily witness any person and the objects he interacts to see how direct perception really is. It’s so direct that some of the objects, like apples, can be consumed, physically entering the so-called inner world and passing through it. So we can put the directness of perception, or at least interaction, to the side.

Since the indirect realist neither has the periphery or range of sense to examine what is really going on during perception we can say his “experience” is invariably a limited and impoverished view of his own biology. His eyes and ears don’t point inward, and thus needs other instruments, other people, to fill in the blanks where his senses cannot reach. For example, all it takes is one or two other observers to confirm that a person is hallucinating or dreaming.

So why the indirect realist prefers the limited and impoverished view of his own biology is the real question.

Can't say fairer than that. What is unpersuasive is unpersuasive. — Isaac

Or perhaps I should say, given that I don’t know much about cognitive science, I can’t understand the attempt to “Bayes” qualia.

So the best I can do is withhold judgement until it becomes accepted by the wider scientific community. And from what I understand it’s just Clark’s/Friston’s/Wilkinson’s theory and not something that has been scientifically demonstrated?

So why the indirect realist prefers the limited and impoverished view of his own biology is the real question. — NOS4A2

Because they prefer the certainty of appearances and/or immediate sense data of their private world.

So why the indirect realist prefers the limited and impoverished view of his own biology is the real question. — NOS4A2

Because they prefer the certainty of appearances and/or immediate sense data of their private world. — Richard B

It’s not about what people prefer but about what they find the evidence and reasoning shows.

If you watch someone eat an apple, what does the evidence show regarding the directness of his perception?

Nothing

But he’s touching it, destroying it, consuming it. At no point are the interactions indirect, so we need not say the experience is indirect.